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Category:Memoranda
MONTHYEARML23044A3662023-02-15015 February 2023
Calendar Year 2022 Reactor Oversight Process Baseline Inspection Program Completion - Region III
ML22034A3932022-02-16016 February 2022
Calendar Year 2021 Security Baseline Completion Memo
ML22020A2812022-02-11011 February 2022
Subsequent License Renewal Application Summary of December 2, 2021, Public Meeting on Proposed Aging Management Activities
ML22004A0772022-01-0606 January 2022
Summaries of December 8, 2021 Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for Subsequent License Renewal Application Public Meetings
ML21062A0702021-04-21021 April 2021
Memo to File: Final Ea/Fonsi of 2012 and 2015 Decommissioning Funding Plans for Point Beach Units 1 and 2 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (2012 and 2015)
ML21075A3422021-03-17017 March 2021
Meeting Summary: Public Scoping Meeting for the Environmental Review of the Subsequent License Renewal Application for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (EPID No.: L-2020-SLE-0002) - Memo
ML20233A7902020-08-20020 August 2020
Summary of the July 30, 2020, Public Webinar to Discuss the NRC 2019 End-Of-Cycle Plant Performance Assessment of the Duane Arnold Energy Center and the Point Beach Nuclear Plant
ML16088A2052016-03-28028 March 2016
Enclosure 1 - (72.30 DFP Reviews to Be Completed 2015) - Memo T Bowers from s Ruffin, Technial Assistance Requests - Review 2015 Tri-Annual Decommissioning Funding Plans for Multiple Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations
ML16088A2042016-03-28028 March 2016
Memo T Bowers from s Ruffin, Technical Assistance Requests - Review 2015 Tri-Annual Decommissioning Funding Plans for Multiple Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations W/ Encl 2 (Template)
ML15302A1702015-11-0202 November 2015
Forthcoming Closed Pre-Application Teleconference with NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (Nextera), Regarding Steam Generators H* License Amendment Request
ML13154A5112013-06-0404 June 2013
Rai'S Following Ifib Analysis of NextEra Energy'S 2013 Decommissioning Funding Status Reports for Duane Arnold Energy Center and Point Beach Units 1 and 2
ML12222A0392012-08-0909 August 2012
8/16/2012 Cancellation Notice of Forthcoming Conference Call with NextEra Energy and Florida Power and Light Concerning Generic Letter 2004-02 and Request for NRC Staff Review of Draft Proposed Guideline for Strainer Fiber Bypass Test Proto
ML12213A0612012-08-0101 August 2012
8/16/12 Forthcoming Conference Call with NextEra Energy and Florida Power & Light Concerning Generic Letter 2004-02 and Request for NRC Staff Review of Draft Proposed Guideline for Strainer Fiber Bypass Test Protocol
ML12243A5232012-07-19019 July 2012
Letter from FEMA Region 5 to FEMA Hq Regarding Closure of Point Beach Deficiency
ML1212805092012-06-18018 June 2012
May 1, 2012 - Summary of Teleconference with Performance Contracting, Inc., Regarding Large Flume Testing for Point Beach Nuclear Plant
ML12115A0802012-04-24024 April 2012
Memo 042412 TIA 2012-07 for Point Beach EDG Tornado Missiles
ML11228A2572011-08-16016 August 2011
Final - Task Interface Agreement (TIA) - Evaluation of Point Beach Nuclear Plant Torado Missile Protection Licensing Basis (TIA 2011-011)
ML1106104272011-03-0707 March 2011
Notice of Forthcoming Pre-Application Meeting with Florida Power & Light Company and NextEra Energy Regarding Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4, St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2, Point Beach, Units 1, and 2, and Duane Arnold
ML0921805182009-08-0606 August 2009
Notice of Public Meeting with Florida Power & Light Energy
ML0827307072008-09-29029 September 2008
Pre-application Meeting with FPL Energy Point Beach, LLC to Discuss Their Proposed Alternate Source Term Amendment
ML0824102292008-08-28028 August 2008
Notice of Forthcoming Meeting with Florida Energy Point Beach LLC, to Discuss Their Proposed Extended Power Uprate
ML0807400842008-03-14014 March 2008
Draft Regulatory Guide for Comment
ML0712002952007-05-18018 May 2007
Cover Memo to Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation - Direct Transfer of License from Nuclear Management Company, LLC & Wisconsin Electric Power Company to FPL Energy Point Beach, LLC (TAC # MD4112 & TAC # MD4113)
ML0634003252006-12-0707 December 2006
Notice of Presubmittal Conference for Proposed Emergency Plan Changes
ML0621603282006-08-29029 August 2006
Request for Additional Information Related to Evaluation of Event Notification 42129
ML0617805592006-07-10010 July 2006
Revised Closeout Letter for Bulletin 2003-01, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Sump Recirculation at Pressurized-Water Reactors.
ML0607503402006-04-20020 April 2006
Trip Report Regarding Staff Observations of Scaled Flume Testing of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Proposed Replacement Suction Strainer Design
ML0603000432006-02-13013 February 2006
Document Reclassified as Non-Proprietary
ML0602301932006-02-10010 February 2006
Document Reclassified as Non-Proprietary
ML0602400292006-02-0909 February 2006
Document Reclassified as Non-Proprietary
ML0602502942006-01-25025 January 2006
Canceled Notice of Meeting with Nuclear Management Company Regarding Fleet Transition to NFPA Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants
ML0602400772005-12-23023 December 2005
Memo 12/23/05 Point Beach One-Time Deviation from Regulatory Response Column of Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix
ML0529401992005-12-0202 December 2005
Unit 2 - Closeout Letter for Bulletin 2003-01, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Sump Recirculation at Pressurized-Water Reactors.
ML0526203802005-09-30030 September 2005
Fiscal Year 2005 Evaluation of the Operating Reactor Licensing Program
ML0523801282005-08-31031 August 2005
Unit 2 - Closeout Letter for Bulletin 2003-01, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Sump Recirculation at Pressurized-Water Reactors
ML0626504112005-08-29029 August 2005
Memorandum to Region III Office Allegation Coordinator from P. Louden, Review of Discrimination Complaint Filed with Department of Labor
ML0518203592005-07-0808 July 2005
Notice of Meeting with Nuclear Management Company Regarding the Planned Amendment to the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Updated Safety Analysis Report Relating to Movement of the Reactor Vessel Head
ML0626504042005-06-22022 June 2005
Memorandum to P. Louden from P. Pelke, Review of Receipt of Allegation, Allegation No. RIII-05-A-0062 (Point Beach)
ML0626802612005-06-21021 June 2005
Memorandum to Allegation File from P. Pelke Receipt of Allegation (Point Beach)
IR 05000266/20040032005-05-24024 May 2005
or Inspection Report Input to Point Beach Integrated Report 50-266/04-003 & 50-301-04-003
ML0515202472005-05-24024 May 2005
Previous Revision of Inspection Input to Point Beach Integrated Report 50-266-04-003 & 50-301-04-003
ML0502700462005-01-19019 January 2005
Summary of Telephone Conference Held on January 10, 2005, Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Concerning Draft Requests for Additional Information Pertaining to the Point Beach Nuclear
ML0432706522004-11-17017 November 2004
Summary of Telephone Conference Heldon November 17, 2004, Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Nuclear Management Company, Llc. Concerning Draft Requests for Additional Information Pertaining to the Point Beach Nuclear Plan, U
ML0432705872004-11-16016 November 2004
Summary of Telephone Conference Held on October 26, 2004, Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Concerning Draft Requests for Additional Information Pertaining to the Point Beach Nuclear Plant,
ML0420404302004-07-22022 July 2004
Notice of Meeting Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Staff and Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC) on Recent Decisions Involving Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Pressurized Thermal Shock
ML0419604622004-07-0707 July 2004
Wpdes Permit Reissuance
ML0421003322004-06-30030 June 2004
Close-out of Tacs Relating to the Review of 35-day Letters Submitted in Response to the April 29, 2003, Orders Revising the Design Basis and Security Guard Force Training Enhancements and Physical Fitness Requirements
ML0418803242004-06-29029 June 2004
Audit and Review Plan for Plant Aging Management Reviews and Programs at Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
ML0417400862004-06-21021 June 2004
All Region III Facility Training Managers Revised NRC Form 398 - Personal Qualification Statement Licensee
ML0508304222004-06-0202 June 2004
Memo T.Chan, NRR, to L. Raghavan, NRR, Safety Evaluation for Point Beach Unit 1 First Revised Order
2023-02-15
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INTERNAL committed to Nude.r r;1xC..o-.., CORRESPONDENCE NPM 2002-0293 To: Randy Amundson From: James Masterlark 1 Date: June 4 th, 2002
Subject:
Risk Ranking of Human Actions from the PBNP PRA Copy To: Paul Knoespel Rick Wood Paul Smith Terry Vandenbosch The purpose of this memo is to transmit a risk ranking of human actions from the latest PRA update (Version 3.03). I am including 2 tables that rank the Human Actions from two perspectives: Fussell-Vesely (F-V) importance and risk achievement worth (RAW). Which of these rankings to use depends on the application.
F-V importance of a human action is the fraction or percent contribution to the total core damage frequency (CDF) attributable to the human action being performed incorrectly. It can also be looked upon as a measure of the maximum reduction in total CDF achievable based on the complete reduction in error probability of a human action, (i.e., error probability approaches 0). Therefore, F-V importance is a good measure to use when
.iding which operator actions should have high quality procedures and enhanced (not necessarily more)
.Lining. The underlying assumption is that effective training and simplified procedures can reduce the error rate of the human action. Increasing the reliability of a human action with a low F-V importance will not result in a significant reduction in core damage risk. Therefore, it is not generally in the best interest of the plant to develop and implement enhanced training or procedures for a human action with a low F-V importance. Table I lists the top 15 human actions in order of highest to lowest F-V importance.
RAW is a measure of the increase in total CDF assuming the human action is never performed correctly (i.e.,
error probability is 1). This measure is not truly risk informed as it only relates to the consequences of the error without regard for the likelihood of occurrence (in reality it is a hybrid deterministic/probabilistic measure combining an assumed error, and the probabilistic result of the error). For example, a simple action to start a turbine driven pump from the Control Room will have a higher RAW than the pump due tor the lower failure probability of the human action even though the consequence of the failures is the same (i.e., the pump doesn't work). This would lead one to believe that the action to start the pump is more important than the pump itself, and more resources should be spent training on the human action when in reality, the weak link is the pump.
Human actions with a high error probability but a low RAW will have little or no impact on CDF if the error robability is reduced. Also, a human action with a high RAW but an error probability that is already low (less han about IE-3) cannot, in most cases, be improved no matter how much the training or procedures are nhanced. However, a high RAW does indicate human actions for which training should not be reduced or rocedures made more complicated. Table 2 lists the top 15 human actions in order of highest to lowest RAW:
REC'D JUN II Z002
To obtain the most useful information from these two ranked lists, both should be examined in combination for specific type of insights they provide. Please contact me or anyone in the PRA Group if you have any Muesttons on how to apply this information. We will be happy to meet with you to discuss it.
L.
61YI7/ZD Prepared by: .4 anes MastA ark Reviewed By:
Paul Knioespel Table 1: HEPs Sorted by F-V HEP Identifier Description Point Estimate F-V RAW HEP-HHR-EOPI3-23 High Head Recirculation 1.25E-2 1.71E-1 14.5 HEP-ODC-EOP-3-21 Failure to depressurize intact Steam 2.00E-2 1.59E-1 8.8 Generator after a SGTR HEP-RHR-EOP] 3-23 Low Head Recirculation 2.45E-2 1.49E-1 6.9 HEP-RCS-CSPHI-12 Operator Fails to establish Feed and Bleed 2.36E-2 1.26E-1 6.2 (no SI signal)
-- HEP-CST-LOW- Failure to recognize need for alternate feed 3.901-4 1.18E-1 303.7 for AFW after draining CST 125-HEP-EOP1O-08 Failure to re-establish a battery charger 4.20E-3 9.83E-2 24.3 after an undervoltage REC-OPEN-CV0112 Failure to manually open CV-112B: RWST 1.00E-1 6.25E-2 1.6 to charging HEP-ECA-EOP31-32 Failure to cool down and depressurize 7.70E-3 4.521-2 6.8 AF-HEP-CST-FW- Failure to establish Fire Water backup 1.1E-2 3.67E-2 4.3 AFW after draining CST HEP-MS-EOP-3-02 Failure to diagnose a SGTR event 4.75E-3 3.38E-2 8.1 AF-HEP-CST-SW- Failure to establish Service Water to AFW 4.6E-3 3.21E-2 7.9 after draining CST AF--HEP-MDP-Flow Failure to manually control flow on 4.4E-2 2.9E-2 1.6 MDAFW pumps after a loss of IA and Nitrogen 138-HEP-STARTGO5 Failure to manually start and align G05 1.3E-1 2.77E-2 1.2 AF-HBP-CST-SWMD Failure to establish service water backup to 1.5E-2 2.17E-2 2.4 AFW after draining CST REC-MAN-OPENVLV Failure to manually open IAsupply to IE-1 2.12E-2 1.2 containment HEP-IA-FO-04748 Failure to re-open 3047 or 3048 valve after 1E-3 2.06E-2 21.6 maintenance
_____________ L_____________________________ &
- 2- HEPs Sorted by RAW HEP Identifier Description Point Estimate F-V RAW AF-HEP-CST-LOW- Failure to recognize need for alternate feed 3.90E-4 1.1 SE-I 303.7 for AFW after draining CST 125-HEP-EOP10-08 Failure to re-establish a battery charger 4.20E-3 9.83E-2 24 3 after an undervoltage HEP-RP-AOP9B-63 Operator fails to manually trip with a 1.I E-4 2.06E-3 19.7 Component Cooling Water or Service Water transient HEP-HHR-EOP13-23 High Head Recirculation 1.25E-2 1.71E-1 14.5 HEP-ODC-EOP-3-21 Failure to depressurize intact Steam 2.OOE-2 1.59E-1 8.8 Generator after a SGTR HEP-MS--EOP-3-02 Failure to diagnose a SGTR event 4.75E-3 3.38E-2 8.1 HEP-RHR-EOP13-23 Low Head Recirculation 2.45E-2 1.49E-1 6.9 HEP-ECA-EOP31-32 Failure to cool down and depressurize 7.70E-3 4.52E-2 6.8 HEP-RCS-CSPHI-12 Operator Fails to establish Feed and Bleed 2.36E-2 1.26E-1 6.2 (no SI signal)
HEP-CCW-EOP13-03 Failure to manually start CCS pump 1.2E-4 5.12E-4 5.3 AF-HEP-CST-FW- Failure to establish Fire Water backup 1.1E-2 3.67E-2 4.3 A.FW after draining CST
-HEP-CST-SWMD Failure to establish service water backup to 1.51-2 2.171-2 2.4 AFW after draining CST HEP-ODA-EOP12-05 Failure to cooldown and depressurize after 2.7E-3 3.77E-3 2.4 a small LOCA HEP-IA-FO-START Failure to manually restart IA or SA 6.9E-4 5.82E04 1.8
