ML021050269
| ML021050269 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 04/12/2002 |
| From: | Blough A Division Reactor Projects I |
| To: | Hollingworth B State of NH |
| Shared Package | |
| ML021050259 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML021050269 (4) | |
Text
April 12, 2002 The Honorable Beverly A. Hollingworth Democratic Leader New Hampshire State Senate 107 N. Main St., Room 302 Concord, New Hampshire 03301
Dear Senator Hollingworth:
I am responding on behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to your letter of March 27, 2002, concerning public safety around the Seabrook Station. You requested that the NRC consider several specific proposals for strengthening security and enhancing safety.
As you are aware, the NRC and its licensees have taken a number of steps following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to increase security at NRC-licensed facilities. After the attacks, NRC Chairman Richard A. Meserve, with the support of the full Commission, directed the NRC staff to undertake a top-to-bottom review of our security regulations and procedures, including the basic assumptions of our current programs. This review involves coordination with U.S. national security organizations, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of Homeland Security. Not waiting for this re-evaluation to be completed, the NRC issued a number of threat advisories which outline specific measures our licensees were expected to promptly consider and incorporate, as appropriate, into their protective strategy.
Most recently, the NRC issued orders on February 25, 2002, to all commercial nuclear power plants requiring that they implement interim compensatory measures in response to the continued, generalized high-level threat environment. These orders formally mandate many of the security measures and features already implemented in response to the threat advisories.
Additional security enhancements, which have emerged from our ongoing security review, are also spelled out in the orders. The requirements will remain in effect pending notification from the Commission that the level of threat has significantly diminished or until such time as the Commission determines that other security changes are needed following the re-evaluation of current safeguards and security programs. The Commission views these compensatory measures as prudent, interim measures to address the current threat environment in a consistent manner throughout the nuclear reactor community.
Regarding your proposal of no-fly zones around nuclear power plants, the NRC has worked with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on the development of a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM), which advises pilots to avoid various critical infrastructure, including nuclear power plants. While we would not be opposed to a more prescriptive requirement, we recognize that the issue is very complicated since it involves existing air-traffic control and flight-safety protocols. Relative to nuclear plant physical protection from intentional aircraft impact, we continue to believe that the very best defense is enhanced and effective airport and aircraft
2 The Honorable Beverly A. Hollingworth security. Accordingly, we believe that the enactment of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 will provide additional protection. It should be noted that nuclear power plants are inherently robust and their designs are based on defense-in-depth principles that include many features to protect public health and safety.
Regarding your proposal to station a National Guard unit at the Seabrook station, the security orders issued on February 25, 2002, required licensees to increase security force personnel and augment their capabilities. This included increasing the patrols outside of the protected (fenced-in) areas. These augmented patrols could be provided by the licensees on-site security force, state or local law enforcement, or other off-site support. Those licensees that could not take credit for National Guard troops were required to increase their security patrols and posts outside the plant protected area. The licensees were also required to enhance coordination with law enforcement, including military, local, state and federal authorities.
As you know, the NRC has provided an initial supply of potassium iodide (KI) to the State of New Hampshire. The NRC worked with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to coordinate distribution of KI to the states. FEMA has issued guidelines for KI program implementation. FEMA guidelines require the state to complete and submit revised plans and procedures, public information materials, and prescripted emergency instructions to the public.
With regard to your proposal to determine in advance whether individual children should be treated with KI, FEMA provided specific plan review requirements in their guidelines for KI program implementation. These requirements include ensuring that KI instructions to the general public advise that people check with their doctor before taking KI.
We noted that the licensee responded to your proposal regarding the independent, off-site, real-time radiation monitoring system in a letter dated March 19, 2002. As the licensee indicated, the in-plant monitoring systems provide a very sensitive method of detecting real-time radiation releases. These systems allow control room personnel to take appropriate emergency response actions relative to unplanned releases. Additionally, in accordance with NRC regulatory requirements, the licensee maintains a radiological environmental monitoring program. We have confirmed through inspections that the licensee has maintained these NRC-required radiation monitoring capabilities in accordance with regulatory requirements. The radiological information provided by these programs is available to federal, state and local authorities for monitoring both routine and emergency radiological conditions that could impact public health and safety. While other supplemental independent real-time monitoring systems are not required under current NRC regulations, we acknowledge that in some circumstances, supplemental radiological monitoring systems could provide state and local authorities with additional information on which to make emergency response decisions, providing that the systems are effectively maintained and controlled.
In the March 19, 2002 response to your proposal for permanent closure of the Visitors Center, the licensee indicated that, although they intend to reopen the center, extensive security measures will be in place and visitors will be monitored carefully. Notwithstanding any decision that the licensee makes, they will be obligated to maintain facility security in accordance with the NRC-approved security plan and the specifications of the NRCs Order of February 25, 2002.
3 The Honorable Beverly A. Hollingworth Thank you for your interest in these important public health and safety issues. Mr. Bob Bores, NRC Region I State Liaison Officer, is available at (610) 337-5213 to discuss any of your proposals, especially the issues dealing the potassium iodide and off-site radiation monitoring.
If you have any further questions or would like to discuss any specific details of this letter, please feel free to contact me at (610) 337-5229 or Curt Cowgill at (610) 337-5233.
Sincerely,
/RA/
A. Randolph Blough, Director Division of Reactor Projects
4 The Honorable Beverly A. Hollingworth DOCUMENT NAME: C:\\ORPCheckout\\FileNET\\ML021050269.wpd After declaring this document An Official Agency Record it will be released to the Public.
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