JAFP-96-0110, Forwards Corrected Page of GL 95-07 180-day Response
| ML20101B809 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 03/08/1996 |
| From: | Harry Salmon POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| GL-95-07, GL-95-7, JAFP-96-0110, JAFP-96-110, NUDOCS 9603150067 | |
| Download: ML20101B809 (2) | |
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P.O. Dm 41 hmmN, rkw yoA tze 315 342.3840 l
- > New York Power M M20d Harry P. salmon, Jr.
Site Executive Officer March 8, 1996 JAFP-96-0110 l
l l
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission I
Attn:
Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, D.C.
20555
SUBJECT:
James A. FitsPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket 50-333 l
Correction to Generic Letter 95-07 180 Day j
Response
l l
Reference:
1.
Letter to USNRC Document Control Desk from H.
l P.
Salmon, Jr.,
Evaluation Results for Generic Letter 95-07 Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-l Operated Gate Valves, (Serial Number JAFP 0064), dated 2/13/96 j
Dear Sir:
l The Power Authority has discovered an administrative error in our l
Generic Letter 95-07 180-day response dated 2/13/96.
This error in no way affected the intent of the technical evaluation, and the conclusions remain the same.
The corrected page is enclosed.
I hope this error did not cause any inconvenience.
If you have l
any questions, please contact Mr. Arthur Zaremba at (315) 349-6365.
Very truly yours, A
14 Salmoqn, Harry P.
r.
Site Executive Officer A27 HPS: RAP:las cc:
Project Directorate Licensing File 7h RMS fvnD 9603150067 960308
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PDR ADOCK 05000333 P
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150018 1
ATTACHMENT I New York Power Authority James A. FitsPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Evaluation of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves for Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding c.
The assumed temperature (560*F) for 14MOV-12A(B) comes from the line designation table maximum operating temperature for line 10"-
W23-902-5A(B).
During normal operation 14MOV-12A(B) is closed with a dead water leg downstream to the reactor vessel.
Heating of l
14MOV-12A(B) may occur due to conduction along this dead leg and from slight leakage or pressure equalization flow during surveillance testing.
Whatever heating and temperature change which may occur during normal surveillance testing would be essentially the same as for design basis operation (valve would not cool appreciably between accident depressurization and when signalled to open).
Thus if thermal binding does not occur for surveillance it will not occur during design basis conditions.
d.
A review of maintenance history da,ta has identified no previous thermal binding events for 14MOV-12A or 14MOV-12B.
Although available evidence indicates that 14MOV-12A(B) are not susceptible to thermal binding, the following actions will be performed during Refueling Outage 12 to provide additional assurance that thermal binding of 14MOV-12A and 14MOV-12B will not occur:
a.
14MOV-12A Perform baseline in order to obtain improved pullout thrust data, and reduce seating thrust in order to minimize pullout thrust.
b.
14MOV-12B Perform baseline in order to obtain improved pullout thrust data, and reduce seating thrust in order to minimize pullout thrust.
13