ML030970180
| ML030970180 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 03/26/2003 |
| From: | Bezilla M FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| L-03-050 | |
| Download: ML030970180 (83) | |
Text
Emergency Preparedness Plan TABLE OF CONTENTS
- 1.
DEFINITIONS - Revision 13
- 2.
SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY - Revision 12
- 3.
SUMMARY
OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLAN - Revision 13 3.1 ONSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION 3.2 OFFSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION 3.3 EMERGENCY MEASURES 3.4 EMERGENCY FACILITIES 3.5 MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
- 4.
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS - Revision 16 4.0 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL BASES 4.1 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES 4.2 EAL BASES 4.3 EAL MATRIX 4.4 INDIVIDUAL EAL BASIS DESCRIPTIONS 4.5 SPECTRUM OF POSTULATED ACCIDENTS
- 5.
EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION - Revision 17 5.1 NORMAL OPERATING ORGANIZATION 5.2 BVPS EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION 5.3 NUCLEAR COMMUNICATIONS CONTROLLED BVPS UNIT 3 PAGE l-l 2-1 3-1 3-1 3-2 3-4 3-7 3-7 I
4-1 4-1
,4-7 4-10 4-15 4-17 5-1 5-1 5-1 5-18 IN 24
I I
Emergency Preparedness Plan TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 5.4 EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION STAFFING 5-23 5.5 AUGMENTATION OF THE ONSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION 5-25 5.6 COORDINATION WITH PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 5-27
- 6.
EMERGENCY MEASURES - Revision 17 6-1 6.1 EMERGENCY INITIATION 6-l 6.2 ACTIVATION OF THE ONSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION 6-1 6.3 ACTIVATION OF THE EMERGENCY SUPPORT GROUPS 6-7 6.4 ACTIVATION OF OFFSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS 6-9
6.5 ASSESSMENT
ACTIONS 6-12 6.6 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 6-23 6.7 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS 6-24 6.8 AID TO AFFECTED PERSONNEL 6-40 6.9 EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION 6-43
- 7.
EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT - Revision 18 7-1 7.1 ONSITE EMERGENCY CENTERS 7-1 7.2 EMERGENCY SUPPLIES 7-6 7.3 COUNTY AND STATE EMERGENCY CENTERS 7-7 Hj REVISION 24
Emergency Preparedness Plan TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE
7.4 ASSESSMENT
FACILITIES 7-8 7.5 PROTECTIVE FACILITIES 7-15 7.6 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 7-17 7.7 ONSITE FIRST AID AND MEDICAL FACILITIES 7-22 7.8 DAMAGE CONTROL EQUIPMENT 7-23
- 8.
MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS - Revision 17 8-1 8.1 ORGANIZATIONAL PREPAREDNESS 8-1 8.2 MANAGER, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 8-10 8.3 REVIEW AND UPDATING 8-11 8.4 MAINTENANCE AND INVENTORY OF EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES 8-13 8.5 NUCLEAR COMMUNICATIONS 8-14 8.6 NRC/FEMA 8-15
- 9.
RE-ENTRY AND RECOVERY - Revision 12 9-1 9.1 TRANSITION FROM RESPONSE TO TERMINATION AND/OR RECOVERY 9-1 9.2 TERMINATION CRITERIA 9-2 9.3 RE-ENTRY 9-2 9.4 RECOVERY 9-3 9.5 RECOVERY OPERATIONS 9-3 9.6 POST-ACCIDENT EVALUATION 9-4 REVISION 24
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I Emergency Preparedness Plan TABLE OF CONTENTS
- 10.
APPENDICES A.
Letters of Agreement - Revision 12 B.
Demography and Evacuation Evaluation - Revision 12 C.
Emergency Implementing Procedures - Revision 13 D.
Equipment Listings - Revision 12 E.
Corporate Policy Statement - Revision 12 F.
Warning Sirens - Revision 15 G.
References - Revision 9 i
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- 1 I
I iV REVISION 24
A5.735B EPPAIMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES - EFFECTIVE INDEX INSTRUCTIONS EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EPP/I-2 Unusual Event EPPII-3 Alert EPP/14 Site Area Emergency EPP/I-5 General Emergency Revision 4 Revision 4 Revision 18 Revision 17 Revision 17 Revision 18 IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 1 Series - Activation EPPIP 1.1 Notification 1.2 Communications and Dissemination of Information 1.3 Turnover Status Checklist ED/ERM 1.4 Technical Support Center (TSC)
Activation, Operation and Deactivation 1.5 Operations Support Center (OSC)
Activation, Operation and Deactivation 1.6 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
Activation, Operation and Deactivation 1.7 Emergency Response Organizatibn (ERO)
Teams CONTROLLED BVPS UNIT 3 Revision 31 Revision 18 Revision 9 Revision 18 Revision 14 Revision 16 Revision 10 I
I I
I REVISION 55
A5.735B I
1,I
-t I
t 1--1) 11 EPPAIMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES - EFFECTIVE INDEX EPPIIP 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2 Series - Assessment Emergency Radiological Monitoring Onsite Monitoring for Airborne Release Offsite Monitoring for Airborne Release Offsite Monitoring for Liquid Release Emergency Environmental Monitoring Environmental Assessment and Dose Projection Controlling Procedure 2.6.1 Dose Projection - Backup Methods 2.6.2 Dose Projection - ARERAS/MIDAS With FSAR Defaults 2.6.3 Dose Projection - ARERAS/MIDAS With Real-Time Inputs 2.6.4 Dose Projection - ARERAS/MIDAS With Manual Inputs 1
2.6.5 Alternate Meteorological Parameters 2.6.6 Dose Projections By Hand Calculation -
Known Isotopic Release 2.6.7 Dose Assessment Based on Field Measurements 2.6.8 Dose Assessment Based on Environmental Measurements and Samples 2.6.9 Integrated Dose Assessment I
1/4 2.6.10 Ground.Coniamination Assessment and Protective Action -
Revision 10 Revision 12 Revision 13 Revision 8 Revision 10 Revision 14 Revision 11 Revision 12 Revision 12.
Revision 13 Revision 10 Revision 6 Revision 7 Revision 6 Revision 6 Revision 7 REVISION 55
- 1
A5.735B EPP/IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES - EFFECTIVE INDEX EPPIIP 2 Series - Assessment 2.6.11 Dose Projection - Miscellaneous Data 2.6.12 Dose Projection -ARERAS/MIDAS With Severe Accident Assessment 2.7 Liquid Release Estimate 2.7.1 Liquid Release Estimate -
Computer Method Revision 10 Revision 9 Revision 6 Revision 9 EPPAIP 3 Series - Onsite Protective Actions EPP/IP 3.1 Evacuation 3.2 Site Assembly and Personnel Accountability 3.3 Emergency Contamination Control 3.4 Emergency Respiratory Protection, 3.5 Traffic and Access Control 4 Series - Offsite Protective Actions 4.1 Offsite Protective Actions 5 Series - Aid to Personnel 5.1 Search and Rescue 5.2 RESERVED 5.3 Emergency Exposure Criteria and Control 5.4 Emergency Personnel Monitoring Revision 8 Revision 13 Revision 7 Revision 8 Revision 9 Revision 16 Revision 8 Revision 8 Revision 7 I
EPPAIP REVISION 55
A5.735B LI 11 EPP/IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES - EFFECTIVE INDEX EPPIIP 6 Series - Re-entrv/Recovery 6.1 Re-entry to Affected Areas -
Criteria and Guidance Revision 9 6.2 Termination of the Emergency and Recovery Revision 10 EPPIIP 7 Series - Maintaining Emergency Preparedness 7.1 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Maintenance Procedure Revision 14 7.2 Administration of Emergency Preparedness Plan, Drills and Exercises Revision 9 EPPIIP 8 Series - Fire Fiahting 8.1 Fires in Radiologically Controlled Areas Revision 10 EPPAIP 9 Series - Nuclear Communications
'-I1 9.1 Emergency Public Information Emergency Response Organization Controlling Procedure 9.2 Reserved Revision 1 1 9.3 Activation, Operation and Deactivation of the Emergency Public Information Organization Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 9.4 Activation, Operation and Deactivation of the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) 9.5 Activation, Operation and Deactivation of the Penn Power Customer Account Services Department Revision 4 Revision 9 Revision 7 EPPIIP 10 Series - Corporate Response 10.1 Emergency Response Organization Corporate Support Revision 3 I
rE IS REVISION 55
A5.735B EPPIIMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES - EFFECTIVE INDEX EPPI1P Annex A -
Annex B -
Annex C -
Annex D -
Annex E -
ANNEXES Westinghouse Emergency Response Plan DELETED Major Injury Involving Radioactive Contamination For The Medical Center, Beaver Procedure for Transferring Radiation Casualties to the Radiation Emergency Response Program (UPMC Presbyterian)
Reserved Revision 8 Revision 9 Revision 8 s- -
REVISION 55
EPP/l-la Unit 1 A5.735B RECOGNITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS CONTROLLED BVPS UNIT 1 Revision 4
EPPllmplementing Procedure EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EFFECTIVE INDEX EPP/I-la Unit 1 Issue 8 Rev.
Issue 9 Rev.
0 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
0 1
2 3
OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Safety Related OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision Simple Change Simple Change Simple Change 3-12-87 8-13-87 10-8-87 2-9-88 2-9-89 3-15-89 4-18-89 4-12-90 10-9-90 4-4-91 12-29-92 1-27-93 12-9-93 10-7-94 7-22-98 12-31-99 4-17-01 12-12-01 8-28-02 11-8-02 2-25-03 Rev.
5 6
7 8
Rev.
Rev.
Rev.
Rev.
Rev.
0 1
2 3
4 i
Revision 4
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS A.
Purpose B.
References C.
Responsibilities D.
Action Levels/Precautions E.
Procedure F.
Final Condition G.
Attachments ii Revision 4
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPPII-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 A.
PURPOSE 1.0 This procedure describes the immediate actions to be taken to recognize and classify an emergency condition.
2.0 This procedure identifies the four emergency classifications and emergency action levels.
3.0 Reporting requirements for non-emergency abnormal events are provided.
B.
REFERENCES 1.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Preparedness Plan and Implementing Procedures.
2.0 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix E.
3.0 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants 4.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Operating Manual 5.0 NUMARC/NESP-007, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels 6.0 ERS-SFL-91-041-REV 1 (U1/U2 Containment Monitor Readings due to LOCA's with various Source Terms).
7.0 Condition Report #992522 8.0 Condition Report #991327-1 9.0 Unit I Technical Specification Amendment 204 and Unit 2 Technical Specification Amendment 101.
10.0 EPPOS #2 "Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions".
11.0 NEI 99-02 "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline" 12.0 Condition Report #00-3939 13.0 Condition Report #99-1234 14.0 Condition Report #02-02125-02 15.0 Condition Report #02-05069 16.0 Unit 1 Technical Specification Amendment 244 I
Revision 4
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 17.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-ATL-93-021 18.0 ODCM Procedure 1/2-ODC-2.01 19.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-HHIvM-87-014 20.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-SFL-86-005 21.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-SFL-99-014 22.0 Condition Report #02-08649 23.0 Condition Report #02-09224 C.
RESPONSIBILITY The Emergency Director (Shift Manager, until properly relieved by a designated alternate) has the responsibility and authority for the performance of the actions prescribed in this procedure.
D.
ACTION LEVELS/PRECAUTIONS/GUIDANCE 1.0 ACTION LEVELS 1.1 An off-normal event has occurred.
1.2 An action step in a plant operating or emergency operating procedure refers to this procedure for classification of the indicated plant condition.
2.0 PRECAUTIONS 2.1 The Emergency Director must review all applicable EALs to ensure that the event is properly classified since a given INDICATOR may be associated with more than one CRITERION. A particular INDICATOR omitted from the fission product barrier matrix may be addressed as an event-based EAL in one of the other tabs.
Event-based EALs may escalate to the fission product barrier matrix. The Emergency Director may need to consider related events (e.g., fire and explosion) or the possible consequences of the event (e.g., fire in an MCC resulting in loss ofAC) in classifying an event.
2.2 Continued surveillance and assessment of plant conditions are necessary to ensure that the emergency classification is appropriately revised as conditions change, or as more definitive information is obtained.
2.3 If there is any doubt with regard to assessment of a particular EAL, the EAL Basis Document (i.e., Chapter 4 of the EPP) entry for that EAL can be reviewed.
Classifications shall be consistent with the fundamental definitions of the four emergency classifications (tabulated in Tab 4.7).
2 Revision 4
EPPlImplementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 2.4 The Emergency Director shall take whatever mitigative or restoration actions are necessary to protect public health and safety. The Emergency Director shall not reject courses of action solely on the basis that the action would result in escalation of the emergency classification.
3.0 GUIDANCE 3.1 Structure of the EALs 3.1.1 There are two types of Emergency Action Levels included in this procedure:
3.1.1.1 Barrier-Based EALs:
These EALs address conditions that represent potential losses, or losses, of one or more of the Fuel Clad, RCS, or Containment fission product barriers.
INDICATORs of these conditions include CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION status, fundamental indications such as subcooling or reactor vessel water level, or auxiliary indications such as containment radiation monitor readings. Classifications are based on the number of barriers lost or potentially lost.
3.1.1.2 Event-Based EALs:
These EALs address discrete conditions or events that are generally precursors to fission product barrier degradation, or are otherwise degradations in the level of safety of the plant. Events may be external (e.g., severe weather, earthquakes, loss of offsite power) internal (e.g., fires, explosions, instrumentation failure) or may involve radioactivity releases.
3.1.2 The EALs are grouped by recognition category as follows:
Tab 1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix Tab 2 System Degradation Tab 3 Loss of Power Tab 4 Hazards and ED Judgement Tab 5 Destructive Phenomena Tab 6 Shutdown Systems Degradation Tab 7 Radiological 3.1.3 Each of the EAL tabs includes one or more columns that address one initiating condition (e.g., fires). Each column provides EALs for each of the four emergency classifications, as applicable. A notation adjacent to each EAL identifies the plant operating mode(s) for which the EAL is applicable.
3 Revision 4
EPPlImplementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.1.4 Each EAL is comprised of a CRITERION, printed in bold type, and one or more INDICATORs.
The purpose of each is as follows:
3.1.4.1 CRITERION: identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration) All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
3.1.4.2 INDICATOR:
is available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs,
- EOPs, etc.),
operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
Upon occurrence of one or more indicators, the Emergency Director performs an assessment against the criterion.
Depending on the particular condition, this assessment may be as simple as a review of the criterion, an instrument channel check, or a detailed calculation as in the case of a radioactivity release.
3.1.4.3 Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
3.1.4.4 The INDICATORs were selected with the objective of providing unambiguous guidance to assist with assessment of the CRITERION.
There may be other INDICATORs not envisioned by the writers of this procedure that, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, correspond to the CRITERION. In these cases, the Emergency Director should base the declaration on engineering judgment, using the supplied INDICATORs as examples of the severity of the condition.
4 Revision 4
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.2 Common Plant Conditions 3.2.1 IF an event occurs such that both reactor units are affected, e.g.,
tornado, toxic gas offsite, etc., THEN the senior Shift Manager shall make the appropriate classification and assume the role of Emergency Director.
3.2.2 IF the common plant condition results in a higher emergency classification at one reactor unit, THEN the Shift Manager from that unit shall make the appropriate classification and assume the role of Emergency Director.
3.3 Mode Applicability 3.3.1 The plant operating mode that existed at the time that the event occurred, prior to any protective system or operator action initiated in response to the condition, is compared to the mode applicability of the EALs.
3.3.2 IF an event occurs, and a lower or higher plant operating mode is reached before the classification can be made, THEN the classification shall be based on the mode that existed at the time that the event occurred.
3.3.3 The fission product barrier matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at mode 4 or higher. An event that occurs in modes 5 or 6 shall not be classified using the fission product barrier matrix, even if mode 4 is entered due to subsequent heatup.
In these cases, Tab 6, Shutdown Systems Degradation, shall be used for classification.
3.4 Transient Events 3.4.1 For some EALs the existence of the event, without regard to duration, is sufficient to warrant classification. In these cases, the appropriate emergency classification is declared as soon as the Emergency Director assessment concludes that the CRITERION is met.
3.4.2 Some EALs specify a duration of occurrence. For these EALs the classification is made when Emergency Director assessment concludes that the specified duration is exceeded or will be exceeded (i.e., condition can not be reasonably rectified before the duration elapses), whichever is sooner.
5 Revision 4
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.4.3 IF a plant condition meeting an EAL CRITERION is rectified before the specified duration time is exceeded, THEN the event is NOT classified by that EAL. Lower severity EALs, if any, shall be reviewed for possible applicability in these cases.
3.4.4 IF a plant condition meeting an EAL CRITERION is NOT classified at the time of occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g., as a result of routine log or record review) AND the condition no longer exists, THEN an emergency shall NOT be declared. However, reporting under 10 CFR 50.72 may be required. Such a condition could occur, for example, if a followup evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the condition was more severe than earlier believed.
3.4.5 IF an emergency classification was warranted, but the plant condition has been rectified (such that the CRITERION is no longer met) prior to declaration and notification, THEN the following guidance applies:
3.4.5.1 For transient events that would have been declared as UNUSUAL
- EVENTS, no emergency is declared.
However, the event shall be reported to those local, state, and Federal agencies designated to receive the initial notification form. These agencies shall be told that the UNUSUAL EVENT condition was rectified upon detection and no emergency is being declared.
3.4.5.2 For transient events that would have been declared as an ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, or GENERAL EMERGENCY, the event shall be declared and the emergency response organization activated.
The EAL CRITERIA for these events has been set at a threshold that warrants declaration even if the initiating condition has been rectified.
Termination can occur when the criteria of EPP/IP-6.2, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery can be satisified.
3.5 Declaration Timing and Assessment Emergency conditions shall be classified as soon as the Emergency Director assessment of the INDICATORs shows that the CRITERION is met. IF the EAL specifies a duration, THEN the event shall be declared as soon as it is determined that the condition cannot be corrected within the specified period.
In either case, the assessment time starts from the indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
6 Revision 4
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.5.1 The assessment time is limited to 15 minutes, except as follows:
3.5.1.1 IF the EAL specifies a duration (e.g., release exceeds 2x TIS for one hour), THEN the assessment time runs concurrently with the required duration AND is the same length (e.g., in this example, one hour).
3.5.1.2 The assessment time and any required duration are NOT additive.
3.5.2 IF the assessment cannot be completed within the specified period, THEN the event must be declared on the basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.
3.6 Bases 3.6.1 Chapter 4 of the BVPS EPP provides the bases for these EALs.
The bases can be used for guidance to assist the Emergency Director in classifying events for which the classification is not immediately apparent.
3.7 Defined Terms 3.7.1 In the EALs, words written in bold uppercase letters are defined terms having specific meanings as they relate to this procedure.
Definitions of these terms are provided on the reverse side of most pages in the EAL section of this procedure. Such terms shall be interpreted as provided in the definitions.
E.
PROCEDURE 1.0 DETERMINE OPERATING MODE THAT EXISTED AT THE TIME THAT THE EVENT OCCURRED PRIOR TO ANY PROTECTION SYSTEM OR OPERATOR ACTION INITIATED IN RESPONSE TO THE EVENT.
2.0 DETERMINE IF THE CONDITION AFFECTS FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS AND, IF SO, PROCEED TO TAB 1.
2.1 IF the condition involves any of the following AND the initial mode was 1-4 THEN proceed to Tab 1 and follow instructions provided AND continue with Step 2.2.
2.1.1 CSF status tree ORANGE PATH or RED PATH conditions 2.1.2 Core exit thermocouple readings above 719 F 7
Revision 4
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 2.1.3 Reactor vessel full range water level less than 40% (no RCPs) 2.1.4 Elevated RCS activity >300 giCi/gm 2.1.5 Elevated Containment High Range Area Radiation Monitor reading 2.1.6 RCS leakrate large enough to require a 2nd charging pump 2.1.7 Loss of RCS subcooling 2.1.8 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 2.1.9 Containment bypass or loss of integrity 2.1.10 Rise in containment pressure or hydrogen concentration 2.2 Consider other related event-based EALs. IF other EALs are applicable, THEN perform Steps 3.0 and 4.0 if necessary. Otherwise, go to Step 5.0 3.0 CATEGORIZE THE EVENT INTO ONE OF THE INITIATING CONDITIONS AND LOCATE THE TAB.
3.1 Locate one of the EAL indices provided at the start of each tab.
3.2 Review the index to identify the tab that addresses the event that has occurred.
3.3 Turn to the appropriate tab.
NOTE:
The assessment of an emergency condition shall be completed as soon as possible and within 15 minutes of the occurance of one or more INDICATORs.
IF the assessment cannot be completed within the specified period, THEN the event must be declared on the basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.
NOTE:
IF the EAL specifies a duration (e.g., release exceeds 2x TIS for one hour),
THEN the assessment time runs concurrently with the required duration AND is the same length.
8 Revision 4
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 4.0 ASSESS THE EVENT AND COMPARE TO THE EALS 4.1 Locate the EAL for the highest severity emergency classification that is applicable for the initiating condition and operating mode 4.2 Review the INDICATORs and CRITERION for that EAL 4.3 IF the specified INDICATORs are not observed, THEN:
4.3.1 Proceed to the next lower severity EAL and re-perform step 4.2
& 4.3.
4.3.2 IF none of the EALs for an initiating condition are met, THEN re-perform steps 3.0 and 4.0 for related initiating conditions.
4.3.3 IF the actions above do not identify an applicable EAL, THEN review the observed conditions against Tab 4.7, Hazards and Emergency Director Judgment.
4.3.4 IF, after performing the above, no EAL is identified, THEN proceed to step 6.0.
4.4 IF the specified INDICATORs are observed, THEN:
4.4.1 Perform necessary assessments to validate the instrument readings and/or confirm reported observations.
4.4.2 Initiate any sampling, inspections, or dose assessments specified by the EAL.
NOTE:
IF the CRITERION specifies an event or condition duration, THEN the classification shall be made as soon as the duration is exceeded, OR when it is apparent that the duration will be exceeded, whichever is-earlier.
4.4.3 Compare the results of the assessments to the CRITERION.
NOTE A given INDICATOR may apply to more than one CRITERION.
The Emergency Director shall review other related EALs for applicability.
9 Revision 4
EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EPP/I-la Unit 1 4.5 IF the assessment concludes that the CRITERION is met, THEN the classification shall be made. Proceed to Step 5.0 4.6 IF the assessment concludes that the CRITERION is not met, THEN re-perform steps 3.0 and 4.0 for other related initiating conditions as applicable.
4.7 IF no classification results from the above, THEN proceed to step 6.0.
NOTE:
The declaration of the emergency classification shall be made as soon as the Emergency Director has assessed that the EAL has been met OR will be met, AND within 15 minutes of occurance of the INDICATOR. Once the emergency is classified, notifications to state and local governments shall be completed within 15 minutes of the declaration.
5.0 DECLARE THE EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND TRANSITION TO RESPONSE PROCEDURES 5.1 IF an UNUSUAL EVENT is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-2 5.2 IF an ALERT is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-3 5.3 IF a SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-4 5.4 IF a GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-5 NOTE:
The step below is implemented only if an emergency classification is NOT made. IF a classification is made, THEN the transition indicated in step 5.0 should have been made.
6.0 EVALUATE THE NEED FOR AND MAKE NON-EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 6.1 IF the abnormal condition is reportable to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 and 1/2-ADM-2202, THEN perform the following:
6.1.1 Complete the NRC Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet (located on the Regulatory Affairs web page).
10 Revision 4
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPPII-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 6.1.2 Notify First Energy Communications of the event and provide the information on the NRC Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet.
6.2 IF directed by station management, THEN make courtesy calls to the following state and local agencies on a timely basis consistent with normal working hours.
6.2.1 BCEMA 6.2.2 PEMA 6.2.3 CCEMA 6.2.4 HCOES F.
FINAL CONDITIONS 1.0 For emergency events, the transition to the appropriate response procedure has been made and actions pursuant to that procedure are in progress.
2.0 For non-emergency events, required notifications have been completed.
G.
ATTACHMENTS 1.0 Tabs for Classification of Emergency Conditions H.
FIGURES 1.0 Figures are identified on the EAL indices 11 Revision 4
9 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad (RCS activity, corecooling, heat sink) 1.2 RCS (Integrity, SGTR, heat sink) 1.3 Containment (CNMT Red Path, CNMT bypass) o c,
0
. I
-1 SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unident Leakage 2.9 Turbine Failure Loss of Function/Comm's 2.6 RCS Ident. Leakage 2.10 Stm/Feed Line Break Failure of Rx Prot.-ATWS 2.7 Technical Specification S/D Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Safety Limit Exceeded 2
LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) (Modes 1-4) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and ED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security 4
Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 ED Judgement Figure 4-A Figure 4-B/Figure 4-C Table 4-3/Table 4-4 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA 5.1 Earthquake 5.3 Aircraft Crash/Projectile 5.2 Tornado/High Winds 5.4 River Level High Table 5-1 5.5 River Level Low Figure 5-A 5.6 Watercraft Crash (RW/SWS Loss)
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.3 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.2 RCS Inventory-Shutdown 6.4 Loss of DC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.5 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 6.6 Inadvertent Criticality RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 7 Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A A.
_ O
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.
BOMB: A fused explosive device.
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (ie., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.
There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Core Cooling. Heat Sink.
Vessel Integrity (Pressurized T'hermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,
steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion charactenzed by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.). operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
INElFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree REE PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of seventy is art improvement in the applicable parameters (e g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).
INTRUSIONIINTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below whicl combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
as specified ii the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performanrc level for equipment required for safe shutdown.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
I The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mus-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g, chlorine).
UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which 7) contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, is destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 1.2 1.3 Fuel Clad (RCS activity, corecooling, heat sink)
RCS (Integrity, SGTR, heat sink)
Containment (CNMT Red Path, CNMT bypass) 1 SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unident Leakage 2.9 Turbine Failure 2.2 Loss of Function/Comm's 2.6 RCS Ident. Leakage 2.10 Stm/Feed Line Break 2.3 Failure of Rx Prot.-ATWS 2.7 Technical Specification S/D 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Safety Limit Exceeded LOSS OF POWER 3.1 3.2 3.3 Loss of AC (Power Ops) (Modes 14)
Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6)
Loss of DC 3
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U' a0 HAZARDS and ED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security 4
Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 ED Judgement Figure 4-A Figure 4-B/Figure 4-C Table 4-3/Table 4-4 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA 5.1 Earthquake 5.3 Aircraft Crash/Projectile 5.2 Tornado/High Winds 5.4 River Level High 5
Table 5-1 5.5 River Level Low Figure 5-A 5.6 Watercraft Crash (RW/SWS Loss)
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.3 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.2 RCS Inventory-Shutdown 6.4 Loss of DC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.5 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 6.6 Inadvertent Criticality RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 7 Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A S.~
a.
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad (RCS activity,-corecooling, heat sink) 1.2 RCS (Integrity, SGTR, heat sink) 1 1.3 Containment (CNMTRed Path, CNMTbypass)
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unident Leakage 2.9 Turbine Failure 2.2 Loss of Function/Comm's 2.6 RCSIdent.Leakage 2.10 Sti/FeedLineBreak 2
2.3 Failure of RxF Prot.-ATWS 2.7 Technical Specification S/D 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Safety Limit Exceeded LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) (Modes 14) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and ED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security 4
Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 ED Judgement Figure 4-A Figure 4-B/Figure 4-C Table 4-3/Table 4-4 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA 5.1 Earthquake 5.3 Aircraft Crash/Projectile 5.2 Tornado/High Winds 5.4 River Level High 5
Table 5-1 5.5 River Level Low Figure 5-A 5.6 Watercraft Crash (RW/SWS Loss)
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.3 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.2 RCS Inventory-Shutdown 6.4 Loss of DC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.5 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 6.6 Inadvertent Criticality RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 7 Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A C
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FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad (RCS activity, corecooling, heat sink) 1.2 RCS (Integrity, SGTR, heat sink) 1 1.3 Containment (CNMT Red Path, CNMT bypass)
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unident Leakage 2.9 Turbine Failure 2.2 Loss of Function/Comm's 2.6 RCS Ident. Leakage 2.10 Strn/FeedLineBreak 2.3 Failure of Rx Prot.-ATWS 2.7 Technical Specification S/D 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Safety Limit Exceeded LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) (Modes 14) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and ED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 ED Judgement Figure 4-A Figure 4-B/Figure 4-C Table 4-3/Table 4-4 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA 5.1 Earthquake 5.3 Aircraft Crash/Projectile 5.2 TornadolHigh Winds 5.4 River Level High Table 5-1 5.5 River Level Low Figure 5-A 5.6 Watercraft Crash (RW/SWS Loss)
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.3 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.2 RCS Inventory-Shutdown 6.4 Loss of DC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.5 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 6.6 Inadvertent Criticality RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7
7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling (All Modes)
Table 7-1 Table7-2 Figure 7-A a:
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Figure 4-C EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad (RCS activity, corecooling, heat sink) 1.2 RCS (Integrity, SGTR, heat sink)
I 1.3 Containment(CNMTRedPath, CNMTbypass)
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unident Leakage 2.9 Turbine Failure 2.2 Loss of Function/Comm's 2.6 RCS Ident. Leakage 2.10 Stm/Feed Line Break 2.3 Failure of Rx Prot.-ATWS 2.7 Technical Specification S/D 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Safety Limit Exceeded LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) (Modes 14) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 3 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and ED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security 4
Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 ED Judgement Figure 4-A Figure 4-B/Figure 4-C Table 4-3/Table 4-4 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA 5.1 Earthquake 5.3 Aircraft Crash/Projectile 5.2 Tornado/High Winds 5.4 River Level High Table 5-1 5.5 River Level Low Figure 5-A 5.6 Watercraft Crash (RW/SWS Loss)
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.3 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.2 RCS Inventory-Shutdown 6.4 Lossof DC(Shutdon n) (Modes5&6))
6.5 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 6.6 Inadvertent Criticality RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7A Fuel Handling (All Modes) 7 Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A th ov I ft ft
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FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad (RCS activity, corecooling, heat sink) 1.2 RCS (Integrity, SGTR, heat sink) 1.3 Containment(CNMTRedPath, CNMTbypass)
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unident Leakage 2.9 Turbine Failure 2.2 Loss of Function/Comm's 2.6 RCS Ident. Leakage 2.10 Stm/FeedLineBreak 2.3 Failure of Rx Prot.-ATWS 2.7 Technical Specification S/D 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Safety Limit Exceeded LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) (Modes 1-4) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 3 3.3 Loss of DC
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HAZARDS and ED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security 4
Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 ED Judgement Figure 4-A Figure 4-B/Figure 4-C Table 4-3/Table 4-4 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA 5.1 Earthquake 5.3 Aircraft Crash/Projectile 5.2 Tornado/High Winds 5.4 River Level High 5
Table 5-1 5.5 River Level Low Figure 5-A 5.6 Watercraft Crash (RW/SWS Loss)
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.3 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.2 RCS Inventory-Shutdown 6.4 Loss of DC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.5 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 6.6 Inadvertent Criticality RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 7 Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A
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-9 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad (RCS activity, corecooling, heat sink) 1.2 RCS (Integrity, SGTR, heat sink) 1 1.3 Containment(CNMTRedPath, CNMTbypass)
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unident Leakage 2.9 Turbine Failure 2.2 Loss of Function/Comnm's 2.6 RCS Ident. Leakage 2.10 Stmr/Feed Line Break j
2.3 Failure of Rx Prot.-ATWS 2.7 Technical Specification S/D 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Safety Limit Exceeded LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) (Modes 14) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and ED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security 4
Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 ED Judgement Figure 4-A Figure 4-B/Figure 4-C Table 4-3/Table 4-4 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA 5.1 Earthquake 5.3 Aircraft Crash/Projectile 5.2 Tornado/High Winds 5.4 River Level High 5
Table 5-1 5.5 River Level Low Figure 5-A 5.6 Watercraft Crash (RW/SWS Loss)
-4 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Systems RCS Inventory-Shutdown 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6)
Loss of DC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6)
Fuel Handling (All Modes)
Inadvertent Cnticality 6
RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling (All Modes)
Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A E
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EPP/I-lb Unit 2 A5.735B RECOGNITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS CONTROLLED BVPS UNIT 2 Revision 4
EPP/lmplementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EFFECTIVE INDEX EPPII-lb Unit 2 Issue 8 Rev.
Issue 9 Rev.
0 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
0 1
2 3
OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Safety Related OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision Simple Change Simple Change Simple Change 3-12-87 8-13-87 10-8-87 2-9-88 2-9-89 3-15-89 4-18-89 4-12-90 10-9-90 4-4-91 12-29-92 1-27-93 12-9-93 10-7-94 7-22-98 12-31-99 4-17-01 12-12-01 8-28-02 11-8-02 2-25-03 Rev.
5 6
7 8
Rev.
Rev.
Rev.
Rev.
Rev.
0 1
2 3
4 Revision 4 i
EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EPP/I-lb Unit 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
Purpose References Responsibilities Action LevelslPrecautions Procedure Final Condition Attachments Revision 4 H.
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPPJI-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 A.
PURPOSE 1.0 This procedure describes the immediate actions to be taken to recognize and classify an emergency condition.
2.0 This procedure identifies the four emergency classifications and emergency action levels.
3.0 Reporting requirements for non-emergency abnormal events are provided.
B.
REFERENCES 1.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Preparedness Plan and Implementing Procedures.
2.0 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix E.
3.0 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation -and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants 4.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Operating Manual 5.0 NUMARC/NESP-007, Methodology-for Development of Emergency Action Levels 6.0 ERS-SFL-91-041-REV 1 (U1/U2 Containment Monitor Readings due to LOCA's with various Source Terms).
7.0 Condition Report #992522 8.0 Condition Report #991327-1 9.0 Unit 1 Technical Specification Amendment 204 and Unit 2 Technical Specification Amendment 101.
10.0 EPPOS #2 "Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions".
11.0 NEI 99-02 "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline" 12.0 Condition Report #00-3939 Revision 4 1
EPPtlmplementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 13.0 Condition Report #99-1234 14.0 Condition Report #02-02125-02 15.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-ATL-93-021 F
16.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-HHM-87-014 17.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-SFL-86-005 18.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-SFL-99-014 19.0 Condition Report #02-08649 20.0 Condition Report #02-09224' C.
RESPONSIBILITY The Emergency Director (Shift Manager, until properly relieved by a designated alternate) has,the responsibility and authority for the performance of the actions prescribed in this procedure.,
D.
ACTION LEVELS/PRECAUTIONS/GUIDANCE 1.0 ACTION LEVELS 1.1 An off-normal event has occurred.
1.2 An action step in a plant operating or emergency operating procedure
- \\ --
refers to this procedure for classification of the indicated plant condition.
2.0 PRECAUTIONS 2.1 The Emergency Director must review all applicable EALs to ensure that the event is properly classified since a given INDICATOR may be associated with more than one CRITERION.
A particular INDICATOR omitted, from the fission product barrier matrix may be addressed as an event-based EAL in one of the other tabs. Event-based EALs may escalate to the fission product barrier matrix. The Emergency Director may need to consider related events (e.g., fire and explosion) or the possible consequences of the event (e.g., fire in an MCC resulting in loss of AC) in classifying an event.
2.2 Continued surveillance and assessment of plant conditions are necessary to ensure that the emergency classification is appropriately revised as conditions change, or as more definitive information is obtained.
Revision 4 2
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EPPlImplementing Procedure EPP/I-1b Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 2.3 If there is any doubt with regard to assessment of a particular EAL, the EAL Basis Document (i.e., Chapter 4 of the EPP) entry for that EAL can be reviewed.
Classifications shall be consistent with the fundamental definitions of the four emergency classifications (tabulated in Tab 4.7).
2.4 The Emergency Director shall take whatever mitigative or restoration actions are necessary to protect public health and safety. The Emergency Director shall not reject courses of action solely on the basis that the action would result in escalation of the emergency classification.
3.0 GUIDANCE 3.1 Structure of the EALs 3.1.1 There are two types of Emergency Action Levels included in this procedure:
3.1.1.1 Barrier-Based EALs:
These EALs address conditions that represent potential losses, or losses, of one or more of the Fuel Clad, RCS, or Containment fission product barriers.
INDICATORs of these conditions include CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION status, fundamental indications such as subcooling or reactor vessel water level, or auxiliary indications such as containment radiation monitor readings. Classifications are based on the number of barriers lost or potentially lost.
3.1.1.2 Event-Based EALs:
These EALs address discrete conditions or events that are generally precursors to fission product barrier degradation, or are otherwise degradations in the level of safety of the plant. Events may be external (e.g., severe weather, earthquakes, loss
- of offsite power) internal (e.g., fires, explosions, tinstrumentation failure) or may involve radioactivity releases.
Revision 4 3
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 3.1.2 The EALs are grouped by recognition category as follows:
Tab 1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix Tab 2 System Degradation Tab 3 Loss of Power Tab 4 Hazards and ED Judgement Tab 5 - Destructive Phenomena Tab 6 Shutdown Systems Degradation' Tab 7 Radiological 3.1.3 Each of the EAL tabs includes one or more columns that address one initiating condition (e.g., fires). Each column provides EALs for each of the four emergency classifications, as applicable. A notation adjacent to each EAL identifies the plant operating mode(s) for which the EAL is applicable.
3.1.4 Each EAL is comprised of a CRITERION, printed in bold type, and one or more INDICATORs. The purpose of each is as follows:
3.1.4.1 CRITERION: identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration) All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
3.1.4.2 INDICATOR:
is available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.),
operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received fromr-plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
Upon occurrence of one or more indicators, the Emergency Director performs an assessment against the criterion.
Depending on the particular condition, this assessment may be as simple as a review of the criterion, an instrument channel check, or a detailed calculation as in the case of a radioactivity release.
Revision 4 4
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 3.1.4.3 Inherent in this protocol -is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
3.1.4.4 The INDICATORs were selected with the objective of providing unambiguous guidance to assist with assessment of the CRITERION.
There may be other INDICATORs not envisioned by the writers of this procedure that, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, correspond to the CRITERION. In these cases, the Emergency Director should base the declaration on engineering judgment, using the supplied INDICATORs as examples of the severity of the condition.
3.2 Common Plant Conditions 3.2.1 IF an event occurs such that both reactor units are affected, e.g.,
tornado, toxic gas. offsite, etc., THEN the senior Shift Manager shall make the appropriate classification and assume the role of
-Emergency Director.
3.2.2 IF -the common plant condition results in a higher emergency classification at one reactor unit, THEN the Shift Manager from that unit shall make the appropriate classification and assume the role of Emergency Director.'
3.3 Mode Applicability-3.3.1 The plant operating mode that existed at the time that the event occurred, prior to any protective system or operator action initiated in response to the condition, is compared to the mode applicability of the EALs.
l 3.3.2 IF an event occurs, and a lower or higher plant operating mode is reached before the classification can be made, THEN the classification shall be based on the mode that existed at the time that the event occurred.
Revision 4 S
EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EF Un
'P/I-I ift 2' 3.3.3 The fission product barrier matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at mode 4 or higher. An event that occurs in modes 5 or 6^ shall not be classified using the fission product barrier matrix, even if mode 4 is entered due to subsequent heatup. In these cases, Tab 6; Shutdown Systems Degradation, shall be used for classification.
3.4 Transient Events, 3.4.1 For -some EALs the existence of the event, without regard to duration, is sufficient to warrant classification. In these cases, the appropriate emergency classification is declared as soon as the Emergency Director assessment concludes that the CRITERION is met.
3.4.2 Some EALs specify a duration of occurrence. For these EALs the classification is made when Emergency Director assessment concludes that the specified duration is exceeded or will be exceeded (i.e., condition can not be reasonably rectified before the duration elapses), whichever is sooner.
3.4.3 IF a plant condition meeting an EAL CRITERION is rectified before the specified duration time is exceeded, THEN the event is NOT classified by that EAL. Lower severity EALs, if any, shall be reviewed for possible applicability in these cases.
3.4.4 IF a plant condition meeting an', EAL CRITERION is NOT classified at the time of occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g., as a result of routine log or record review) AND the condition no longer exists, THEN an emergency shall NOT be declared. However, reporting under 10 CFR 50.72 may be required. Such a condition could occur, for example, if a followup evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the condition was more severe than earlier believed.
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EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-1b Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 3.4.5 IF an emergency classification was warranted, but the plant condition has been rectified (such that the CRITERION is no longer met) prior to declaration and notification, THEN the following guidance applies:
3.4.5.1 For transient events that would have been declared as UNUSUAL EVENTS, no emergency is declared.
However, the event shall be reported to those local, state, and Federal agencies designated to receive the initial notification form. These agencies shall be told that the UNUSUAL EVENT condition was rectified upon detection and no emergency is being declared.
3.4.5.2 For transient events that would have been declared as an ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, or GENERAL EMERGENCY, the event shall be declared and the
- emergency response organization activated.
The EAL CRITERIA for these events has been set at a threshold that warrants declaration even if the initiating condition has been rectified.
Termination can occur when the criteria of EPP/IP-6.2, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery can be satisified.
3.5 Declaration Timing and Assessment Emergency conditions shall be classified as soon as the Emergency Director assessment of the INDICATORs shows that the CRITERION is met. IF the EAL specifies a duration, THEN the event shall be declared as soon as it is determined that the condition cannot be corrected within the specified period.
In either case, the assessment time starts from the indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
3.5.1 The assessment time is limited to 15 minutes, except as follows:
3.5.1.1 IF the EAL specifies a duration (e.g., release exceeds 2x TIS for one hour), THEN the assessment time runs concurrently with the required duration AND is the same length (e.g., in this example, one hour).
3.5.1.2 The assessment time and any required duration are NOT additive.
Revision 4 7
EPP/Implementing Procedure
'EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 3.5.2' IF the assessment cannot be completed within the specified period, THEN the event must be declared on the basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.
3.6 Bases 3.6.1 Chapter 4 of the BVPS EPP provides the bases for these EALs.
The bases can be used -for guidance to assist the Emergency Director in classifying events for which the classification is not immediately apparent.
3.7 Defined Terms 3.7.1 In the EALs, words written in bold uppercase letters are defined terms having specific meanings as they relate to this procedure.
Definitions of these terms are provided on the reverse side of most pages in the EAL section of this procedure. Such terms shall be interpreted as provided in the definitions.
E.
PROCEDURE 1.0 DETERMINE OPERATING MODE THAT EXISTED AT THE TIME THAT jK.
THE EVENT OCCURRED PRIOR TO ANY PROTECTION SYSTEM OR OPERATOR ACTION INITIATED IN RESPONSE TO THE EVENT.
2.0 DETERMINE IF THE CONDITION AFFECTS FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS AND, IF SO, PROCEED TO TAB 1.
2.1 IF the condition involves any of the following AND the initial mode was l
1-4 THEN proceed to Tab 1 and follow instructions provided AND continue with Step 2.2.
2.1.1 CSF status tree ORANGE PATH or RED PATH conditions 2.1.2 Core exit thermocouple readings above 729 F
[
2.1.3 Reactor vessel full range water level less than 40% (no RCPs) 2.1.4 Elevated RCS activity >300,uCi/gm 2.1.5' Elevated' Containment High Range Area Radiation Monitor reading 2.1.6 RCS leakrate large enough to require a 2nd charging pump 2.1.7 Loss of RCS subcooling 2.1.8 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 2.1.9 Containment bypass or loss of integrity 2.1.10 Rise in containment pressure or hydrogen concentration 8
Revision 4 8
EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EPP/I-lb Unit 2 2.2 Consider other related event-based EALs. IF other EALs are applicable, THEN perform Steps 3.0 and 4.0 if necessary. Otherwise, go to Step 5.0 3.0 CATEGORIZE THE EVENT INTO ONE OF THE INITIATING CONDITIONS AND LOCATE THE TAB.
3.1 Locate one of the EAL indices provided at the start of each tab.
3.2 Review the index to identify the tab that addresses the event that has occurred.
3.3 Turn to the appropriate tab.
NOTE:
The assessment of an emergency condition shall be completed as soon as possible and -within 15 minutes of the occurance of one or more INDICATORs.
IF the assessment cannot be completed within the specified period, THEN the event must be declared on the basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.
NOTE:
IF the EAL specifies a duration (e.g., release exceeds 2x T/Sfor one hour),
THEN the assessment time runs concurrently with the required duration AND is the same length.
4.0 ASSESS THE EVENT AND COMPARE TO THE EALS 4.1 Locate the EAL for the highest severity emergency classification that is applicable for the initiating condition and operating mode 4.2 Review the INDICATORs and CRITERION for that EAL 4.3 IF the specified INDICATORs are not observed, THEN:
4.3.1 Proceed to the next lower severity EAL and re-perform step 4.2
& 4.3.
4.3.2 IF none of the EALs for an initiating condition are met, THEN re-perform steps 3.0 and 4.0 for related initiating conditions.
Revision 4 9
EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EPP/I-lb Unit 2 4.3.3 IF the actions above do not identify' an applicable EAL, THEN review the observed conditions against Tab 4.7, Hazards and Emergency Director Judgment.
4.3.4 IF, after performing the above, no EAL is identified, THEN proceed to step 6.0.
4.4 IF the specified INDICATORs are observed, THEN:
4.4.1 Perform necessary assessments to validate the instrument readings and/or confirm reported observations.
4.4.2 Initiate any sampling, inspections, or dose assessments specified by the EAL.
NOTE:
IF the CRITERION specifies an event or condition duration, THEN the classification shall be made as soon as the duration is exceeded, OR when it is apparent that the duration will be exceeded, whichever is earlier.
4.4.3 Compare the results of the assessments to the CRITERION.
NOTE:
A given INDICATOR may apply to more than one CRITERION.
The Emergency Director shall review other related EALs for applicability.
4.5 1 IF the assessment concludes that the CRITERION is met, THEN the classification shall be made. Proceed to Step 5.0 4.6 IF the assessment concludes that the CRITERION is not met, THEN re-perform steps 3.0 and A4.0 for other related l initiating conditions as applicable.
Revision 4 10 JII I
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EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EPP/I-lb Unit 2 4.7 IF no classification results from the above, THEN proceed to step 6.0.
NOTE The declaration of the emergency classification shall be made as soon as the Emergency Director has assessed that the EAL has been met OR will be met, AND within 15 minutes of occurance of the INDICATOR.
Once the emergency is classified, notifications to state and local governments shall be completed within 15 minutes of the declaration.
5.0 DECLARE THE EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND TRANSITION TO RESPONSE PROCEDURES 5.1 IF an UNUSUAL EVENT is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-2 5.2 IF an ALERT is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-3 5.3 IF a SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-4 5.4 IF a GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-5 NOTE The step below is implemented only if an emergency classification is NOT made. IF a classification is made, THEN the transition indicated in step 5.0 should have been made.
6.0 EVALUATE THE NEED FOR AND MAKE NON-EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 6.1 IF the abnormal condition is reportable to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 and 1/2-ADM-2202, THEN perform the following:
6.1.1 Complete the NRC Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet (located on the Regulatory Affairs web page).
6.1.2 Notify First Energy Communications of the event and provide the information on the NRC Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet.
Revision 4 11
EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EPP/I-lb Unit 2 6.2 IF directed by station' management, THEN make courtesy calls to the following state and local agencies on a timely basis consistent with normal working hours.
6.2.1' 6.2.2 6.2.3 6.2.4 BCEMA PEMA CCEMA HCOES F.
FINAL CONDITIONS 1.0 For emergency events, the transition to the appropriate response procedure has been made and actions pursuant to that procedure are in progress.
2.0 For non-emergency events, required notifications have been completed.
G.
ATTACHMENTS 1.0 Tabs for Classification of Emergency Conditions H.
FIGURES 1.0 Figures are identified on the EAL indices 4'
4' Revision 4 12
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad (RCS activity, corecooling, heat sink) 1.2 RCS (Integrity, SGTR, heat sink) 1.3 Containment (CNMT Red Path, CNMT bypass)
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 9
I t5
=oi x
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Loss of Instrumentation Loss of Function/Comm's Failure of Rx Prot.-ATWS Fuel Clad Degradation 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 RCS Unident Leakage 2.9 Turbine Failure RCS Ident. Leakage 2.10 Stm/Feed Line Break Technical Specification S/D Safety Limit Exceeded 2
LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) (Modes 14) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 3.3 Loss of DC 3
HAZARDS and ED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 ED Judgement Figure 4-A Figure 4-B/Figure 4-C Table 4-3/Table 4-4 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA 5.1 Earthquake 5.3 Aircraft Crash/Projectile 5.2 Tornado/High Winds 5.4 River Level High Table 5-1 5.5 River Level Low Figure 5-A 5.6 Watercraft Crash (RW/SWS Loss)
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.3 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.2 RCS Inventory-Shutdown 6.4 Loss of DC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.5 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 6.6 Inadvertent Criticality RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 7 Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A
'I--
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FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad (RCS activity, corecooling, heat sink) 1.2 RCS (Integrity. SGTR, heat sink) 1.3 Containment (CNMT Red Path, CNMT bypass) 1
'-omm I
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Loss of Instrumentation Loss of Function/Comm's Failure of Rx Prot.-ATWS Fuel Clad Degradation 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 RCS Unident Leakage 2.9 RCS Ident. Leakage 2.10 Technical Specification S/D Safety Limit Exceeded Turbine Failure Stm/Feed Line Break I LOSS OF POWER 3.1 3.2 3.3 Loss of AC (Power Ops) (Modes 1-4)
Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6)
Loss of DC 3
tz N CD cm 11 rA
= C-It r- z W n
=. R CM HAZARDS and ED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security 4
Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 ED Judgement Figure 4-A Figure 4-B/Figure 4-C Table 4-3/Table 4-4 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA 5.1 Earthquake 5.3 Aircraft Crash/Projectile 5.2 Tornado/High Winds 5.4 River Level High 5
Table 5-1 5.5 River Level Low Figure 5-A 5.6 Watercraft Crash (RW/SWS Loss)
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.3 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes S & 6) 6.2 RCS Inventory-Shutdown 6.4 Loss of DC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.5 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 6.6 Inadvertent Criticality RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 7 Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A Jr
- ,O.*
ft
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad (RCS activity,-corecooling, heat sink) 1.2 RCS (Integrity, SGTR, heat sink) 1 1.3 Containment(CNMTRedPath, CNMTbypass)
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unident Leakage 2.9 Turbine Failure 2.3 Failure of Rx Prot.-ATWS 2.7 Technical Specification S/D 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Safety Limit Exceeded LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) (Modes 14) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and ED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security 4
Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 ED Judgement Figure 4-A Figure 4-B/Figure 4-C Table 4-3/Table 44 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA 5.1 Earthquake 5.3 Aircraft Crash/Projectile, 5.2 Tornado/High Winds 5.4 River Level High Table 5-1 5.5 River Level Low Figure 5-A 5.6 Watercraft Crash (RW/SWS Loss)
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.3 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.2 RCS Inventory-Shutdown 6.4 Loss of DC (Shutdown) (Modes
)
& 6) 6.5 Fuel Handling (All Modes 6.6 Inadvertent Criticality RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 7 Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A 0zC ft
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FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad (RCS activity, corecooling, heat sink) 1.2 RCS (Integrity, SGTR, heat sink) 1.3 Containment(CNMTRed PathCNMTbypass)
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unident Leakage 2.9 Turbine Failure 2.2 Loss of FunctionlComm's 2.6 RCS Ident. Leakage 2.10 S tm/FeedLineBreak 2.3 Failure of Rx Prot.-ATWS 2.7 Technical Specification S/D 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Safety Limit Exceeded LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) (Modes 1-4) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes S & 6) 3.3 Loss of DC 3
HAZARDS and ED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 ED Judgement Figure 4-A Figure 4-B/Figure 4-C Table 4-3/Table 4-4 f
1i DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA 5.1 Earthquake 5.3 Aircraft Crash/Projectile 5.2 Tornado/High Winds 5.4 River Level High 5
Table 5-1 5.5 River Level Low Figure 5-A 5.6 Watercraft Crash (RW/SWS Loss)
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.3 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.2 RCS Inventory-Shutdown 6 4 Loss of DC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.5 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 6.6 Inadvertent Criticality RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling (All Modes)
Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A I
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40.
If
Figure 4-C EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad (RCS activity, corecooling, heat sink) 1.2 RCS (Integrity, SGTR, heat sink) 1 1.3 Containment(CNMTRedPath, CNMTbypass)
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unident Leakage 2.9 Turbine Failure 2.2 Loss of Function/Comm's 2.6 RCS Ident. Leakage 2.10 Stm/Feed Line Break 2.3 Failure of Rx. Prot.-ATWS 2.7 Technical Specification S/D 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Safety Limit Exceeded LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) (Modes 14) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 3 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and ED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security 4
Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 ED Judgement Figure 4-A Figure 4-B/Figure 4-C Table 4-3/Table 4-4 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA 5.1 Earthquake 5.3 Aircraft Crash/Projectile 5.2 Tornado/High Winds 5.4 River Level High Table 5-1 5.5 River Level Low Figure 5-A 5.6 Watercraft Crash (RW/SWS Loss)
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.3 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.2 RCS Inventory-S hutdowvn 6.4 Loss of DC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.5 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 6.6 Inadvertent Criticality RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 7 Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A L"
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= 5r 0
a 'I 1 10 CD a.
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FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad (RCS activity, corecooling, heat sink) 1.2 RCS (Integrity, SGTR, heat sink) 1.3 Containment (CNMTRedPath, CNMTbypass)
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unident Leakage 2.9 Turbine Failure 2.2 Loss of FunctioniComm's 2.6 RCS Ident. Leakage 2.10 Stm/Feed Line Break 2.3 Failure of Rx Prot.-ATWS 2.7 Technical Specification S/D 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Safety Limit Exceeded LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) (Modes 14) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and ED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security 4
Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 ED Judgement Figure 4-A Figure 4-B/Figure 4-C Table 4-3/Table 44 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA 5.1 Earthquake 5.3 Aircraft Crash/Projectile 5.2 Tornado/High Winds 5.4 River Level High Table 5-1 5.5 River Level Low Figure 5-A 5.6 Watercraft Crash (RW/SWS Loss)
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.3 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.2 RCS Inventory-Shutdown 6.4 Loss of DC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 6.5 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 6.6 Inadvertent Criticality RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling (All Modes)
Table 7-1 Table 7-2 7
Figure 7-A tv r.
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4
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FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad (RCS activity, corecooling, heat sink) 1.2 RCS (Integrity, SGTR, heat sink) 1 1.3 Containment(CNMTRedPath, CNMTbypass)
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unident Leakage 2.9 Turbine Failure 2.2 Loss of Function/Commr's 2.6 RCS Ident. Leakage 2.10 Stni/FeedLineBreak A
2.3 Failure of Rx Prot.-ATWS 2.7 Technical Specification SID 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Safety Limit Exceeded LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) (Modes 1-4) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6) 3 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and ED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flamnnable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security 4
Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 ED Judgement Figure 4-A Figure 4-B/Figure 4-C Table 4-3/Table 44 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA 5.1 Earthquake 5.3 Aircraft Crash/Projectile Table 5-1 5.5 River Level Low Figure 5-A 5.6 Watercraft Crash (RWISWS Loss)
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Systems RCS Inventory-Shutdown 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6)
Loss of DC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 & 6)
Fuel Handling (All Modes)
Inadvertent Criticality 6
RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling (All Modes)
Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A I'*
4