ML031210775
| ML031210775 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1979 |
| From: | NRC/IE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| -RFPFR, NRC-2018-000040 BL-79-008 | |
| Download: ML031210775 (4) | |
Text
LIS ORIWNAL
-- / ______ -UNITEDS'TATES-NUCLEAR. REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 April 14, 1979 IE Bulletin No. 79-08 IDENTIFIED DURING EVENTS RELEVANT TO BOILING WATER POWER REACTORS THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT Description of Circumstances:
Power Plant, Unit 2 On march 28, 1979 the Three Mile Island Nuclear series of events which experienced core damage which resulted from a Several aspects of were initiated by a loss of feedwater transient. to operating boiling the incident may have general applicability aclions of licensees water reactors. This bulletin requests certain of operating. boiling water reactors.
Actions to be taken by Licensees:
license
'C. For all Boiling water reactor facilities with an operating
_ @complete the actions specified below:
Enclosure 1
- 1. Review the description of circumstances described inof the ThI-2 of IE Bulletin 79-05 and the preliminary chronology 3/28/79 accident Included in Enclosure 1 to IE Bulletin 79-OSA.
(1) the
- a. This review should be directed toward understanding: blocking extreme seriousness and consequences of the simultaneous of both trains of a safety system at the Three Mile Island
- during the early phases Unit 2 plant and other actions taken operational errors which of the accident; (2) thedamage,; apparent led to the eventual core and (3) the necessity to systematically analyze plant conditions and parameters and take appropriate corrective action.
(1) not
- b. Operational personnel should be instructed to features safety override automatic action of engineered safety features unless continued operation of engineered will result in unsafe plant conditions (see Section 5a of this bulletin); and (2)plant not make operational decisions based solely on a single parameter indication when
. one or more confirmatory indications are available.
.1.
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t IE Bulletin No. 79-08 April 14, 1979 Page 4 of 4
.11.Propose changes, as required, to those technical specifications which must be modified as a result of your implementing the items above.
For all boiling water reactor facilities with an operating license, respond to Items 1-10 within 10 days of the receipt of this Bulletin.
Respond to item 11 (Technical Specification Change proposals) in 30 days.
Reports should be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRCof Regional Office and a copy should be forwarded to the NRC Office Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Washington, D.C. 20555.
For all other power reactors with an operating license or construction response permit, this Bulletin is for information purposes and no written is required.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7/31/80. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic
- problems.
- J I
-. b.* -s April 14, 197 April 14, 1979 IE Bulletin No. 79-08 Page 2 of 4 management and supervisors
- c. All licensed operators and plant shall participate in this with operational responsibilities documented in plant review and such participation shall be records.
design and procedures,
- 2. Review the containment isolation initiation necessary to initiate and prepare and implement all changes or automatic, of all lines containment isolation, whether manual whose isolation does not degrade needed safety features or cooling of safety injection.
capability, upon automatic initiation necessary for proper
- 3. Describe the actions, both automatic and manual, removal systems (e.g., RCIC) functioning of the auxiliary heat system is not operable. For that are used when the main feedwater in summary form the procedure, any manual action necessary, describe timely sense.
by which this action is taken in a level indication for both
- 4. Describe all uses and types of vessel safety systems. Describe other and manual initiation of automatic redundant instrumentation which the operator might have to give the operators to f
Csame information regarding plant status. Instruct utilize other available information to initiate safety systems.
procedures and training
- 5. Review the action directed by the operating instructions to ensure that:
actions of engineered
- a. Operators do not override automaticoperation of engineered safety features, unless continued plant conditions safety features will result in unsafe (e.g. vessel integrity).
information and instructions
- b. Operators are provided additional to not rely upon vessel level indication alone for manual indications actions, but to also examine other plant parameter in evaluating plant conditions.
positioning requirements
- 6. Review all safety-related valve positions,valves remain positioned and positive controls to assure that the proper operation of (open or closed) in a manner to ensure review related procedures, such engineered safety features. Also plant and system startup, and as those for maintenance, testing, checks,) surveillance to supervisory periodic (e.g., daily/shift positions to ensure that such valves are returned to their correct in their following necessary manipulations and are maintained modes.
proper positions during all operational
- s a M u
,. IEBulletin Mo0. 79-08 April 14, 1979 Page 3 of 4
- 7. Review your operating modes and procedures for all systems designed to transfer potentially radioactive gases and liquids out of the primary containment to assure that undesired pumping,
-i venting or other release of radioactive liquids and gases will not occur inadvertently.
. In particular, ensure that such an occurrence would not be caused by the resetting of engineered safety features instrumentation.
List all such systems and indicate:
- a. Whether interlocks exist to prevent transfer when high radiation indication exists, and
- b. Whether such systems are isolated by the containment isolation signal.
- c. The basis on which continued operability of the above features is assured.
- 8. Review and modify as necessary your maintenance and test procedures to ensure that they require:
- a. Verification, by test or inspection, of the operability of redundant safety-related systems prior to the removal of any safety-related system from service.
- b. Verification of the operability of all safety-related' systems when they are returned to service following maintenance or testing.
- c. Explicit notification of involved reactor operational personnel whenever a safety-related system is removed from and returned to service.
-'I
- 9. Review your prompt reporting procedures for NRC notification to assure that NRC is notified within one hour of the time the reactor is not in a controlled or expected condition of operation. Further, at that time.an open continuous communication channel shall be established and maintained with NRC.