ML031630918

E-Mail from Haag to Starefos, Subject: More Interview Forms

ML031630918
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	08/12/2002
From:	Haag R NRC/EDO
To:	Russ Bywater, Starefos J NRC/EDO
References
FOIA/PA-2003-0018
Download: ML031630918 (2)

Text

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I Joelle Starefos - more interview forms Paae Paae I I belle Starefos more interview forms From: Robert Haag £.r) oj ~)

(0 To: Joelle Starefos; Russ Bywater Date: 8/12/02 12:17PM 41FF.

Subject:

more interview forms fgrf-aton in this record was de!oed

,n aCcordance with the Freedom of InformaUion Act, eempItions 4 FOIA-

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E Treto - zu3-iee 1.Wpp NRC EXP: Joined NRC in 1987. Has been Inrisk assessment for most of the time.

History: Last fall, r orked with uon assessing nozzle cracking.

They didn't know enough to be deveIping a dible risk model: the number they were working on was being developed for the average plant. Ucejses were focusing on CRDM ejection, and they did not consider wastage.

focused on reviewing the adequacy of licensee risk assessment justifytng conduslons.

During the meetings on DB in late ,Ras one o 4 ho were in favor of issuing an order to DB4_Wnd Barrett ended up supporting no order. The as an nitial cha ctenza in that the decision was risk-lnfoed. aty stated that the decision was not risk informed.WJ stated that theFt often does this, I.e., make decisions and label them as risk Informed, even though they are not) Licensee risk assessment of 1111/01 said that the center nozzles were not susceptible to cracking; then, on 11/12/01, Oconee reported the nozzle #2 circumferential crack; DB nozzles same heat as Oconee's. NRC management didn't follow the risk-informed process per RG 1.174.

Responselassessment of DB event: 43tated that the information of BA coming out of the weep holes and the changing of filters Incontainment did not make It to NRC headquarters until after the hole was discovered in the RV head.

Risk Informed Regulation: Use of risk assessment to reduce regulatory requirements has been oversold. In some cases, we've backed off of requirements without adequate NRC review. Also, we have had trouble getting industry to give us good, unbiased data.

In PRAs, a rate of pressure boundary failure Isgenerally cranked Into assumptions for initiating event frequencies. Wastage from outside wasn't considered In developing PRAs.

ROP: SDP needs t2.he refined. Some folks InNRC are using SDP results to "write off issues. U ommented that he has heard from his branch chief that upper managemeuifn the agency Is nervous about the DB risk assessment because of the implications for the November 2001 decision to let DB operate past 12/31101 (this Is especially true vith respect to the fact that the sophistication of analyses has improved such that we can better understand the range of uncertainties for plant specific results, and we have developed some better Information on DB Inrecent months).

pave Castleman a sheet describing his views on this matter Ingreater a at the dose of the interview. Castleman passed this sheet on to Hackett.