LR-N21-0007, Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments
| ML21028A788 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/2021 |
| From: | David Mannai Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N21-0007 | |
| Download: ML21028A788 (3) | |
Text
January 28, 2021 PSEG Nuclear UC P.O. Box 236, Hancock& Bridge, New Jersey 08038--0236 LR-N21-0007 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington DC 20555-001
Subject:
Hope Creek Generating Station Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 Docket No. 50-354 Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments 0 PSEG Nurlenr /,LC 10 CFR 50.59 Pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, UChanges, Tests, and Experiments," paragraph (d) (2), Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) is providing the required report (Attachment 1) for Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57. This report provides a summary of 10CFR50.59 evaluations for activities implemented under 10CFR50.59 at HCGS during the period of January 1, 2019, through December 31, 2020.
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.
If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Ms. Bernadette Humphrey at (856) 339-1308.
Si7~;---
David Mannai Senior Director - Regulatory Operations PSEG Nuclear LLC : Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments
1-R-N21-00P7 Page2 cc:
Mr. Davic1 Lew, Regional Administrator - NR.C ~eg;on 1 Mr. James Kim, Project Manager - U~NRC Mr. Jjgar Patel, USNRC Senior ~esident Inspector - HQpe CreeJ<
Mr. Patrick Mulligan, Manager IV, NJBNJ=
Mr, Lee Marabella, Corporate Commitment Tracking CQordinator Mr. Thomas Cachaza, Hope Creek Commitment Tracking Coordinator
LR-N21-0007 Hope Creek Generating Station Renewed Facility Operating License NPF-57 Docket No. 50-354 Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments C-SSW Strainer Backwash Valve Open In May 2019, Temporary Configuration Control Process (TCCP) 4HT-19-Q03 was implemented.
The TCCP fails open Service Water System strainer backwash valve H1EA-EA-HC-2197C.
The TCCP was implemented to defeat the auto-close feature until repairs or replacement can be performed.
The 50.59 evaluation was performed utilizing a prepared technical evaluation that clarified Hope Creek Service Water System {SWS) design and licensing basis. It concluded that having H1EA-EA-2197C in a failed open position is bounded by existing analyses and configurations previously evaluated. Consequently, compensatory measures were not required to assure the SSW/SACS design bases are met and changes to design basis calculations were not required.
While considered an off-normal condition versus what is stated in the UFSAR descriptive material, this configuration would not be considered adverse from a system/thermal hydraulic standpoint The SSWS system remains capable of fulfilling its design/licensing basis functions with or without the TCCP installed. Therefore, the TCCP was implemented without a license Amendment.
Hope Creek control Room HVAC Veritrak Controller Replacement The Hope Creek Control Room Safety Related HVAC controllers were replaced due to obsolescence in November 2020. The Design Change replaced the Main Control Room differential pressure (dp) controllers and alarm cards, originally supplied by Westinghouse, with digital, microprocessor-based single loop controllers supplied by Yokogawa. The replacement was performed on both the A and B trains of Main Control Room HVAC.
The 50.59 evaluation was performed in order to evaluate the impact of a digital failure, specifically a common cause failure. A qualitative assessment was performed in accordance with the guidance of Regulatory Information Summary 2002-22 Supplement 1. It concluded that the likelihood of a systematic failure due to a design defect of the Yokogawa controllers is sufficiently low; i.e., much lower than other failures that are considered in the UFSAR. The failure modes of the new equipment due to random hardware failures, including new failure modes due to combination of functions, are bounded by failure modes of the existing equipment. System-level failure modes described in the UFSAR remain bounding. The assessment concluded that the replacement controllers are qualified to the design environment, including environmental capability and Seismic qualification. There is no increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety, and a malfunction with a different result is not created. Thus, replacement of the Main Control Room dp controllers with new digital controllers did not require a license amendment.
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