ML020880161

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
SG Tube Failure Lessons Learned Task Group Summary
ML020880161
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 03/19/2002
From:
- No Known Affiliation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2001-0256
Download: ML020880161 (2)


Text

PREDECISIONAL-NOT FOR RELEASE Indian Point 2 SG Tube Failure Lessons Learned Task Group Summary

-Interoffice Task Group established in accordance with Charter

-Objectives/Scope

-areas of improvement in NRC and Industry SG programs

-review of restart SE(terminated)

-considered OIG report findings and RES independent review

-did not take on DPO, 2.206, non SG issues

-No public stakeholder input yet

-Safety Significance

-Event had no impact on public health and safety

-TG agrees wtih SDP risk assessment insights

-Issues have generic implications

-Recommend IP2 experience be used in risk communication plans Industry

-ConEd

-Industry

-Licensee actions-Should request NEI/industry to coordinate

-NEI 97-06 Industry Initiative-Lessons should be incorporated Technical Specifications(requirements, leakage, reports)

Licensee Oversight of Vendors

-EPRI Guideline improvements NRC issue generic communication NRC Processes

"**Licensing

-Amendment review consistent with guidance

  • Opportunities to pursue weaknesses in ConEd assessment
  • Should have formal guidance for SG examination extensions
  • TG believes that its not clear review results would change
  • Event would have occurred with continuous operation w/o amend.

-Should improve guidance on information relied on in SEs

PREDECISIONAL-NOT FOR RELEASE

-Inspection

-Recommend improved guidance for SG baseline inspections

-Training should be reviewed relative to program objective

-NRC/Licensee telephone interaction should be put into a process

-SG technical information flow to inspectors should be improved

-Should assess PIs and program relative to trends in SG leakage

-Should establish risk informed SG degradation thresholds

    • Staff could not have identified the tube that failed in ConEd SG examination report provided to the NRC as stated in the OIG report

-General

-Staff expertise/capability to support program objectives

-Review guidance for independent internal reviews RES Report Issues Addressed in the TG report

-If basis for 24 month extension adequate, 48d extension not significant

-Could not reconcile SE statements with information reviewed

-Thorough ConEd operational assessment would have predicted increased probability of rupture

-First U bend flaw, denting, hourglassing

-Flaw growth rates PREDECISIONAL-NOT FOR RELEASE