ML023290477
| ML023290477 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/15/2002 |
| From: | Salas P Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TVA-SQN-TS-02-01 | |
| Download: ML023290477 (174) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:Tennessee Valley Authonty, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37384-2000 November 15, 2002 TVA-SQN-TS-02-01 10 CFR 50.90 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen: In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) UNITS 1 AND 2 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE NO. 02 NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINTS FOR REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) INSTRUMENTATION AND RELOCATION OF LOSS OF POWER AND RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90, TVA is submitting a request for an amendment to SQN's licenses DPR 77 and 79 to change the TSs for Units 1 and 2. The proposed change will revise the trip setpoint column of the RPS and ESF instrumentation tables to utilize a nominal setpoint value and revise the associated Bases discussions. The column will be relabeled "Nominal Trip Setpoint" with the inequalities removed from applicable values. The term "trip setpoint" has been evaluated throughout the TSs and has been revised to "nominal trip setpoint" as necessary and the use of the term "nominal" has been eliminated as appropriate. This change is being requested in response to NRC concerns regarding the use of inequalities for RPS and ESF nominal trip setpoint values. This concern was identified in NRC D901ýZ Prnted on recycled paper
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 November 15, 2002 Inspection Report Nos. 50-327 and 50-328/95-26. This change is also consistent with NRC proposed and approved Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Item TSTF-355. In addition, revisions are being made to the RPS underfrequency reactor coolant pump (RCP) nominal trip setpoint and allowable value, the RPS undervoltage RCP allowable value, and the ESF containment purge air exhaust monitor radioactivity high allowable value. The loss of power and radiation monitoring instrumentation will be relocated to new limiting conditions for operation sections consistent with the intent of the requirements in the latest version of the standard TSs (NUREG-1431, Revision 2). The relocated requirements for the radiation monitoring instrumentation-will also utilize the recommendations of NRC approved TSTF-161 by placing the applicability requirements in the associated table. Included in this relocation is the addition of a maximum value for the 6.9-killovolt shutdown board loss of voltage and degraded voltage sensors to protect against inadvertent actuation of the emergency diesel generators. This revision is consistent with NRC proposed and approved TSTF-365. TVA has determined that there are no significant hazards considerations associated with the proposed change and that the change is exempt from environmental review pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 51.22(c) (9). The SQN Plant Operations Review Committee and the SQN Nuclear Safety Review Board have reviewed this proposed change and determined that operation of SQN Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the proposed change will not endanger the health and safety of the public. Additionally, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b) (1), TVA is sending a copy of this letter and attachments to the Tennessee State Department of Public Health. to this letter provides the description and evaluation of the proposed change. This includes TVA's determination that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration, and is exempt from environmental review. contains copies of the appropriate TS pages from Units 1 and 2 marked-up to show the proposed change.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 November 15, 2002 There are no new regulatory commitments being made by this submittal. TVA does not have any specific schedule requirements for this request and processing can be pursued as necessary. TVA requests that the revised TS be made effective within 45 days of NRC approval. This letter is being submitted in accordance with NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2001-05. If you have any questions about this change, please telephone me at (423) 843-7170 or J. D. Smith at (42 )83
- 72.
Licensing and Industry Affairs Manager I declare under penalty of perjury that thefore oing is true and correct. Executed on this j-day of iA e Enclosures cc (Enclosures): Mr. Lawrence E. Nanney, Director Division of Radiological Health Third Floor L&C Annex 401 Church Street Nashville, Tennessee 37243-1532 Mr. Frank Masseth Framatome ANP, Inc. 3315 Old Forest Road P.
- 0. Box 10935 Lynchburg, VA 24506-0935
ENCLOSURE 1 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) UNITS 1 and 2 DOCKET NOS. 327 AND 328 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE TS 02-01 DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE I. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE The proposed TS change will rename the Trip Setpoint column of TS Tables 2.2-1 and 3.3-4, remove the inequality signs for the trip setpoint values as appropriate, and revise the inequality representation for the allowable values (Avs) as needed. The new title for the Trip Setpoint column will be Nominal Trip Setpoint. Bases discussions clarify operable conditions for the functions and prescribe conditions where the setpoints may be set more conservatively. This revision also includes the revision of other locations in the TSs that currently use the term "trip setpoint" and need to be changed to "nominal trip setpoint" to be consistent with the table title. The Bases have been revised as necessary to support these changes. The term "nominal" will be removed from the average temperature at rated thermal power (T') definition in Table 2.2-1, Note 1 and from the lift setting requirement in Section 3.4.12 and the associated Figure 3.4-4. The current trip setpoints will now be represented by a nominal value that will not include an inequality sign. This change does not alter the value of the trip setpoint except as noted below. Avs that are currently represented with a numerical value and a tolerance expressed as a plus or minus, are revised to utilize a representation with inequalities that retains the current limits. Additional changes are proposed to the TS instrumentation tables that involve the revision of a trip setpoint, two Avs, and a required minimum channels operable. Specifically, the nominal trip setpoint for the reactor coolant pump (RCP) underfrequency reactor trip in TS Table 2.2-1 has been changed from 56.0 Hertz (Hz) to 57.0 Hz. The Avs for the RCP underfrequency and undervoltage function in TS Table 2.2-1 have been revised. The underfrequency value has been changed from greater than or equal to 55.9 Hz to greater than or equal to 56.3 Hz. The undervoltage Av has been changed from greater than or equal to 4739 volts to greater than or equal to 4952 volts. The required minimum channels operable for the EI-I
auxiliary feedwater (AFW) loss of power start load shed timer in TS Table 3.3-1 has been revised from 2 per shutdown board to 1 per shutdown board. This revision also modifies Action 35 of TS Table 3.3-1 to accommodate this revision to the required channels. The requirements for the containment ventilation isolation (CVI), loss of power instrumentation, and associated actions in the engineered safety features (ESF) tables have been relocated to new limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) in the instrumentation section of the SQN TSs. In addition, the radiation monitoring instrumentation LCO has been relocated to new LCOs or are already included in other TSs. With these revisions there are four new LCOs that include specifications for CVI instrumentation, auxiliary building gas treatment system (ABGTS) actuation instrumentation, control room emergency ventilation system (CREVS) actuation instrumentation, and loss of power emergency diesel generator (EDG) start instrumentation. New TS Bases sections are provided for each of the new LCOs consistent with the latest standard TSs (NUREG-1431). This revision deletes the current requirements for the reactor coolant system (RCS) leak detection in the radiation monitoring specification based on redundant requirements being located in TS 3.4.6.1. This change will also require a revision to Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.4.6.1.a to define the frequency of the leakage detection instrumentation tests that previously referred to the radiation monitoring specification. These relocated specifications utilize revised LCO requirements, actions, and surveillances that are more consistent with NUREG-1431. In addition, TS limiting values for the radiation monitoring instrumentation have been revised from a trip setpoint to an Av representation. The Av for the CVI function has been increased in the proposed revision from the current requirement in the ESF instrumentation section. These values are based on the latest SQN analysis for limiting actuation values for the
- CVI, ABGTS, and CREVS.
The proposed revision includes the necessary changes to the TS index for the relocated specifications. II. REASON FOR THE PROPOSED CHANGE This revision of the trip setpoint phrase and column title, the trip setpoint inequality signs, the Av inequality representation, the term "nominal" for limiting values, and the Bases, is being proposed to support a request by NRC that TVA discontinue the use of inequalities for representing nominal trip setpoint values. This request is E1-2
the result of representing setpoints that are intended to be a nominal value, with margin above and below the value, and implying that they are limits by utilizing inequality signs. This change is similar to TS changes that have been approved for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant and Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, and the initial TSs for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. In addition, this change is consistent with the NRC approved Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Item TSTF-355. The RCP underfrequency setpoint was revised to support the accuracy of currently installed instrumentation. The underfrequency instrumentation was modified without identifying the need to revise the associated TS requirements. This error has been evaluated in accordance with the SQN Corrective Action Program. The Av was revised in accordance with the setpoint methodology as required for the associated setpoint change. This provides a more appropriate value that supports the safety limit for this function. These changes have been conservatively applied in the plant and are consistent with current TS requirements. In addition, the Av for the RCP undervoltage function has been revised to incorporate the required method for evaluating this function. The current Av is based on the TVA setpoint methodology. TVA' s position is to use the Westinghouse Electric Company setpoint methodology for instrumentation functions that were originally included in the Westinghouse setpoint analysis for SQN. Since this function meets this criteria, TVA is revising the Av to a value consistent with the Westinghouse methodology. TVA evaluated the use of the TVA methodology in accordance with the Corrective Action Program because of procedural requirements that were not met for this protection function. This evaluation identified one other function that did not utilize the appropriate setpoint methodology for a portion of the analysis. The correction of this error did not result in any change to the setpoint or the Av. The change in minimum channels operable for the AFW loss of power timers is to provide a more appropriate requirement in consideration of the plant design. This timer function supports the actuation of the loss of power start of the AFW pumps. This function is provided by both trains of power and the voltage sensors for each train are arranged in a two-out-of-three logic scheme. Using redundant timers in each train of this function after the detection of low voltage provides a conservative design but is in excess of the required design for mitigation features. Therefore, these timers should not have to meet single failure E1-3
requirements in the TSs and only one timer is required to satisfy the loss of power start function. The associated action is modified to provide the appropriate wording for this change in required channels. The current requirements for CVI,
- ABGTS, CREVS, and EDG loss of power start instrumentation is contained in various sections of the ESF instrumentation and radiation monitoring instrumentation specifications.
Many of the requirements in the radiation monitoring specification provide for monitoring but does not adequately address the actuation of accident mitigation functions. The latest version of NUREG-1431 recommends specific LCOs for these functions that are designed to specifically address the mitigation requirements. The proposed revision adds new LCOs and associated Bases similar to the NUREG-1431 recommendations to improve the control of TS required features and provide consistency with the NUREG. The Av revision for the containment purge air exhaust monitor radioactivity high function increases the value for this function currently found in the ESF instrumentation specification. TVA evaluated the accuracy calculations and determined that margin existed such that the Av could be increased without impacting the safety limit. This change is proposed to incorporate available margin into the TSs in accordance with the latest TVA calculations. The current TS requirement for RCS leakage detection refers to the radiation monitoring LCO for the frequency of surveillance performance. Since this portion of the LCO is proposed for deletion, the frequency for the channel check, channel calibration, and channel functional test is being added to the leak detection SR. This change will ensure the appropriate interval for surveillance performance without the need to refer to other LCOs. III. SAFETY ANALYSIS Revision to Nominal Trip Setpoints The title change to "nominal trip setpoint" and the removal of the inequality signs, along with the associated Bases
- changes, is not a change in the current application of the TSs.
The SQN setpoint methodology considers the values in the trip setpoint column to be a nominal value and the calibration procedures have implemented the requirements in this manner. This is an administrative change that is intended to resolve a concern associated with using an inequality sign with a nominal value. In addition to the setpoint change, the representation of the Avs has been revised to exclusively use inequalities in place of plus El-4
and minus allowances. This change also does not change the application of the TSs. The classification of the overtemperature delta temperature T' parameter and the low temperature overpressure protection power operated relief valve (PORV) lift settings as nominal values is not accurate with the evolution of the nominal setting philosophy utilized for RPS and ESF instrumentation. The T' and PORV lift setting values are limiting parameters for TS compliance and should not be described as nominal values. The description of these values, as limits with the appropriate inequalities, is the most accurate method for their representation. Bases discussions provide guidance on the proper use of the nominal trip setpoint representation by indicating conditions that maintain the operability of the function and the acceptability to set functions in the conservative direction. This guidance does not alter the current application of the TSs or the intent of the TSs. Therefore, this change to the nominal trip setpoint representation will not impact plant safety because this revision of the TSs does not change the intent or application of the requirements. Reactor Coolant Pump Underfrequency Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value Revisions The setpoint revision for the RCP underfrequency function was required to address the accuracy of replacement instrumentation. TVA failed to identify this revision when the modification was implemented. This failure has been addressed by the TVA Corrective Action Program. TVA Calculation SQN-EEB-MS-T128-0076, Revision 4, provides the basis for the revised setpoint value. The proposed setpoint was evaluated within the calculation to ensure that erroneous reactor trips resulting from normal frequency fluctuations would not occur and that the lower safety limit of 55.8 Hz would not be impacted. An upper operational limit of 58.5 Hz was chosen primarily because the normal continuous operating frequency is 59.5 to 60.5 Hz. In accordance with SQN' s Westinghouse setpoint methodology, the channel statistical allowance (CSA) for an instrumentation loop is defined by the following equation: CSA = EA+{ (PMA) 2+(PEA) 2+(SCA+SMTE+SD) 2+(SPE) 2+(STE)2 +(RCA+RMTE+RCSA+RD) 2+(RTE) 2I12 The error terms for the above equation as defined by SQN' s Westinghouse setpoint methodology are; environmental El-5
allowance (EA), process measurement accuracy (PMA), primary element accuracy (PEA), sensor calibration accuracy (SCA), sensor measurement and test equipment accuracy (SMTE), sensor drift (SD), sensor pressure effects (SPE), sensor temperature effects (STE), rack calibration accuracy (RCA), rack drift (RD), rack temperature effects (RTE), rack measurement and test equipment accuracy (RMTE), and rack calibration setting accuracy (RCSA). Since this loop only involves the relay, the above terms are evaluated for applicability. The error terms defined in the equation for the primary element and sensor are not applicable since the relay directly monitors the RCP frequency. As documented within the accuracy calculation, the relay is not subjected to harsh environmental parameters of radiation and temperature from a design basis accident. Therefore, the EA term of the equation is not applicable. From TVA Calculation SQN-EEB-MS-T128-0076, Revision 4, the resulting rack effects (RE) portion of the CSA equation for the relay is: RE = +/-{ (RCA+RMTE+RD+RCSA) 2 +RTE 2} 1/2 RE = +/-{ (0.008+(0.05+0.05)+0.553+0.05)2+0.0082}1/2 RE = +/-0.711 Hz Therefore, the error around the setpoint is 57 +/- 0.711 Hz or 57.711 Hz to 56.289 Hz. These results do not impact the lower safety limit of 55.8 Hz nor challenge the normal operational frequency of 59.5 to 60.5 Hz. The results of this calculation provide adequate verification that the installed underfrequency instrumentation will actuate within the required accident analysis assumptions to support accident mitigation. Current TVA procedures conservatively utilize the proposed 57 Hz setpoint requirement to properly maintain the associated safety limit. The Av for this function has been revised to be compatible with the proposed setpoint. This Av is defined by the Westinghouse methodology as: Av = Setpoint-the lowest of the values T, or T2 T, and T2 are referred to as the "trigger values" defined by SQN' s Westinghouse setpoint methodology. The T, method involves the values used in the statistical calculation as follows: T, = (RCA+RMTE+RD+RCSA) E1-6
T, = (0.008+0.1+0.553+0.05) Hz T1 = 0.771 Hz The T2 method extracts these values from the calculation and compares these numbers statistically against the total allowance as follows: T2 = TA-({ A+(S) 2} 1 1 2+EA) where; A = (PMA) 2+(PEA) 2+(SPE) 2+(STE)2+(RTE) 2 S = (SCA+SMTE+SD) TA = Total Allowance = Setpoint-Reactor Trip Safety Limit = 57 Hz-55.8 Hz = 1.2 Hz Therefore, T2 = TA-{ (PMA) 2+(PEA) 2+(SCA+SMTE+SD) 2+(SPE) 2+(STE) 2 +(RTE) 2 } 1/ 2 -EA As previously stated, this loop only involves a relay. The error terms defined in the equation for the process error and sensor are not applicable since the relay directly monitors the RCP frequency. The relay is located in an auxiliary building area not subjected to harsh environmental parameters of radiation and temperature from a design basis accident. Therefore, the EA term of the equation is not applicable. This only leaves the RTE term in the equation as follows: T, = 1.2-{ (0.008)2}1/2 = 1.192 Hz The above value for T, was found to be the most restrictive or lowest of the two values and therefore, utilized to determine Av as follows: Av = Setpoint-T1 Av = 57 Hz-0.711 Hz Av = 56.289 Hz or 56.3 Hz conservatively rounded up The revised Av continues to provide assurance that the safety limit for the underfrequency reactor trip function is not impacted. TVA has verified that past calibrations for this function, with the proposed setpoint, have satisfied the new Av. Reactor Coolant Pump Undervoltage Allowable Value Revision During the setpoint evaluation for the underfrequency
- function, TVA identified an inconsistency in the calculation method used for the RCP undervoltage function.
This method utilized a relaxed formula for calculating the Av in accordance with a methodology developed by TVA instead of the Westinghouse methodology. The TVA methodology allows two methods for calculating the Av with E1-7
the one that was used for this function being less conservative than the Westinghouse method. The Av has been recalculated using the Westinghouse setpoint methodology since the loop was included in the original Westinghouse analysis. TVA' s position is to use the Westinghouse methodology for instrumentation of this type. The use of TVA' s methodology for this function has been evaluated by the SQN Corrective Action Program. TVA evaluated the Av for the RCP undervoltage within TVA Calculation SQN-EEB-27DAT that has been revised to resolve this concern. The error terms for this function are defined by SQN' s Westinghouse setpoint methodology in the same manner as described for the underfrequency relay. These terms are utilized, along with the setpoint that has not changed, to determine the Av which is defined as: Av = Setpoint-the lowest of the values T, or T2 T, and T2 values were evaluated as previously described for the underfrequency function. The T, determination is as follows: T, = (RCA+RMTE+RD+RCSA) T, = (0.5+0.2+0.2+0.5)% of Setpoint T, = 1.4% of Setpoint or 0.014x5022 volts alternating current (VAC) = 70.3 VAC The T2 evaluation resulted in a value of 311.76 volts and is less restrictive than the T, value. Therefore, the T, value was used to determine the Av as follows: Av = Setpoint-T1 Av = 5022-70.3 VAC Av = 4951.7 VAC or 4952 VAC conservatively rounded up The setpoint value and associated safety limit are not affected by this change of the Av. SQN' s calibration procedures have been evaluated and verified to be in compliance with the proposed Av. Containment Purge and Exhaust Radiation Monitor Allowable Value Revision The Av revision for the containment purge air exhaust radioactivity high function is being proposed to properly represent function limits and operability conditions. TVA has been satisfying the more conservative Av that is currently in place. TVA Calculation 1,2-RE-90-130/131, Revision 0, evaluated this function and determined that sufficient margin existed to increase the Av without impacting the safety limit. TVA used a setpoint EI-8
methodology in this calculation that was developed by TVA for instrumentation that was not included in the original Westinghouse setpoint analysis. The TVA setpoint methodology includes two methods for determining an acceptable Av similar to the T, and T2 evaluations in the SQN' s Westinghouse methodology. The TVA calculations representing the two methods are: Av(max) = Safety Limit - (LAn - LAnf) Av(min) = Setpoint + LAnf Where LAnf is defined as the Loop Normal Measurable Accuracy and includes the errors that may be detected during a calibration. These error terms include Drift, Component Accuracy, Calibration Accuracy, and Calibration Uncertainties.
- Whereas, the LAn term also incorporates these terms in addition to terms that are not detectable during a calibration such as Process Measurement Errors.
TVN s methodology allows the use of either result or a value between the limiting Avs. For the high radiation containment purge function, a value between the limiting Avs was used. TVA has chosen to use an intermediate value based on the past history of the function. From TVA calculation 1,2-RE-90-130/131, Revision 0, the Containment Purge Air Exhaust Radiation Monitor Safety Limit is: Safety Limit(LWR Containment Purge) = 1.96 X 106 cpm Safety Limit(UPR Containment Purge) = 1.58 X 105 cpm The smaller of the Safety Limits (1.58 x 10s cpm) for the bistable (BS) will be analyzed for conservatism. +LAnfBS = +0.581 V (+123.2% of reading) +LAnBs = +0.726 V (+172.6% of reading) +Av is defined as follows: +Av = Safety Limit - (LAnBS LAnfBS + Margin) Where Margin is defined as 0.182 volts or 25% of LAnBS for conservatism. Converting the Safety Limit to volts: E1-9
Log[Input(cpm)]- 1 Safety Limit (volts) = E#of Decadesl I Voltage Span] Safety Limit (volts) Log[ 6.58x1 5] [6] Safety Limit (volts) = 6.998 volts Therefore; +Av (volts) = 6.998 (0.726 - 0.581 + 0.182) +Av (volts) = 6.671 volts Converting to counts per minute (cpm); [ OIIIpn(VOUf) A' ofo[DLcadev +1 +Av (cpm) = 10 1 1otageSpan S6671 X 6+ +1 +Av (cpm) = 10 10 +Av (cpm) = 1.00 x 10 5cpm(rounded down for conservatism) This evaluation verified that the setpoint was acceptable without change. Therefore, implementation of the proposed Av revision will not impact plant safety functions and the actuations associated with the high radiation containment purge function will continue to support accident mitigation assumptions. Auxiliary Feedwater and Emergency Diesel Generator Loss-of Power Timers The minimum channels operable requirement change for the AFW and 6.9-killovolt shutdown board loss of power timers is to provide a more appropriate requirement in consideration of the plant design. These timers function to support the actuation of the loss of power start of the AFW pumps and the EDGs. This function is provided by both trains of shutdown power and the voltage sensors for each train are arranged in a two-out-of-three logic scheme. Using redundant timers in each redundant train of this function, after the detection of low voltage, provides a conservative design but is in excess of the requirements for mitigation features. Therefore, multiple timers in each train should not have to meet single failure requirements in the TSs and only one timer is required to satisfy the loss of power start functions. Single failure criteria is satisfied by having actuation capability from El-10
either redundant train in the event of a loss of power condition. The associated action for the AFW and diesel generator start on loss of power is modified to provide the appropriate wording for this change in required channels. While these changes reduce the current redundancy capability, the remaining provisions for the loss of power timers continue to fully satisfy all accident mitigation requirements associated with AFW and EDG starts and maintain single failure requirements. This change is also consistent with NUREG-1431 recommendations because multiple timers are not addressed for either of these functions. Allowable Value for Fuel Storage Pool Area Radiation Monitors The revision to utilize an Av column in the new LCOs for
- CVI, ABGTS, and CREVS does not impact the trip setpoints for these functions or the operability limits.
The Av is a better indicator of function operability and TVA' s setpoint methodology and plant procedures provide the appropriate setpoints to maintain the instrumentation within this allowance. The Avs utilized were developed with the same methodology as the Av for the containment purge air exhaust radioactivity high function previously discussed. The following Av results were determined using this methodology: From TVA Calculation 0-RE-90-102/103, Revision 1, the Fuel Storage Pool Area Radiation Monitor Safety Limit is 375.49 mR/hr. Converting the Safety Limit to volts; Safety Limit (volts) = 2 x [ log(375.49)+l] Safety Limit (volts) = 7.149 volts +Av = Safety Limit - (LAnBS - LAnfBS+ + Margin); Where Margin is defined as 0.158 volts or - 25% of LAnBs+ for conservatism. +Av = 7.149 - (0.632 -0.618 + 0.158) volts +Av = 6.977 volts Converting to mR/hr: +Av (mR/hr) = 101 (6.977 x 5 ) /10 1 -1 +Av (mR/hr) = 307 mR/hr (rounded down for conservatism) El-Il
Allowable Value for Control Room Intake Radiation Monitors From TVA Calculation 0-RE-90-125/126, Revision 0, the Control Room Intake Radiation Monitor Safety Limit for bistable control function (transfer from normal to emergency mode) is 6.82 x 104 counts per minute (cpm). loop bistable errors are: the The +LAnfBS = +0.581 V (+123.2% of reading) +LAnBS = +0.726 V (+172.6% of reading) +Av is defined as follows: +Av = Safety Limit - (LAnBS LAnfBs + Margin) Where margin is defined as 0.182 volts or 25% of +LAnBS for conservatism. Converting the Safety Limit to volts: Safety Limit Safety Limit (volts) = (volts) = Log[Input(cpm)] - I L#of Decades-1 Voltage Span o Log[6 82 x 104 ] - 1 10 6] Safety Limit (volts) = 6.390 volts Therefore; +Av (volts) = 6.390 - (0.726 - 0.581 + 0.182) +Av (volts) = 6.063 V Converting to cpm; +Av (cpm) = 104 Onrput(vott5) X #of Decadev +1 l'ohage Span J 6063 X 6 1 +Av (cpm) = 10' 10 1 +Av (cpm) = 4.34 x 104 (rounded down for conservatism) The implementation of this change to utilize the Av in place of an alarm/trip setpoint will continue to ensure proper operability settings for these functions and will not impact nuclear safety. El-12
Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation The modification of the new LCOs to be more consistent with NUREG-1431 revised several aspects of the requirements. For the new LCO 3.3.3.11, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation," the applicability requirements have been changed to focus the required modes and conditions to be those in which the function is credited for accident mitigation. Current applicability includes Modes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6. These requirements are maintained with one exception, the Mode 6 application is being changed to during movement of irradiated fuel in containment. This change is acceptable because the CVI function is only credited in Mode 6 for a fuel handling accident which is only postulated to occur during movement of irradiated fuel. The containment attribute is based on the CVI only protecting against accidents that originate in containment. The new LCO utilizes a table to describe the applicable functions and has included the safety injection function that is not specifically in the current requirements. This addition clarifies the signals that support the CVI actuation function and retains the current requirements. The LCO table also utilizes a required channels field in place of the previous minimum channels operable and has increased the required channels for the containment purge air and exhaust radiation monitor during movement of irradiated fuel to two channels. This increase in required channels is to ensure the necessary redundancy for the initiation of accident mitigation functions is maintained. This is a conservative, more restrictive change to the current requirements that supports nuclear safety functions. The requirement for one radiation monitoring channel to be operable in Modes 1 through 4 is retained consistent with the current specifications even though they are not credited for actuation in these modes. The CVI actions have been revised to provide measures that more appropriately address the inoperable conditions. Specifically, in place of the current requirements to be in hot standby within 12 hours and closing containment purge and exhaust valves when in Modes 1 through 4 for inoperable radiation monitors, the proposed actions will require entry into TS 3.6.3 for inoperable containment purge and exhaust isolation valves. If the CVI instrumentation inoperability involves manual initiation or automatic actuation logic functions, the proposed actions will require entry into TS 3.6.3 for inoperable containment ventilation isolation valves. For inoperable functions during fuel movement, the current action to enter TS 3.9.9, if both radiation monitors are inoperable, El-13
is revised to require entry in TS 3.9.4 for containment building penetrations consistent with NUREG-1431. The requirements of TS 3.9.4 provide equivalent isolation actions for flow paths that communicate with outside atmospheres and has the same applicability. The action is also expanded to include any of the associated CVI instrumentation and includes a 4-hour interval to enter TS 3.9.4 if only one monitor is inoperable. The revised actions for Modes 1 through 4 are acceptable because they require entry into the CIV specification that addresses the function that has been degraded by the CVI actuation inoperability. The current 12-hour shutdown requirement is not necessary if containment integrity can be satisfied in accordance with the requirements of TS 3.6.3. TS 3.6.3 provides equivalent actions to the closure of the purge and exhaust valves by isolating each affected flow path with at least one device that can not inadvertently open. Therefore, the new requirements are equivalent, more appropriate, or more restrictive to improve the overall assurance that inoperable CVI instrumentation does not adversely impact nuclear safety. The actions for inoperable instrumentation during fuel movement is the same as currently required with two exceptions. The new actions require entry into TS 3.9.4 if only one radiation monitor is inoperable. Current requirements do not specifically recognize the need to address only one inoperable monitor except to return the setpoint to within limits within four hours or declare the channel inoperable. This exception is not necessary with the addition of the more restrictive action. This new action has a four-hour time limit to enter TS 3.9.4 and is necessary because the radiation monitors provide the only qualified and credited function to initiate a CVI during fuel movement inside containment. This ensures single failure criteria is maintained for accident mitigation and is a more conservative position for nuclear safety. These new CVI actions include a provision to allow separate entry into the actions for each of the functions listed in the associated LCO table. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431 and does not impact the intent of the provisions to properly maintain the CVI actuation requirements. Additionally, TVA is retaining the current exception to TS 3.0.4 that allows entry into this LCO without having to meet LCO requirements. This provision is not contained in the latest version of NUREG-1431 but is consistent with the current licensing basis for SQN that includes this provision not only for the CVI instrumentation but also for the CIV requirements for Modes 1 through 4 in TS 3.6.3. This exclusion to TS 3.0.4 will not adversely impact nuclear safety. However, the El-14
current exception to TS 3.0.3 is eliminated consistent with NUREG-1431 because the exception is not necessary to properly maintain the safety function and does not result in additional burden to plant operation. The SRs for the new CVI LCO maintain the same channel check, calibration, and functional test requirements with the addition of the need to be in frequency for movement of irradiated fuel. This is a conservative addition to the current requirements. The current response time SRs are maintained consistent with the current licensing basis. This surveillance is more restrictive than the NUREG-1431 recommendations and provides assurance that the system will actuate within the necessary time limits to support the safety function. Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System Actuation Instrumentation The new LCO 3.3.3.12, "Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System Actuation Instrumentation," has revised LCO requirements that are similar to those proposed for the CVI LCO. The LCO will use a required channels field in place of the minimum channels operable field and the addition of functions for manual initiation and containment isolation Phase A. These changes improve the identification of the functions that support the ABGTS actuation function and is a more conservative representation. The required channel provision for the fuel pool area radiation monitors maintains the current one channel requirement but clarifies that it must be in the same train as the required ABGTS train. This provision is not consistent with NUREG-1431 which requires two channels. The basis for remaining at one channel is that during periods of fuel movement in the fuel pool area, only one train of ABGTS is required to be operable. The associated fuel pool radiation monitors are designed to only actuate ABGTS in the same train. Therefore, only the radiation monitor that is matched to the required ABGTS train is necessary to satisfy the accident mitigation function. Maintaining the current one channel provision with the train specific requirement enhances the LCO to ensure the proper radiation monitor is operable. The current applicability requirement for the radiation monitors is based on fuel in the storage pool and the proposed revision is to be during movement of irradiated fuel in the fuel handling area. This change is acceptable because the only activity that can result in the postulated fuel handling accident, that this instrumentation protects against, is the movement of irradiated fuel in the storage pool area. The current El-15
requirement is overly conservative and is not necessary based on the lack of potential for an event that requires ABGTS actuation without fuel movement. Therefore, the proposed change in applicability is acceptable and does not impact nuclear safety. The applicability for the manual initiation function is added and ensures the availability of manual actuation when the unit is in operation and during movement of irradiated fuel. This is a conservative addition that will enhance the safety function because the manual initiation function was not previously included in any specific TS provision. The current SQN actions for ABGTS instrumentation only addresses the total loss of both fuel pool radiation monitors. The proposed actions for ABGTS address not only the fuel pool monitors but also the manual actuation and containment Phase A isolation instrumentation in Modes 1 through 4 and during fuel movement. The current actions for loss of all ABGTS instrumentation requires 24-hour surveys of the area with portable instrumentation for an indefinite period of time. This action is of little value in Modes 1 through 4 since a fuel handling event is not possible unless fuel movement is in progress. The proposed actions for Modes 1 through 4 do not require these surveys for the loss of a single function and train but do limit the inoperability to 7 days followed by the shutdown of the unit if an ABGTS train cannot be placed in operation to satisfy single failure considerations. This action is more conservative since the current requirements are not applicable for the loss of a single function and do not address the potential for actuation in the event of containment isolation. For two trains of inoperability, the proposed actions require immediate initiation of one ABGTS train and entry of applicable actions of TS 3.7.8, "Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System," for one train. Alternatively, both trains of ABGTS can be placed in operation or the unit must be shut down. These actions are more conservative than the current requirement to conduct 24-hour surveys and is a more effective means of ensuring that the ABGTS safety function is available if needed for accident mitigation in Modes 1 through 4. The proposed action for inoperable ABGTS functions during movement of irradiated fuel is to immediately place a train of ABGTS in operation. This action is for the loss of both trains similar to the current requirement. The immediate initiation of ABGTS provides a better level of protection against the potential fuel handling accident than the current survey provision. Since this action actually satisfies the safety function in place of only providing a means to detect the need to initiate this function, nuclear safety is enhanced and the proposed El-16
change is acceptable. The proposed actions retain the exception to TS 3.0.4 and drop the TS 3.0.3 exception like the CVI LCO as well as the separate entry provision for the Modes 1 through 4 actions. These provisions are acceptable based on the previous discussions for similar CVI actions. The proposed SRs are the same as currently utilized for the radiation monitors and include the addition of a functional test requirement for the manual initiation function. This functional test requirement is to be performed on a refueling outage frequency that is consistent with manual testing requirements in SQN' s TSs and NUREG-1431. This addition is conservative and ensures the necessary components of the ABGTS actuation instrumentation are available for the mitigation of postulated accidents. SRs for the containment isolation Phase A function is covered in the ESF specification. Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Actuation Instrumentation The new LCO 3.3.3.13, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Actuation Instrumentation," retains most of the current requirements for the radiation monitors. As with the previous new LCOs, the LCO requirements are included in a table that utilizes a required channel column and adds the manual initiation and safety injection functions. These additions provide a more conservative representation of the functions that serve to actuate CREVS. The LCO is the same as current requirements for the control room radiation monitors with two channels and the applicability requirements are unchanged. The actions for the CREVS have been slightly modified to provide consistency with NUREG-1431. The proposed action for one inoperable channel or train in Modes 1 through 4 requires one train of CREVS to be placed in operation within 7 days or initiate unit shutdown. The current LCO requires the train associated with an inoperable radiation monitor be started. This limitation is not required because placing either train in operation accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation. The action for two channels or trains inoperable in Modes 1 through 4 is the same as current requirements but differ from NUREG-1431. The NUREG does not provide the one-hour allowance before taking the required actions. This provision is consistent with the current SQN licensing basis and does not adversely impact safety functions. Action requirements for each of the conditions include a provision to have separate entry into the applicable actions for each El-17
function. This is acceptable because there are multiple actuation functions now in place of the previous single function and CREVS actuation capability will continue to be properly maintained. As previously discussed, the exception to TS 3.0.4 is retained consistent with current requirements and the TS 3.0.3 exception is eliminated. The actions for inoperable CREVS instrumentation in Modes 5 and 6 have been revised for consistency with NUREG-1431. The action for one channel or train inoperable is to place a train of CREVS in service for the same reasons previously discussed for Modes 1 through 4.
- However, if a train cannot be placed in operation within seven days, the alternative is to initiate action to restore a train to service.
This change eliminates the need to initiate a unit shutdown that is not applicable in Modes 5 and 6. This does not negatively impact the safety function and provides a conservative course of action to protect against a waste gas decay tank accident. The action for two channels or trains inoperable maintains the current requirement to delay actions for one hour as discussed for the Modes 1 through 4 action. The actions that apply during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies have incorporated the same changes that utilize the actuation of either train of CREVS and a one-hour delay for actions that apply with two channels or trains inoperable. The basis for these changes are the same as previously discussed. Additionally, the action for failure to place one train of CREVS in service within seven days for one inoperable channel or train is to suspend movement of irradiated fuel. This action is more appropriate than unit shutdown since the only credible accident that requires actuation of CREVS is a fuel handling accident. Unit shutdown could apply if movement of fuel is concurrent with power operation of one unit, then both sets of actions would apply. In this case, suspension of fuel movement is necessary in addition to the unit shutdown. This change provides a more appropriate response to the loss of actuation functions during fuel movement and eliminates the potential for a postulated accident. The SRs for CREVS actuation are the same as currently required with the addition of the manual initiation and safety injection functions. This addition ensures that the other means for initiating CREVS are available and capable of performing the required actuation. The surveillance frequencies for the new functions are consistent with current requirements for manual and safety injection functions. The control room radiation monitor El-18
surveillance frequency has not been changed by the proposed revision. Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Surveillance Frequency The current radiation monitoring LCO, that has primarily been relocated to new LCOs, contains surveillance frequency requirements for the RCS leakage detection radiation monitoring instrumentation. These requirements are not applicable to any of the proposed LCOs and are being incorporated into TS 3.4.6.1, "Leakage Detection Instrumentation." The only unique leakage detection requirement contained in the current radiation monitoring section was to provide specific surveillance interval limits for the monitors. The LCO, applicability, action, and surveillance testing requirements are already contained in TS 3.4.6.1. The surveillance frequency portion is not contained in TS 3.4.6.1 and relies on the provisions of TS 3.3.3.1, which is proposed to be deleted. The proposed change will incorporate the frequency requirements into the leakage detection specification without change. This change maintains the exact same requirements and therefore, will not affect any safety function. Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start Instrumentation The new LCO 3.3.3.14, "Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start Instrumentation," is the result of requirements moved from the ESF instrumentation specification and TS Tables 3.3-3, 3.3-4, and 4.3-2. The LCO requirements have been incorporated into a table consistent with NUREG-1431 and utilizes information for applicability, required channels, nominal trip setpoint, and Avs. The required channel requirements for the voltage sensors are not changed. The timer requirements are changed from two required channels to one. This is based on the previous discussion regarding the AFW and EDG start actuation functions for these timers. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431 in that the number of timers are not specifically addressed and no implication of timer redundancy is stated. The applicability requirements have not been changed by the proposed revision. The Avs for the loss of power functions has been enhanced in accordance with NUREG-1431 and TSTF Item 365. NRC proposed and approved a change to the NUREG that would add upper limits to the loss of voltage and degraded voltage limits. TVA has incorporated this provision to provide better control of the voltage sensor settings and ensure the accident mitigation capabilities. This change El-19
provides better assurance that unintended actuation of the AFW and EDG start circuitry will not occur. These new limits were developed using TVA setpoint methodology similar to that used in determining the Av for the containment purge air exhaust radioactivity high function previously discussed. The only significant difference for the degraded voltage relay function is that a 25% margin allowance was incorporated into the upper analytical limit (UAL) determination instead of being considered within the allowable value equation resulting in an equivalent level of conservatism. For the loss of voltage relay function, an intermediate value between the maximum and minimum Av was used since sufficient margin did not exist between the relay setpoint and the UAL to allow incorporation of a 25% LAn margin within the calculation of the Av. From TVA Calculation 27DAT, Revision 5, the degraded voltage relay dropout UAL was determined by using the following equation: UAL = Setpoint + LAn + Margin Where the setpoint is 6456 volts, the loop accuracy (LAn) composed of the transformer and relay is 55.77 volts and margin is defined as 25% of LAn for conservatism. Therefore; UAL = 6456 + 55.77 + 13.94 volts UAL = 6526 volts (rounded up) The Av was determined by the TVA setpoint methodology using the following equation: Av = UAL - (LAn - LAnf) Where LAnf is defined as the relay normal measurable accuracy of 52.29 volts. The above equation represents a determination of the maximum allowable value since a margin of 25% LAn has already been incorporated within the determination of the above UAL value. Therefore; Av = 6526 - (55.77 - 52.29) volts Av = 6522.5 volts Based on the above, the TS Av for the 6.9-kV shutdown board degraded voltage is 6522.5 volts. In conjunction with this change, a lower time limit for the degraded voltage time delay has been added. Currently, only a maximum allowable value is utilized and EI-20
this change will ensure that unintended actuations for degraded voltage will not occur when not necessary. This is not a change to the analysis and only adds the value that has been verified and used even though not previously included in the TSs. The time delay functions for the other timers currently have upper and lower limits and retain these limits in the proposed changes. From TVA Calculation 27DAT, Revision 5, the loss of voltage relay Av was determined by using the TVA methodology for the maximum and minimum allowable values. The intermediate value was chosen which is conservative compared to using maximum allowable value. The maximum and minimum Avs were determined utilizing the following TVA setpoint methodology equations: For a decreasing setpoint maximum Av determination; Av(max) = UAL + (LAn - LAnf) For a decreasing setpoint minimum Av determination; Av(mln) = Setpoint - LAnf The above equation for Av(max); Av max) = UAL - (LAn Lanfrelay) Avcmax) = 5700 - (159.45 - 158.59) Av(max) = 5699.14 Volts Av(mn) = Setpoint + LAnfrelay Av(min) = 5520 + 159.45 Av(mln) = 5678.59 Volts The intermediate Av value is determined as follows; = Av(max)+ Av(min) 2 5699.14 + 5678.59 Av ( int) =2 Av(1fnt) = 5688.9 Volts Based on the above, the 6.9-kV shutdown board loss of voltage Av will be defined as 5688 Volts (rounded down for conservatism). El-21
The action requirements have been revised to accommodate the change in required number of timers. This utilizes an action for one inoperable voltage sensor out of the three required and does not address the timers. This action provides a six-hour interval to return the sensor to operable conditions or declare the associated EDG inoperable. This action differs from NUREG-1431, which requires the channel to be tripped within six hours. This action is not utilized because the voltage sensors are not capable of being individually tripped without performing wiring changes in the field. The additional risk of performing this action is not justified and requiring the channel to be returned to operable status instead of placing the function in a partial trip arrangement is an acceptable alternative for this condition. This action will provide an equivalent or more conservative action to ensure the proper actuation of EDG starts. A second action addresses the loss of more than one voltage sensor and all timers. This action is consistent with the current SQN requirements and NUREG-1431. As with the other proposed new LCOs, a provision is being added to allow separate entry into the actions for each function. As previously discussed, this provision does not impact the ability to initiate the start of the EDGs when needed for accident mitigation and provides consistency with NUREG-1431. An exclusion to TS 3.0.4 provisions is maintained when shutdown power sources are required consistent with the current licensing basis. An additional action is being added to this LCO that is not addressed in the current SQN specifications or NUREG-1431. This action is a reminder that some of these voltage sensors and timers provide a start function for the AFW pumps and requires the evaluation of applicable action in the ESF instrumentation specification. By adding this action to the LCO for EDG start instrumentation, any inoperability that could also affect the AFW system will also be considered as applicable. This is a conservative change that will help to ensure the entry into all applicable TS requirements. SRs for the loss of power diesel start instrumentation has not been altered from the current requirements for channel calibrations and functional tests. These requirements differ slightly from the NUREG because of specific SQN plant design. In particular, there is not any indication on the voltage sensors or timers to allow performance of a channel check and therefore, a channel check is not applicable. Channel calibration and functional tests are consistent with the NUREG requirements and utilize the same refueling and monthly frequencies, respectively. The EI-22
current response time SRs are maintained consistent with the current licensing basis. This surveillance is more restrictive than the NUREG-1431 recommendations and provides assurance that the system will actuate within the necessary time limits to support the safety function. Conclusion The proposed changes provide acceptable limits to ensure all accident mitigation and safety functions are available and capable of performing their intended function. In many cases the proposed changes implement more conservative requirements in response to identified non conservative TS requirements or to enhance the ability to maintain safety functions. Changes that relax or retain current licensing basis requirements and are less restrictive that those in NUREG-1431 are acceptable based on the discussions provided. Overall, the proposed changes are acceptable and adequately maintain required safety functions. IV. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION TVA has concluded that operation of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the proposed change to the technical specifications (TSs) does not involve a significant hazards consideration. TVA's conclusion is based on its evaluation, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(a) (1), of the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The proposed TS change will rename the Trip Setpoint column of reactor protection and engineered safety feature (ESF) TS tables to be Nominal Trip Setpoint, remove the inequality signs for the trip setpoint values as appropriate, and revise the inequality representation for the allowable values (Avs) as needed. Bases discussions clarify operable conditions for the functions and prescribe conditions where the setpoints may be set more conservatively. This revision also includes the revision of other TSs that currently use the term "trip setpoint" or "nominal" that needs to be changed to be consistent with the table title. Additional changes are proposed to the TS instrumentation tables that involve the revision of a trip setpoint, two Avs, and a required minimum channels operable. The requirements for the containment ventilation isolation (CVI), loss of power instrumentation, and associated actions in the ESF tables have been relocated to new limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) in the instrumentation section of the SQN TSs. In addition, the El-23
radiation monitoring instrumentation LCO has been relocated to new LCOs or are already included in other TSs. With these revisions there are four new LCOs that include specifications for CVI instrumentation, auxiliary building gas treatment system (ABGTS) actuation instrumentation, control room emergency ventilation system (CREVS) actuation instrumentation, and loss of power emergency diesel generator (EDG) start instrumentation. TS limiting values for the radiation monitoring instrumentation have been revised from a trip setpoint to an Av representation. The Av for the CVI function has been increased in the proposed revision from the current requirement in the ESF instrumentation section. The proposed revision includes the necessary changes to the TS index and Bases for the affected specifications. A. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed revisions for the nominal trip setpoint representation are administrative changes that will not impact the application of the reactor trip or ESF actuation system instrumentation requirements. This is based on the setpoint requirements being applied without change, as well as the Avs, in accordance with the setpoint methodology. The removal of the inequalities associated with the trip setpoint values will be more appropriate for the use of nominal setpoint values but will not differ in application from the setpoint methodology utilized by TVA. The revision of the radiation monitoring instrumentation table to use an Av will continue to provide appropriate operability limits. Deletion of the nominal terminology associated with overtemperature delta temperature average temperature at rated thermal power (T') and reactor coolant system power operated relief valve (PORV) lift settings provides a better representation of the limits associated with these values. In addition, this change will not alter plant equipment or operating practices. Therefore, the implementation of these changes will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident. The revision of the reactor coolant pump (RCP) underfrequency trip setpoint and the Avs for the RCP underfrequeny and undervoltage and the containment purge radiation high has been evaluated and the results are documented in approved calculations. These calculations verify that the revised values are acceptable in accordance with appropriate calculation methodologies and that they will continue to support El-24
the accident analysis. This is based on margin being available in the accuracy determinations that could be used without impacting the intended functions of this instrumentation and maintains the established safety limits. These revisions will not require changes to the instrumentation settings currently being used or the methods for maintaining them. The offsite dose potential will not be impacted because this instrumentation will continue to adequately provide the designed safety functions to limit the release of radioactivity. Therefore, the proposed revision of these values will not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident. The relocation and enhancement of current radiation monitoring and loss of voltage functions to new LCOs does not alter the intended functions of these systems or physically alter these systems. While some requirements have change from current limitations, these changes have provided more appropriate criteria to ensure that the accident mitigation functions are maintained properly and are available. Changes to Avs have been evaluated in accordance with TVA setpoint methodology and have been verified to acceptably protect the associated safety limits. Format changes provide a clearer representation of the requirements and provide more consistency with the standard TSs in NUREG-1431. These changes continue to support or improve the required safety functions and therefore, will not increase the possibility or consequence of an accident. B. The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The revision of the nominal trip setpoint representation and elimination of the nominal nomenclature, as well as the revised setpoint value and Avs, and the relocated LCOs will not alter the plant configuration or functions. The revised setpoint and the proposed operability limits will continue to provide acceptable initiation of safety functions for the mitigation of postulated accidents as required by the design basis. The primary function of the reactor protection system, the ESF actuation system, and the new actuation function LCOs is to initiate accident mitigation functions. These functions are not considered to be initiators of postulated accidents. The PORVs provide accident mitigation functions and could be the source of a loss of coolant accident.
- However, a clarification of how El-25
to apply the actuation setpoints without a change to the setpoints will not impact accident generation. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident because the design functions are not altered and the proposed values meet the accident analysis requirements for accident mitigation. C. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The setpoint and Av revisions proposed in this request were evaluated and found to be acceptable based on operating margin available in the accuracy determinations. The reassignment of this excess margin to the setpoint and Av will not impact the safety limits required for the associated functions. The nominal trip setpoint representation change and the elimination of inappropriate nominal indications does not alter the TS functions or their application and will not require changes to design settings. The relocated requirements to new LCOs provide appropriate limits and enhancements to the actuation functions. Plant systems will continue to be actuated for those plant conditions that require the initiation of accident mitigation functions. The margin of safety is not significantly reduced because the proposed changes to the Av and setpoint representations will not change design functions and the initiation of accident mitigation functions for appropriate plant conditions will not be adversely impacted. V. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CONSIDERATION The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration, a significant change in the types of or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Therefore, the proposed change meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c) (9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), an environmental assessment of the proposed change is not required. El-26
ENCLOSURE 2 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH PLANT (SQN) UNITS 1 and 2 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE TS 02-01 MARKED PAGES I. AFFECTED PAGE LIST Unit 1 Index Page V 2-4 2-5 2-6 2-6a 2-7 2-8 2-9 2-10 B 2-2 3/4 3-14 3/4 3-17 3/4 3-20 3/4 3-21 3/4 3-22 3/4 3-23 3/4 3-23a 3/4 3-24 3/4 3-25 3/4 3-26 3/4 3-27 3/4 3-27a 3/4 3-27b 3/4 3-28 3/4 3-35 3/4 3-37 3/4 3-37a 3/4 3-39 3/4 3-40 3/4 3-41 3/4 3-42 3/4 4-13 3/4 4-29 3/4 4-30 B 3/4 3-1 B 3/4 3-2a Unit 2 Index Page V 2-4 2-5 2-6 2-7 2-8 2-9 2-10 2-11 2-12 B 2-2 3/4 3-14 3/4 3-17 3/4 3-20 3/4 3-21 3/4 3-22 3/4 3-23 3/4 3-23a 3/4 3-24 3/4 3-25 3/4 3-26 3/4 3-27 3/4 3-27a 3/4 3-27b 3/4 3-28 3/4 3-35 3/4 3-37 3/4 3-38 3/4 3-40 3/4 3-41 3/4 3-42 3/4 3-43 3/4 4-17 3/4 4-34 3/4 4-35 B 3/4 3-1 B 3/4 3-2a II. MARKED PAGES See attached. E2-1
INSERT 1 Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to contain Limiting Safety System Settings (LSSS) defined by the regulation as ". settings for automatic protective devices so chosen that automatic protective action will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded." The analytic limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the analytic limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded.
- However, in practice, the actual settings for automatic protective devices must be chosen to be more conservative than the analytic limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur.
The Nominal Trip Setpoint is a predetermined setting for a protective device chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the analytic limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded. As such, the Nominal Trip Setpoint accounts for uncertainties in setting the device (e.g., calibration), uncertainties in how the device might actually perform (e.g., repeatability), changes in the point of action of the device over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors which may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments). In this manner, the Nominal Trip Setpoint plays an important role in ensuring that SLs are not exceeded. As such, the Nominal Trip Setpoint meets the definition of an LSSS in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.105 and could be used to meet the requirements that they be contained in the technical specifications. Technical specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. OPERABLE is defined in the technical specifications as being capable of performing its safety function(s)." For automatic protective devices, the required safety function is to ensure that a SL is not exceeded and therefore the LSSS as defined by 10 CFR 50.36 is the same as the OPERABILITY limit for these devices. However, use of the Nominal Trip Setpoint to define OPERABILITY in technical specifications and its corresponding designation as the LSSS required by 10 CFR 50.36 would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as found" value of a protective device setting during a surveillance. This would result in technical specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule which are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protective device with a setting that has been found to be different from the Nominal Trip Setpoint due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected. This expected E2-2
drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint methodology for calculating the Nominal Trip Setpoint and thus the antomatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded with the "as found" setting of the protective device. Therefore, the device would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the device to the Nominal Trip Setpoint to account for further drift during the next surveillance interval. Use of the Nominal Trip Setpoint to define "as found" OPERABILITY and its designation as the LSSS under the expected circumstances described above would result in actions required by both the rule and technical specifications that are clearly not warranted. However, there is also some point beyond which the device would have not been able to perform its function due, for example, to greater than expected drift. This value needs to be specified in the technical specifications in order to define OPERABILITY of the devices and is designated as the Allowable Value which, as stated above, is the same as the LSSS. The Allowable Value specified in Table 2.2-1, although conservative, serves as the LSSS such that a channel is OPERABLE if the trip setpoint is found not to exceed the Allowable Value during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. As such, the Allowable Value differs from the Nominal Trip Setpoint by an amount primarily equal to the expected instrument loop uncertainties, such as
- drift, during the surveillance interval.
In this manner, the actual setting of the device will still meet the LSSS definition and ensure that a Safety Limit is not exceeded at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval. Note that, although the channel is "OPERABLE" under these circumstances, the trip setpoint should be left adjusted to a value within the established trip setpoint calibration tolerance band, in accordance with uncertainty assumptions stated in the referenced setpoint methodology (as-left criteria), and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned. If the actual setting of the device is found to have exceeded the Allowable Value the device would be considered inoperable from a technical specification perspective. This requires corrective action including those actions required by 10 CFR 50.36 when automatic protective devices do not function as required. E2-3
INSERT 2 A channel is OPERABLE with an actual trip setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the trip setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is readjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A trip setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions. The conservative direction is established by the direction of the inequality applied to the Allowable Value. It is consistent with the setpoint methodology for the as-left trip setpoint to be outside the established calibration tolerance band but in the conservative direction with respect to the Nominal Trip Setpoint. An exception to readjusting the channel to within the established calibration tolerance band, is the Power Range Neutorn Flux Low and High Trip Setpoints, the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint, and the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux - (P--6) Enable Block Source Range Reactor Trip. These setponts can be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint value, in accordance with the setpoint methodology, to provide additional conservatism. INSERT 3 (Unit 1) CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION .. 3/4 3-76 AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 3-79 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 3-81 LOSS OF POWER DIESEL GENERATOR START INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 3-84 INSERT 3 (Unit 2) CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 3-74 AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 3-77 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION............................... 3/4 3-79 LOSS OF POWER DIESEL GENERATOR START INSTRUMENTATION............................... 3/4 3-82 E2-4
INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION 3/4 2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2 1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD)... 3/4 2.2 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR-FQ (Z) 3/42 3 NUCLEAR ENTHALPY HOT CHANNEL FACTOR... 3/4 2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO............. 3/4 2.5 DNB PARAMETERS .... 3/4 2-1 ... 3/4 2-5 3/42-10 3/4 2-12 ...3/4 2-15 3/4 3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3 1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3 2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 3-1 3/43-14 3/4 3 3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION ETED) 3/4 3-39 MOVABLE INCORE DETECTORS.. 3/4 3-43 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION (DELETED).. .. 3/4 3-44 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION .. 3/4 3-47 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 3-50 CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEMS (DELETED).... 3/4 3-54 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION... 3/4 3-55 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (DELETED)........ 3/4 3-58 DELETED... 3/4 3-70 EXPLOSIVE GAS MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Ad Iset SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 V S................ ........ 3/4 3-71 September 7, 1999 Amendment No 62, 138, 148, 227, 245 E2-5
SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS 2 2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS r trip system instrumentation and interlocks setpoints shall be set consistent with the Tt i es shown in Table 2 2-1 APPLICABILITY As shown for each channel in Table 3 3-1 ACTION With a reactor trip system instrumentation or interlock setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 2 2-1, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION statement requirement of Specification 3 3 1 until the chan I is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with t e Trip Setpoint va ue TN~omiin~al1 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 March 25, 1982 2-4 Amendment No 12 E2-6
TABLE 2 2-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT
- 1. Manual Reactor Trip
- 2. Power Range Neutron Flux
- 3. Power Range Neutron Flux High Positive Rate
- 4. Power Range Neutron Flux, High Negative Rate 5 Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux 6 Source Range Neutron Flux 7 Overtemperature AT 8 Overpower AT 9 Pressurizer Pressure--Low 10 Pressurizer Pressure--High 11 Pressurizer Water Level--High 12 Loss of Flow UNOMINA L TIPSETPOINT Low Setpoint 1Q25% of RATED THERMAL POWER High Setpoint-'109% of RATED THERMAL POWER l05% of RATED THERMAL POWER with a time constant _ 2 second 05%
of RATED THERMAL POWER with a time constant > 2 second P]25% of RATED THERMAL POWER 1ý105 counts per second See Note 1 See Note 2 >1970 psig <2385 psig 2% of instrument span 90% of design flow per loop* ALLOWABLE VALUES Not Applicable Low Setpoint - < 27.4% of RATED THERMAL POWER High Setpoint -:5 111.4% of RATED THERMAL POWER _< 6 3% of RATED THERMAL POWER with a time constant > 2 second < 6 3% of RATED THERMAL POWER with a time constant Ž2 second < 45 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER _< 1 45 x 105 counts per second See Note 3 See Note 4 >_ 1964.8 psig < 2390 2 psig <92 7% of instrument span > 89 6% of design flow per loop*
- Design flow is 90,045 (87,000 X 1 035) gpm per loop SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 2-5 April 21, 1997 Amendment No 44, 141,185, 221, 223 E2-7
TABLE 2 2-1 (Continued) REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT
- 13. Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low a
RCS Loops AT Equivalent to Power < 50% RTP Coincident with Steam Generator Water Level -- Low-Low (Adverse) and Containment Pressure - EAM or Steam Generator Water Level - Low-Low (EAM) with A time delay (Ts) if one Steam Generator is affected or A time delay (TM) if two or more Steam Generators are affected
- b.
RCS Loop AT Equivalent to Power > 50% RTP Coincident with Steam Generator Water Level -- Low-Low (Adverse) and Containment Pressure (EAM) or Steam Generator Water Level - Low-Low (EAM) UNOMINAL ALLOWABLE VALUES RIP SETPOINT RCS Loop AT variabl in RCS Loo T variable input < 50% RTP ,trip setpoint + 2 5% RTP flnominal 15~ ~C 0%oIarwrne Ž14 fnro ag 15 0% of narrow range instrument span 0.5 psig 10 7% of narrow range instrument span Ts (Note 5) TM (Note 5) 115 0% of narrow range 10 5 psig
- 10 7% of narrow range "instrument span
>_14 4% of narrow range instrument span < 0 6 psig Ž10 1% of narrow range instrument span < (1.01) Ts (Note 5) _ (1 01) TM (Note 5) > 14 4% of narrow range instrument span < 0.6 psig _ 10.1% of narrow range instrument SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 2-6 July 24, 1991 Amendment No 16, 85, 136, 141,151 E2-8
TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued) REAl FUNCTIONAL UNIT 14 Deleted 15 Undervoltage-Reactor Coolant Pumps 16 Underfrequency-Reactor Coolant Pumps
- 17. Turbine Trip A.
Low Trip System Pressure B. Turbine Stop Valve Closure 18 Safety Injection Input from ESF 19 Intermediate Range Neutron Flux - (P-6) Enable Block Source Range Reactor Trip 20 Power Range Neutron Flux (not P-10) Input to Low Power Reactor Trips Block P-7 CTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS JNOMINAL ALLOWABLE TRIP SETPO;iNI 0 5022 volts-each bus 6M- - each bus 45 psig 1% open Not Applicable x 10-5% of RATED ThERMAL POWER Q 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER VALUES 4952 >Ž 47-39 volt each bus 56.3 >_ 55-9 H -each bus _43 psig _ 1% open Not Applicable >_ 6 x 10-6% of RATED THERMAL POWER
- 12.4% of RATED THERMAL POWER SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 2-6a May 16, 1990 Amendment No. 16, 85, 136, 141 E2-9
TABLE 2 2-1 (Continued) REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT
- 21. Turbine Impulse Chamber Pressure (P-13) Input to Low Power Reactor Trips Block P-7 22 Power Range Neutron Flux - (P-8) Low Reactor Coolant Loop Flow, and Reactor Trip
- 23. Power Range Neutron Flux - (P-10)
Enable Block of Source, Intermediate, and Power Range (low setpoint) Reactor Trips 24 Reactor Trip P-4 25 Power Range Neutron Flux - (P-9) Blocks Reactor Trip for Turbine Trip Below 50% Rated Power 10% Turbine Impulse -35% of RATED THERMAL POWER > 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER Not Applicable -50% of RATED THERMAL POWER ALLOWABLE VALUES _< 12.4% Turbine Impulse Pressure Equivalent < 37.4% of RATED THERMAL POWER _> 7.6% of RATED THERMAL POWER Not Applicable < 52 4% of RATED THERMAL POWER NOTATION NOTE 1: Overtemperature AT 1 + T4S I + +/- '5S J ATo {Ki - K2 I + "2S) [T - T'] + K3 (P - P') Where: Lead-lag compensator on measured AT Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for AT, T4 Ž 5 secs, T" < 3 sec. = Indicated AT at RATED THERMAL POWER 1.15 0011 SEQUOYAH - UNIT I 2-7 September 15, 1995 Amendment No 19, 114,141,211 E2-10 - fi (AI)} 1 + T4S I + TsS ,4, T 5 ATo K, K 2
TABLE 2 2-1 (Continued) REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS NOTATION (Continued) NOTE 1 (Continued) = The function generated by the lead-lag controller for Tavg dynamic compensation Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for Tavg, T, > 33 secs., T 2 < 4 secs = Average temperature OF 578.20 (NomT* t RATED THERMAL POWER) = 0 00055 = Pressurizer pressure, psig = 2235 psig (Nominal RCS operating pressure) Laplace transform operator (sec-1) and f1 (AI) is a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range nuclear ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measured instrument response during plant startup tests such that (i) for qt - qt between QTNL* and QTPL* ft (Al) = 0 (where qt and qb are percent RATED THERMAL POWER in the top and bottom halves of the core respectively, and qt + qb is total THERMAL POWER in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER) SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 2-8 April 21, 1997 Amendment No 19, 141, 211, 223 E2-11 I + tS 1 + T2S .i, & T 2 T Tv K3 P P S
TABLE 2 2-1 (Continued) REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS NOTATION (Continued) NOTE 1 (Continued) SUnominal* for each percent that the magnitude of (ct - qb) exceeds QTNL, e.tr shall be automatically reduced by QTNS of its value at RATED THERMAL POWER for each percent that the magnitude of (qt - qb) exceeds QTPL, A s-1o shall be automatically reduced by QTPS of its value at RATED THERMAL POWER. Overpower AT 1+ T4SJ (.1 + *,S ) <AT{ T-K 6 (TK -T")- f2 (Al) Where l+r 4S as defined in Note 1 1 + r"S T4 T as defined in Note 1 AT 0 as defined in Note 1
- K4 1 087 K 5 0 02fF for increasing average temperature and 0 for decreasing average temperature T'3S The function generated by the rate-lag controller for Tavg I +
'3S dynamic compensation "QTNL, QTPL, QTNS, and QTPS are specified in the COLR per Specification 6 9 1.14 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 2-9 April 21, 1997 Amendment No. 19, 114, 141, 211, 223 E2-12 (ii) (iii) NOTE 2
TABLE 2 2-1 (Continued) REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS NOTATION (Continued) NOTE 2 (Continued) T 3 Time constant utilized in the rate-lag controller for Tavg, T > 10 secs 3 3 K 00011forT >T"andK >_OforT <T" 6 6 T = as defined in Note 1 T" = Indicated Tavg at RATED THERMAL POWER (Calibration temperature for AT instrumentation, < 578 20F) S= as defined in Note 1 and f2(AI) is a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range nuclear ion chambers, with gains to be selected based on measured instrument response during plant startup tests such that: (i) for qt - qb between QPNL* and QPPL* f2(AI) = 0 (where qt and qb are percent RATED THERMAL POWER in the top and bottom halves of the core respectively, and qt + qb is total THERMAL POWER in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER) () nominal for each percent that the magnitude of (qt - qb) exceeds QPNL* he T tri setpoint shall be automatically reduced by QPNS* of its value at RATED THERMAL POWER (iii) Unominal for each percent that the magnitude of (qt - qb) exceeds QPPL the AT tri setpoint shall be automatically reduced by QPPS* of its value aTATED THERMAL POWER NOTE 3 The channel's maximum trip setpoint shall not exceed its; by more than 1.9 percent AT span rnominal U IU set NOTE 4 The channel's maximum trip setpoint shall not exceed itlcomputed trip point y more than 1 7 percent AT span
- QPNL, QPPL, QPNS, and QPPS are specified in the COLR per Specification 6 9.1 14.
April 21, 1997 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 2-10 Amendment No 19, 141, 211, 223 E2-13
SAFETY LIMITS BASES These limiting heat flux conditions are higher than those calculated for the range of all control rods fully withdrawn to the maximum allowable control rod insertion assuming the axial power imbalance is within the limits of the f, (Delta I) function of the Overtemperature Delta T trip. When the axial power imbalance is not within the tolerance, the axial power imbalance effect on the Overtemperature Delta T trips will reduce the setpoints to provide protection consistent with core safety limits. 2 1.2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE The restriction of this Safety Limit protects the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System from overpressurization and thereby prevents the release of radionuclides contained in the reactor coolant from reaching the containment atmosphere. The reactor pressure vessel and pressurizer are designed to Section III of the ASME Code for Nuclear Power Plant which permits a maximum transient pressure of 110% (2735 psig) of design pressure. The Reactor Coolant System piping, valves and fittings, are designed to ANSI B 31 1 1967 Edition, which permits a maximum transient pressure of 120% (2985 psig) of component design pressure The Safety Limit of 2735 psig is therefore consistent with the design criteria and associated code requirements The entire Reactor Coolant System is hydrotested at 3107 psig, 125% of design pressure, to demonstrate integrity prior to initial operation 2.2 1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS IVomninal Th CReactor Trip Setpoint Limits specified n Table 2.2-1 are the values at which the Reactor Trips I U Nominal are set for each functional unit. The Trip Setpoints, ave been selected to ensure that the reactor core and reactor coolant system are prevented from i-g t eir safety limits during normal operation and design basis anticipated operational occurrences and to assist the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System in Nontinal mitigating the consequences of accidents. Operation with a trip set less conservative t an its Trip Setpoint NominalU but within its specified Allowable Value is acce able on the basis that the difference betw n each Tri etpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or less than t e dfi-allowance sumed for each trip in the ft racA safety analyses AddI Ins ert I Add Insert 2 Bases Change SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 2-2 Revised- 08/18/87 E2-14
INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 3 2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3 2 1 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in Tolumn of Table 3 3-4 ftNominal APPLICABI . 5a3Tn in Table 3.3-3. ACTION
- a.
With an ESFAS instrumentation channel or interlock trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3 3-4, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3 3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with pvalue. Kft Nominal) b With an ESFAS instrumentation channel or interlock inoperable, tak shoshown in Table 3.3-3. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4 3 2.1 1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4 3-2 4.3 2.1 2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the automatic actuation logic test. The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation 4.3 2.1 3 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be verified to be within the limit at least once per 18 months Each verification shall include at least one train such that both trains are verified at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are verified at least once per N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the "Total No of Channels" Column of Table 3.3-3. SEQUOYAH - UNIT I 3/4 3-14 E2-15 February 29, 2000 Amendment No. 190, 251
TABLE 3 3-3 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION
- b.
Phase "B" Isolation
- 1)
Manual 2 1** 2 1,2,3,4 20
- 2)
Automatic Actuation 2 1 2 1,2, 3,4 15 Logic
- 3)
Containment Pressure-4 2 3 1, 2, 3 18 High-High A ContaiRnment Vt'.'niation -Manual 2 4-2- 4,2,3,4 4-l9
- 2)
A u tomtic) Ilatio 2-4- 2 4,-2,3,4 41-5
- 3)
Coen ta;i n~menAt PurgF~qe Air 2-4- 4-4,r2,-3,4 4 Exhaust Monitor
- Two switches must be operated simultaneously for actuation SEQOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-17 E2-16 June 25, 1993 Amendment No 41, 63, 168
TABLE 3 3-3 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTIONAL UNIT
- e. Loss of Power Start
- 1. Voltage Sensors
- 2.
Load Shed Timer f Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps Start Motor-Driven Pumps and Turbine Driven Pump g Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Pressure-Low h Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Transfer Time Delays 1 Motor-Driven Pump 2 Turbine-Driven Pump "**Unit 1 shutdown boards only TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS 3/shutdown board 2/shutdown board 1/pump 3/pump 1/pump 2/pump CHANNELS TO TRIP 2/shutdown board 1/shutdown board 1/pump 2/pump 1/pump 1/pump MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE 3/shutdown a/shutdown board 1/pump 3/pump 1/pump 2/pump APPLICABLE MODES 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-20 E2-17 August 22, 1995 Amendment No 41, 129, 182, 188, 207 ACTION 35 35 20* 21* 21
- 21
- TABLE 3 3-3 (Continued)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TOTAL NO CH/ FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TC U7. This Specificationhas been deleted. 7 LOSS OF POWER &NNELS )TRIP MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE APPLICABLE MODES a 6 9 kv Shutdown Beard Loss of Voltage "1jchtiudn 2 Diesel Generator 2!shutdGw Start and Load Shed Timer b 6 9 k'- Shutdown Board Degraded Voltage 1 Voltage Sensors 3!sh'tdewn
- 2.
Diesel Generator 2!shutdwn Start and Lad ShedbGad 3 Sl!Degraded Vo!tage 2!shutdewR LoIgc Enable Timer board 8 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INTERLOCKS
- a. Pressurizer Pressure P-11/Not P-11 b Deleted
- c. Steam Generator Level P-1 4 3
3/loop 2/sh,-tdewn 3!shutdo boaid board Ilshutd,,n 2!sh'tde-n 2/shude b3saud -21 s h ut di n-211hutdewn hn;;rd ARM beard SlIs;h .tdewn 2 2/loop any loop Plshut.in board -1 O, "2 4 34 4 34 14 34 21 s r h, td,, n 2 1,2,3 3/loop 34 22a 1,2 22c SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/43-21 E2-18 August 22, 1995 Amendment No. 41, 129, 141,160, 182, 188, 207 ACTION
TABLE 3 3-3 (Continued) TABLE NOTATION
- Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure Block of Safety Injection) setpoint.
- Trip function automatically blocked above P-11 and may be blocked below P11 when Safety Injection on Steam Line Pressure-Low is not blocked
- When Associated Diesel Generator is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3 8.1 2, "AC Sources-Shutdown." The Provisions of Specification 3 0.4 are not applicable.
- Trip function automatically blocked above P-11 and may be blocked below P11 when Safety Injection on Steam Line Pressure-Low is not blocked
The provisions of Specification 3 0.4 are not applicable ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 15 With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4 3.2 1.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE. ACTION 16 Deleted ACTION 17 With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied
- a.
The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours b The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements is met, however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4 3 2.1 1. ACTION 18 With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition within 6 hours and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met, one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4 3.2 1 1. AC IO W t le st; tpM RFI G......................... R-R-F-op rto ma"o tn e rvd ACTION 2 eroO RiEC,**i n esta the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours October 4, 1995 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-22 Amendment No 63, 141, 168, 182, 188, 202, 207, 213 E2-19
TABLE 3 3-3 (Continued) ACTION 21 ACTION 22 - ACTION 23 ACTION 24 With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, declare the associated auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, and comply with the ACTION requirements of Specification 3 7.1.2 With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, declare the interlock inoperable and verify that all affected channels of the functions listed below are OPERABLE or apply the appropriate ACTION statement(s) for those functions Functions to be evaluated are: a Safety Injection Pressurizer Pressure Steam Line Pressure Negative Steam Line Pressure Rate b Deleted
- c.
Turbine Trip Steam Generator Level High-High Feedwater Isolation Steam Generator Level High-High With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3 2 1.1 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours ACTION 25 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or declare the associated valve inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7 1.5 b With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of / S. P~~~~~hannels, reste tnr hen 11n9prabler G 1 h ,annel tnknl OPRAL '*Il vAitI a*eo withi 1 hour or enter applicable Limiting Condition(s) Forl Operain and Action(S) for the assoc-iae diesel generator set Made inoperable by the Gha~nes-SEQUOYAH - UNIT I 3/43-23 E:2-20 August 22, 1995 Amendment No 12, 63, 129, 141, 160, 182, 188, 207
TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) ACTION 35 ACTION 36 - ACTION 37 ACTION 38 a With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Sfor voltage senso N mber of Channels restore the inoperable hannel to OPERABLE status within6ours or enter apphcab Limiting Condition(s) For Operation and Action(s) for the associated auxiliary feedwater pump made inoperable by the channel.
- b.
With the number of OPERAB chann lstah olumber r, for voltage sensors or timer. of Channels by more tha one, restore all but one channel to RABLE status within 1 hour or enter a`pplicab1leifingonWtion(s) For Operation and Action(s) for the associated auxiliary feedwater pump made inoperable by the channels With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied a The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours. b For the affected protection set, the Trip Time Delay for one affected steam generator (Ts) is adjusted to match the Trip Time Delay for multiple affected steam generators (TM) within 4 hours
- c.
The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met, however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3 2.1.1. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided that within 6 hours, for the affected protection set, the Trip Time Delays (Ts and TM) threshold power level for zero seconds time delay is adjusted to 0% RTP. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided that within 6 hours, for the affected protection set, the Steam Generator Water Level - Low-Low (EAM) channels trip setpoint is adjusted to the same value as Steam Generator Water Level - Low-Low (Adverse). SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-23a E2-21 August 22, 1995 Amendment No. 141,160, 182, 188, 207
TABLE 3 3-4 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT
- 1. SAFETY INJECTION, TURBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION
- a.
Manual Initiation
- b. Automatic Actuation Logic c
Containment Pressure-High
- d. Pressurizer Pressure--Low
- e. Deleted f
Steam Line Pressure-Low Not Applicable Not Applicable 1.54 psig 1870 psig 600 psig steam line pressure (Note 1) ALLOWABLE VALUES Not Applicable Not Applicable < 1.6 psig Ž1864.8 psig > 592 2 psig steam line pressure (Note 1) May 16,1990 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-24 Amendment No. 141 E2-22
TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT OU~MiNAL ALLOWABLE VALUES TRIP SETPOINT
- 2.
CONTAINMENT SPRAY
- a. Manual Initiation Not Applicable Not Applicable
- b. Automatic Actuation Logic Not Applicable Not Applicable
- c. Containment Pressure--High-High
&-2.81 psig < 2.9 psig
- 3.
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
- a. Phase 'A' Isolation
- 1. Manual Not Applicable Not Applicable
- 2.
From Safety Injection Automatic Not Applicable Not Applicable Actuation logic
- b. Phase "B" Isolation
- 1. Manual Not Applicable Not Applicable
- 2. Automatic Actuation Logic Not Applicable Not Applicable 3
Containment Pressure-High-High [3.81 psig _< 2.9 psig I Aanua Not AppliGable NatAppi~ab~ 2 AuternatIG Isolation Logic Nat AppliGable Not-Appi~eable May 16,1990 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-25 Amendment No. 12, 141 E2-23
TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT 3 Containment Purge Air Exhaust Monitor Radioactvity High
- 4.
STEAM ýE ISOLATION a Manual
- b.
Automatic Actuation Logic
- c. Containment Pressure-High-High d
Steam Line Pressure--Low e Negative Steam Line Pressure Rate-High
- 5.
TURBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION
- a. Steam Generator Water level-High-High b
Automatic Actuation Logic SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 ALLOWABLE VALUES Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable " 2.81 psig < 2.9 psig 1600 psig steam line pressure Note 1) 1100 0 psi (Note 2) instrument span generator NA 3/4 3-26 E2-24 steam > 592 2 psig steam line pressure (Note 1) _< 107.8 psi (Note 2) < 81.7% of narrow range instrument span each steam generator N.A. June 25, 1993 Amendment No. 63, 141,168
TABLE 3 3-4 (Continued) ENGI NEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEMJNSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT UNOMINAL ALLOWABLE VALUES TRIP SETPOINT
- 6.
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER
- a.
Manual Not Applicable
- b. Automatic Actuation Logic Not Applicable
- c.
Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low
- i.
RCS Loop AT Equivalent to RCS Loop AT variable input") Power*< 50% RTP 50% RTP Coincident with Steam > 15 0% of narrow range Generator Water Level-Low-instrument span Low (Adverse) and Containment Pressure-EAM 0.5 psig or Steam Generator Water 10.7% of narrow range Level-Low-Low (EAM) instrument span with A time delay (Ts) if one _ TS (Note 5, Table 2.2-1) Steam Generator is affected or A time delay (Tm) if two or T m (Note 5, Table 2.2-1) more Steam Generators are affected SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-27 Not Applicable Not Applicable nominal RCS Loop AT riable input:* trip setpoint +2.5% RTP _14.4% of narrow range instrument span < 0.6 psig > 10.1% of narrow instrument span < (1.01) TS (Note 5, Table 2.2-1) < (1.01) Tm (Note 5, Table 2.2-1) July 24, 1991 Amendment No 29, 94, 141, 151 E2-25
TABLE 3 3-4 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS ONAL UNIT UNOMINAL ALLOWABLE VALUES TRIP SEPOINT ii. RCS Loop AT Equivalent to Power > 50% RTP Coincident with Steam Generator I, 15.0% of narrow range Water Level-- Low-Low (Adverse) instrument span and Containment Pressure (EAM)
- 0.5 psig or Steam Generator Water Level-10.7% of narrow range Low-Low (EAM) instrument span
>_ 14.4% of narrow range instrument span _< 0.6 psig > 10.1% of narrow range instrument span d S.I. See I above (all SI Setpoints)
- e. Loss of Power Start
- 1. Voltage Sensors
- 2. Load Shed Timer f Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps g
Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Pressure Low h Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Transfer Time Delays SEQUOYAH - UNIT I 3.21 psig (motor driven > 2.44 psig (motor driven mp) pump) 53 9 psig (turbine driven >12 psig (turbine driven pump) (pump) 4 seconds (motor driven > 3.6 seconds pump) 41 seconds- +04 (motor driven pump) seconds
- 5< 6.05 seconds 5.5 seconds (turbine driven
> 4.95 seconds pump) 5 5 seconds +0 55 SeGeR4s(turbine drven pump) 3/4 3-27a E2-26 March 1, 1996 Amendment No. 29, 94, 129, 141, 151,182, 183, 188, 207, 219 FUNCTI R frt Function1o a l .31 o ep i [ > 5520 '*!s 533! V'olts S ~and allowable values. N A. N.A
TABLE 3 3-4 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT UNOMINA T ALLOWABLE VALUES S7. This Specfication has >beendeleted. / 7. LOSS OF PO..E.R. a 6 9 kv Shutdown Board-Dnrde.V'oltage LGS-nsf Voltage 1 Voltage Scnisors Ž5520 volts n& 2 Diesel Generator Start and Load Shcd _*2Q-seee* 1.25 0 25seconnd > b 6 ki Shutdownm Bor-P;d Degraded Voltage 1 VNIoltage SEnsors 64 56 unifi 6403 5 volts (dropout) a 695 5 P rte (eesseut) 2 Diesel Generator Start and Load Shed !5 300 secod G30seod TwneF
- 3. SNtPDe11aded Vboltage L of S
p5s igr < 1972 0 s iends En;able Timer
- 8.
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INTERLOCKS a Pressurizer Pressure
- 1. Not P-il, Automatic Unblock of Safety
-1970 psig
- 5 1975.2 psi9 Injection on Increasing Pressure 2
P-11, Enable Manual Block of Safety 1962 psig >1956.8 psig Injection on Decreasing Pressure March 1, 1996 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-27b Amendment No. 33, 129, 141, 182, 188,207, 219 E2-27
TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS )NAL UNIT =4NOMINAL ALLOWABLE VALUES T - lN TRIP SETPOINT INEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INTERLOCKS (Continued)
- b. Deleted
- c. Deleted
- d. Steam Generator Level Turbine Trip, Feedwater Isolation P-14
- 9.
AUTOMATIC SWITCHOVER TO CONTAINMENT SUMP a RWST Level - Low COINCIDENT WITH Containment Sump Level - High AND Safety Injection
- b. Automatic Actuation Logic (See 5. above) 130" from tank base 30" above elev. 680' 4 ý: 127.29" 130" +/- 2 71" from tank base
- 5 132.71 "from tank base
<_ 31.68 "above elev. 680' ý 2:28.32" 30" +/- 1.69" above elev. 680' a (See 1 above for all Safety Injection SetpointslAllowable Values) N.A NA Note 1: Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for Steam Pressure - Low are T1 >- 50 seconds and "T 2 < 5 seconds Note 2: Time constant utilized in the rate-lag controller for Negative Steam Line Pressure Rate - High is t > 50 seconds SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-28 E2-28 May 16,1990 Amendment No 14, 63, 141 FUNCTIC
- 8.
ENG
TABLE 4 3-2 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT
- 3) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
- a.
Phase "' Isolation
- 1) Manual
- 2) From Safety Injection Automatic Actuation Logic CHANNEL CHANNEL CHECK CALIBRATION NA NA N.A.
N.A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST R M(1) MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 b Phase "B" Isolation
- 1) Manual N.A.
N.A. R 1,2, 3, 4
- 2) Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.
N.A. M(1) 1,2,3,4
- 3) Containment Pressure-- High-S R
Q 1, 2, 3 High
- 4) MaR Ua! 4ANA-
- 2) Autmatic Is*lation Logic
-N-A- -N-A- ,-) 1,2
- 3) Containment Purge Air
-S -s -Q 1,2,3,4 rExhaust Monitor Radio aGtivty--iglh SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-35 E2-29 March 4, 1996 Amendment No 47, 168, 220
TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED c Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low
- 1. Steam Generator Water S
R Q 1,2,3 Level--Low-Low (Adverse)
- 2. Steam Generator Water S
R Q 1, 2, 3 Level-Low-Low (EAM)
- 3.
RCS Loop AT S R Q 1,2,3
- 4. Containment Pressure S
R Q 1, 2, 3 (EAM)
- d.
S.I. See l above (all SI surveillance requirements) e Loss of Power Start
- 1. Voltage Sensors N A R
M 1,2,3
- 2.
Load Shed Timer N A R N.A. 1, 2, 3 f Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps N A N.A. R 1, 2
- g. Auxiliary Feedwater Suction N A.
R N A 1,2, 3 Pressure-Low h Auxiliary Feedwater Suction N A. R N A 1, 2, 3 Transfer Tim Dela s
- 47.
This Specification has been deleted. 7 LOSS OF POWER a 6.9 k v Sh'utdown BoIrd LosI.s off VGolt
- 1. VoItaRge SenSOrsN
,2,3 ,5,4 2 Diesel Genernator Star and -N-A R LAnd Shod Tmerp March 29, 2000 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-37 Amendment No 29, 129,141, 182,188, 207, 253 E2-30
TABLE 4 3-2 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION b69 ky Shutdow.n Bo~ard Degraded Voltage 1 Voltage Semnor -N-A- -R 2 Diesel Generators Start and -N-A- -R Lo Aa d Sh.e d Timer 3 SI!Degraded Voltage Logic -S-A- --R 8 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INTERLOCKS a Pressurizer Pressure, P-1 1/Not P-11 b Deleted
- c. Steam Generator Level, P-14
- 9. AUTOMATIC SWITCHOVER TO CONTAINMENT SUMP
- a.
RSWT Level - Low COINCIDENT WITH Containment Sump Level High AND Safety Injection
- b. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.
N.A S S R(2) R(2) R R CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED -M !, 2, 3, 4, 5#',6# -NhW A!,2,3,4,5
- ,-6
-N-A-4,2i3,4 NA. N A. Q Q 1,2,3 1,2 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 (See 1 above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements) N A. NA M(1) 1,2,3,4 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-37a August 22, 1995 Amendment No. 47, 63, 129, 141,182, 188, 207 E2-31
3/4 3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ~JThis Specification has been de~leted. 3.3.3.1 The ....,,4o,R.....,hrotle,. shown in Table 3 3-6 sha,, ER8 their alarmitrip 6etpoin;ts ithi the specifed lmit APPLICABILI! As ShoWn in Table -343 a W'th a radiation monitoring channel alarm/trip setpoint exceeding the value shown in Table 3.3 6, adjust the setpoint to Within the limit within 4 hours Or declare the channel b With one or more radiation monitoring channels inoperable, take the ACTION show n in c The proiwsions of Specifications 3 0 3 and 3 0 4 are not applicable SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4 3 3 1 Each radiation monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABL-E te PefOFRmane~e of he CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRA.TION and CHANNEL FUNCTIOA TES operations for the MODES and at the frequencies show-An in Tabhle 33 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-39 E2-32
TABLE 3 3-6 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION This Table has been deleted. U (Pages 3/4 3-40 and 3/4 3-41 are deleted) MINIMUM GHANNEIS APPL21ICABSLE ALAIRM/TRI MEASU REMEN -AGT4QN I N S-T RUM-I4EmN T 0O12R-RA. RI MODRS STON A I AREA MONITOR SFuel Storage Pool -4 < :200 m PR hr 4Q-4 -4'1---. 4 2-68 -Area 2 PROCESS MONITORS a Containment Purge 4 ,2_3_, -GPM 2-8 i Gascou-s Activ:y RCS Leakage 4 4, 2,3 & 4 -N/A 4 70--0 -G i--a4eteete -AGiv,,y RCS Leakage 4 4, 2,3 &,4 --N/A 40-4 -GA-2-7 c Control Room 7 isGiatiGPn R G iFrad~ated 4ueI IW~ith fulin the storage paoo or building SEquivalent to 1.0 x 0 j-GG May 31, 2000 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-40 Amendment No. 12, 60, 112, 168, 256 E2-33
I 1 .AC-T!ON STATEME4NlTS ACTION 26 Wth the number of OPERABLE channels Wo66 than required by the Minimum ChnesOPERABLIEn requirement, peormeFr area Pcurleys of the monRito-red-area with portable mon~itoring instFrumentat;ionR at least onco per 24 hours ACTION '27 Wth the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum Channels O .PERABLE requirement, comply with the ACTION requirements Of Specification 32 4 6-1 ACTION,28hWnth the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Mnum Cha"M.nnels,OPERABLE r~equiremcn;t,rcomply with the ACTION requirements of Specification 3 9 9 (MOIDE 6) and 3 3 2 1 (MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4) A.CTQIONl :29-a; Wi.th onet-channRel inoperable, placoe the assocn-iatead contirol roo-m. telmergency Yentilation system; (CREVS) train in recircu~la~tion mode of operation within 7 days or be at least HOT STANDBY Y w:ithin the next 6 hou-rs and in COLD SHUTDMOQWN within the foll Owing 30 hours b W,th two ch;;annes inoperable, Within hour initiate and maintain operation of one CREY trin i th recrcuatinemde of operation and enter the required Actions for: one CRE=VS train made inoperable by inoperable CREVS actuato place both trains_ in the-recirclation mod~e of operation within one hor If thez copeto tieo cin bcnnont bem met in Modes 4, 2, 3, and 1 ci at leasFt HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours ;And in COLD SHUT-DOWN within the following 3h hours G If the completion time of Action 29b cannot be mnet during the moevcmn~t ot irradi~atedd fuell assem~blies, suspend core alterations and suspend moevemnent op irradiated fuel assemblies/ If the completion time of Action 29b cannot be met in Modes 5 and 6, initiate action to resto)rep one P CR E VS_ t ra in May 31, 2000 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-41 Amendment No. 12, 112, 168, 256 E2-34
TABLE 4 3-3 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS U This Table has been deleted GHANNEL WHICH G WANNEI=L CHANNE-N=CONAL 2SU1 RVE ILNCE INS-TRM NT CHEC CALIBRATIO T REQURRED 4 AREA MONITOR a Fuel Stamp Pool S R 2 PROCESS MONITORS aConptainment Purge Alt 1z R,2 Exhaust
- b. Containment Ga*Sc" u Activity RCS S
R Q 2,3, &. 4 Leakage Detection 1i Partic-ulate Activity S R r, 2,3, & 4 RGS-Leakage Deteptien c ControlRoom S R A
- \\Afjh fuel in the storage poo rbidn March 4, 1996 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-42 Amendment No. 12, 112,168, 220 E2-35
New Page INSTRUMENTATION CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.11 The Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation for each function in Table 3.3-14 shall be OPERABLE APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3-14 ACTION: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4
- a.
With one or more functions inoperable with one or more manual or automatic actuation trains inoperable, immediately enter applicable conditions and actions of Specification 3.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves," for containment ventilation isolation valves made inoperable by isolation instrumentation.
- b.
With the required radiation monitoring channel inoperable, immediately enter applicable conditions and actions of Specification 3 6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves," for containment purge and exhaust isolation valves made inoperable by isolation instrumentation.
- c.
Separate condition entry is allowed for each function.
- d.
The provisions of Specification 3 0.4 are not applicable.
- e.
One train of automatic actuation logic may be bypassed and Action a. may be delayed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment
- a.
With one radiation monitoring channel inoperable, restore the affected channel to OPERABLE status within 4 hours or enter applicable conditions and actions of Specification 3.9 4, "Containment Building Penetrations," for containment ventilation isolation valves made inoperable by isolation instrumentation.
- b.
With one or more functions inoperable with one or more manual or automatic actuation trains inoperable, immediately enter applicable conditions and actions of Specification 3 9.4, "Containment Building Penetrations," for containment ventilation isolation valves made inoperable by isolation instrumentation.
- c.
With two radiation monitoring channels inoperable, immediately enter applicable conditions and actions of Specification 3 9.4, "Containment Building Penetrations," for containment ventilation isolation valves made inoperable by isolation instrumentation. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-76 Amendment No. 12, 60, 112, 168, 220, 256, E2-36
New Page INSTRUMENTATION ACTION (Continued)
- d.
Separate condition entry is allowed for each function.
- e.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4 3.3.11.1 Each Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-10. 4.3.3.11.2 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation function shall be verified to be within the limit at least once per 18 months. Each verification shall include at least one train such that both trains are verified at least once per 36 months. The Safety Injection function response time is addressed in Specification 3.3.2. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-77 Amendment No. 12, 60,112,168, 220,256, E2-37
New Page FUNCTION
- 1. Manual Initiation
- 2. Automatic Actuation I 3
Containment Purge,/ Exhaust Radiation Monitors
- 4. Containment Purge /
Exhaust Radiation Monitors 5 Safety Injection TABLE 3 3-14 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION APPLICABLE MODES OR REQUIRED ALLOWABLE ME CONDITIONS CHANNELS VALUE 1, 2,3, &4, *2 NA Logic 1, 2,3, & 4,** 2 NA %ir 1, 2,3, & 4 1 < 100,000 cpm %ir 2 < 100,000 cpm EASUREMENT RANGE NA NA 10-107cpm 10-10 7cpm TABLE 4 3-10 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FUNCTION
- 1. Manual Initiation 2
Automatic Actuation Logic
- 3. and 4. Containment Purge Air Exhaust Radiation Monitors 5
Safety Injection CHANNEL CHECK N.A. N. A S CHANNEL CALIBRATION NA NA R CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST R M* Q MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED 1, 2, 3, & 4,** 1, 2, 3, & 4,** 1, 2,3, & 4,**
- Each train or logic channel shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
- During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment
- Refer to Specification 3.3 2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," Function 1 for all initiating functions and requirements.
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-78 Amendment No. 12, 60, 112, 168, 220, 256, E2-38
New Page INSTRUMENTATION AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM (ABGTS) ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3 3.12 The ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation for each function in Table 3.3-15 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3-15 ACTION MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 a With one or more functions with one channel or train inoperable, place one ABGTS train in operation within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. b With one or more functions with two channels or trains inoperable, immediately place one ABGTS train in operation and enter applicable conditions and actions of Specification 3.7.8, "Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System," for one train made inoperable by inoperable actuation instrumentation or immediately place both ABGTS trains in emergency radiation protection mode; Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c.
Separate condition entry is allowed for each function. d The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling area
- a.
With one or more functions with two channels or trains inoperable, immediately place one ABGTS train in operation or immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling area
- b.
The provisions of Specifications 3.0.4 are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4 3 3.12.1 Each ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-11. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-79 Amendment No. 12, 60,112, 168, 220, 256, E2-39
FUNC
- 1. Manual Ini
- 2. Fuel Stora Area Radi Monitors
- 3. ContainmE Phase "A" New Page TABLE 3 3-15 AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION APPLICABLE MODES OR REQUIRED ALLOWABLE MEASUREM TION CONDITIONS CHANNELS VALUE RANGE tiation 1, 2, 3, & 4, **
2 NA NA ,, 0 1 5f%7 Mni.. A I n-1 I n 4 ation ent Isolation (Same Train as Required ABGTS) Iu IU lIII ENT R/hr TABLE 4 3-11 AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FUNCTION
- 1. Manual Initiation 2
Fuel Storage Pool Area Radiation Monitors
- 3. Containment Isolation Phase "A" CHANNEL CHECK N A.
S CHANNEL CALIBRATION N.A. R CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST R Q MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED 1, 2, 3, &4, **
- During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling area.
- Refer to Specification 3.3 2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," Function 3.a for all initiating functions and requirements SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 314 3-80 Amendment No. 12, 60, 112, 168, 220, 256, E2-40
"*....*UI IIIrllll
New Page I INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (CREVS) ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.13 The CREVS Actuation Instrumentation for each function in Table 3.3-16 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3-16 ACTION: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4
- a.
With one or more functions with one channel or train inoperable, place one CREVS train in recirculation mode of operation within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b.
With one or more functions with two channels or trains inoperable, within one (1) hour place one CREVS train in recirculation mode operation and enter applicable conditions and actions of Specification 3.7.7, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation System," for one train made inoperable by inoperable actuation instrumentation or within one (1) hour place both CREVS trains in emergency radiation protection mode; Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours
- c.
Separate condition entry is allowed for each function
- d.
The provisions of Specification 3 0.4 are not applicable. MODES 5 and 6
- a.
With one or more functions with one channel or train inoperable, place one CREVS train in recirculation mode of operation within 7 days or immediately initiate action to restore one CREVS train to OPERABLE status
- b.
With one or more functions with two channels or trains inoperable, within one (1) hour place one CREVS train in recirculation mode operation and enter applicable conditions and actions of Specification 3 7.7, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation System," for one train made inoperable by inoperable actuation instrumentation or within one (1) hour place both CREVS trains in emergency radiation protection mode; Otherwise, immediately initiate action to restore the CREVS trains to OPERABLE status.
- c.
Separate condition entry is allowed for each function
- d.
The provisions of Specifications 3.0.4 are not applicable. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-81 Amendment No. 12, 60, 112, 168, 220, 256, E2-41
New Page I INSTRUMENTATION ACTION (Continued) During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies a With one or more functions with one channel or train inoperable, place one CREVS train in recirculation mode of operation within 7 days or immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies b With one or more functions with two channels or trains inoperable, within one (1) hour place one CREVS train in recirculation mode operation and enter applicable conditions and actions of Specification 3.7.7, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation System," for one train made inoperable by inoperable actuation instrumentation or within one (1) hour place both CREVS trains in emergency radiation protection mode; Otherwise, immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
- c.
Separate condition entry is allowed for each function. d The provisions of Specifications 3.0.4 are not applicable SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.3.13.1 Each CREVS Actuation Instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-12. SEQUOYAH - UNIT I 3/4 3-82 Amendment No. 12, 60, 112, 168, 220, 256, E2-42
New PageI TABLE 3 3-16 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION APPLICABLE MODES OR REQUIRED ALLOWABLE MEASUREMEN NCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS VALUE RANGE I Initiation 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, & 6** 2 NA NA I Room Intake 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, & 6** 2 <43,400 cpm 10-107 cpm ion Monitors Injection IT TABLE 4.3-12 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FUNCTION
- 1. Manual Initiation
- 2. Control Room Intake Radiation Monitors 3
Safety Injection CHANNEL CHECK N.A S CHANNEL CALIBRATION N.A. R CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST R Q MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED 1, 2,3,4,5, &6, ** 1, 2,3,4,5, &6, **
- During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
- Refer to Specification 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," Function I for all initiating functions and requirements.
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-83 Amendment No. 12, 60, 112, 168, 220, 256, E2-43 FUI
- 1. Manua
- 2. Contro Radiat
- 3. Safety
New Page INSTRUMENTATION LOSS OF POWER (LOP) DIESEL GENERATOR (DG) START INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3 3.14 The LOP DG start instrumentation for each function in Table 3.3-17 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2,3, and 4, When associated DG is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8 1.2, "AC Sources Shutdown." ACTION:
- a.
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Required Channels for voltage sensors, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or enter applicable Limiting Condition(s) For Operation and Action(s) for the associated DG set made inoperable by the channel
- b.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Required Channels by more than one for voltage sensors or with the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Required Channels for timers, restore all but one channel of voltage sensors and at least one timer for each function to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or enter applicable Limiting Condition(s) For Operation and Action(s) for the associated DG set made inoperable by the channels
- c.
Separate entry is allowed for each function.
- d.
Enter applicable Actions of LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," for Auxiliary Feedwater Loss of Power Start Instrumentation made inoperable by LOP DG Start Instrumentation. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3 3.14.1 Each LOP DG Start Instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-13 4.3.3.14.2 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each LOP DG Start Instrumentation function shall be verified to be within the limit at least once per 18 months. Each verification shall include at least one train such that both trains are verified at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are verified at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-84 Amendment No. 12, 41, 63, 129, 141, 160, 182, 188, 207 E2-44
I New Page ý TABLE 3 3-17 LOSS OF POWER DIESEL GENERATOR START INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTIONAL UNIT APPLICABLE MODES OR CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES
- 1.
6.9 kv Shutdown Board Loss of Voltage a Voltage Sensors 1, 2,3,4, # 3/Shutdown Board 5520 >5331 volts and < 5688 volts
- b. Diesel Generator Start and Load Shed Timer 1,2,3,4, #
1/Shutdown Board 1.25 seconds S1.00 seconds and
- 1.50 seconds
- 2.
6.9 kv Shutdown Board Degraded Voltage
- a. Voltage Sensors b Diesel Generator Start and Load Shed Timer c
SI/Degraded Voltage Logic Enable Timer 1,2,3,4, # 1,2,3,4,# 1,2,3,4 3/Shutdown Board 1/Shutdown Board 1/Shutdown Board 6456 volts 300 seconds 9.5 seconds Ž6403.5 volts and
- 6522.5 volts
Ž218.6 seconds and
- 370 seconds S7.5 seconds and
- 11.5 seconds
- When associated DG is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8 1.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown." The provision of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-85 Amendment No. 12, 41, 63, 129,141, 160,182, 188, 207 E2-45
New Page TABLE 4 3-13 LOSS OF POWER DIESEL GENERATOR START INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNEL CHANNEL CHECK CALIBRATION CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
- 1.
6.9 kv Shutdown Board Loss of Voltage
- a. Voltage Sensors
- b. Diesel Generator Start and Load Shed Timer 2
6 9 kv Shutdown Board Degraded Voltage
- a. Voltage Sensors
- b. Diesel Generators Start and Load Shed Timer
- c. SI/Degraded Voltage Logic Enable Timer
- When associated DG is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.1.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown."
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-86 Amendment No. 12, 41,63, 129, 141, 160, 182, 188, 207 E2-46 N.A. N.A. R R M N.A. 1,2,3,4,# 1,2,3,4,# N.A. N.A. N.A. R R R M N.A N.A. 1,2,3,4, # 1,2,3,4, # 1,2,3,4
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4 4 6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE LEAKAGE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.6.1 The following Reactor Coolant System leakage detection instrumentation shall be OPERABLE: a Two lower containment atmosphere radioactivity monitoring (gaseous and particulate), and
- b.
The containment pocket sump level monitor. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 ACTION:
- a.
With both containment pocket sump monitors inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided SR 4.4.6.2.1 is performed once per 24 hours*; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
- b.
With either or both the gaseous or particulate lower containment atmosphere radioactivity monitors inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the lower containment atmosphere are analyzed once per 24 hours or SR 4.4.6.2.1 is performed once per 24 hours*; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. The provisions of Specification 3.0 4 are not applicable.
- c.
With both containment pocket sump monitors and both lower containment atmosphere radioactivity monitors inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4 4.6.1 The leakage detection instrumentation shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by: Sa. Performac ftelwrcnanetamshr aeu nd particulate monitor 4a es nepe 2hus a easts once per18 month~s CANLCEK, C HANLCLBATO V C NEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at the *
- b.
Performance of con ainmen poc e sump level monitor CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months. Surveillance performance not required until 12 hours after establishment of steady state operation. August 4, 2000 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 4-13 Amendment No. 12, 259 E2-47
This specification affected bypreviously submitted TS Change 00-14 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4 12 LOW TEMPERATURE OVER PRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.12 At least one of the following Overpressure Protection Systems shall be OPERABLE:
- a.
Two power operated relief valves (PORVs)w less than or equal to that shown in Figure 3.4-4, or
- b.
The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) depressurized with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 3 square inches APPLICABILITY: MODE 4, MODE 5 and MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on. ACTION:
- a.
With one PORV inoperable, in MODE 4 either:
- 1.
Restore the inoperable PORV to operable status within 7 days, or
- 2.
Depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 3 square inch vent within the next 8 hours, or
- 3.
Ensure pressurizer level is maintained less than or equal to 30 percent
- b.
With one PORV inoperable in MODES 5 or 6, either (1) restore the PORV to operable status within 24 hours, or (2) complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 3 square inch vent within a total of 32 hours
- c.
With both PORVs inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 3 square inch vent within 8 hours
- d.
With the RCS vented per ACTIONS a, b, or c, verify the vent pathway at least once per 31 days when the pathway is provided by a valve(s) that is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, otherwise, verify the vent path every 12 hours.
- e.
When RCS temperature is less than 3500 F, both safety injection pumps and one centrifugal charging pump shall be made incapable of automatic injection into the RCS Should any of these pumps be found actually capable of automatic injection, return the pump(s) to incapable status within 12 hours or depressurize and vent RCS through at least a 3 square inch vent within the next 8 hours.
- f.
In the event either the PORVs or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or RCS vent(s) on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.
- g.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/44-29 E,2-48 October 4, 1995 Amendment No. 157, 213
This figure affected by previously submitted TS Change 00-14 I I' I I I I I I I 200C 1500 Lu 0: U) (n ui Q: CL 1000 500 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 TEMPERATURE, -F SETTINGS - APPLICABLE UP TO 16 EFPY FIGURE 3.4-4 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 March 30, 1992 Amendment No. 157 3/4 4-30 E2-49 - 1.... r--T- _______I I Ii RCS PS Ps i AU TLO PCV-68-340A PCV 34 F) i-(PSIG) (PSIG) TI/ 1 j1 425 425 jI 120 425 425 165 450 475 I 200 465 500 230 500 540 280 610 655 05 715 765 30 685 740 450 2350 2350 I I I I I I I-y-11 1 I Y PC'V-68-334 I I PCV-68-340A -7 7 7 zzK . T 0 0
3/4 3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3 1 and 3/4.3 2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the protective and ESF instrumentation systems and interlocks ensure that
- 1) the associated ESF action and/or reactor trip will be ini en the ar eter Snominal trip monitored by each channel or combination thereof reachesits setpoint, 2) the secfiedoincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to per' a eo e out o service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses The Engineered Safety Features System interlocks perform the functions indicated below on increasing the required parameter, consistent wittqns ei Table 3 3-4:
P-11 Defeats the manual block of safety injection a ironow-essurizer pressure. P-14 Trip of all feedwater pumps, turbine trip, closure of feedwater isolation valves and inhibits feedwater control valve modulation. On decreasing the required parameter the opposite function is performed at reset setpoints. The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. The surveillance for the comparison of the incore to the excore Axial Flux Difference is required only when reactor power is > 15 percent The 96 hour delay in the first performance of the surveillance after reaching 15 percent reactor thermal power (RTP), following a refueling outage, is to achieve a higher power level and approach Xenon stability. The surveillance is typically performed when the RTP is > 30 percent to ensure the results of the evaluation are more accurate and the adjustments more reliable. The frequency of 31 EFPD is to allow slow changes in neutron flux to be better detected during the fuel cycle. May 30,1995 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 141, 199 E2-50
INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4 3 3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Relat-ive to the control room instrumentation isolation function, one set of process radiation redundant radiation monGitors. A high radiation signal from the detec-tor wvill initiate its associated train ot a safety injection (SI) signal from-F either unit The SI func-tion is, di~scussed in IGO 3 3 2, "Eng~ineered manually initiate CREVS 3/4.3 3 2 MOVABLE INCORE DETECTORS The OPERABILITY of the movable incore detectors with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this system accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core. The OPERABILITY of this system is demonstrated by irradiating each detector used and determining the acceptability of its voltage curve For the purpose of measuring FQ(X,Y,Z) or FAH(X,Y) a full incore flux map is used Quarter-core flux maps, as defined in WCAP-8648, June 1976, may be used in recalibration of the excore neutron flux detection system, and full incore flux maps or symmetric incore thimbles may be used for monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO when one Power Range Channel is inoperable. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-2a May 31, 2000 Amendment Nos 54, 190, 223, 238, 256 E2-51
New Page Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3/4.3 3.11 B 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 314.3.3 11 Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation closes the containment isolation valves in the Containment Purge System This action isolates the containment atmosphere from the environment to minimize releases of radioactivity in the event of an accident. The Reactor Building Purge System may be in use during reactor operation and with the reactor shutdown. Containment Ventilation Isolation is initiated by a safety injection (SI) signal or by manual actuation. The Bases for LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," discuss initiation of SI signals Redundant and independent gaseous radioactivity monitors measure the radioactivity levels of the containment purge exhaust, each of which will initiate its associated train of automatic Containment Ventilation Isolation upon exceeding the alarm/trip setpoint. The containment isolation valves for the Reactor Building Purge System close within five seconds following the DBA. The containment ventilation isolation radiation monitors act as backup to the SI signal to ensure closing of the purge air system supply and exhaust valves. They are also the primary means for automatically isolating containment in the event of a fuel handling accident during shutdown. Containment isolation in turn ensures meeting the containment leakage rate assumptions of the safety analyses, and ensures that the calculated accidental offsite radiological doses are below 10 CFR 100 (Ref 1) limits The Containment Ventilation Isolation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. The LCO requirements ensure that the instrumentation necessary to initiate The LCO requirements ensure that the instrumentation necessary to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation, listed in Table 3.3-14, is OPERABLE.
- 1.
Manual Initiation The LCO requires two channels OPERABLE. The operator can initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation at any time by using either of two switches in the control room. Either switch actuates both trains. This action will cause actuation of all components in the same manner as any of the automatic actuation signals. These manual switches also initiate a Phase A isolation signal SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-5 E2-52 Amendment No.
New Page Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.11 BASES LCO (continued) The LCO for Manual Initiation ensures the proper amount of redundancy is maintained in the manual actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has manual initiation capability. Each channel consists of one selector switch and the interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic cabinet.
- 2.
Automatic Actuation Logic The LCO requires two trains of Automatic Actuation Logic OPERABLE to ensure that no single random failure can prevent automatic actuation. Automatic Actuation Logic consists of all circuitry housed within the actuation subsystems, including the initiating relay contacts responsible for actuating Containment Ventilation Isolation. The applicable MODES and specified conditions for the containment ventilation isolation portion of the SI Function is different and less restrictive than those for the SI role. If one or more of the SI Functions becomes inoperable in such a manner that only the Containment Ventilation Isolation Function is affected, the Conditions applicable to the SI Functions need not be entered. The less restrictive Actions specified for inoperability of the Containment Ventilation Isolation Functions specify sufficient compensatory measures for this case.
- 3.
Containment Radiation The LCO specifies required channels of radiation monitors to ensure that the radiation monitoring instrumentation necessary to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation remains OPERABLE. In Modes 1 through 4, the radiation monitors provide a supplemental function to the Safety Injection signal for the isolation of containment and only requires the OPERABILITY of one channel of radiation monitors. During the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, the radiation monitors provide the primary isolation function for containment isolation and both radiation monitors are required to be OPERABLE to provide adequate single failure capability. For sampling systems, channel OPERABILITY involves more than OPERABILITY of the channel electronics. OPERABILITY may also require correct valve lineups and sample pump operation, as well as detector OPERABILITY, if these supporting features are necessary for trip to occur under the conditions assumed by the safety analyses. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-6 Amendment No. E2-53
New Page I Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 314.3.3.11 BASES LCO (continued)
- 4.
Safety Iniection (SI) Refer to LCO 3.3.2, Function 1, for all initiating Functions and requirements APPLICABILITY The Manual Initiation, Automatic Actuation Logic, Safety Injection, and Containment Radiation Functions are required OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment. Under these conditions, the potential exists for an accident that could release fission product radioactivity into containment. Therefore, the Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation must be OPERABLE in these MODES While in MODES 5 and 6 without fuel handling in progress, the Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation need not be OPERABLE since the potential for radioactive releases is minimized and operator action is sufficient to ensure post accident offsite doses are maintained within the limits of Reference 1. The Applicability for the containment ventilation isolation on the ESFAS Safety Injection Functions are specified in LCO 3.3.2. ACTIONS The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or drift sufficient to exceed the tolerance allowed by unit specific calibration procedures Typically, the drift is found to be small and results in a delay of actuation rather than a total loss of function. If the Trip Setpoint is less conservative than the tolerance specified by the calibration procedure, the channel must be declared inoperable immediately and the appropriate condition entered. Action a - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 Action a. applies to all Containment Ventilation Isolation Functions and addresses the train orientation of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) and the master and slave relays for these functions If a train is inoperable, operation may continue as long as the required action for the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.6.3 is met for each valve made inoperable by failure of isolation instrumentation. Action b - MODES 1, 2. 3, and 4 Action b. addresses the failure of the required radiation monitoring channel. If the required radiation monitor is inoperable, operation may continue as long as the required action for the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.6 3 is met for each containment purge and exhaust isolation valve made inoperable by failure of isolation instrumentation. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 Amendment No. B 3/4 3-7 E2-54
New Page Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3/4.3 3.11 BASES ACTIONS (continued) Action c - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 This action has been added to clarify the application of completion time rules. The conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each function listed in Table 3.3-14. The completion time(s) of the inoperable channel(s)/train(s) of a function will be tracked separately for each function starting from the time the condition was entered for that function. Action d - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 Action d. allows the entry into applicable modes while relying on the required actions as an exception to the requirements of Specification 3.0.4. Action e - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 Action e. has been added to allow one train of actuation logic to be placed in bypass and to delay entering the required actions for up to four hours to perform surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE. The 4 hour allowance is consistent with the required actions for actuation logic trains in LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation" and allows periodic testing to be conducted while at power without causing an actual actuation. The delay for entering the required actions relieves the administrative burden of entering the required actions for isolation valves inoperable solely due to the performance of surveillance testing on the actuation logic and is acceptable based on the OPERABILITY of the opposite train. Action a - Fuel Movement Action a applies to the failure of one containment purge isolation radiation monitor channel. Since the two containment radiation monitors are both gaseous detectors, failure of a single channel may result in loss of the redundancy. Consequently, the failed channel must be restored to OPERABLE status. The 4 hours allowed to restore the affected channel is justified by the low likelihood of events occurring during this interval, and recognition that one or more of the remaining channels will respond to most events. If the radiation monitor channel is not returned to OPERABLE status within the 4-hour limit, operation may continue as long as the required action for the applicable conditions of LCO 3.9.4, "Containment Building Penetrations," is met for each valve made inoperable by failure of isolation instrumentation. Action b - Fuel Movement Action b. applies to all Containment Ventilation Isolation Functions and addresses the train orientation of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) and the master and slave relays for these functions. If a train is inoperable, operation may continue as long as the required action for the applicable Conditions of LCO 3 9.4, "Containment Building Penetrations," is met for each valve made inoperable by failure of isolation instrumentation. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-8 Amendment No. E2-55
New Page Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.11 BASES ACTIONS (continued) Action c. - Fuel Movement Action c. addresses the failure of multiple radiation monitoring channels If multiple radiation monitors are inoperable, operation may continue as long as the required action for the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.9.4, "Containment Building Penetrations," is met for each valve made inoperable by failure of isolation instrumentation. Action d - Fuel Movement This action has been added to clarify the application of completion time rules. The conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each function listed in Table 3.3-14. The completion time(s) of the inoperable channel(s)/train(s) of a function will be tracked separately for each function starting from the time the condition was entered for that function. Action e - Fuel Movement Action e. allows the entry into applicable conditions while relying on the required actions as an exception to the requirements of Specification 3 0.4. SURVEILLANCE 43.3 11.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. The frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on the Automatic Actuation Logic every 31 days The train being tested is placed in the bypass condition, thus preventing inadvertent actuation. Through the semiautomatic tester, all possible SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-9 Amendment No. E2-56
New Page Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3/4 3.3.11 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) logic combinations, with and without applicable permissives, are tested for each protection function. In addition, the master relay coil is pulse tested for continuity. This verifies that the logic modules are OPERABLE and there is an intact voltage signal path to the master relay coils. This test is performed every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The Surveillance interval is acceptable based on instrument reliability and industry operating experience. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed every 92 days on each radiation monitor to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended function. The frequency is based on the staff recommendation for increasing the availability of radiation monitors according to NUREG-1366 (Ref. 2) This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the containment ventilation system isolation. The setpoint shall be left consistent with the current unit specific calibration procedure tolerance. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the Manual Initiation function is performed every 18 months. Each Manual Initiation function is tested up to, and including, the master relay coils. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i e., pump starts, valve cycles, etc ) The frequency is based on the known reliability of the function and the redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. The Frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle. REFERENCES
- 1.
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 100 11, "Determination of Exclusion Area, Low Population Zone, and Population Center Distance."
- 2.
NUREG-1 366, "Improvement to Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements," December 1992. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-10 Amendment No. E2-57
New Page_ ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.12 B 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3/4.3.3.12 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment (ABGTS) Actuation Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The ABGTS ensures that radioactive materials in the fuel building atmosphere following a fuel handling accident or a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) are filtered and adsorbed prior to exhausting to the environment The system initiates filtered exhaust of air from the fuel handling area, ECCS pump rooms, and penetration rooms automatically following receipt of a fuel pool area high radiation signal or a Containment Phase A Isolation signal. Initiation may also be performed manually as needed from the main control room. High area radiation, monitored by either of two monitors, provides ABGTS initiation. Each ABGTS train is initiated by high radiation detected by a channel dedicated to that train. There are a total of two channels, one for each train High radiation exceeding the monitor's alarm/trip setpoint or a Phase A isolation signal from the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) initiates auxiliary building isolation and starts the ABGTS. These actions function to prevent exfiltration of contaminated air by initiating filtered ventilation, which imposes a negative pressure on the Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure (ABSCE) APPLICABLE The ABGTS ensures that radioactive materials in the ABSCE SAFETY ANALYSES atmosphere following a fuel handling accident or a LOCA are filtered and adsorbed prior to being exhausted to the environment. This action reduces the radioactive content in the auxiliary building exhaust following a LOCA or fuel handling accident so that offsite doses remain within the limits specified in 10 CFR 100 (Ref 1). The ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LCO The LCO requirements ensure that instrumentation necessary to initiate the ABGTS is OPERABLE.
- 1.
Manual Initiation The LCO requires two channels OPERABLE. The operator can initiate the ABGTS at any time by using either of two switches in the control room. This action will cause actuation of all components in the same manner as any of the automatic actuation signals. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 Amendment No. B 3/4 3-11 E2-58
New Page ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation ____B 3/4.3.3.12 BASES LCO (continued) The LCO for Manual Initiation ensures the proper amount of redundancy is maintained in the manual actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has manual initiation capability. Each channel consists of one hand switch and the interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic relays.
- 2.
Fuel Pool Area Radiation The LCO specifies one required Fuel Pool Area Radiation Monitor during the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling area to ensure that the radiation monitoring instrumentation necessary to initiate the ABGTS remains OPERABLE. One radiation monitor is dedicated to each train of ABGTS. For sampling systems, channel OPERABILITY involves more than OPERABILITY of channel electronics. OPERABILITY may also require correct valve lineups, sample pump operation, and filter motor operation, as well as detector OPERABILITY, if these supporting features are necessary for trip to occur under the conditions assumed by the safety analyses.
- 3.
Containment Phase A Isolation Refer to LCO 3.3.2, Function 3.a, for all initiating functions and requirements. APPLICABILITY The manual ABGTS initiation must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 and when moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling area, to ensure the ABGTS operates to remove fission products associated with leakage after a LOCA or a fuel handling accident The Phase A ABGTS Actuation is also required in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to remove fission products caused by post LOCA Emergency Core Cooling Systems leakage. High radiation initiation of the ABGTS must be OPERABLE in any MODE during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling area to ensure automatic initiation of the ABGTS when the potential for a fuel handling accident exists. While in MODES 5 and 6 without fuel handling in progress, the ABGTS instrumentation need not be OPERABLE since a fuel handling accident cannot occur. The Applicability for the ABGTS actuation on the ESFAS Containment Isolation Phase A Functions are specified in LCO 3.3.2. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-12 Amendment No E2-59
New Page ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.12 BASES ACTIONS The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or drift sufficient to exceed the tolerance allowed by unit specific calibration procedures. Typically, the drift is found to be small and results in a delay of actuation rather than a total loss of function. If the Trip Setpoint is less conservative than the tolerance specified by the calibration procedure, the channel must be declared inoperable immediately and the appropriate Condition entered. Action a - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 Action a. applies to the actuation logic train function from the Phase A Isolation and the manual function Action a applies to the failure of a single actuation logic train or manual channel If one channel or train is inoperable, a period of 7 days is allowed to restore it to OPERABLE status. If the train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, one ABGTS train must be placed in operation. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation. The 7 day completion time is the same as is allowed if one train of the mechanical portion of the system is inoperable as required by Specification 3.7.8. If the required action to return the ABGTS train to OPERABLE status or place a train of ABGTS in operation within 7 days has not been met and the plant is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. The plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO requirements are not applicable. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems Action b - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 Action b. applies to the failure of two ABGTS actuation logic signals from the Phase A Isolation or two manual channels. The required action is to place one ABGTS train in operation immediately. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function that may have been lost and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation. The applicable conditions and required actions of Specification 3.7.8 must also be entered for the ABGTS train made inoperable by the inoperable actuation instrumentation. This ensures appropriate limits are placed on train inoperability. Alternatively, both trains may be placed in the emergency radiation protection mode. This ensures the ABGTS Function is performed even in the presence of a single failure. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-13 Amendment No. E2-60
New Page ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3 12 BASES ACTIONS (continued) If the above required actions have not been met and the plant is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO requirements are not applicable. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems Action c - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 This action has been added to clarify the application of completion time rules The conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each function listed in Table 3.3-15. The completion time(s) of the inoperable channel(s)/train(s) of a function will be tracked separately for each function starting from the time the condition was entered for that function. Action d. - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 Action d. allows the entry into applicable modes while relying on the required actions as an exception to the requirements of Specification 3 0 4. Action a. - Fuel Movement Action a. applies to the failure of two ABGTS actuation logic signals from the Phase A Isolation, two radiation monitors, or two manual channels The required action is to place one ABGTS train in operation immediately. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function that may have been lost and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation. When the above required action has not been met and irradiated fuel assemblies are being moved in the fuel handling area. Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling area must be suspended immediately to eliminate the potential for events that could require ABGTS actuation. Performance of these actions shall not preclude moving a component to a safe position. Action b - Fuel Movement Action b. allows the entry into applicable modes while relying on the required actions as an exception to the requirements of Specification 3.0 4. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. E2-61
New Page ABGTS ActuationInstuentation B 3/4.3 3.12 BASES SURVEILLANCE 43 3.12 1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. The frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed every 92 days on each radiation monitor to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended function This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the ABGTS actuation. The setpoints shall be left consistent with the unit specific calibration procedure tolerance. The frequency of 92 days is based on the known reliability of the monitoring equipment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the Manual Initiation function is performed every 18 months. Each Manual Initiation function is tested up to, and including, the master relay coils. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i.e., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.) The frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. The frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle REFERENCES
- 1.
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 100.11, "Determination of Exclusion Area, Low Population Zone, and Population Center Distance" SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-15 Amendment No. E2-62
New Page CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3 13 B 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3/4.3.3.13 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) Actuation Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The CREVS provides an enclosed control room environment from which the unit can be operated following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity. During normal operation, the Control Building Ventilation System provides control room ventilation. Upon receipt of an actuation signal, the CREVS initiates filtered ventilation and pressurization of the control room. The actuation instrumentation consists of redundant radiation monitors. A high radiation alarm/trip signal from any monitor will initiate its associated trains of the CREVS The control room operator can also initiate CREVS trains by manual switches in the control room. The CREVS is also actuated by a safety injection (SI) signal. The control room must be kept habitable for the operators stationed there during accident recovery and post accident operations The CREVS acts to terminate the supply of unfiltered outside air to the control room, initiate filtration, and emergency pressurization of the control room These actions are necessary to ensure the control room is kept habitable for the operators stationed there during accident recovery and post accident operations by minimizing the radiation exposure of control room personnel In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the radiation monitor actuation of the CREVS is a backup for the SI signal actuation. This ensures initiation of the CREVS during a loss of coolant accident or steam generator tube rupture. The radiation monitor actuation of the CREVS in MODES 5 and 6, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and during CORE ALTERATIONS, is the primary means to ensure control room habitability in the event of a fuel handling or waste gas decay tank rupture accident. The CREVS actuation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-16 E2-63 Amendment No.
New Page BASES CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.13 LCO APPLICABILITY The CREVS Functions must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The Functions must also be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 when required for a waste gas decay tank rupture accident, to ensure a habitable environment for the control room operators. The Applicability for the CREVS actuation on the ESFAS Safety Injection Functions are specified in LCO 3.3 2. SEQUOYAH - UNIT I B 3/4 3-17 E2-64 The LCO requirements ensure that instrumentation necessary to initiate the CREVS is OPERABLE.
- 1.
Manual Initiation The LCO requires two channels OPERABLE. The operator can initiate the CREVS at any time by using either of two switches in the control room This action will cause actuation of all components in the same manner as any of the automatic actuation signals. The LCO for Manual Initiation ensures the proper amount of redundancy is maintained in the manual actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has manual initiation capability. Each channel consists of one hand switch and the interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic relays.
- 2.
Control Room Radiation The LCO specifies two required Control Room Air Intake Radiation Monitors to ensure that the radiation monitoring instrumentation necessary to initiate the CREVS remains OPERABLE. One radiation monitor is dedicated to each train of CREVS. For sampling systems, channel OPERABILITY involves more than OPERABILITY of channel electronics OPERABILITY may also require correct valve lineups, sample pump operation, and filter motor operation, as well as detector OPERABILITY, if these supporting features are necessary for trip to occur under the conditions assumed by the safety analyses.
- 3.
Safety Iniection Refer to LCO 3.3.2, Function 1, for all initiating Functions and requirements Amendment No.
New Page CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.13 BASES ACTIONS The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or drift sufficient to exceed the tolerance allowed by the plant specific calibration procedures. Typically, the drift is found to be small and results in a delay of actuation rather than a total loss of function. If the Trip Setpoint is less conservative than the tolerance specified by the calibration procedure, the channel must be declared inoperable immediately and the appropriate condition entered. Action a. - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 Action a. applies to the actuation logic train function of the CREVS, the radiation monitor channel functions, and the manual channel functions. If one train is inoperable, or one radiation monitor channel is inoperable in one or more functions, 7 days are permitted to restore it to OPERABLE status. The 7-day completion time is the same as is allowed if one train of the mechanical portion of the system is inoperable as required by LCO 3.7.7. If the channel/train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, one CREVS train must be placed in the emergency radiation protection mode of operation. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation. If the required action to return the CREVS train to OPERABLE status or place a train of CREVS in operation within 7 days has not been met and the plant is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or4, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO requirements are not applicable. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems Action b - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 Action b. applies to the failure of two CREVS actuation trains, two radiation monitor channels, or two manual channels The first required action is to place one CREVS train in the emergency radiation protection mode of operation immediately. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function that may have been lost and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation. The applicable actions of LCO 3.7.7 must also be entered for the CREVS train made inoperable by the inoperable actuation instrumentation. This ensures appropriate limits are placed upon train inoperability. Alternatively, both trains may be placed in the emergency radiation protection mode. This ensures the CREVS function is performed even in the presence of a single failure. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-18 Amendment No. E2-65
New Page CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.13 BASES ACTIONS (continued) If the above required actions have not been met and the plant is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO requirements are not applicable. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems Action c - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 This action has been added to clarify the application of completion time rules. The conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each function listed in Table 3.3-16. The completion time(s) of the inoperable channel(s)/train(s) of a function will be tracked separately for each function starting from the time the condition was entered for that function. Action d. - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 Action d. allows the entry into applicable modes while relying on the required actions as an exception to the requirements of Specification 3.0 4. Action a - MODES 5 and 6 Action a. applies to the actuation logic train function of the CREVS, the radiation monitor channel functions, and the manual channel functions. If one train is inoperable, or one radiation monitor channel is inoperable in one or more functions, 7 days are permitted to restore it to OPERABLE status The 7-day completion time is the same as is allowed if one train of the mechanical portion of the system is inoperable as required by LCO 3.7.7. If the channel/train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, one CREVS train must be placed in the emergency radiation protection mode of operation. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation. If the required action to return the CREVS train to OPERABLE status or place a train of CREVS in operation within 7 days has not been met and the plant is in MODE 5 or 6, actions must be initiated to restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status immediately to ensure adequate isolation capability in the event of a waste gas decay tank rupture. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-19 Amendment No E2-66
New Page CREVS Actuation Instrumentation New__ PageB 3/4.3 3.13 BASES ACTIONS (continued) Action b - MODES 5 and 6 Action b. applies to the failure of two CREVS actuation trains, two radiation monitor channels, or two manual channels. The first required action is to place one CREVS train in the emergency radiation protection mode of operation immediately This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function that may have been lost and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation. The applicable actions of LCO 3 7.7 must also be entered for the CREVS train made inoperable by the inoperable actuation instrumentation. This ensures appropriate limits are placed upon train inoperability. Alternatively, both trains may be placed in the emergency radiation protection mode. This ensures the CREVS function is performed even in the presence of a single failure. If the above required actions have not been met and the plant is in MODE 5 or 6, actions must be initiated to restore the inoperable trains to OPERABLE status immediately to ensure adequate isolation capability in the event of a waste gas decay tank rupture. Action c - MODES 5 and 6 This action has been added to clarify the application of completion time rules. The conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each function listed in Table 3.3-16. The completion time(s) of the inoperable channel(s)/train(s) of a function will be tracked separately for each function starting from the time the condition was entered for that function. Action d - MODES 5 and 6 Action d allows the entry into applicable modes while relying on the required actions as an exception to the requirements of Specification 3.0.4. Action a - Fuel Movement Action a. applies to the actuation logic train function of the CREVS, the radiation monitor channel functions, and the manual channel functions. If one train is inoperable, or one radiation monitor channel is inoperable in one or more functions, 7 days are permitted to restore it to OPERABLE status. The 7-day completion time is the same as is allowed if one train of the mechanical portion of the system is inoperable as required by LCO 3.7.7. If the channel/train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, one CREVS train must be placed in the emergency radiation protection mode of operation. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-20 Amendment No. E2-67
New Page CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.13 BASES ACTIONS (continued) If the required action to return the CREVS train to OPERABLE status or place a train of CREVS in operation within 7 days has not been met when irradiated fuel assemblies are being moved, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be suspended immediately to reduce the risk of accidents that would require CREVS actuation Action b - Fuel Movement Action b. applies to the failure of two CREVS actuation trains, two radiation monitor channels, or two manual channels. The first required action is to place one CREVS train in the emergency radiation protection mode of operation immediately. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function that may have been lost and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation. The applicable actions of LCO 3.7.7 must also be entered for the CREVS train made inoperable by the inoperable actuation instrumentation. This ensures appropriate limits are placed upon train inoperability. Alternatively, both trains may be placed in the emergency radiation protection mode This ensures the CREVS function is performed even in the presence of a single failure. If the above required actions have not been met when irradiated fuel assemblies are being moved, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be suspended immediately to reduce the risk of accidents that would require CREVS actuation Action c - Fuel Movement This action has been added to clarify the application of completion time rules The conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each function listed in Table 3.3-16. The completion time(s) of the inoperable channel(s)/train(s) of a function will be tracked separately for each function starting from the time the condition was entered for that function. Action d. - Fuel Movement Action d. allows the entry into applicable modes while relying on the required actions as an exception to the requirements of Specification 3.0.4. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-21 Amendment No. E2-68
New Page CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.13 BASES SURVEILLANCE 433 13.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit The frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed every 92 days on each radiation monitor to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended function. This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the CREVS actuation. The setpoints shall be left consistent with the unit specific calibration procedure tolerance The frequency of 92 days is based on the known reliability of the monitoring equipment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the Manual Initiation function is performed every 18 months. Each Manual Initiation function is tested up to, and including, the master relay coils. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i.e., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.). The frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. The frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle. REFERENCES None. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-22 Amendment No. E2-69
New Page LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.14 B 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 314.3.3.14 Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The DGs provide a source of emergency power when offsite power is either unavailable or is insufficiently stable to allow safe unit operation Undervoltage protection will generate an LOP start if a loss-of-voltage or degraded voltage condition occurs in the switchyard. There are four LOP start signals, one for each 6.9 kV Shutdown Board Three degraded voltage relays (one per phase) are provided on each 6.9 kV Shutdown Board for detecting a sustained undervoltage condition. The relays are combined in a two-out-of-three logic configuration to generate a shutdown board load shed actuation and start the DGs if the voltage is below 93.5% for 300 seconds (nominal) If a safety injection signal is present at the time of the degraded voltage condition or if a safety injection actuation occurs during a degraded voltage condition, the load shed actuation will occur within 9.5 seconds (nominal). Additionally, three loss-of-voltage relays (one per phase) are provided on each 6.9 kV Shutdown Board for the purpose of detecting a loss-of-voltage condition. These relays are combined in a two-out-of-three logic to generate a shutdown board load shed actuation and start the DGs if the voltage is below 80% for 1.25 seconds (nominal) The LOP start actuation is described in FSAR Section 8.3, "Onsite Power System" (Reference 1). Allowable Values and LOP DG Start Instrumentation Setpoints The trip setpoints used in the relays and timers are based on the analytical limits presented in TVA calculations, References 3, 4, and 5. The selection of these trip setpoints is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and time delays are taken into account. The Nominal Trip Setpoint is the expected value to be achieved during calibrations The Nominal Trip Setpoint considers all factors which may affect channel performance by statistically combining rack drift, rack measurement and test equipment effects, rack calibration accuracy, rack comparator setting accuracy, rack temperature effects, sensor measurements and test equipment effects, sensor calibration accuracy, primary element accuracy, and process measurement accuracy. The Allowable Value has been established by considering the measurable values assumed for rack effects only. The Allowable Value serves as an operability limit for the purpose of the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-23 Amendment No. E2-70
New Page LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.14 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) Setpoints adjusted consistent with the requirements of the Allowable Value ensure that the consequences of accidents will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the accident and that the equipment functions as designed. Allowable Values and/or Nominal Trip Setpoints are specified for each function in Table 3.3-17. Nominal Trip Setpoints are also specified in the unit specific setpoint calculations The trip setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoint measured by the surveillance procedure does not exceed the Allowable Value if the relay is performing as required. If the measured setpoint does not exceed the Allowable Value, the relay is considered OPERABLE Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint, but within the Allowable Value, is acceptable provided that operation and testing is consistent with the assumptions of the unit specific setpoint calculation (Reference 3). APPLICABLE The LOP DG start instrumentation is required for the Engineered Safety SAFETY ANALYSES Features (ESF) Systems to function in any accident with a loss of offsite power. Its design basis is that of the ESF Actuation System (ESFAS). Accident analyses credit the loading of the DG based on the loss of offsite power during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The actual DG start has historically been associated with the ESFAS actuation. The DG loading has been included in the delay time associated with each safety system component requiring DG supplied power following a loss of offsite power. The analyses assume a non mechanistic DG loading, which does not explicitly account for each individual component of loss of power detection and subsequent actions. The channels of LOP DG start instrumentation, in conjunction with the ESF systems powered from the DGs, provide unit protection in the event of any of the analyzed accidents discussed in Reference 2, in which a loss of offsite power is assumed. The delay times assumed in the safety analysis for the ESF equipment include the 10 second DG start delay, and the appropriate sequencing delay, if applicable. The response times for ESFAS actuated equipment in LCO 3.3 2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," include the appropriate DG loading and sequencing delay. The LOP DG start instrumentation channels satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-24 Amendment No. E2-71
New Page LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.14 BASES LCO The LCO for LOP DG Start Instrumentation requires that the loss-of-voltage, degraded voltage, load shed, and DG Start functions shall be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 when the LOP DG Start Instrumentation supports safety systems associated with the ESFAS. In MODES 5 and 6, the functions must be OPERABLE whenever the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that the automatic start of the DG is available when needed A channel is OPERABLE with an actual trip setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the trip setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is readjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A trip setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions. Loss of the LOP DG Start Instrumentation function could result in the delay of safety systems initiation when required. This could lead to unacceptable consequences during accidents During the loss of offsite power the DG powers the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps Failure of these pumps to start would leave only one turbine driven pump, as well as an increased potential for a loss of decay heat removal through the secondary system. APPLICABILITY The LOP DG Start Instrumentation Functions are required in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 because ESF Functions are designed to provide protection in these MODES Actuation in MODE 5 or 6 is required whenever the required DG must be OPERABLE so that it can perform its function on an LOP or a degraded voltage condition on the 6.9 kV Shutdown Board. ACTIONS In the event a channel's trip setpoint is found nonconservative with respect to the Allowable Value, or the channel is found inoperable, then the function that channel provides must be declared inoperable and the LCO condition entered for the particular protection function affected Action a Action a. applies to the LOP DG start function with one channel of voltage sensors per board inoperable. If one channel of voltage sensors is inoperable, Action a. requires the channel to be restored to OPERABLE status within 6 hours The specified completion time is reasonable considering the function remains fully OPERABLE on every board and the low probability of an event occurring during these intervals When the inoperable channel can not be returned to OPERABLE status within 6 hours, the requirements specified in LCO 3.8 1.1, "AC Sources Operating," or LCO 3 8.1.2, "AC Sources Shutdown," for the DG made inoperable by failure of the LOP DG start instrumentation are required to be entered immediately. The actions of those LCOs provide for adequate compensatory actions to assure unit safety. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-25 Amendment No. E2-72
INew Page LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.14 BASES ACTIONS (continued) Action b Action b. applies when more than one channel of voltage sensors or the required timer(s) on a single board is inoperable. Action b. requires restoring all but one channel of voltage sensors and at least one timer for each required function to OPERABLE status The 1 hour completion time should allow ample time to repair most failures and takes into account the low probability of an event requiring an LOP start occurring during this interval When the inoperable channel can not be returned to OPERABLE status within 1 hour, the requirements specified in LCO 3.8.1.1, "AC Sources Operating," or LCO 3.8.1.2, "AC Sources Shutdown," for the DG made inoperable by failure of the LOP DG start instrumentation are required to be entered immediately. The actions of those LCOs provide for adequate compensatory actions to assure unit safety. Action c Because the required channels are specified on a per shutdown board basis, the condition may be entered separately for each board as appropriate. Action c. has been added to clarify the application of completion time rules. The conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each function listed in the LCO. The completion time(s) of the inoperable channel(s) of a function will be tracked separately for each function starting from the time the condition was entered for that function. Action d Action d. has been added to direct entry into the applicable actions of LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," for inoperable Auxiliary Feedwater Loss of Power start instrumentation. The loss-of-voltage relays required by this LCO also initiate load shed and the sequencing functions that initiate the start of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps for a loss of power condition and generate a start signal for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump as required in LCO 3.3.2. SURVEILLANCE 4.3 3 14 1 REQUIREMENTS A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the voltage sensors is performed every 31 days. This test checks operation of the loss-of-voltage and degraded voltage sensors that provide actuation signals. The frequency is based on the known SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-26 E2-73 Amendment No.
New Page LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3/4.3 3.14 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) reliability of the relays and timers and the redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the loss-of voltage and degraded voltage functions, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. The setpoints, as well as the response to a loss-of-voltage and a degraded voltage test, shall include a single point verification that the trip occurs within the required time delay, as shown in Reference 1. The frequency of 18 months is based on operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycle and is justified by the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. REFERENCES
- 1.
Sequoyah FSAR, Section 8.3, "Onsite Power System."
- 2.
Sequoyah FSAR, Section 15 0, "Accident Analysis"
- 3.
TVA Calculation 27 DAT, "Demonstrated Accuracy Calculation 27 DAT"
- 4.
TVA Calculation DS1-2, "Demonstrated Accuracy Calculation DS1-2"
- 5.
TVA Calculation SQN-EEB-MS-TI06-0008, "Degraded Voltage Analysis" SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-27 Amendment No. E2-74
INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4 2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD)....................................................................................... 3/4 2-1 3/4.2.2 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR-FQ(Z).................................... 3/4 2-4 3/4.2.3 NUCLEAR ENTHALPY HOT CHANNEL FACTOR............................................................ 3/4 2-8 3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO.................................................................................. 3/4 2-10 3/4 2.5 DNB PARAM ETERS......................................................................................................... 3/4 2-13 3/4 3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION............................................................... 3/4 3-1 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION.......... 3/4 3-14 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Radiation Monitoring Instrumentatio (DELETED)................................................. 3/4 3-40 M ovable Incore Detectors....................................... ....................................... 3/4 3-44 Seismic Instrumentation (Deleted)........................................................................ 3/4 3-45 Meteorological Instrumentation..................................... 3/4 3-48 Remote Shutdown Instrumentation...................................................................... 3/4 3-51 Chlorine Detection Systems (Deleted)...................................................................... 3/4 3-55 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation..................................................................... 3/4 3-56 Fire Detection Instrumentation (Deleted)................................................................... 3/4 3-59 D eleted...................................................................................................................... 3/4 3-68 Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation.............................................................. 3/4 3-69 C Ad Insert 3 September 7, 1999 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 V Amendment No. 54, 130, 134, 218, 236 E2-75
SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS 2 2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS 2.2.1 The reactor trip system instrumentation and interlocks setpornts shall be set consistent with (values shown in Table 2.2-1. APPLICABILITY: As shown for each channel in Table 3.3-1. ACTION With a reactor trip system instrumentation or interlock setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 2.2-1, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION statement requirement of Specification 3 3.1 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with t r p SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 2-4 E2-76
FUNCTIONAL UNIT
- 1. Manual ReactorTri
- 2. Power Range Neuti Flux
- 3. Power Range Neut Flux High Positive Rate
- 4. Power Range Neut High Negative Rate
- 5. Intermediate Range Flux
- 6. Source Range Neu Flux
- 7. Overtemperature A
- 8. Overpower AT
- 9. Pressurizer Pressu
- 10. Pressurizer Pressu
- 11. Pressurizer Water I
- 12. Loss of Flow TABLE 2.2-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS SNAL ALLOWABLE VALUES p
Not Applicable Not Applicable ron Low Setpoint 1925% of RATED Low Setpoint - < 27.4% of RATED THERMAL POWER THERMAL POWER High Setpoint-'9109% of High Setpoint -*5 111.4% of RATED RATED THERMAL POWER THERMAL POWER ron j05% of RATED THERMAL < 6.3% of RATED THERMAL POWER with a time constant > 2 POWER with a time constant > 2 second second ron Flux, c)5% of RATED THERMAL
- 6.3% of RATED THERMAL POWER with a time constant > 2 POWER with a time constant > 2 second second e, Neutron
ý25% of RATED THERMAL
- 45.20% of RATED THERMAL POWER POWER tron 1105 counts per second
< 1.45 x 105 counts per second T See Note 1 See Note 3 See Note 2 See Note 4 re--Low - 1970 psig >_ 1964.8 psig re--High 5 t2385 psig < 2390.2 psig Level--High 2% of instrument span _< 92.7% of instrument span 4 90% of design flow per loop* > 89.6% of design flow per loop*
- Design flow is 90,045 (87,000 X 1.035) gpm per loop.
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 2-5 April 21, 1997 Amendment No. 36,132, 177, 203, 212, 214 E2-77
TABLE 2 2-1 (Continued) FUNCTIONAL UN REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS TLOMINAL IT TRIPSETPON ALLOWABLE fALUES Level-Low-Low a RCS Loop AT Equivalent to Power* 50% RTP or With or RCS Loop AT variablnt 50% RTP Coincident with 5.0% of narrow range Steam Generator instrument span Water Level-Low-Low (Adverse) and Containment Pressure 0.5 psig (EAM) Steam Generator Water 0.7% of narrow range Level-Low-Low (EAM) instrument span A time delay (Ts) if one s (Note 5) Steam Generator is affected A time delay (Tm) if two M Note 5) or more Steam Generators are affected SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 iable input t% RTP > 14.4% of narrow range instrument span < 0.6 psig _> 10.1% of narrow range instrument span _< (1.01) Ts (Note 5) _< (1.01)TM (Note 5) October 31, 1990 2-6 Amendment Nos. 7, 132 E2-78
TABLE 2 2-1 (Continued) FUNCTIONAL UN REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS UNOMINA L IT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES, L flfC I U. I'I..,O LUUO L/ I E"*UiVdleint to Power > 50% RTP Coincident with Steam Generator Water /'15.0% of narrow range Level--Low-Low(Adverse) pinstrument span and Containment Pressure (EAM) or Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low (EAM)
- 14. Deleted
- 15. Undervoltage-Reactor Coolant Pumps
- 16. Underfrequency-Reactor Coolant Pumps
- 17. Turbine Trip A. Low Trip System Pressure B. Turbine Stop Valve Closure
- 18. Safety Injection Input from ESF
>456-Hz each bus Spsig 1% open Not Applicable > 14.4% of narrow range instrument span < 0.6 psig range _ 10.1% of narrow range instrument span bus 4952 >:-47-39 volts - each bus 56.3 _>-54-9 Hz each bus _> 43 psig > 1% open Not Applicable SEQUOYAH -UNIT2 2-7 October 31, 1990 Amendment Nos. 7, 76, 132 E2-79
TABLE 2 2-1 (Continued) FUI
- 19.
- 20.
- 21.
22. REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS IJNOMINAL 4CTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE \\ Intermediate Range Neutron -5 -6 Flx P6 nallok* x 10"5% of RATED > 6 x 10"6% of Flux, P-6, Enable Block -THER MA O E H R A P Source Range Reactor Trip TEMAL POWER THERMAL PO! Power Range Neutron Flux 0% of RATED THERMAL < 12.4% of RA (not P-10) Input to Low Powe POWER POWER Reactor Trips Block P-7 Turbine Impulse Chamber __0% Turbine Impulse Pressure < 12.4% Turbin Pressure -(P-13) Input to Lo Equivalent Pressure Equiv Power Reactor Trips Block P-7 Power Range Neutron Flux 5% of RATED THERMAL < 37 4% of RA (P-8) Low Reactor Coolant OWER POWER Loop Flow, and Reactor Trip Power Range Neutron Flux - - 10% of RATED THERMAL _7.6% of RATI (P-10) - Enable block of POWER POWER Source, Intermediate, and Power Range (low setpoint) Reactor Trips Reactor Trip P-4 Not Applicable Not Applicable Power Range Neutron Flux - 0% of RATED THERMAL < 52 4% of RA (P-9) Blocks Reactor Trip for POWER POWER Turbine - Trip Below 50% Rated Power SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 2-8 IALUES RATED WER FED THERMAL e Impulse 'alent TED THERMAL ED THERMAL TED THERMAL October 31, 1990 Amendment Nos. 21,129,132 E2-80 23
- 24.
25.
TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued) REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS NOTATION NOTE 1: Overtemperature AT (+ <4S < ATo Ki - K( + -iS) [T - T] + K3(P ) f, (AI) 1I + TsS) (I + T2S) T] ( ~~~~ Where: 1 + T'4S Lead-lag compensator on measured AT 1 + T5S T4, T5 Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for AT, T 4 > 5 secs, T5 5 3 sec. ATo Indicated AT at RATED THERMAL POWER Ki 1.15 K 2 0011 I + r'S = The function generated by the lead-lag controller for Tavg dynamic I + T 2S compensation TI, & T2 Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for Tavg, T1 > 33 secs., T 2 < 4 secs. T Average temperature cF T< 578.20 a Tavgt RATED THERMAL POWER) K3 = 0.00055 p = Pressurizer pressure, psig pt = 2235 psig (Nominal RCS operating pressure) September 15, 1995 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 2-9 Amendment No 21, 104, 132, 201 E2-81
TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued) REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS NOTATION (Continued) NOTE 1: (Continued) S = Laplace transform operator (sec-1 ) and f, (Al) is a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range nuclear ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measured instrument response during plant startup tests such that. (i) for qt - qb between QTNL* and QTPL* ft (Al) = 0 (where qt and q, are percent RATED THERMAL POWER in the top and bottom halves of the core respectively, and qt + qb is total THERMAL POWER in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER (ii) noia for each percent that the magnitude of (qt - qb) exceeds QTNL, the T tr s point shall be automatically reduced by QTNS of its value at RATED THERMAL POWER. (iii) nominal for each percent that the magnitude of (qt - qb) exceeds QTPL, th A ri set point shall be automatically reduced by QTPS of its value at RATED THERMAL POWER. AT+T5SJ < ATo AT1+F 5S)_ {K4 ( Z3S, "- Ks 15+ "3S T-K 6 (T-T") 1 + TS l+T5,S as defined in Note 1 "QTNL, QTPL, QTNS, and QTPS are specified in the COLR per Specification 6.9.1.14. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 2-10 April 21, 1997 Amendment No. 21,132, 214 E2-82 NOTE 2: Overpower Where: f 2 ( A'I)}
TABLE 2 2-1 (Continued) REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS NOTATION (Continued) NOTE 2: (Continued) 4 5 as defined in Note 1 AT 0 as defined in Note 1 K4 1.087 K 5 0.02/F for increasing average temperature and 0 for decreasing average temperature '3S The function generated by the rate-lag controller for Tavg I + '3S dynamic compensation T 3 Time constant utilized in the rate-lag controller for Tavg, T > 10 secs K 0.0011 forT >T"andK >_0forT <T" 6 6 T as defined in Note 1 T" Indicated Tavg at RATED THERMAL POWER (Calibration temperature for AT instrumentation, < 578.20F) S as defined in Note 1 and f2(AI) is a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range nuclear ion chambers, with gains to be selected based on measured instrument response during plant startup tests such that (i) for qt - qb between QPNL* and QPPL* f2(AI) = 0 (where qt and qb are percent RATED THERMAL POWER in the top and bottom halves of the core respectively, and qt + qb is total THERMAL POWER in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER). (ii) for each percent that the magnitude of (qt - qb) exceeds QPNLt rsp shall be automatically reduced by QPNS* of its value at RATED THERMAL POWER. (iii)nominal for each percent that the magnitude of (qt - qb) exceeds QPPL the :ý ri etpoint shall be automatically reduced by QPPS* of its value at RATE --TIHERMAL POWER.
- QPNL, QPPL, QPNS, and QPPS are specified in the COLR per Specification 6.9.1.14.
April 21, 1997 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 2-11 Amendment No. 21,104, 132, 201,214 E2-83
TABLE 2 2-1 (Continued) REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS NOTATION (Continued) NOTE 3. The channel's maximum trip setpoint shall not exceed itsomuted trip poinby more than 1.9 percent AT span ýnominalI7I NOTE 4: The channel's maximum trip setpoint shall not exceed it omputed trip setpoin by more than 1.7 percent AT span NOTE 5" Trip Time Delay - Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low Ts = {(-0.00583)(P)3 + (0 735)(P)2- (33.560)(P) + 649.5}{0.99) secs Tm = {(-0.00532)(P) 3 + (0.678)(P) 2 - (31.340)(P) + 589 5}{0.99} secs Where. P = RCS Loop AT Equivalent to Power (% RTP), P
- 50% RTP T =
Time delay for Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low Reactor Trip, one s Steam Generator affected (secs). T = Time delay for Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low Reactor Trip, two or more Steam Generators affected (secs) SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 2-12 October 4, 1995 Amendment No. 132, 203 E2-84
SAFETY LIMITS BASES 2 1.1 REACTOR CORE (Continued) These limiting heat flux conditions are higher than those calculated for the range of all control rods fully withdrawn to the maximum allowable control rod insertion assuming the axial power imbalance is within the limits of the f1(delta I) function of the Overtemperature Delta T trip. When the axial power imbalance is not within the tolerance, the axial power imbalance effect on the Overtemperature delta T trips will reduce the setpoints to provide protection consistent with core safety limits. 2 1.2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE The restriction of this Safety Limit protects the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System from overpressurization and thereby prevents the release of radionuclides contained in the reactor coolant from reaching the containment atmosphere. The reactor pressure vessel and pressurizer are designed to Section III of the ASME Code for Nuclear Power Plant which permits a maximum transient pressure of 110% (2735 psig) of design pressure The Reactor Coolant System piping, valves and fittings, are designed to ANSI B 31.1 1967 Edition, which permits a maximum transient pressure of 120% (2985 psig) of component design pressure. The Safety Limit of 2735 psig is therefore consistent with the design criteria and associated code requirements. The entire Reactor Coolant System is hydrotested at 3107 psig, 125% of design pressure, to demonstrate integrity prior to initial operation. 2.2 1 REACTOR TRIPSYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS U Nor'inal ThLReactor Trip SetpoinyLimits specified re the values at which the Nominal Reactor Trips are set for each functional unit. Trip Setpoints ave been selected to ensure that the reactor core and reactor coolant system are prevente-from e ding their safety limits during normal operation and design basis anticipated operational occurrences and to assist the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System in he consequences of accidents Operation with a trip set less conservative tha its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the as difference e ee a h Trip Set oi and the Allowable Value is equal to or less than th alO a suced for each trip in the sa ety analyses. Add Insert 1 Add Insert 2 March 30, 1992 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 2-2 Amendment Nos. 130, 146 E2-85
INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in 56 j ~ponýlm of Table 3.3-4. _PNominal A tCBt:As shown in Table 3.3-3. ACTION:
- a.
With an ESFAS instrumentation channel or interlock trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-4, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3 3-3 unt nneli estored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent wit he Trip Setpoint alue.
- b.
With an ESFAS instrumentation channel or interlock inoperable, take thWe9 lION shown in Table 3.3-3. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4 3 2.1.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel and interlock shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2. 4.3 2.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the automatic actuation logic test. The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation. 4.3 2.1.3 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be verified to be within the limit at least once per 18 months. Each verification shall include at least one train such that both trains are verified at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are verified at least once per N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the "Total No of Channels" Column of Table 3.3-3 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-14 February 29, 2000 Amendment No. 182, 242 E2-86
TABLE 3 3-3 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTIONAL UNIT TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS
- 3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
- b.
Phase "B" Isolation
- 1) Manual
- 2) Automatic Actuation Logic
- 3) Containment Pressure-High-High
""1-2 2 4 CHANNELS TO TRIP 1 ** 1 2 MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE 2 2 3 APPLICABLE MODES 1, 2,3,4 1,2,3,4 1,2,3 ACTION 20 15 18 c UontaInment ventilation I s n 'a;tI n-R
- 2) Automatic Isolation 2
- 3) Containment Purge Air Exhaust Monitor Radioactivity-High 2-1.2,3,4 49 2-4,2,3,4
-5 4-4 4,2.3,44 1-9 Two switches must be operated simultaneously for actuation. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-17 June 25, 1993 Amendment No 55, 158 E2-87
TABLE 3 3-3 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTIONAL UNIT
- e.
Loss of Power Start
- 1. Voltage Sensors
- 2. Load Shed Timer
- f.
Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps Start Motor Driven Pumps and Turbine Driven Pump
- g. Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Pressure-Low
- h.
Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Transfer Time Delays
- 1. Motor-Driven Pump
- 2. Turbine-Driven Pump TOTAL NO.
OF CHANNELS 3/shutdown board 2/shutdown board 1/pump 3/pump 1/pump 2/pump CHANNELS TO TRIP MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE 2/shutdown 3/shutdown board** oard** 1/shutdown a/shutdown boardboard 1/pump 2/pump 1/pump 1/pump 1/pump 3/pump 1/pump 2/pump APPLICABLE MODES 1,2,3 1.2,3 1,2 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3
- Unit 2 Shutdown Boards Only SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-20 August 22, 1995 Amendment No. 29, 116, 174, 180, 197 E2-88 ACTION 35 35 20*
21
- 21
- 21
- TABLE 3 3-3 (Continued)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TOTAL NO. MINIMUM OF CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION J 7. This Specification has been deleted. 7-LOSS OF POWEGR a 6 9 kv Shutdown Boa;rd LosAo Voltage I Voltage Sensors 3JshutdnwR 2_4eh,_tdew~q 31shutdo 1-2 2 34 hnbr hArd bn;ard 2 _D e Di.ee.l Gnrtor 2!shutdo'w, IIsh'utde vR 2!shu ftdow q 1 4 2 3.4 34 Start and Lead beaFd beard bGard 5 4,-6 Shed-T-Mrn Sb 9,"Shutdown "1. Voltage Sensors 3,shh'd-w 21rhudewR 316hutdW';; 2 -2 4-4 34 bewd hpeard 6 2 Diesel Generatei 21shutdGWR 11shutdow 2/shutdown 1 22-- 34 Sta*t and Lo-ad beard beard bard 3Seqae 2/,sh,_tdo';:n !/shutdo'wn 2/shutdo:.n 4, 2, 3,4 ý34 August 22, 1995 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-21 Amendment No. 18, 132, 150, 174, 180, 197 E2-89
TABLE 3 3-3 (Continued) TABLE NOTATION Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure Block of Safety Injection) setpoint.
- Trip function automatically blocked above P-1 I and may be blocked below P-1 1 when Safety Injection on Steam Line Pressure-Low is not blocked.
- When Associated Diesel Generator is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.1.2, "AC Sources Shutdown." The Provisions of Specification 3.0 4 are not applicable.
- Trip function automatically blocked above P-1 I and may be blocked below P-1 1 when Safety Injection on Steam Line Pressure-Low is not blocked.
The provisions of Specification 3 0 4 are not applicable. ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 15 ACTION 16 ACTION 17-With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, be in HOT STANDBY within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE. Deleted. With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements is met, however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.1.
ACTION 18 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition within 6 hours and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specic on 4.3.2. 1. 1. ACTION 20 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-22 October 4, 1995 Amendment Nos 55, 132, 158, 174, 180, 192,197,203 E2-90
TABLE 3 3-3 (Continued) ACTION 21 ACTION 22-ACTION 23 ACTION 24 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, declare the associated auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, and comply with the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.7.1.2. With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, declare the interlock inoperable and verify that all affected channels of the functions listed below are OPERABLE or apply the appropriate ACTION statement(s) for those functions. Functions to be evaluated are: a Safety Injection Pressurizer Pressure Steam Line Pressure Negative Steam Line Pressure Rate b Deleted C Turbine Trip Steam Generator Level High-High Feedwater Isolation Steam Generator Level High-High With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3 2.1.1. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours ACTION 25-With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or declare the oci dvalv inopON rq e, Delete SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-23 August 22, 1995 Amendment No. 55, 116, 132, 150, 174,180,197 E2-91
TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) ACTION 35 - ACTION 36 - ACTION 37 ACTION 38 -
- a.
th the num L hannels one less than the Total Number of ethe inoperablehannel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or "enter applcal ion(s) For Operation and Action(s) for the associated auxiliary feedwater pump made inoperable by the channel.
- b.
With the number of OPER Echfl ber of 1 4 for voltage sensors or timers Channels by more than one, restore all but one channel to OPERABLE status ithin 1 hour or enter applicab e Li s Action(s) for the associated auxiliary feedwater pump made inoperable by the channels. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied. a The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours
- b.
For the affected protection set, the Trip Time Delay for one affected steam generator (Ts) is adjusted to match the Trip Time Delay for multiple affected steam generators (TM) within 4 hours.
- c.
The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2 1.1. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided that within 6 hours, for the affected protection set, the Trip Time Delays (Ts and TM) threshold power level for zero seconds time delay is adjusted to 0% RTP. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided that within 6 hours, for the affected protection set, the Steam Generator Water Level - Low-Low (EAM) channels trip setpoint is adjusted to the same value as Steam Generator Water Level - Low-Low (Adverse). SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-23a August 22, 1995 Amendment No. 132, 150, 174, 180, 197 E2-92
TABLE 3 3-4 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS C JNOMINAL 4 JNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP: SEPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES t-Ixfr--r* m n ir
- 'ji., "I -ui",L, m 1-U~i i'J i-lr~Ir"%r
- 1.
ot/w'r-I T IINJ-4j -, 1 Ilulm, 1 uml' lm::ll-I mI'1 AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION
- a. Manual Initiation
- b. Automatic Actuation Logic c Containment Pressure--High
- d. Pressurizer Pressure--Low
- e. Deleted
- f. Steam Line Pressure-Low Not Applicable Not Applicable
-1.54 psig - 1870 psig 00 psig steam line pressure (Note 1) Not Applicable Not Applicable <1.6 psig _>1864.8 psig _>592.2 psig steam line pressure (Note 1) SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-24 October 31, 1990 Amendment Nos. 55, 132 E2-93 FL
TABLE 3 3-4 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRIMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRI 1P::S::E T:P01NT ALLOWABLE VALUES
- 2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY
- a.
Manual Initiation Not Applicable Not Applicable
- b. Automatic Actuation Logic Not Applicable Not Applicable
- c.
Containment Pressure--High-High -_2.81 psig _<2.9 psig
- 3.
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
- a. Phase "A" Isolation
- 1. Manual Not Applicable Not Applicable
- 2.
From Safety Injection Not Applicable Not Applicable Automatic Actuation logic
- b.
Phase "B" Isolation
- 1. Manual Not Applicable Not Applicable
- 2. Automatic Actuation Logic Not Applicable Not Applicable
- 3.
Containment Pressure--High-High &.81 psig
- 2.9 psig G GOtai~ent e~tiatio 16"at'G SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 October 31, 1990 3/4 3-25 Amendment No. 132 E2-94
TABLE 3 3-4 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP POINT ALLOWABLE VALUES M niter Ra~d~ieatiMit - High 4....
- 4.
STEAM LINE ISOLATION
- a. Manual Not Applicable Not Applicable b
Automatic Actuation Logic Not Applicable Not Applicable
- c. Containment Pressure-High-High
.81 psig <2.9 psig
- d. Steam Line Pressure-Low i__ 600 psiq steam line
Ž592.2 psig steam line e Negative Steam Line Pressure Rate-High
- 5.
TURBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION
- a. Steam Generator Water level High-High
- b. Automatic Actuation Logic 00.0 psi (Note 2)
Vs8% of narrow range i strument span each steam generator NA. pressure (Note 1)
- 107.8 psi (Note 2)
- 81.7% of narrow range instrument span each steam generator N.A.
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-26 June 25, 1993 Amendment Nos 55, 132, 158 E2-95
TABLE 3 3-4 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS UNOMINAL FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES
- 6.
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER
- a.
Manual
- b. Automatic Actuation Logic
- c.
Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low
- i. RCS Loop AT Equivalent to Power <50% RTP Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable RCS Loop AT variable inpLE) RCS L T
iable 50% RTP nominal input:* trip setpoint 2.5% Coincident with Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low (Adverse) and Containment Pressure-EAM or Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low (EAM) with A time delay (Ts) if one Steam Generator is affected or A time delay (TM) if two or more Steam Generators are affected Ž-15.0% of narrow range instrument span -0.5 psig 110.7% of narrow range instrument span -TTs (Note 5, Table 2.2-1) M (Note 5, Table 2.2-1) 214.4% of narrow range instrument span
- 0.6 psig
_>10.1% of narrow instrument span < (1.01) Ts (Note 5, Table 2.2-1) < (1.01) TM (Note 5, Table 2.2-1) SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-27 October 31, 1990 Amendment Nos. 18, 84, 132 E2-96
TABLE 3 3-4 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS IONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ii. RCS Loop AT Equivalent Power >50% RTP Coincident with Steam 5.0% of narrow range /p Generator Water Level-instrument span Low-Low (Adverse) and Containment Pressure . 0.5 psig (EAM) or Steam Generator Water 10.7% of narrow range Level-Low-Low (EAM) instrument span d S.I. ALLOWABLE VALUES >14 4% of narrow range instrument span <0 6 psig >10.1% of narrow range instrument span See 1 above (all SI Setpoints) Ref r t Fu ctin 1 of Table 3.3-1 7f r ep i t "5-52 -v Its 6 > 533! v'o ls q h an-d allowable values. 1 25 se G d 25
1
25 sec GOnds/ umnps N.A N.A. e Loss of Power Start 1 Voltage Sensors
- 2.
Load Shed Timer
- f.
Trip of Main Feedwater Pi
- g.
Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Pressure-Low
- h.
Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Transfer Time Delays SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 21 psig (motor driven pump) _> 2.44 psig (motor driven pump) 13.9 psig (turbine driven pump) _> 12 psig (turbine driven pump) 4 seconds (motor driven pump)
- 4.4 seconds 4 e-rni 0 (m otor driven pump) se nands 5.5 seconds (turbine driven
< 6.05 seconds pump) Ž 4.95 seconds 5.5 seconds +0 55 seconds(turbine driven pump) 3/4 3-27a March 1, 1996 Amendment Nos 18, 84, 116, 132, 174, 175, 180, 197, 209 E2-97 FUNCT
TABLE 3 3-4 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS UNOMINAL FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES U7. This Specification has been deleted.
- 7.
LOSS OF POWER a 6- 0 kv S-hutdown.; BoarFd UndeR'oltage .,o*tage Sensors.>5520-yels ,n-5 31-VG4, 2 Diesel Generator Start and Load 1:25-Lnnnds 1 25 +0 25 seconds Shed-T~m* h 63 A-kV Shutdon Board Degraded Voltage
- 1. V.oltage Sensors 6456-valt6 6403 5 Volts (dropout)
RE695 5 volts (reset)
- 2.
Diescl Generator Start and Load _0-4eoo*4s
- 370-secconds Shed-Th~m*
3 SI/Degraded Voltage LogicA -,nd 9 5 -+/- 2 0 secondGs
- 8.
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INTERLOCKS a Pressurizer Pressure
- 1.
Not P-1 1, Automatic Unblock of - 1970 psig _<1975 2 psig Safety Injection on Increasing Pressure
- 2.
P-1 1, Enable Manual Block of 962 psig >1956 8 psig Safety Injection on Decreasing Pressure March 1, 1996 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 314 3-27b Amendment Nos. 18, 25, 116, 132, 174, 180, 197, 209 E2-98
TABLE 3 3-4 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS UNOMINAL FUNCTIONAL UNIT CTRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES
- 8.
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INTERLOCKS (Continued) b Deleted
- c. Deleted
- d. Steam Generator Level Turbine Trip, Feedwater Isolation P-14 9
AUTOMATIC SWITCHOVER TO CONTAINMENT SUMP
- a.
RWST Level - Low COINCIDENT WITH Containment Sump Level - High AND Safety Injection b Automatic Actuation Logic (See 5. above) 130" from tank base 30" above elev. 680' 127.2911 12-0-2:+/- 2 71" from tank base
- 5 132.71 " from tank base
>_ 28.32" e elev. 680' abov (See 1 above for all Safety Injection SetpointsfAllowable Valves) NA NA Note 1: Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for Steam Pressure-Low are "r1 > 50 seconds and T2 - 5 seconds. Note 2: Time constant utilized in the rate-lag controller for Negative Steam Line Pressure Rate-High is "Ž1 > 50 seconds SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-28 October 31, 1990 Amendment Nos. 5, 55, 132 E2-99
TABLE 4 3-2 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNEL CHANNEL CHECK CALIBRATION CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
- 3.
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
- a. Phase "A" Isolation
- 1) Manual
- 2) From Safety Injection Automatic Actuation Logic
- b.
Phase "B" Isolation
- 1) Manual
- 2) Automatic Actuation Logic NA N.A N.A.
N.A. N.A. NA NA N.A R M(1) R M(1) 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4
- 3) Containment Pressure--
S R Q 1, 2, 3 High-High
- 3) Containment Purge Air SR----.3.
Exhaust Monitor Ra dloa rctivity -H i, h SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-35 March 4, 1996 Amendment Nos. 39, 158, 210 E2,-100
TABLE 4 3-2 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS MODES FOR CHANNEL WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST IS REQUIRED
- c.
Main Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low
- 1. Steam Generator Water S
R Q 1, 2, 3 Level-Low-Low (Adverse)
- 2.
Steam Generator Water S R Q 1, 2, 3 Level-Low-Low (EAM)
- 3.
RCS LoopAT S R Q 1,2,3
- 4. Containment Pressure S
R Q 1, 2, 3 (EAM)
- d.
S.I See 1 above (all SI surveillance requirements)
- e.
Loss of Power Start
- 1.
Voltage Sensors N.A. R M 1, 2, 3
- 2.
Load Shed Timer N.A. R N.A. 1, 2, 3
- f.
Trip of Main Feedwater N.A. N.A R 1, 2 Pumps
- g.
Auxiliary Feedwater Suction N.A. R N.A 1,2, 3 Pressure-Low
- h.
Auxiliary Feedwater Suction N.A. R N.A. 1,2,3 "7 LOSS OF POERtg ~~~~N ý. 2, 3,4 5",-6 March 29, 2000 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-37 Amendment No. 18, 116, 132,174,180, 197, 244 E2-101
TABLE 4 3-2 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION
- 1. Voltage Sensors.
N-A-R
- 2. Die scel G en.cr:a torsF N-A-f Start and Loand Shcd Time 3
SlIlDegraded Voltage N-A-R
- 8.
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INTERLOCKS a Pressurizer Pressure, P-1 l/Not P-1I
- b.
Deleted
- c.
Steam Generator Level, P-14
- 9. AUTOMATIC SWITCHOVER TO CONTAINMENT SUMP
- a. RSWT Level - Low COINCIDENT WITH Containment Sump Level - High AND Safety Injection
- b.
Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. NA. S S R(2) R(2) R R CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED M 1, 2, 3, 4, 5r -# ,-A- ,2, 3, 4,5 S!,2, 3,4 NA N.A Q Q 1,2,3 1,2 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 (See 1 above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements) N.A N.A. M(1) 1,2,3,4 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-38 August 22, 1995 Amendment No. 39, 55,116,132,174, 180,197 E2-102
INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 3 3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION UThis Specification has been deleted I ý1QD 44 3.3.3.1Th dlto oioigiruetainnans hw Tal -shlhe .A their alar~m..trip setpoints within the 6pecified limits "AP"1ICA I' As shown in Table 3 3 26 a 'Mth a radiation monitoring channel alarm!trip setpoint exceeding the value shown in Table 3 3 6, adjust the oetp.int to w.thin theo, limit within 4 hours.. or d.el.rc the channel inopeFable -b I.A'th ne or more radiation monitoring channels inoperable, take the ACTION shown in G The provisions of Specificattions 3 0 3 and 3 0.4 are not applicable SURVEILIANCE REQUIREMENTS 4 3 3 2 Each radiation monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the peo.rma.nc.. Gel of th=e CHANNEL CIHEC:PK, CIHANNINEL CALII-RATION and CHANNEL* F1 FNClTION'AL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 1, 3-3 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-40 E2-103
This Table has been deleted. JJ(Pages 314 3-41 and 3/4 3-42 are deleted) M41NIIM4 M CHANN4ELS APPU GARI E Al ARAURI OPE=RABLE hADDRS STO MAEASU REMEN RANGE I AREA MONITOR a Fuel Storage Pool Area -~r-,~','. mgrr~~~VdI~Z rrLýJ 4-i 4200 mR/h4 4e _4np a Containment Purge 4-4,2~344 KGi/GG 4040-p; bh. Containment Gaseous Actiity -RGSILeakage -DetpGtHi4 4-41A 40-407-GPM iiPa;riGUlate .-Aetivity -RGRS-Leakage -DetectIGR 4
- 1. 2,3 & 4 W/A
- 10-40 7-Gpn; c
GControl Room I r, _Ia ti _) 2-AlI MOD~ES ir~adiatedf4ueI a66ernblies !* 400 Gpm~- VNT iUPei in Twe irq oiruiunc
- Equivalent tol xO 1p i/wG-SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/43-41 May 31, 2000 Amendment Nos 52,102, 158, 247 E2 -104 INSTRUMENT ACT409 2-6 2-9 2-7
ACTION 26 - Wth the number of OPERABLE chahnn-els ls than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE re rquirement, perform area su--Peys of the monnitorimd areA With portable moniitoring instrumen~tatlIon at GIcas one pcr 24 hourýs A.CTIN2 oth the number of OPETRANBYLE channels less than required by the Minimum Cha~nnelso OPE-R.AB-LEr requirement, comply With the ACTIOQN requirements of Specifcation 3-4 6-1. ACTIONI 28 With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum ChnesOPERABLE requirement, comply With the ACTION requirements of Specfcation 3 9 9 (MODE 6) and 3 3 2 (MODES 1, 2, 3, and 1) A ChTIOnNl 229
- a.
-t one channel inoperable, place the associated control room emergenc ventilation system (CREVS) train in recirnculation mo-de of operation within 7 days or be at least HOT STANDBY w;÷ithin the next 6 hou.r, ;and in COLUD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours b WIth teo channels ineperable, within 1 hour initiate and maintain operation of one CRErAd train in the reirculati* n mode of operation and enter the required Actions for one CREVS train made inoperable by inoperable CREVS actut instrumentationt Or place both trains, in the rocircula;tion mode of operation Within; one hour. If the completion timez of Action 29b cannot be met in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, be in at Ileasrt HOQT S-T.A.NIDB R)(Y wit h in t he nex wt 6 hoQ-u rs ranPd inm COL--D-S-HU11T DOW .4fN w .9i t h.in the following 3-0 houirs If the completion 'timea of 'Ac tion :29h canno' t be met during the movement ot irraddiateddfe assemblies, suspend core alterations and suspend movement ot If the c~ompletion time o-f Action 2-9bh c-annot be met in Modes-r -5 and 6, initiate actfion to restore one CREVS train May 31, 2000 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-42 Amendment Nos. 102, 158, 247 E2-105
TABLE 4 3-3 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4 Th'is Table has been deleted. INSTRUMENT GHANNE1 GHANNEL G-HEG GCALIB RRATIOQN GHANNEU= FU*NG-T4ONA* PICTFSTIA MODES FOR WHICH SA IRL=, I ANCE IS REQUIRED
- 1. AREA MONITOR a
hUSI toraae -'ooi :re3 1' In A tg kIT(*ID 0 3 Containment Purge Air ha4 S R Q 1, 2,3.4 & 6 h Con-tainment Gaseous Ativity -RGS-Leakage Dptpretinn S R Q 1,2,3, &4 ii Particulate AGtiity -RGS-Leakage DetztpeRp S R Q G Control Room Isolation S R 0 ALL MODES A,'th fuel in the storage pool or building SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-43 March 4, 1996 Amendment Nos. 102, 158, 210 E2-106 S R Q i f-P, ý=O I- [ý- - I w I - I I I I - I t - SI d
New Page INSTRUMENTATION CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3 11 The Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation for each function in Table 3 3-14 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3-14 ACTION: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4
- a.
With one or more functions inoperable with one or more manual or automatic actuation trains inoperable, immediately enter applicable conditions and actions of Specification 3.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves," for containment ventilation isolation valves made inoperable by isolation instrumentation.
- b.
With the required radiation monitoring channel inoperable, immediately enter applicable conditions and actions of Specification 3.6 3, "Containment Isolation Valves," for containment purge and exhaust isolation valves made inoperable by isolation instrumentation.
- c.
Separate condition entry is allowed for each function.
- d.
The provisions of Specification 3 0.4 are not applicable.
- e.
One train of automatic actuation logic may be bypassed and Action a. may be delayed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment
- a.
With one radiation monitoring channel inoperable, restore the affected channel to OPERABLE status within 4 hours or enter applicable conditions and actions of Specification 3 9.4, "Containment Building Penetrations," for containment ventilation isolation valves made inoperable by isolation instrumentation.
- b.
With one or more functions inoperable with one or more manual or automatic actuation trains inoperable, immediately enter applicable conditions and actions of Specification 3 9.4, "Containment Building Penetrations," for containment ventilation isolation valves made inoperable by isolation instrumentation.
- c.
With two radiation monitoring channels inoperable, immediately enter applicable conditions and actions of Specification 3.9.4, "Containment Building Penetrations," for containment ventilation isolation valves made inoperable by isolation instrumentation. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-74 Amendment No. 52, 102, 158, 210, 247 E2-107
New Page INSTRUMENTATION ACTION (Continued)
- d.
Separate condition entry is allowed for each function.
- e.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3 3.11.1 Each Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-10. 4.3.3.11.2 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation function shall be verified to be within the limit at least once per 18 months Each verification shall include at least one train such that both trains are verified at least once per 36 months. The Safety Injection function response time is addressed in Specification 3.3.2. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-75 Amendment No. 52, 102, 158, 210, 247 E2-108
New Page FUNCTION
- 1. Manual Initiation
- 2. Automatic Actuation
- 3.
Containment Purge, Exhaust Radiation Monitors
- 4. Containment Purge)
Exhaust Radiation Monitors
- 5. Safety Injection TABLE 3 3-14 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION APPLICABLE MODES OR REQUIRED ALLOWABLE MI CONDITIONS CHANNELS VALUE 1, 2,3, & 4, 2
NA Logic 1, 2, 3, & 4,** 2 NA \\ir 1, 2,3, & 4 1 _< 100,000 cpm ,ir 2 _< 100,000 cpm EASUREMENT RANGE NA NA 10 -107 cpm 10-107 cpm TABLE 4 3-10 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FUNCTION
- 1. Manual Initiation
- 2. Automatic Actuation Logic
- 3. and 4. Containment Purge Air Exhaust Radiation Monitors 5
Safety Injection CHANNEL CHECK N.A. N. A. S CHANNEL CALIBRATION N.A N.A. R CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST R M* Q MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED 1, 2, 3, &4,** 1, 2, 3, &4,** 1, 2, 3, &4,*
- Each train or logic channel shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
- During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment
- Refer to Specification 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," Function 1 for all initiating functions and requirements.
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-76 Amendment No. 52, 102, 158, 210, 247 E2-109
New Page I INSTRUMENTATION AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM (ABGTS) ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.12 The ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation for each function in Table 3.3-15 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3-15 ACTION: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 a With one or more functions with one channel or train inoperable, place one ABGTS train in operation within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. b With one or more functions with two channels or trains inoperable, immediately place one ABGTS train in operation and enter applicable conditions and actions of Specification 3.7.8, "Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System," for one train made inoperable by inoperable actuation instrumentation or immediately place both ABGTS trains in emergency radiation protection mode; Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours
- c.
Separate condition entry is allowed for each function.
- d.
The provisions of Specification 3 0.4 are not applicable. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling area
- a.
With one or more functions with two channels or trains inoperable, immediately place one ABGTS train in operation or immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling area.
- b.
The provisions of Specifications 3.0.4 are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.3.12.1 Each ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-11. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-77 Amendment No. 52, 102, 158, 210, 247 E2-110
New Page TABLE 3.3-15 AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION
- 1. Manual Initiation
- 2. Fuel Storage Pool Area Radiation Monitors APPLICABLE MODES OR CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, &4, **
- ./
REQUIRED CHANNELS 2 1 (Same Train as Required ABGTS) ALLOWABLE VALUE NA MEASUREMENT RANGE NA < 307 mRPhr
- 3. Containment Isolation Phase "A" TABLE 4 3-11 AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
- 3. Containment Isolation##
Phase "A"
- During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling area.
CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST R Q MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED 1, 2, 3, &4, **
- .A FUNCTION
- 1. Manual Initiation
- 2. Fuel Storage Pool Area Radiation Monitors CHANNEL CHANNEL CHECK CALIBRATION N.A.
S NA R
- Refer to Specification 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," Function 3.a for all initiating functions and requirements.
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-78 Amendment No. 52, 102, 158, 210, 247 E2-111 10-1 _ 104 mP/hr
New Page INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (CREVS) ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3 3.3 13 The CREVS Actuation Instrumentation for each function in Table 3.3-16 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3-16 ACTION: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4
- a.
With one or more functions with one channel or train inoperable, place one CREVS train in recirculation mode of operation within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours
- b.
With one or more functions with two channels or trains inoperable, within one (1) hour place one CREVS train in recirculation mode operation and enter applicable conditions and actions of Specification 3.7.7, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation System," for one train made inoperable by inoperable actuation instrumentation or within one (1) hour place both CREVS trains in emergency radiation protection mode; Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c.
Separate condition entry is allowed for each function
- d.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. MODES 5 and 6
- a.
With one or more functions with one channel or train inoperable, place one CREVS train in recirculation mode of operation within 7 days or immediately initiate action to restore one CREVS train to OPERABLE status
- b.
With one or more functions with two channels or trains inoperable, within one (1) hour place one CREVS train in recirculation mode operation and enter applicable conditions and actions of Specification 3.7.7, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation System," for one train made inoperable by inoperable actuation instrumentation or within one (1) hour place both CREVS trains in emergency radiation protection mode, Otherwise, immediately initiate action to restore the CREVS trains to OPERABLE status.
- c.
Separate condition entry is allowed for each function
- d.
The provisions of Specifications 3.0.4 are not applicable. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-79 Amendment No. 52, 102, 158, 210, 247 E2-112
I New Page INSTRUMENTATION ACTION (Continued) During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies
- a.
With one or more functions with one channel or train inoperable, place one CREVS train in recirculation mode of operation within 7 days or immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
- b.
With one or more functions with two channels or trains inoperable, within one (1) hour place one CREVS train in recirculation mode operation and enter applicable conditions and actions of Specification 3.7.7, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation System," for one train made inoperable by inoperable actuation instrumentation or within one (1) hour place both CREVS trains in emergency radiation protection mode; Otherwise, immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies
- c.
Separate condition entry is allowed for each function d The provisions of Specifications 3.0 4 are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3 3 13.1 Each CREVS Actuation Instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-12. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-80 Amendment No. 52, 102, 158, 210, 247 E2-113
I New Page TABLE 3 3-16 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION
- 1. Manual Initiation
- 2. Control Room Intake Radiation Monitors APPLICABLE MODES OR CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, & 6-*
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, & 6"* REQUIRED CHANNELS 2 2 ALLOWABLE VALUE NA < 43,400 cpm MEASUREMENT RANGE NA 10-107 cpm
- 3. Safety Injection TABLE 4 3-12 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FUNCTION
- 1. Manual Initiation
- 2. Control Room Intake Radiation Monitors CHANNEL CHANNEL CHECK CALIBRATION NA.
S N.A. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST R Q R MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED 1, 2,3,4,5, & 6,** 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, & 6, ** 3 Safety Injection
- During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
- Refer to Specification 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," Function 1 for all initiating functions and requirements.
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-81 Amendment No 52, 102, 158, 210, 247 E2-114
New Page INSTRUMENTATION LOSS OF POWER (LOP) DIESEL GENERATOR (DG) START INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.14 The LOP DG start instrumentation for each function in Table 3.3-17 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, When associated DG is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8 1.2, "AC Sources Shutdown." ACTION:
- a.
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Required Channels for voltage sensors, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or enter applicable Limiting Condition(s) For Operation and Action(s) for the associated DG set made inoperable by the channel. b With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Required Channels by more than one for voltage sensors or with the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Required Channels for timers, restore all but one channel of voltage sensors and at least one timer for each function to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or enter applicable Limiting Condition(s) For Operation and Action(s) for the associated DG set made inoperable by the channels
- c.
Separate entry is allowed for each function.
- d.
Enter applicable Actions of LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," for Auxiliary Feedwater Loss of Power Start Instrumentation made inoperable by LOP DG Start Instrumentation. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.3 14.1 Each LOP DG Start Instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-13. 4.3.3 14.2 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each LOP DG Start Instrumentation function shall be verified to be within the limit at least once per 18 months. Each verification shall include at least one train such that both trains are verified at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are verified at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-82 Amendment No. 18, 25, 116, 132, 150, 174,180,197, 209 E2-115
New Page TABLE 3 3-17 LOSS OF POWER DIESEL GENERATOR START INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTIONAL UNIT APPLICABLE MODES OR CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES
- 1.
6.9 kv Shutdown Board Loss of Voltage
- a. Voltage Sensors
- b. Diesel Generator Start and Load Shed Timer 1, 2, 3, 4, #
3/Shutdown Board 1, 2, 3, 4, # 1/Shutdown Board 5520 1.25 seconds > 5331 volts and
- 5688 volts
Ž1.00 seconds and < 1.50 seconds
- 2.
6.9 kv Shutdown Board Degraded Voltage a Voltage Sensors
- b. Diesel Generator Start and Load Shed Timer
- c. SI/Degraded Voltage Logic Enable Timer 1, 2,3,4, #
3/Shutdown Board 1,2,3,4, # 1,2,3,4 1/Shutdown Board 1/Shutdown Board 6456 volts 300 seconds 9.5 seconds S6403.5 volts and
- 6522.5 volts
Ž218.6 seconds and
- 370 seconds S7.5 seconds and S11.5 seconds
- When associated DG is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.1.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown." The provision of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-83 Amendment No. 18, 25, 116, 132, 150, 174, 180, 197, 209 E2-116
I New Page TABLE 4 3-13 LOSS OF POWER DIESEL GENERATOR START INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNEL CHANNEL CHECK CALIBRATION CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- 1.
6.9 kv Shutdown Board Loss of Voltage a Voltage Sensors N.A R M
- b.
Diesel Generator Start and N A R N.A. Load Shed Timer 2 .6.9 kv Shutdown Board Degraded Voltage
- a. Voltage Sensors N A R
M
- b. Diesel Generators Start N.A.
R N.A. and Load Shed Timer c SI/Degraded Voltage Logic N.A R N.A. Enable Timer
- When associated DG is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.1.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown."
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-84 MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED 1,2, 3,4,# 1,2,3,4,# 1,2,3,4, # 1,2,3,4, # 1,2,3,4 Amendment No 18, 25, 116, 132, 150, 174,180,197,209 E2-117
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4 6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE LEAKAGE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3 4.6 1 The following Reactor Coolant System leakage detection instrumentation shall be OPERABLE:
- a.
Two lower containment atmosphere radioactivity monitors (gaseous and particulate), and
- b.
One containment pocket sump level monitor. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. ACTION: a With both containment pocket sump monitors inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided SR 4.4.6.2.1 is performed once per 24 hours*; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. The provisions of Specification 3 0 4 are not applicable.
- b.
With either or both the gaseous or particulate lower containment atmosphere radioactivity monitors inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the lower containment atmosphere are analyzed once per 24 hours or SR 4 4.6.2.1 is performed once per 24 hours*, otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. The provisions of Specification 3.0 4 are not applicable. c With both containment pocket sump monitors and both lower containment atmosphere radioactivity monitors inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.6.1 The leakage detection instrumentation shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by: a Performance of the lower contacnen smoplevel mnoous and particulate monitor / Uat least once per 12 hours.= at least once per IS months CHANNEL CHECK, HNE CLBAIN d NEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at the S,, frequenc~ies specified on Table 4 3-3, and -las oneper 92 days.* b Performance ofcname oe sump level monitor CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.
- Surveillance performance not required until 12 hours after establishment of steady state operation.
August 4, 2000 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 4-17 Amendment No. 250 E2-118
This specification affected by previously submitted TS Change 00-14 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4 4 12 LOW TEMPERATURE OVER PRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3 4.12 At least one of the following Overpressure Protection Systems shall be OPERABLE:
- a.
Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) with a,mial-liftsettin less than or equal to that shown in Figure 3.4-4, or
- b.
The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) depressurized with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 3 square inches. APPLICABILITY-MODE 4, MODE 5, and MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on ACTION
- a.
With one PORV inoperable, in MODE 4 either.
- 1.
Restore the inoperable PORV to operable status within 7 days, or 2 Depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 3 square inch vent within the next 8 hours, or 3 Ensure pressurizer level is maintained less than or equal to 30 percent
- b.
With one PORV inoperable in MODES 5 or 6, either (1) restore the PORV to operable status within 24 hours, or (2) complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 3 square inch vent within a total of 32 hours. c With both PORVs inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 3 square inch vent within 8 hours
- d.
With the RCS vented per ACTIONS a, b, or c, verify the vent pathway at least once per 31 days when the pathway is provided by a valve(s) that is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position; otherwise, verify the vent path every 12 hours.
- e.
When RCS temperature is less than 3500 F, both safety injection pumps and one centrifugal charging pump shall be made incapable of automatic injection into the RCS. Should any of these pumps be found actually capable of automatic injection, return the pump(s) to incapable status within 12 hours or depressurize and vent RCS through at least a 3 square inch vent within the next 8 hours.
- f.
In the event either the PORVs or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or RCS vent(s) on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence
- g.
The provisions of Specification 3 0.4 are not applicable. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 4-34 October 4, 1995 Amendment No. 147. 203 E2-119
This specification affected by previously submitted TS Change 00-14 2500 2000-- 15O0 LU u) w 1000 500 0 I I II I 1 II I I I I I I I I I TR~ AUCTL (*F) Ps PCV-68-340A I(PSI G) -4 4 85 120 165 200 230 255 290 380 450 482 482 500 555 630 735 715 685 2350 Ps PCV-68-334 (PSIG) 482 482 525 590 670 775 760 740 2350 I/ I - -/ I I APPENDIX G S PCV-68-334 i
- -PCV-68-340A 0
50 I I 200 I I 100 150 200 250 300 350 I 4 5 400 450 500 TEMPERATURE. OF QPORNIVI4INAL IFT SETTINGS -APPLICABLE UP TO 14.5 EFPY FIGURE 3.4-4 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 4-35 E2-120 April 30, 2002 Amendment No. 147, 264 1 l l I l I I I I l l I l I ,f I
3/4 3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4 3.1 and 3/4 3 2 REACTOR TRIP AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip and Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems instrumentation and interlocks ensure that 1) the associated action and/or reactor nominal trip U be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination the f.f ra hes its set
- imt,
- 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to &-
)channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters. The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses. The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. CAdd Insert 2 The Engineered Safety Feature perform the functions indicated below on increasing the required parameter, co sstentisted in Table 3 3-4. nomina trip P-11 Defeats the manual block of safety injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure P-14 Trip of all feedwater pumps, turbine trip, closure of feedwater isolation valves and inhibits feedwater control valve modulation. On decreasing the required parameter the opposite function is performed at reset setpoints. The surveillance for the comparison of the incore to the excore Axial Flux Difference is required only when reactor power is > 15 percent. The 96 hour delay in the first performance of the surveillance after reaching 15 percent reactor thermal power (RTP), following a refueling outage, is to achieve a higher power level and approach Xenon stability. The surveillance is typically performed when RTP is > 30 percent to ensure the results of the evaluation are more accurate and the adjustments more reliable. The frequency of 31 EFPD is to allow slow changes in neutron flux to be better detected during the fuel cycle. 1\\ May 30,1995 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 132, 190 E2-121
INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3 3 MONITORING INSTRU ATION 314 3 3 1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION U This Specification has been deleted The OPERABILITY of the radiat*in monitoring channels ensures that 1) the radiation levels"are contiuallymeasued.. the areas sew.ed by the individual channels and 2) the alarm or automatic cto is ;nitia;tcd wPhn the MrAdtion level trip et*int is exi*ePedd Relative to the coentrol roomr instrumentation r-C-isoltio-n fu-nctIon, one set Of process radiation monitors acts to automatically initiate cOntrolromemisolation T-he actuation instrume~ntatiomn cnis~ts of red-undaR-nt ra~diatfion monitors A high radiation signal from the detector Will intaeits, associated train oA the Control Room Emergency \\entilatiOn System (CREV.S) T-he CREVS ;;is also atoma;tica;;lly actuated by a safe', injection (SI) signal from either unit The SI function is disc-uss-e-d in LCGO 3.3 2, "Engineered manually initiAte CREYS; 3/4 33 2 MOVABLE INCORE DETECTORS The OPERABILITY of the movable incore detectors with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this system accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core. The OPERABILITY of this system is demonstrated by irradiating each detector used and determining the acceptability of its voltage curve. For the purpose of measuring F0(X,Y,Z) or FAH(X,Y) a full incore flux map is used. Quarter-core flux maps, as defined in WCAP-8648, June 1976, may be used in recalibration of the excore neutron flux detection system, and full incore flux maps or symmetric incore thimbles may be used for monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO when one Power Range Channel is inoperable May 31, 2000 B 3/4 3-2a Amendment No. 46, 72,182, 214, 228, 247 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 E2-122
New Page Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3 11 B 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3/4.3.3.11 Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation closes the containment isolation valves in the Containment Purge System This action isolates the containment atmosphere from the environment to minimize releases of radioactivity in the event of an accident The Reactor Building Purge System may be in use during reactor operation and with the reactor shutdown. Containment Ventilation Isolation is initiated by a safety injection (SI) signal or by manual actuation. The Bases for LCO 3.3 2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," discuss initiation of SI signals. Redundant and independent gaseous radioactivity monitors measure the radioactivity levels of the containment purge exhaust, each of which will initiate its associated train of automatic Containment Ventilation Isolation upon exceeding the alarm/trip setpoint The containment isolation valves for the Reactor Building Purge System close within five seconds following the DBA. The containment ventilation isolation radiation monitors act as backup to the SI signal to ensure closing of the purge air system supply and exhaust valves They are also the primary means for automatically isolating containment in the event of a fuel handling accident during shutdown. Containment isolation in turn ensures meeting the containment leakage rate assumptions of the safety analyses, and ensures that the calculated accidental offsite radiological doses are below 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 1) limits The Containment Ventilation Isolation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. The LCO requirements ensure that the instrumentation necessary to initiate The LCO requirements ensure that the instrumentation necessary to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation, listed in Table 3.3-14, is OPERABLE.
- 1.
Manual Initiation The LCO requires two channels OPERABLE. The operator can initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation at any time by using either of two switches in the control room Either switch actuates both trains. This action will cause actuation of all components in the same manner as any of the automatic actuation signals. These manual switches also initiate a Phase A isolation signal. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-5 E2-123 Amendment No
New Page Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.11 BASES LCO (continued) The LCO for Manual Initiation ensures the proper amount of redundancy is maintained in the manual actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has manual initiation capability. Each channel consists of one selector switch and the interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic cabinet.
- 2.
Automatic Actuation Logic The LCO requires two trains of Automatic Actuation Logic OPERABLE to ensure that no single random failure can prevent automatic actuation Automatic Actuation Logic consists of all circuitry housed within the actuation subsystems, including the initiating relay contacts responsible for actuating Containment Ventilation Isolation. The applicable MODES and specified conditions for the containment ventilation isolation portion of the SI Function is different and less restrictive than those for the SI role. If one or more of the SI Functions becomes inoperable in such a manner that only the Containment Ventilation Isolation Function is affected, the Conditions applicable to the SI Functions need not be entered. The less restrictive Actions specified for inoperability of the Containment Ventilation Isolation Functions specify sufficient compensatory measures for this case.
- 3.
Containment Radiation The LCO specifies required channels of radiation monitors to ensure that the radiation monitoring instrumentation necessary to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation remains OPERABLE. In Modes 1 through 4, the radiation monitors provide a supplemental function to the Safety Injection signal for the isolation of containment and only requires the OPERABILITY of one channel of radiation monitors During the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, the radiation monitors provide the primary isolation function for containment isolation and both radiation monitors are required to be OPERABLE to provide adequate single failure capability. For sampling systems, channel OPERABILITY involves more than OPERABILITY of the channel electronics OPERABILITY may also require correct valve lineups and sample pump operation, as well as detector OPERABILITY, if these supporting features are necessary for trip to occur under the conditions assumed by the safety analyses SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-6 Amendment No. E2-124
New Page I Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.11 BASES LCO (continued)
- 4.
Safety Iniection (SI) Refer to LCO 3.3.2, Function 1, for all initiating Functions and requirements. APPLICABILITY The Manual Initiation, Automatic Actuation Logic, Safety Injection, and Containment Radiation Functions are required OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment Under these conditions, the potential exists for an accident that could release fission product radioactivity into containment. Therefore, the Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation must be OPERABLE in these MODES While in MODES 5 and 6 without fuel handling in progress, the Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation need not be OPERABLE since the potential for radioactive releases is minimized and operator action is sufficient to ensure post accident offsite doses are maintained within the limits of Reference 1. The Applicability for the containment ventilation isolation on the ESFAS Safety Injection Functions are specified in LCO 3.3.2. ACTIONS The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or drift sufficient to exceed the tolerance allowed by unit specific calibration procedures. Typically, the drift is found to be small and results in a delay of actuation rather than a total loss of function If the Trip Setpoint is less conservative than the tolerance specified by the calibration procedure, the channel must be declared inoperable immediately and the appropriate condition entered Action a - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 Action a. applies to all Containment Ventilation Isolation Functions and addresses the train orientation of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) and the master and slave relays for these functions If a train is inoperable, operation may continue as long as the required action for the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.6 3 is met for each valve made inoperable by failure of isolation instrumentation. Action b - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 Action b. addresses the failure of the required radiation monitoring channel. If the required radiation monitor is inoperable, operation may continue as long as the required action for the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.6 3 is met for each containment purge and exhaust isolation valve made inoperable by failure of isolation instrumentation. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 Amendment No B 3/4 3-7 E2--125
New Page Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.11 BASES ACTIONS (continued) Action c - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 This action has been added to clarify the application of completion time rules The conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each function listed in Table 3.3-14. The completion time(s) of the inoperable channel(s)/train(s) of a function will be tracked separately for each function starting from the time the condition was entered for that function. Action d - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 Action d. allows the entry into applicable modes while relying on the required actions as an exception to the requirements of Specification 3.0 4. Action e - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 Action e. has been added to allow one train of actuation logic to be placed in bypass and to delay entering the required actions for up to four hours to perform surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE. The 4 hour allowance is consistent with the required actions for actuation logic trains in LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation" and allows periodic testing to be conducted while at power without causing an actual actuation. The delay for entering the required actions relieves the administrative burden of entering the required actions for isolation valves inoperable solely due to the performance of surveillance testing on the actuation logic and is acceptable based on the OPERABILITY of the opposite train. Action a - Fuel Movement Action a applies to the failure of one containment purge isolation radiation monitor channel. Since the two containment radiation monitors are both gaseous detectors, failure of a single channel may result in loss of the redundancy. Consequently, the failed channel must be restored to OPERABLE status. The 4 hours allowed to restore the affected channel is justified by the low likelihood of events occurring during this interval, and recognition that one or more of the remaining channels will respond to most events. If the radiation monitor channel is not returned to OPERABLE status within the 4-hour limit, operation may continue as long as the required action for the applicable conditions of LCO 3.9.4, "Containment Building Penetrations," is met for each valve made inoperable by failure of isolation instrumentation. Action b. - Fuel Movement Action b. applies to all Containment Ventilation Isolation Functions and addresses the train orientation of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) and the master and slave relays for these functions. If a train is inoperable, operation may continue as long as the required action for the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.9 4, "Containment Building Penetrations," is met for each valve made inoperable by failure of isolation instrumentation. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-8 Amendment No. E2-126
New Page Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.11 BASES ACTIONS (continued) Action c. - Fuel Movement Action c. addresses the failure of multiple radiation monitoring channels If multiple radiation monitors are inoperable, operation may continue as long as the required action for the applicable Conditions of LCO 3 9.4, "Containment Building Penetrations," is met for each valve made inoperable by failure of isolation instrumentation. Action d. - Fuel Movement This action has been added to clarify the application of completion time rules. The conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each function listed in Table 3.3-14. The completion time(s) of the inoperable channel(s)ltrain(s) of a function will be tracked separately for each function starting from the time the condition was entered for that function. Action e - Fuel Movement Action e. allows the entry into applicable conditions while relying on the required actions as an exception to the requirements of Specification 3.0.4. SURVEILLANCE 4.3 3 11 1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit The frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on the Automatic Actuation Logic every 31 days The train being tested is placed in the bypass condition, thus preventing inadvertent actuation. Through the semiautomatic tester, all possible SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 314 3-9 Amendment No E2-127
New Page Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3/4 3.3.11 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) logic combinations, with and without applicable permissives, are tested for each protection function. In addition, the master relay coil is pulse tested for continuity. This verifies that the logic modules are OPERABLE and there is an intact voltage signal path to the master relay coils. This test is performed every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The Surveillance interval is acceptable based on instrument reliability and industry operating experience. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed every 92 days on each radiation monitor to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended function. The frequency is based on the staff recommendation for increasing the availability of radiation monitors according to NUREG-1366 (Ref. 2) This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the containment ventilation system isolation. The setpoint shall be left consistent with the current unit specific calibration procedure tolerance A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the Manual Initiation function is performed every 18 months Each Manual Initiation function is tested up to, and including, the master relay coils. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i.e., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.) The frequency is based on the known reliability of the function and the redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. The Frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle. REFERENCES
- 1.
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 100.11, "Determination of Exclusion Area, Low Population Zone, and Population Center Distance."
- 2.
NUREG-1 366, "Improvement to Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements," December 1992. SEQUOYAH-UNIT2 B 3/4 3-10 E2-128 Amendment No
New Page ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.12 B 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3/4.3.3.12 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment (ABGTS) Actuation Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The ABGTS ensures that radioactive materials in the fuel building atmosphere following a fuel handling accident or a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) are filtered and adsorbed prior to exhausting to the environment. The system initiates filtered exhaust of air from the fuel handling area, ECCS pump rooms, and penetration rooms automatically following receipt of a fuel pool area high radiation signal or a Containment Phase A Isolation signal. Initiation may also be performed manually as needed from the main control room. High area radiation, monitored by either of two monitors, provides ABGTS initiation. Each ABGTS train is initiated by high radiation detected by a channel dedicated to that train. There are a total of two channels, one for each train. High radiation exceeding the monitor's alarm/trip setpoint or a Phase A isolation signal from the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) initiates auxiliary building isolation and starts the ABGTS. These actions function to prevent exfiltration of contaminated air by initiating filtered ventilation, which imposes a negative pressure on the Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure (ABSCE) APPLICABLE The ABGTS ensures that radioactive materials in the ABSCE SAFETY ANALYSES atmosphere following a fuel handling accident or a LOCA are filtered and adsorbed prior to being exhausted to the environment. This action reduces the radioactive content in the auxiliary building exhaust following a LOCA or fuel handling accident so that offsite doses remain within the limits specified in 10 CFR 100 (Ref 1) The ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LCO The LCO requirements ensure that instrumentation necessary to initiate the ABGTS is OPERABLE.
- 1.
Manual Initiation The LCO requires two channels OPERABLE. The operator can initiate the ABGTS at any time by using either of two switches in the control room. This action will cause actuation of all components in the same manner as any of the automatic actuation signals. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-11 E2-129 Amendment No.
New Page ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.12 BASES LCO (continued) The LCO for Manual Initiation ensures the proper amount of redundancy is maintained in the manual actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has manual initiation capability. Each channel consists of one hand switch and the interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic relays
- 2.
Fuel Pool Area Radiation The LCO specifies one required Fuel Pool Area Radiation Monitor during the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling area to ensure that the radiation monitoring instrumentation necessary to initiate the ABGTS remains OPERABLE. One radiation monitor is dedicated to each train of ABGTS. For sampling systems, channel OPERABILITY involves more than OPERABILITY of channel electronics. OPERABILITY may also require correct valve lineups, sample pump operation, and filter motor operation, as well as detector OPERABILITY, if these supporting features are necessary for trip to occur under the conditions assumed by the safety analyses. 3 Containment Phase A Isolation Refer to LCO 3 3.2, Function 3 a, for all initiating functions and requirements APPLICABILITY The manual ABGTS initiation must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 and when moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling area, to ensure the ABGTS operates to remove fission products associated with leakage after a LOCA or a fuel handling accident. The Phase A ABGTS Actuation is also required in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to remove fission products caused by post LOCA Emergency Core Cooling Systems leakage. High radiation initiation of the ABGTS must be OPERABLE in any MODE during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling area to ensure automatic initiation of the ABGTS when the potential for a fuel handling accident exists While in MODES 5 and 6 without fuel handling in progress, the ABGTS instrumentation need not be OPERABLE since a fuel handling accident cannot occur. The Applicability for the ABGTS actuation on the ESFAS Containment Isolation Phase A Functions are specified in LCO 3.3.2. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-12 Amendment No. E2-130
New Page ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation B 3/4 3.3 12 BASES ACTIONS The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or drift sufficient to exceed the tolerance allowed by unit specific calibration procedures. Typically, the drift is found to be small and results in a delay of actuation rather than a total loss of function. If the Trip Setpoint is less conservative than the tolerance specified by the calibration procedure, the channel must be declared inoperable immediately and the appropriate Condition entered. Action a - MODES 1, 2. 3, and 4 Action a applies to the actuation logic train function from the Phase A Isolation and the manual function. Action a. applies to the failure of a single actuation logic train or manual channel. If one channel or train is inoperable, a period of 7 days is allowed to restore it to OPERABLE status. If the train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, one ABGTS train must be placed in operation. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation. The 7 day completion time is the same as is allowed if one train of the mechanical portion of the system is inoperable as required by Specification 3.7.8. If the required action to return the ABGTS train to OPERABLE status or place a train of ABGTS in operation within 7 days has not been met and the plant is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. The plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO requirements are not applicable. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems Action b - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 Action b. applies to the failure of two ABGTS actuation logic signals from the Phase A Isolation or two manual channels The required action is to place one ABGTS train in operation immediately This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function that may have been lost and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation. The applicable conditions and required actions of Specification 3 7.8 must also be entered for the ABGTS train made inoperable by the inoperable actuation instrumentation. This ensures appropriate limits are placed on train inoperability. Alternatively, both trains may be placed in the emergency radiation protection mode This ensures the ABGTS Function is performed even in the presence of a single failure. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-13 Amendment No. E2-131
New Page ABGTS ActuationInstentation B 3/4.3.3.12 BASES ACTIONS (continued) If the above required actions have not been met and the plant is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO requirements are not applicable. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. Action c - MODES 1, 2. 3, and 4 This action has been added to clarify the application of completion time rules. The conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each function listed in Table 3.3-15. The completion time(s) of the inoperable channel(s)/train(s) of a function will be tracked separately for each function starting from the time the condition was entered for that function. Action d - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 Action d allows the entry into applicable modes while relying on the required actions as an exception to the requirements of Specification 3.0.4. Action a - Fuel Movement Action a. applies to the failure of two ABGTS actuation logic signals from the Phase A Isolation, two radiation monitors, or two manual channels. The required action is to place one ABGTS train in operation immediately. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function that may have been lost and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation When the above required action has not been met and irradiated fuel assemblies are being moved in the fuel handling area Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling area must be suspended immediately to eliminate the potential for events that could require ABGTS actuation Performance of these actions shall not preclude moving a component to a safe position. Action b - Fuel Movement Action b. allows the entry into applicable modes while relying on the required actions as an exception to the requirements of Specification 3.0.4. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. E2-132
New Page ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation BASES SURVEILLANCE 433 12.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. The frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed every 92 days on each radiation monitor to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended function This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the ABGTS actuation. The setpoints shall be left consistent with the unit specific calibration procedure tolerance. The frequency of 92 days is based on the known reliability of the monitoring equipment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the Manual Initiation function is performed every 18 months Each Manual Initiation function is tested up to, and including, the master relay coils. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i e., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.). The frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. The frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle REFERENCES
- 1.
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 100.11, "Determination of Exclusion Area, Low Population Zone, and Population Center Distance." SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-15 Amendment No. E2-133
New Page CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.13 B 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3/4.3.3.13 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) Actuation Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The CREVS provides an enclosed control room environment from which the unit can be operated following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity. During normal operation, the Control Building Ventilation System provides control room ventilation. Upon receipt of an actuation signal, the CREVS initiates filtered ventilation and pressurization of the control room The actuation instrumentation consists of redundant radiation monitors. A high radiation alarm/trip signal from any monitor will initiate its associated trains of the CREVS The control room operator can also initiate CREVS trains by manual switches in the control room The CREVS is also actuated by a safety injection (SI) signal The control room must be kept habitable for the operators stationed there during accident recovery and post accident operations The CREVS acts to terminate the supply of unfiltered outside air to the control room, initiate filtration, and emergency pressurization of the control room These actions are necessary to ensure the control room is kept habitable for the operators stationed there during accident recovery and post accident operations by minimizing the radiation exposure of control room personnel In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the radiation monitor actuation of the CREVS is a backup for the SI signal actuation This ensures initiation of the CREVS during a loss of coolant accident or steam generator tube rupture. The radiation monitor actuation of the CREVS in MODES 5 and 6, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and during CORE ALTERATIONS, is the primary means to ensure control room habitability in the event of a fuel handling or waste gas decay tank rupture accident. The CREVS actuation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-16 E2-134 Amendment No.
New Page CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3/4 3.3 13 LCO APPLICABILITY The CREVS Functions must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The Functions must also be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 when required for a waste gas decay tank rupture accident, to ensure a habitable environment for the control room operators. The Applicability for the CREVS actuation on the ESFAS Safety Injection Functions are specified in LCO 3.3.2. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 Amendment No. B 3/4 3-17 E2-135 BASES The LCO requirements ensure that instrumentation necessary to initiate the CREVS is OPERABLE.
- 1.
Manual Initiation The LCO requires two channels OPERABLE. The operator can initiate the CREVS at any time by using either of two switches in the control room This action will cause actuation of all components in the same manner as any of the automatic actuation signals. The LCO for Manual Initiation ensures the proper amount of redundancy is maintained in the manual actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has manual initiation capability. Each channel consists of one hand switch and the interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic relays
- 2.
Control Room Radiation The LCO specifies two required Control Room Air Intake Radiation Monitors to ensure that the radiation monitoring instrumentation necessary to initiate the CREVS remains OPERABLE. One radiation monitor is dedicated to each train of CREVS. For sampling systems, channel OPERABILITY involves more than OPERABILITY of channel electronics OPERABILITY may also require correct valve lineups, sample pump operation, and filter motor operation, as well as detector OPERABILITY, if these supporting features are necessary for trip to occur under the conditions assumed by the safety analyses
- 3.
Safety Iniection Refer to LCO 3.3.2, Function 1, for all initiating Functions and requirements.
New Page CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.13 BASES ACTIONS The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or drift sufficient to exceed the tolerance allowed by the plant specific calibration procedures. Typically, the drift is found to be small and results in a delay of actuation rather than a total loss of function. If the Trip Setpoint is less conservative than the tolerance specified by the calibration procedure, the channel must be declared inoperable immediately and the appropriate condition entered. Action a - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 Action a. applies to the actuation logic train function of the CREVS, the radiation monitor channel functions, and the manual channel functions. If one train is inoperable, or one radiation monitor channel is inoperable in one or more functions, 7 days are permitted to restore it to OPERABLE status The 7-day completion time is the same as is allowed if one train of the mechanical portion of the system is inoperable as required by LCO 3 7.7. If the channel/train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, one CREVS train must be placed in the emergency radiation protection mode of operation. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation. If the required action to return the CREVS train to OPERABLE status or place a train of CREVS in operation within 7 days has not been met and the plant is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO requirements are not applicable. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. Action b - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 Action b applies to the failure of two CREVS actuation trains, two radiation monitor channels, or two manual channels. The first required action is to place one CREVS train in the emergency radiation protection mode of operation immediately. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function that may have been lost and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation. The applicable actions of LCO 3.7.7 must also be entered for the CREVS train made inoperable by the inoperable actuation instrumentation. This ensures appropriate limits are placed upon train inoperability. Alternatively, both trains may be placed in the emergency radiation protection mode. This ensures the CREVS function is performed even in the presence of a single failure. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-18 Amendment No. E2-136
New Page CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3/4.3 3.13 BASES ACTIONS (continued) If the above required actions have not been met and the plant is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO requirements are not applicable. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems Action c - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 This action has been added to clarify the application of completion time rules The conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each function listed in Table 3 3-16. The completion time(s) of the inoperable channel(s)/train(s) of a function will be tracked separately for each function starting from the time the condition was entered for that function. Action d - MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 Action d allows the entry into applicable modes while relying on the required actions as an exception to the requirements of Specification 3.0 4. Action a. - MODES 5 and 6 Action a. applies to the actuation logic train function of the CREVS, the radiation monitor channel functions, and the manual channel functions If one train is inoperable, or one radiation monitor channel is inoperable in one or more functions, 7 days are permitted to restore it to OPERABLE status. The 7-day completion time is the same as is allowed if one train of the mechanical portion of the system is inoperable as required by LCO 3.7.7. If the channel/train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, one CREVS train must be placed in the emergency radiation protection mode of operation. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation If the required action to return the CREVS train to OPERABLE status or place a train of CREVS in operation within 7 days has not been met and the plant is in MODE 5 or 6, actions must be initiated to restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status immediately to ensure adequate isolation capability in the event of a waste gas decay tank rupture. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-19 Amendment No. E2-137
New Page CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.13 BASES ACTIONS (continued) Action b. - MODES 5 and 6 Action b. applies to the failure of two CREVS actuation trains, two radiation monitor channels, or two manual channels. The first required action is to place one CREVS train in the emergency radiation protection mode of operation immediately. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function that may have been lost and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation The applicable actions of LCO 3 7.7 must also be entered for the CREVS train made inoperable by the inoperable actuation instrumentation. This ensures appropriate limits are placed upon train inoperability. Alternatively, both trains may be placed in the emergency radiation protection mode. This ensures the CREVS function is performed even in the presence of a single failure If the above required actions have not been met and the plant is in MODE 5 or 6, actions must be initiated to restore the inoperable trains to OPERABLE status immediately to ensure adequate isolation capability in the event of a waste gas decay tank rupture. Action c - MODES 5 and 6 This action has been added to clarify the application of completion time rules The conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each function listed in Table 3.3-16. The completion time(s) of the inoperable channel(s)/train(s) of a function will be tracked separately for each function starting from the time the condition was entered for that function Action d - MODES 5 and 6 Action d allows the entry into applicable modes while relying on the required actions as an exception to the requirements of Specification 3.0.4. Action a - Fuel Movement Action a. applies to the actuation logic train function of the CREVS, the radiation monitor channel functions, and the manual channel functions. If one train is inoperable, or one radiation monitor channel is inoperable in one or more functions, 7 days are permitted to restore it to OPERABLE status. The 7-day completion time is the same as is allowed if one train of the mechanical portion of the system is inoperable as required by LCO 3.7.7. If the channelltrain cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, one CREVS train must be placed in the emergency radiation protection mode of operation. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-20 Amendment No. E2-138
New Page CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3/4 3.3 13 BASES ACTIONS (continued) If the required action to return the CREVS train to OPERABLE status or place a train of CREVS in operation within 7 days has not been met when irradiated fuel assemblies are being moved, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be suspended immediately to reduce the risk of accidents that would require CREVS actuation Action b - Fuel Movement Action b applies to the failure of two CREVS actuation trains, two radiation monitor channels, or two manual channels The first required action is to place one CREVS train in the emergency radiation protection mode of operation immediately. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function that may have been lost and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation The applicable actions of LCO 3.7.7 must also be entered for the CREVS train made inoperable by the inoperable actuation instrumentation. This ensures appropriate limits are placed upon train inoperability. Alternatively, both trains may be placed in the emergency radiation protection mode This ensures the CREVS function is performed even in the presence of a single failure If the above required actions have not been met when irradiated fuel assemblies are being moved, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be suspended immediately to reduce the risk of accidents that would require CREVS actuation. Action c - Fuel Movement This action has been added to clarify the application of completion time rules The conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each function listed in Table 3.3-16. The completion time(s) of the inoperable channel(s)/train(s) of a function will be tracked separately for each function starting from the time the condition was entered for that function. Action d - Fuel Movement Action d allows the entry into applicable modes while relying on the required actions as an exception to the requirements of Specification 3.0.4. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-21 Amendment No E2-139
New Page CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3/4.3 3.13 BASES SURVEILLANCE 4 3 3.13 1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. The frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed every 92 days on each radiation monitor to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended function. This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the CREVS actuation. The setpoints shall be left consistent with the unit specific calibration procedure tolerance The frequency of 92 days is based on the known reliability of the monitoring equipment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the Manual Initiation function is performed every 18 months Each Manual Initiation function is tested up to, and including, the master relay coils In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i e, pump starts, valve cycles, etc.) The frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. The frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle. REFERENCES None. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-22 Amendment No E2-140
New Page LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3 14 B 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3/4.3.3.14 Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The DGs provide a source of emergency power when offsite power is either unavailable or is insufficiently stable to allow safe unit operation. Undervoltage protection will generate an LOP start if a loss-of-voltage or degraded voltage condition occurs in the switchyard. There are four LOP start signals, one for each 6.9 kV Shutdown Board. Three degraded voltage relays (one per phase) are provided on each 6.9 kV Shutdown Board for detecting a sustained undervoltage condition. The relays are combined in a two-out-of-three logic configuration to generate a shutdown board load shed actuation and start the DGs if the voltage is below 93.5% for 300 seconds (nominal). If a safety injection signal is present at the time of the degraded voltage condition or if a safety injection actuation occurs during a degraded voltage condition, the load shed actuation will occur within 9 5 seconds (nominal) Additionally, three loss-of-voltage relays (one per phase) are provided on each 6.9 kV Shutdown Board for the purpose of detecting a loss-of-voltage condition. These relays are combined in a two-out-of-three logic to generate a shutdown board load shed actuation and start the DGs if the voltage is below 80% for 1.25 seconds (nominal) The LOP start actuation is described in FSAR Section 8.3, "Onsite Power System" (Reference 1). Allowable Values and LOP DG Start Instrumentation Setpoints The trip setpoints used in the relays and timers are based on the analytical limits presented in TVA calculations, References 3, 4, and 5. The selection of these trip setpoints is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and time delays are taken into account. The Nominal Trip Setpoint is the expected value to be achieved during calibrations. The Nominal Trip Setpoint considers all factors which may affect channel performance by statistically combining rack drift, rack measurement and test equipment effects, rack calibration accuracy, rack comparator setting accuracy, rack temperature effects, sensor measurements and test equipment effects, sensor calibration accuracy, primary element accuracy, and process measurement accuracy. The Allowable Value has been established by considering the measurable values assumed for rack effects only. The Allowable Value serves as an operability limit for the purpose of the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 Amendment No. B 3/4 3-23 E2-121
New Page LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3.14 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) Setpoints adjusted consistent with the requirements of the Allowable Value ensure that the consequences of accidents will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the accident and that the equipment functions as designed. Allowable Values and/or Nominal Trip Setpoints are specified for each function in Table 3.3-17. Nominal Trip Setpoints are also specified in the unit specific setpoint calculations The trip setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoint measured by the surveillance procedure does not exceed the Allowable Value if the relay is performing as required If the measured setpoint does not exceed the Allowable Value, the relay is considered OPERABLE. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint, but within the Allowable Value, is acceptable provided that operation and testing is consistent with the assumptions of the unit specific setpoint calculation (Reference 3). APPLICABLE The LOP DG start instrumentation is required for the Engineered Safety SAFETY ANALYSES Features (ESF) Systems to function in any accident with a loss of offsite power. Its design basis is that of the ESF Actuation System (ESFAS). Accident analyses credit the loading of the DG based on the loss of offsite power during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The actual DG start has historically been associated with the ESFAS actuation The DG loading has been included in the delay time associated with each safety system component requiring DG supplied power following a loss of offsite power. The analyses assume a non mechanistic DG loading, which does not explicitly account for each individual component of loss of power detection and subsequent actions. The channels of LOP DG start instrumentation, in conjunction with the ESF systems powered from the DGs, provide unit protection in the event of any of the analyzed accidents discussed in Reference 2, in which a loss of offsite power is assumed. The delay times assumed in the safety analysis for the ESF equipment include the 10 second DG start delay, and the appropriate sequencing delay, if applicable. The response times for ESFAS actuated equipment in LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," include the appropriate DG loading and sequencing delay. The LOP DG start instrumentation channels satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 314 3-24 Amendment No. E2-122
New Page LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3/4.3.3 14 BASES LCO The LCO for LOP DG Start Instrumentation requires that the loss-of-voltage, degraded voltage, load shed, and DG Start functions shall be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 when the LOP DG Start Instrumentation supports safety systems associated with the ESFAS. In MODES 5 and 6, the functions must be OPERABLE whenever the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that the automatic start of the DG is available when needed. A channel is OPERABLE with an actual trip setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the trip setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is readjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A trip setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions Loss of the LOP DG Start Instrumentation function could result in the delay of safety systems initiation when required. This could lead to unacceptable consequences during accidents During the loss of offsite power the DG powers the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps Failure of these pumps to start would leave only one turbine driven pump, as well as an increased potential for a loss of decay heat removal through the secondary system APPLICABILITY The LOP DG Start Instrumentation Functions are required in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 because ESF Functions are designed to provide protection in these MODES. Actuation in MODE 5 or 6 is required whenever the required DG must be OPERABLE so that it can perform its function on an LOP or a degraded voltage condition on the 6.9 kV Shutdown Board. ACTIONS In the event a channel's trip setpoint is found nonconservative with respect to the Allowable Value, or the channel is found inoperable, then the function that channel provides must be declared inoperable and the LCO condition entered for the particular protection function affected. Action a. Action a. applies to the LOP DG start function with one channel of voltage sensors per board inoperable. If one channel of voltage sensors is inoperable, Action a requires the channel to be restored to OPERABLE status within 6 hours. The specified completion time is reasonable considering the function remains fully OPERABLE on every board and the low probability of an event occurring during these intervals When the inoperable channel can not be returned to OPERABLE status within 6 hours, the requirements specified in LCO 3 8.1.1, "AC Sources Operating," or LCO 3 8.1.2, "AC Sources Shutdown," for the DG made inoperable by failure of the LOP DG start instrumentation are required to be entered immediately The actions of those LCOs provide for adequate compensatory actions to assure unit safety. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-25 Amendment No E2-123
New Page LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3/4.3 3.14 BASES ACTIONS (continued) Action b Action b. applies when more than one channel of voltage sensors or the required timer(s) on a single board is inoperable. Action b. requires restoring all but one channel of voltage sensors and at least one timer for each required function to OPERABLE status. The 1 hour completion time should allow ample time to repair most failures and takes into account the low probability of an event requiring an LOP start occurring during this interval When the inoperable channel can not be returned to OPERABLE status within 1 hour, the requirements specified in LCO 3.8.1.1, "AC Sources Operating," or LCO 3.8 1.2, "AC Sources Shutdown," for the DG made inoperable by failure of the LOP DG start instrumentation are required to be entered immediately. The actions of those LCOs provide for adequate compensatory actions to assure unit safety. Action c. Because the required channels are specified on a per shutdown board basis, the condition may be entered separately for each board as appropriate. Action c has been added to clarify the application of completion time rules The conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each function listed in the LCO. The completion time(s) of the inoperable channel(s) of a function will be tracked separately for each function starting from the time the condition was entered for that function Action d Action d. has been added to direct entry into the applicable actions of LCO 3.3 2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," for inoperable Auxiliary Feedwater Loss of Power start instrumentation. The loss-of-voltage relays required by this LCO also initiate load shed and the sequencing functions that initiate the start of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps for a loss of power condition and generate a start signal for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump as required in LCO 3.3 2. SURVEILLANCE 4.3 3 14 1 REQUIREMENTS A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the voltage sensors is performed every 31 days. This test checks operation of the loss-of-voltage and degraded voltage sensors that provide actuation signals. The frequency is based on the known SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-26 Amendment No E2-124
New Page BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) reliability of the relays and timers and the redundancy aVailable, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the loss-of voltage and degraded voltage functions, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within'the necessary range and accuracy. The setpoints, as well as the response to a loss-of-voltage and a degraded voltage test, shall include a single point verification that the trip occurs within the required time delay, as shown in Reference 1. The frequency of 18 months is based on operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycle and is justified by the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. REFERENCES
- 1.
Sequoyah FSAR, Section 8.3, "Onsite Power System."
- 2.
Sequoyah FSAR, Section 15.0, "Accident Analysis."
- 3.
TVA Calculation 27 DAT, "Demonstrated Accuracy Calculation 27 DAT"
- 4.
TVA Calculation DS1-2, "Demonstrated Accuracy Calculation DS1-2"
- 5.
TVA Calculation SQN-EEB-MS-TI06-0008, "Degraded Voltage Analysis" SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-27 E.2-125 Amendment No LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3/4 3.3.14 -}}