ML020110027

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RAI, a Change to the Facility Descriptions
ML020110027
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 01/17/2002
From: Jack Cushing
NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD4
To: Parrish J
Energy Northwest
Cushing J 415-1424
References
TAC MB1777
Download: ML020110027 (4)


Text

January 17, 2002 Mr. J. V. Parrish Chief Executive Officer Energy Northwest P.O. Box 968 (Mail Drop 1023)

Richland, WA 99352-0968

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (RAI) - COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION (TAC NO. MB1777)

Dear Mr. Parrish:

By letter dated April 16, 2001, Energy Northwest submitted for NRC staff review, an amendment request to change the facility descriptions as originally evaluated in the Columbia Generating Stations Final Safety Analysis Report. The requested change would allow an unisolable drain line between the reactor core isolation cooling and the control rod drive/condensate pump room. As a result of the review, the NRC staff has determined that additional information is needed to complete the review. The information needed is detailed in the enclosure.

The enclosed request was discussed with Mr. Brownlee of your staff on January 10, 2002. A mutually agreeable target date of February 15, 2002, was established for responding to the RAI. If circumstances result in the need to revise the target date, please call me at your earliest opportunity at (301) 415-1424.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jack Cushing, Project Manager, Section 2 Project Directorate IV Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-397

Enclosure:

Request for Additional Information cc w/encl: See next page

Columbia Generating Station cc:

Mr. Greg O. Smith (Mail Drop 927M)

Vice President, Generation Energy Northwest P. O. Box 968 Richland, WA 99352-0968 Mr. Albert E. Mouncer (Mail Drop 1396)

Chief Counsel Energy Northwest P.O. Box 968 Richland, WA 99352-0968 Ms. Deborah J. Ross, Chairman Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council P. O. Box 43172 Olympia, WA 98504-3172 Mr. D. W. Coleman (Mail Drop PE20)

Manager, Regulatory Affairs Energy Northwest P.O. Box 968 Richland, WA 99352-0968 Mr. Paul Inserra (Mail Drop PE20)

Manager, Licensing Energy Northwest P.O. Box 968 Richland, WA 99352-0968 Regional Administrator, Region IV U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Harris Tower & Pavilion 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-8064 Chairman Benton County Board of Commissioners P.O. Box 69 Prosser, WA 99350-0190 Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 69 Richland, WA 99352-0069 Mr. Rodney L. Webring (Mail Drop PE08)

Vice President, Operations Support/PIO Energy Northwest P. O. Box 968 Richland, WA 99352-0968 Thomas C. Poindexter, Esq.

Winston & Strawn 1400 L Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005-3502 Mr. Bob Nichols Executive Policy Division Office of the Governor P.O. Box 43113 Olympia, WA 98504-3113 Ms. Lynn Albin Washington State Department of Health P.O. Box 7827 Olympia, WA 98504-7827

January 17, 2002 Mr. J. V. Parrish Chief Executive Officer Energy Northwest P.O. Box 968 (Mail Drop 1023)

Richland, WA 99352-0968

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (RAI) - COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION (TAC NO. MB1777)

Dear Mr. Parrish:

By letter dated April 16, 2001, Energy Northwest submitted for NRC staff review, an amendment request to change the facility descriptions as originally evaluated in the Columbia Generating Stations Final Safety Analysis Report. The requested change would allow an unisolable drain line between the reactor core isolation cooling and the control rod drive/condensate pump room. As a result of the review, the NRC staff has determined that additional information is needed to complete the review. The information needed is detailed in the enclosure.

The enclosed request was discussed with Mr. Brownlee of your staff on January 10, 2002. A mutually agreeable target date of February 15, 2002, was established for responding to the RAI. If circumstances result in the need to revise the target date, please call me at your earliest opportunity at (301) 415-1424.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jack Cushing, Project Manager, Section 2 Project Directorate IV Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-397

Enclosure:

Request for Additional Information cc w/encl: See next page DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC RidsNrrPMJCushing PDIV-2 R/F RidsNrrLAEPeyton RidsNrrDlpm (TMarsh)

JGolla LBerry SDinsmore RidsOgcRp RidsAcrsAcnwMailCenter RidsRgn4MailCenter (KBrockman)

ACCESSION NO: ML020110027 NRR-088 OFFICE PDIV-2/PM PDIV-2/LA PDIV-2/SC NAME JCushing:lf EPeyton SDembek DATE 1/16/02 1/16/02 1/17/2002 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION UNISOLABLE DRAIN LINE COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-397 1.

Discuss the augmented piping inspection programs, if any, for the service water system (SWS) and the condensate system.

2.

Provide an estimate of the amount of SWS piping (in feet) and the number of welds in the control rod drive/condensate (CRD/COND) room. Also, provide an estimate of how much condensate storage and transfer (CST) piping and how many welds are in the CRD/COND room.

3.

It is stated on page 3 of the November 8, 2001, letter, that "The analysis assumes if the plant operators cannot terminate the flooding in one hour, then core damage occurs."

Based on this statement, it appears that the estimated probability of failure to isolate within one hour of 1E-4/demand for the SWS piping flooding dominates the conditional core damage probability (CCDP) for ruptures 1, 1R, 2, and 2R (and doesn't change between scenarios) and that this assumption is not used in the CST piping ruptures 3 and 3R. Is this conclusion correct? Discuss why there is not a one-hour time for the CST piping failure.

4.

Discuss how high the water is expected to be in the CRD/COND room one hour after a SWS pipe break and one hour after a CST pipe break. State what equipment in the CRD/COND room modeled in the plant's probable risk assessment (PRA) may be expected to fail within the one hour because of the water from the pipe breaks.

5.

Discuss how high the water is expected to reach in the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) room (caused by drainage through the unisolable drain line) within one hour after a SWS pipe break and one hour after a CST pipe break. State what equipment in the RCIC room that is modeled in the plant PRA may be expected to fail within the one hour because of the water from the pipe breaks. Discuss how long before equipment, other than RCIC modeled in the plant PRA, would be expected to fail.