ML030800326

License Amendment Nos. 159 & 150 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

ML030800326
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	03/21/2003
From:	Rinaldi F NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD2
To:	Beasley J Southern Nuclear Operating Co
Rinaldi F, NRR/LPD2-1, 415-1447
References
TAC MB4756, TAC MB4757
Download: ML030800326 (18)

Text

March 21, 2003 Mr. J. B. Beasley, Jr.

Vice President - Farley Project Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295

SUBJECT:

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 RE: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. MB4756 AND MB4757)

Dear Mr. Beasley:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 159 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 and Amendment No. 150 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated April 4, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated January 9, 2003.

The amendments revise TS 5.5.17, Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, to reflect a one-time deferral of the Type A Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT). The 10-year interval between ILRTs is to be extended to 15 years from the previous ILRTs that were completed in March 1994 for Unit 1 and March 1995 for Unit 2.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Frank Rinaldi, Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 159 to NPF-2

2. Amendment No. 150 to NPF-8

3. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: See next page

ML030800326 *No major changes to SE OFFICE PDII-1/PM PDII-1/LA SC:EMEB* SC:SPSB*

NAME FRinaldi CHawes DTerao MRubin DATE 03/21/03 03/21/03 02/07/03 02/13/03 OFFICE SC:SPLB* OGC PDII-1/SC NAME SWerakkody SCole** JNakoski DATE 02/13/2003 3/13/2003 03/21/03 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-348 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 159 License No. NPF-2

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

(Southern Nuclear), dated April 4, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated January 9, 2003, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 159, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

John A. Nakoski, Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: March 21, 2003

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 159 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 DOCKET NO. 50-348 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 150 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 DOCKET NO. 50-364 Replace the following page of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert 5.5-17 5.5-17

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-364 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 150 License No. NPF-8

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

(Southern Nuclear), dated April 4, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated January 9, 2003, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 150, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

John A. Nakoski, Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: March 21, 2003

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 159 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 AND AMENDMENT NO. 150 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC., ET AL.

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-348 AND 50-364

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated April 4, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated January 9, 2003, the Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC or licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Farley), Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would revise TS 5.5.17, Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, to reflect a one-time deferral of the Type A Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT). The 10-year interval between ILRTs is to be extended to 15 years from the previous ILRTs that were completed in March 1994 for Unit 1 and March 1995 for Unit 2. The January 9, 2003, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the April 4, 2002, application nor the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

As a result, the Type A containment ILRT required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix J, would be performed during refueling outage R22 (currently scheduled for Spring 2009) for Unit 1 and during refueling outage R20 (currently scheduled for Spring 2010) for Unit 2. According to the licensee, this one-time exception will result in a substantial cost savings and will avoid unnecessary personnel radiation exposure by deferring the Type A test for an additional five years. Also, this evaluation addresses the aging degradation of the containment pressure boundary as it relates to the proposed amendments of a one-time extension for each unit of the time interval for performing the containment ILRT from the current 10-year to a 15-year interval.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

Option B of Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 50 requires that a Type A test be conducted at a periodic interval based on historical performance of the overall containment system. Farleys TS 5.5.17 requires that leakage rate testing be performed as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions, and in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.163, Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program, dated September 1995. This RG endorses, with certain exceptions, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) report 94-01, Revision 0, Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, dated July 26, 1995.

The regulations in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J were revised, effective October 26, 1995, to allow licensees to perform containment leakage testing in accordance with the requirements of Option A, Prescriptive Requirements, or Option B, Performance-Based Requirements.

Amendment 122 was issued for Farley, Unit 1 on September 3, 1996, and Amendment 114 was issued for Farley, Unit 2 on September 3, 1996, to permit implementation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B. These amendments revised the TS to require Type A, B, and C testing in accordance with RG 1.163, which specifies a method acceptable to NRC for complying with Option B by approving the use of NEI 94-01 and American National Standards Institute/

American Nuclear Society 56.8 - 1994, subject to several regulatory positions provided in RG 1.163.

In order to meet the test interval requirements of NEI 94-01, the Type A test was scheduled to be performed during refueling outage R22 in March 2004 for Unit 1 and during refueling outage R20 in March 2005 for Unit 2. With the requested extension of the ILRT interval, the next overall verification of the containment leak-tight integrity will be performed by March 2009 for Unit 1 and March 2010 for Unit 2. As described in Reference 7.1, the extended testing interval will not affect any Code requirements or Code acceptance criteria.

A Type A test is an overall (integrated) leakage rate test of the containment structure.

NEI 94-01 specifies an initial test interval of 48 months, but allows an extended interval of 10 years, based upon two consecutive successful tests. There is also a provision for extending the test interval an additional 15 months in certain circumstances. The most recent two Type A tests at each of the Farleys units have been successful, so the current interval requirement is 10 years.

The licensee is requesting additions to TS 5.5.17 that would allowed the licensee to take an exception from the guidelines of RG 1.163 regarding the Type A test interval. Specifically, the proposed TS states that the next Unit 1 Type A test performed after the March 1994 test, and the next Unit 2 Type A test performed after the March 1995 test, shall be performed within 15 years.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 Inservice Inspection Program Farley, Units 1 and 2, are Westinghouse pressurized water reactors (PWRs) with a large, prestressed, reinforced-concrete, primary containment structure. The containment pressure boundary consists of the steel liner, containment access penetrations, and process piping and electrical penetrations. The integrity of the penetrations is verified through Type B and Type C local leak rate tests (LLRT) as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, and the overall integrity of the containment structure is verified through an ILRT.

These tests are performed to verify the essentially leak-tight characteristics of the containment structure at the design basis accident pressure. As stated in the request, Farley, Unit 1 has performed six ILRTs (including the pre-operation test) during the period of its operating license, and the completion dates of these tests are: February 1977; January 1981; April 1984; November 1986; May 1991; and March 1994. Farley, Unit 2 has performed five ILRTs (including the pre-operation test) during the period of its operating license, and the completion dates of these tests are: June 1980; March 1985; November 1987; December 1990; and

March 1995. Based on these successful Type A tests and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, the current interval requirement is 10 years for both Units 1 and 2. With the requested extension of the ILRT time interval, the licensee proposed that the next overall verification of the containment leak-tight integrity will be performed by March 2009 for Unit 1 and by March 2010 for Unit 2.

Also, during the staffs review of the Type A test interval extension applications of other plants, the staff identified several general issues related to the inservice inspection (ISI) of the containment. These issues relate to the relationship between the leak rate testing requirements (ILRT and LLRTs) of Option B of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, and the containment ISI requirements mandated by 10 CFR 50.55a that complement each other in ensuring the leak-tightness and structural integrity of the containment. The licensee has addressed the staffs concerns in its supplemental response, and a discussion is presented in the following paragraphs.

Regarding the ISI program performed on the containment and the schedule for implementation, the licensee, in References 7.1 and 7.2, stated that the containment leak rate integrity is verified through inservice inspections conducted in accordance with the requirements of the 1992 Edition of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code,Section XI, Subsections IWE and IWL. The licensee added that an NRC regulation, 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(2)(ix)(E), requires licensees to conduct visual inspections of the accessible areas in the interior of the containment three times every 10 years. These requirements will not be changed as a result of the extended ILRT interval. The licensee further justified that the ASME Code,Section XI, Subsections IWE and IWL inspections will provide a high degree of assurance that any degradation of the containment structure is identified and corrected before a containment leakage path is introduced. Based on its review of the information provided by the licensee, the staff finds that the schedule for implementing the containment ISI program will not be affected by the requested extension (up to 15 years) of the ILRT interval.

For the issue related to the application of any augmented examination (required by IWE Table-2500-1, Examination Category E-C), the licensee stated in Reference 2 that based on the results of the previous inspections, there are no areas of the Farley, Units 1 and 2, containment liners that require augmented examinations according to Subarticle IWE-1240 of the 1992 Edition of ASME Code,Section XI, Subsection IWE.

With regard to the issue related to the ISI of seals, gaskets and the pressure retaining bolting, the licensee received the staffs approval for relief requests (Relief Request I-RR-31 proposed to perform Type B test instead of VT-3 visual examinations for seals and gaskets; and Relief Request I-RR-32 proposed to perform Type B test and visual examination once every interval to ensure the bolt torque or tension remains adequate) that require the containment leak-tight integrity be tested periodically during Type B testing. On this basis, the licensee, in References 1 and 2, justified that the one-time extension applies only to the Type A ILRT that is currently on a 10-year interval pursuant to Appendix J, Option B. Appendix J, Type B and Type C tests are performed at the intervals required by Appendix J, Option B and will be tested at least once in the 10-year interval. The periodic testing of seals, gaskets and containment pressure-retaining bolting will ensure the integrity of the containment pressure boundary over the period of the extension. On the basis discussed above, the staff finds that the licensees ISI program for seals, gaskets and bolted connections provides reasonable assurance that the integrity of the containment pressure boundary will be maintained.

SNCs response (Reference 2) to the issue regarding the integrity of two-ply stainless steel bellows (Information Notice 92-20, Inadequate Local Leak Rate Testing), states that Farley does not have such bellows as a part of the containment pressure boundary. Therefore, the concern related to NRC Information Notice 92-20 is not applicable to the bellows installed at Farley, Units 1 and 2.

For the issue related to the inaccessible areas of the containment liner, for which degradation cannot be found by visual examinations, the licensee performed an ILRT extension risk assessment considering the potential age related corrosion effects on the containment liner integrity and a series of parametric sensitivity studies (References 1 and 2). The results of the risk assessment indicated that the ILRT interval extension has a minimal impact on the plant risk. From the staff's review of the licensees submittals, the staff finds that the increase in predicted risk due to the proposed change is within the acceptance guidelines while maintaining the defense-in-depth philosophy of RG 1.174, An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Bases, and, therefore, is acceptable. The details of the staffs evaluation regarding the risk assessment performed by the licensee are documented in Section 3.2 of this Safety Evaluation.

On the basis of the staff's review of the information provided by the licensee in its TS amendment request and its response to the staffs questions, the staff finds: (1) the structural integrity of the containment vessel is verified through the periodic inservice inspections conducted as required by Subsections IWE and IWL of the ASME Code,Section XI, and (2) the integrity of the penetrations and containment isolation valves are periodically verified through Type B and Type C tests as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J. In addition, the system pressure tests for containment pressure boundary (i.e., Appendix J tests, as applicable) are required to be performed following repair and replacement activities, in accordance with Article IWE-5000 of the ASME Code,Section XI. Serious degradation of the primary containment pressure boundary is required to be reported under 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73. The staff concludes that a one-time extension of the performance of the ILRT is acceptable.

3.2 Risk Assessment The licensee has performed a risk impact assessment of extending the Type A test interval to 15 years. The assessment was provided to the staff in Reference 1, application for license amendment. Additional analysis and information were provided by the licensee in Reference 2.

In performing the risk assessment, the licensee considered the guidelines of NEI 94-01, the methodology used in Electric Power Research Instititue (EPRI) TR-104285, Risk Impact Assessment of Revised Containment Leak Rate Testing, and RG 1.174.

The basis for the current 10-year test interval is provided in Section 11.0 of NEI 94-01, Revision 0, and was established in 1995 during development of the performance-based Option B to Appendix J. Section 11.0 of NEI 94-01 states that NUREG-1493, Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program, dated September 1995, provided the technical basis to support rulemaking to revise leakage rate testing requirements contained in Option B to Appendix J. The basis consisted of qualitative and quantitative assessments of the risk impact (in terms of increased public dose) associated with a range of extended leakage rate test intervals. To supplement the NRCs rulemaking basis, NEI undertook a similar study.

The results of that study are documented in EPRI Research Project Report TR-104285.

The EPRI study used an analytical approach similar to that presented in NUREG-1493 for evaluating the incremental risk associated with increasing the interval for Type A tests. The EPRI study estimated that relaxing the test frequency from 3 in 10 years to 1 in 10 years increased the average time that a leak detectable only by a Type A test goes undetected from 18 to 60 months. Since Type A tests only detect about 3 percent of leaks (the rest are identified during local leak rate tests based on industry leakage rate data gathered from 1987 to 1993), this results in a 10 percent increase in the overall probability of leakage. The risk contribution of pre-existing leakage for the PWR and boiling water reactor representative plants confirmed the NUREG-1493 conclusion that a reduction in the frequency of Type A tests from 3 in 10 years to 1 in 20 years leads to an imperceptible increase in risk on the order of 0.2 percent and a fraction of one person-rem per year.

Building upon the methodology of the EPRI study, the licensee assessed the change in the predicted person-rem/year frequency. The licensee quantified the risk from sequences that have the potential to result in large releases if a pre-existing leak were present. Since the Option B rulemaking in 1995, the staff has issued RG 1.174 on the use of probabilistic risk assessment in risk-informed changes to a plants licensing basis. The licensee has proposed using RG 1.174 to assess the acceptability of extending the Type A test interval beyond that established during the Option B rulemaking. RG 1.174 defines very small changes in the risk-acceptance guidelines as increases in core damage frequency (CDF) less than 10-6/year and increases in large early release frequency (LERF) less than 10-7/year. Since the Type A test does not impact CDF, the relevant criterion is the change in LERF. The licensee has estimated the change in LERF for the proposed change and the cumulative change from the original 3 in 10 year interval. RG 1.174 also discusses defense-in-depth and encourages the use of risk analysis techniques to help ensure and show that key principles, such as the defense-in-depth philosophy, are met. The licensee estimated the change in the conditional containment failure probability for the proposed change to demonstrate that the defense-in-depth philosophy is met.

The licensee provided an analysis that estimated all of these risk metrics and whose methodology is consistent with previously approved submittals. The following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis associated with extending the Type A test frequency:

1. A slight increase in risk is predicted when compared to that estimated from current requirements. Given the change in test interval from 3 in 10 year to a 1 in 15 year, the increase in the total integrated plant risk is estimated to be less than 0.01 person-rem/year for both units. This increase is comparable to that estimated in NUREG-1493, in which it was concluded that a reduction in the frequency of tests from 3 in 10 years to 1 in 20 years leads to an imperceptible increase in risk. Therefore, the increase in the total integrated plant risk for the proposed change is considered small and supportive of the proposed change.

2. The increase in LERF resulting from a change in the Type A test interval from the original 3 in 10 years to 1 in 15 years is estimated to be 2.0 x 10-7/year for Unit 1 and 4.1 x 10-7/year for Unit 2. However, there is some likelihood that the undetected flaw in the containment liner estimated as part of the Class 3b frequency would be detected as part of the visual examination of the containment surfaces performed in accordance with the ASME Code,Section XI, Subsections IWE and IWL. The most recent visual examinations of the Farley containments were performed in Spring 2000 for Unit 1 and Spring 2001 for Unit 2. The

next scheduled visual examinations of the containments are Spring 2003 for Unit 1 and Spring 2004 for Unit 2. Visual examinations are expected to be effective in detecting large flaws in the visible regions of the containment and would reduce the impact of the extended test interval on LERF. The licensee performed additional risk analysis to consider the impact of hypothetical corrosion in inaccessible areas of the containment shell on the proposed change. The risk analysis considered the likelihood of an age-adjusted flaw that would lead to a breach of the containment. The risk analysis also considered the likelihood that the flaw was not visually detected but could be detected by a Type A test. The increase in LERF associated with corrosion events is estimated to be less than 1 x 10-9/year for both units.

When the calculated increase in LERF is in the range of 10-7/year to 10-6/year, applications are considered if the total LERF is less than 10-5/year. The licensee estimates that the total LERF, including internal and external events, is approximately 1 x 10-6/year. This is based on judgements concerning the potential contribution from fire events when the current plant configuration is taken into consideration. The staff concludes that increasing the Type A interval to 15 years results in only a small change in LERF and is consistent with the acceptance guidelines of RG 1.174.

3. RG 1.174 also encourages the use of risk analysis techniques to help ensure and show that the proposed change is consistent with the defense-in-depth philosophy. Consistency with the defense-in-depth philosophy is maintained if a reasonable balance is preserved among prevention of core damage, prevention of containment failure, and consequence mitigation.

The licensee estimates the change in the conditional containment failure probability to be about 0.5 percent for Unit 1 and 0.7 percent for Unit 2 for the cumulative change of going from a test interval of 3 in 10 years to 1 in 15 years. The staff finds that the defense-in-depth philosophy is maintained based on the change in the conditional containment failure probability for the proposed amendment.

Therefore, the staff concludes that the increase in predicted risk due to the proposed change is within the acceptance guidelines while maintaining the defense-in-depth philosophy of RG 1.174 and is found acceptable. Further, based on the foregoing evaluation, the staff finds that the interval until the next Type A tests at Farley, Units 1 and 2, may be extended to 15 years, and that the proposed change to Section 5.5.17 of the TSs is acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commissions regulations, the State of Alabama official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change an inspection or a surveillance requirement. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (67 FR 68743). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical

exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

7.0 REFERENCES

1. Letter from Dave Morey, SNC to NRC, Technical Specification Revision Request -

Integrated Leakage Rate Testing Interval Extension - Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, dated April 4, 2002.

2. Letter from J. B. Beasley, SNC to NRC, Response to Request for Additional Information Technical Specification Revision Request, Integrated Leakage Rate Testing Interval Extension, dated January 9, 2003.

3. Letter from R. Emch, NRC to D. N. Morey, SNC, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Inservice Inspection Relief Request Nos. 31 through 39, dated March 3, 2000.

Principal Contributors: J. Pulsipher, SPLB/DSSA R. Palla, SPSB/DSSA T. Chen, DE/EMEB Date: March 21, 2003

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant cc:

Mr. Don E. Grissette William D. Oldfield General Manager - SAER Supervisor Southern Nuclear Operating Company Southern Nuclear Operating Company Post Office Box 470 P. O. Box 470 Ashford, Alabama 36312 Ashford, Alabama 36312 Mr. B. D. McKinney, Licensing Manager Southern Nuclear Operating Company Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295 Mr. M. Stanford Blanton Balch and Bingham Law Firm Post Office Box 306 1710 Sixth Avenue North Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Mr. J. D. Woodard Executive Vice President Southern Nuclear Operating Company Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 State Health Officer Alabama Department of Public Health 434 Monroe Street Montgomery, Alabama 36130-1701 Chairman Houston County Commission Post Office Box 6406 Dothan, Alabama 36302 Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7388 N. State Highway 95 Columbia, Alabama 36319