ML022880204

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G20020584/LTR-02-0653 - Edwin S. Lyman Ltr. OI Report 3-2001-059, Security Incident at Perry Nuclear Plant
ML022880204
Person / Time
Site: Perry  
Issue date: 10/08/2002
From: Edwin Lyman
Nuclear Control Institute
To: Meserve R
NRC/Chairman
Shared Package
ML023010200 List:
References
3-2001-059
Download: ML022880204 (4)


Text

EDO Principal Correspondence Control FROM:

DUE: 10/22/02 EDO CONTROL: G20020584 DOC DT: 10/08/02 FINAL REPLY:

Edwin S.

Lyman Nuclear Control Institute TO:

Chairman Meserve FOR SIGNATURE OF :

Chairman Meserve DESC:

    • PRI 01 Report No.

3-2001-059, Security Incident at Perry Nuclear Plant DATE: 10/10/02 ASSIGNED TO:

CONTACT:

CRC NO: 02-0653 ROUTING:

Travers Paperiello Kane Norry Craig Burns/Cyr

Caputo, 01 Collins, NRR Dyer, RIII NSIR Zimmerman SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

Coordinate with 01.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET Date Printed: Oct 09, 2002 12:27 PAPER NUMBER:

ACTION OFFICE:

AUTHOR:

AFFILIATION:

ADDRESSEE:

SUBJECT:

ACTION:

DISTRIBUTION:

LETTER DATE:

ACKNOWLEDGED SPECIAL HANDLING:

NOTES:

FILE LOCATION:

LOGGING DATE:

10/09/2002 LTR-02-0653 EDO Edwin Lyman NCI Richard Meserve Concerns the NRC Office of Investigations (01) Report No. 3-2001-059, security inciden/at the Perry nuclear plant in Ohio Signature of Chairman RF, SECY to Ack 10/08/2002 No OCM #12159 Commission Correspondence Adams DATE DUE:

10/24/2002 DATE SIGNED:

SEDO -- G20020584

NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE.

1 0(00 CONNI'R.IIt UI VE.N'W 1:11I 410 WA*HINGTONDCn 20036 202-t22.544i FAX 202*-12-0692 E-mail no' i nrt Wcb wv.-wnc'i rrg October 8, 2002 Honorable Richard A. Meserve Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Chairman Meserve:

I am writing to you on behalf of the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) in reference "to the NRC Office o['Investigations (01) Report No. 3-2001-059, dated September 26, 2002, involving a security incident at the Perry nuclear plant in Ohio.

In this report, which was publicly released yesterday on ADAMS, it is stated that an investigation by the 01 initiated on December 28, 2001 substantiated that "a contract insulator dcliberately falsified access authorization records by failing to disclose his complete criminal hitory" in applying for unescorted access at Perry. The letter states that NRC will not take any enfbrcement action against Perry's owner, First Energy Operating Company (FENOC) in response to this incident.

NCI requests that NRC provide answers to the numerous questions raised by this incident. Was this individual actually granted temporary unescorted access (TUA) based on false information'? If so, for how long did it remain in effect? Did the individual enter areas of the plant where he or she could havc committed sabotage or obtained information of use to external attackers? Was there any evidence that the individual had links to terrorism? Was the deception uncovered by an F1BI background check or by some other means? And finally, would the "severe limitations on temporary unescorted access" that you claim NRC has imposed in its February security orders have prevented this security failure from occurring?

NCI ha, communicated with you more than once since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 to express our concern regarding NRC's practice of allowing nuclear plant licensees to grant TUAs to contract workers for extended periods based on self reported information about their criminal histories. At least one similar security breach.

at Duke Energy's Oconee plant, has come to light in the past thirteen months. The incident at Perry is yet another demonstration of the recklessness of this practice.

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Given that you have acknowledged in a September 6 letter to Homeland Security director Tom Ridge and other officials that "enhancing access control may be one ofthe most effective means of preventing a successful attack [on a nuclear plant], because an insider could provide significant assistance to an attacking force," NCT cannot understand why NRC continues to allow TUA to be granted in the 'pot-September II era.

We once again urge NRC to forbid unescorted access to nuclear plant protected areas to individuals unless they have been cleared by FBI criminal background checks, as well as by more thorough investigations of non-criminal but suspicious behavior that may indicate involvement with terrorist activities. We also urge you to demonstrate your commitment to combating the insider threat, as articulated in your September 6 letter, by issuing enfbrcement actions when serious breaches of security like the one at Perry occur.

We look forward to your prompt reply. Thank you for your consideration of these important matters.

Sincerely, Dr. Edwin S. Lyman President 2

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