IR 05000312/1975004
| ML19319D982 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 05/09/1975 |
| From: | Mulmros M, Spencer G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19319D978 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-75-04, 50-312-75-4, NUDOCS 8003270683 | |
| Download: ML19319D982 (13) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:.-. ___ _ . O
-l . . . . . . . . . . . ,
U. S. JUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '.*0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT ' . . . .
REGION V
. .
.; , . . <IE Inspection Report No.
50-312/75-04 Licensee Sacramento Municipal Utility District Docket No. 50-312 P. O. Box 15830 License No.DPR-54 Sacramento, California 95813 ' Priority - Facility Rancho Seco Category B . . , Location Clav Station. California . Type of Facility PWR, B&W, 913 MWe (2772 MWt) Type of Inspection Routine & Special, Announced - . Dates of Inspection __ April 22-25, 1975 l Dates of Previous Inspection February 20, 25-27, 1975 Principal Inspector DMM d f' /7)~ M. H. Malmros, Reactor inspector eat 6 . . Accompanying Inspectors tiene Date - w . Date l Other Accompanying Personnel: {{one , J/?/7]~ ,T'-d ' 7 L CI t - Reviewed by ' G. S. Spencer /, Chief, Reactor Testing and Date j Operations Branch J - . A e . % bh 8003270 . . . - - - - -- -
_ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.____ - _ , - . - . . , _ _ . , , # . SUMMARY OF FINDINGS - . t . Enforcement Action . . . None.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items . None.
, . . - Unusual Occurrences ~ The circumstances and corrective action described in Abnormal Occurrence Reports Nos. 75-3 through 75-7 submitted by the licensee to Licensing were confirmed.
(Paragraph 2 of Details) . Other Significant Findings . Current Findines 1.
Designchangesandcodificationshavebeenperf5rmedconsistentwith the Technical Specificction requirements.
(Paragraph 4 of Details) . 2.
Procedure revisions have been made consistent with the review and n/ approval requirements of the Technical Specifications.
. s__ (Paragraph 5 of Details) . 3.
Reactor operation in conformance to selected Technical Specifications was verified.
(Paragraph 6 of Details) . i 4.
The installation, modification and maintena'nce of fire barriers for cable trays and penetratio'ns were consistent with specification and procedural requirements.
(Section II of Details) - The detensioning of vertical and dome test tendons as' required by j 5.
the Technical Specificaticns for surveillance testing may not be ! possible. The licensee was evaluating the situation. This is designated as an unresolved item pending further information from the licensee.
(Paragraph 7ofDetails) . 6.
The facility has been designated in commercial operation for -powe-levels up to 92.6%. (Paragraph 8ofDetails) . ..
s._ - - . . ~ - ~ - m _ -, -, _, y
- _
_ . . - , . . . w: , -2- . . t . Status of previously Reported Unresolved Items The licensee had implemented the corrective action comitment described in Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 74-10.
(Paragraph 2 of Details and IE Inspection Report Nc. 50-312/75-02) " Manaoement Interview, The results of the inspection were discussed with Messrs. D. Raasch, R. Rodriguez and L. Schwieger and other members of the licensee's staff at the conclusion of the inspection on April 25, 1975. The licensee - commented that the apparent inability to detension the vertical and dome test tendons was being investigated and would be resolved as appropriate.
..- .
0 e e G - %.'f . .
m* m w %
' - - - - - . _. _ _ - - - _ _ _ . _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _
_
. . . , . . . , . . - , . p . -3- _ ~ SECTION I , DETAILS - 1.
Persons Contacted l' . a.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District R. Rodriguez, Manager, Nuclear Operations P. Oubre, Assistant Plant Superintendent, Operations R. Columbo, Technical Assistant ' D. Whitney, Plant Nuclear Engineer D. Comstock, Shift Supervisor D. Cass, Maintenance Supervisor R. Miller, Chemistry / Radiation Supervisor J. Williams, Senior Mechanical Engineer R. Lawrence, Senior Mechanical Engineer R. Daniels, Electrical Engineer . G. Drew, Civil Engineer . . R. Dean, Instrumentation and Control Foreman L. Schwieger, Quality Assurance Director O J. Jewett, Quality Assurance Engineer D . b.. Bechtel . J. Tosh, Technical Assistant .c.
Babcock & Wilcox , G. Mitchell, Field En'gineer . 2.
Abnormal Occurrences ,, . Abnormal Occurrence Panorts Nos. 75-3, " Pressure Transmitter Out of Calibration;" 75-4, ' essure Transmitters Out of Calibration;" 75-5, - " Activity in Component Cooling Water System;" 75-6, " Failure of SFV-20578 l to Open '
75-7, " Excessive Boron Concentration in the CBAST," were submittsd *f the licensee since the previous inspection. Based on an , examination of the records and discussions with licensee representatw es the inspectce verified the following: The cause of each abnormal occurrence was identified and the ' a.
details were clearly reported to facility management.
- .. b.
The corrective actions described in the reports to prevent recurrence of the events were implemented by the licensee.
O) ( l . m
- ,. _ \\
- -. . . - . . . , , '
. , c.
The abnor' mal occurrences had been reviewed by the Plant Review Comittee and the Management Safety Review Committee.
' d.
The limiting conditions for operation were met in all occurrences
reported.
- j ,, ' System and component failures have been reviewed by the plant e.
staff and properly identified as abnormal occurrences when applicable, f.
Revision 3 to Operating Procedure A-51, " Auxiliary Feedwater ' System," was reviewed by the Plant Review Committee and approved for implementation on March 21, 1975. This revision implemented the corrective action commitment described in Abnormal Occurrence . Report No. 74-10.
g.
The initial data to determine the drift rate of the pressure transmitters as described in Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 75-5
were obtained on April 18, 1975.
The results of the drift rate determination program will be reviewed during the next scheduled inspection.
3.
IE Bulletin Followup - " a.
75-03, ASCO Solenoid Valves Through discussions with licensee representatives and an . examination of facility records, the information and corrective action described in the licensee's response were verified. The licensee had received replacement springs &nd instructions directly from the manufacturer which specified, in detail, the resolution of the clearance and spring problem for Type 8300 and 8302 ASCO ' solenoid valves.
., b.
75-04A, Cable Tray Fire - Browns Ferry The action taken by the licensee regarding I$ Bulletin No. 75-04A is described in Section II, " Details," of this report.
c.
75-05, Operability of Cateaory I Hydraulic Shock and Sway Suppressors The licensee had received IE Bulletin No. 75-05 and preparation of the response was in progress.
. . . I O O - . m . a -- ..-. - ~-r
- __. _ _ _.
. . _ . , - , ~ - . , , - - < . . '* .;, , . . -5- - t . 4.
Design, Design Changes and Modifications Design, design changes and modifications were controlled by the ~ I procedural requirements of SMUD quality assurance program. The records that document the review, approval, installation and testing - of'seven design changes and modifications to safety related systems or components were examined with the following comments noted: Design changes were reviewed by the Planc Review Committee a.
and the Management Safety Review Committee in accordance - with the requirements of the Technical Specifications. The reviews addressed the criteria described in 10 CFR 50.59.
b.
Design change documentation contained the results of engineering reviews for the specification of applicable codes, standards
and acceptance test methods which define the acceptance criteria.
, c.
The results of the tests performed for acceptance of the design changes and modifications had been reviewed and approved in accordance with the QA program requirements. Test records ' indicated that the test results of completed modifications met
the acceptance criteria.
'
d d.
Procedure revisions were made and approved when the completed modifications changed the operating methods or characteristics , of the affected system or component.
l-c.
Drawing change notices or vendor drawing change notices had - been issued to reflect the design changes and modifications on the applicable as-built drawings.
5.
Procedures - f Procedures were reviewed for compliance to the requirements of the j Technical Specifications and conformance to the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.33 and ANSI N18.7. Procedures examined consisted of safety
I related procedures for system operations (10), emergency conditions (3), i abnormal conditions and alarm response (10), and maintenance (3). The results of the review were as follows: a.
The review and approval of procedure revisions were in accordance I i with the Technical Specifications.
b.
The procedures included appropriate. Technical Specification ! limitationr and as applicable required the use of checklists with provisions for signatures and 6tes.
j I O U . - ,. - - - -. . . -. . _ - _ - _ - -.,. .-- - -. - -.,. - -... - . _ - -.,
_ . - . _ . , ' -6- - - . s l c.
No Technital Specification revisions have been approved that would require changes in procedures.
d.
Temporary procedu're changes (three in effe'et) did not conflict ' with the Technical Specification requirements.
6.
Rev'iew of Safety Limits (SL), Limitino Safety System Settinos (LSSS), ' and Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO) Records of reactor operations were examined. to verify conformance to
the following Technical Specifications: a. Reactor Coolant System TS 3.1.6.1 . TS 3.1.6.2 TS 3.1.6.7 b. Reactivity and Power Control ' ' TS 2.3.1 . c. Core and Internals TS 2.1.2 - TS 3.S.2.6 . , d. Power Conversion Systems , TS 3.4.1.4 ' e. Auxiliary Systems , TS 3.3.1.C - f. Electrical Systems " . TS 3.7.1 g. Emergency Power TS 3.7.2.A TS 3.7.2.B TS 3.7.2.C . TS 3.7.2.0 . . . . l
- -. - - - - - -- _ - - _ _ _,
. _ _ _ _.
_ - _ _ _ _ _. - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
- . . . m/ . ' \\ -7- , , h. Emergency Core Cooling System - TS 3.3.1.8 . - 1.
Other Engineered Safety Features . TS'3.3.1.D . Through direct observation of process instrumentation, reviews of ,
' control room logs (November 1974, February and March 1975), daily and weekly surveillance records (January through April 1975), and - independent calculations of voltage settings for reactor trip set points, the operation of the facility was verified to be in conformance with the Technical Specifications listed above.
7.
Independent Inspection Additional areas of facility operation were examined by the inspector.
Areas examined were as follows: ' The results of special test procedure (STP-021) were verified a.
to have been reviewed and approved. The test results indicated that the isolation valves to the Makeup Tank function as described in Amendment 29 to the FSAR dated January 5, 1975, which stated that upon receipt of a safety feature signal the '- valves would isolate the Makeup Tank from the high pressure injection pump injection header to prevent a loss of suction to the high pressure injection pumps.
' b.
The status of tendon surveillance testing was discussed with the cognizant licensee representative. The first year surveillance test was being performed by an outside contractor and was scheduled for completion in approximately two weeks.
The licensee indicated that the vertical and dome test tendons ' may not be capable of being completely detensioned as required - by Technical Specification 4.4.2.2.
The specific reasons for this problem were being investigated by the licensee and would be fully documented in the report of the tendon surveillance tests. The test results and resolution of any test deficiencies will be examined during the next scheduled inspection.
8.
Power Ascension Test Procram The power ascension testing has been completed through 92.6% of full The reviewed and approved test results for TP 800-40, " Shutdown power.
Outside of the Control Room," were verified by the inspector to have ' O v . ! - - . -. ..
_ _ .. . .. __ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . ~ . . . . - . - , ., .
. -8- . met the acceplance criteria of the test procedure. The test' program will continue at the 100% power level plateau, as required by Technical Specification 3.12, upon approval from Licensing to escalate
power to 2772 MWt. The licensee declared the plant in commercial - operation for power levels up to 92.6% of full power on April 17, 1975.
,
. . O e { .se .
. .l
. ' . . e
% y
- . & G ! . .
ED p r . O . m .
_., _. _ _ _ _ _ _.. _ _,, ,,, _ __ __,. _ - _. _ _.... _ _. - - - _,, _.. _ _, _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _. -. - - _... -
. . . . , . ~
. . . .- . ' _g , ' ' SECTION II
, . DETAILS . ' . l.
Persons Contacted . , a.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District ,. R. Rodriguez, Manager, Nuclear Operations J. Dunn, Supervisory Electrical Engineer J. Wheeler, Electrical Engineer L. Schwieger, Quality Assurance Director J. Jewett, Quality Assurance Engineer , b.
Bechtel G. Jacobson, Electrical Inspector 2.
Installation of Fire Stops on Electrical Cables and Penetration Seals a.
Facility Specifications n (,/ The requirements for the location and installation of fire barriers and compartment boundary seals for safety related cables including the application of fire retardant coatings - for safety related cab!es were described in the FSAR Section 8.2.2.10, '" Evaluation of the Physical Layout of Electrical Distribution System Equipment," and in engineering drawings, and construction specifications. Through discussions with licensee representatives and an examination of the above documents, it was determined that the following requirements " were imposed: (1) Fire stops were installed at all locations where cable trays passed through a compartment boundary as indicated on Bechtel Drawing No. 734, " Conduit and Tray Arrangement Plan."
(2)WhereconduitscarryingClassIinstrumentationcableswere installed parallel to and above power cable trays, the conduits were wrapped with one inch thick insulation thermobestos, for protection.
. . e
q . !
- . - .. . - . . . , . '- s p , -10-V - . (3) Haysite polyester board fire barriers were installed between the crossovers of. cable trays carrying different channels.
(4) Fire barriers were installed where cable trays or conduits penetrated electrical panels.
, (5) Bechtel Drawing fio. E-783, Revision 3, specified that fire barriers were to consist of (1) 1/4 inch polyestfr board
- ETR-FR-C from the Haysite Division of the Synthane-Taylor Corporation; (2) Kaowool - Bulk A high purity from Babcock &
Wilcox; and (3) Flamemastic 71 A - sprayable from Dyna-Therm Corporation.
(6) The Haysite polyester board was sized to maintain a minimum of three inches and a maximum of six inch overlap of the cable tray penetration in the compartment boundary.
(7) The Haysite polyester board was to be cut to fit around the tray and cable with the remaining voids packed with Kaowool.
(8) Flamemastic 71A was applied to fill the seams between the (N Haysite. polyester board, seal the edges of the polyester (d) board to the mounting medium, and cover all Kacwool.and exposed cables to a distance of 12 inches from the fire stop. The Flamemastic 71A coating was a minimum of 1/8 inches thick.
- b.
Fire Barrier Inspections and Tests Inspections of the initial installation of the fire barriers were performed by Bechtel inspectors using Bechtel Quality Control Instruction flo. 206, " Installation Inspection of Cable Trays." The results of these inspections were documented on Construction Inspection Data Reports (CIDR).
Record copies of the following CICR's were examined by the inspector and found to document a completed inspection program of initial fire barrier t installation.
(1) CIDR - Installation of Fire Barriers for Cable and Conduit Penetration of Electrical Panels and Cabinets.
Inspection performed July-August 1374.
(2) CIDR - Installation of Fire Barriers for Wall Penetrations and Tray Separation.
Inspection performed May through October 1974.
o f h V , -
. . -
.. . -
. . . ~ (O) -11 - . , (3) CIDR'- Installation of Fire Barriers for Cable and C'onduit Crossover Separation.
Inspection performed July through October 1974.
Testsoffirebarrieradequacywereperfo[medbyBechteland SMUD persbnnel at the Rancho Seco site on April 4-5, 1974. i % Three separate tests were conducted in a test stand with various Fire types of cables secured in six inch vertical cable trays.
barriers using 1/4 inch Haysite polyester board, Kaowool and Flame Flamemastic 71A were-installed on ghe cable trays.F. were applied from a 10 temperatures of approximately 1900 - ribbon burner at a 30 degree angle from the vertical to the underside of the fire barrier. The flame was applied for 30 The minutes in two tests and for one hour in the last test.
test results concluded that the fire barrier limits the amount of heat transmitted from the fire on one side to cables on the other side and prevents cables which have been ignited from propagating the flames past the fire barrier. The fire barriers remained intact during all tests conducted.
..- . Maintenance and Modification ! c.
The maintenance and modification of fire barriers as a result of (]/ recent cable changes have remained under the supervision of i ' ~ The procedures and specifications including the s Bechtel.
inspection documentation methods were the same as those used during i initial installation. The licensee's response to IE Bulletin No.
j 74-04A indicated that their policies and procedures for maintenance ( and modification control will be reviewed and changes thereto will be implemented to provide SMUD with the equivalent requirements currently incorporated in the Bechtel procedures.
i I Through discussions with licensee and Bechtel representatives and i an examination of applicable documents, 26 fire barriers were i' found to have required rework as a result of cable removal or addition. A review of the records verified that the specifica-tions and inspection requirements had been met for the fire barrier rework performed by Bechtel.
.
d.
Visual Examination of Fire Barriers The inspector toured the facility in company with licensee representatives to visually confirm the status of cable tray l and penetration seal installation. The visual examination of . . e % \\vl ' ,
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _____ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ~ .
. .. -
' .. , - . -12- , . ? fire barriers was performed in accessible areas of the facility . with the exception of the containment building since the reactor was operating at 92% of full power. The following observations were made: . ' (1) Fire barriers recently modified due to cable changes had been repaired to original installation specifications.
(2) Cable tray penetrations through flocr, ceiling and wall l openings in the 480 and 4160 volt switch gear rooms, l A, B, C and D battery rooms, diesel generator rooms, cable l shafts and cable spreading area contained fire barriers.
i (3) Flamemastic 71A was verified to have covered the specified area of the fire barrier. Measurements for a 12 inch application along the cables and cable tray to a thickness of 1/8 inch were made on randomly selected fire barriers I in each compartment.
(4)Crossoverpolyesterfirebarriershadbeeninstalled.
(5) Carbon dioxide fire extinguishing systems were operational.
O The carbon dioxide emitting nozzles were unobstructed and the smoke and heat sensors positioned to detect-cable tray , fires, f e.
IE Bulletin Resoonse On April 23, 1975, the licensee submitted a response to IE Bulletins l Nos. 74-04 and 74-04A. The review of policies and procedures described in the licensee's response have commenced. Monthly reports will be provided to indicate the status of open items described in their response. The review and resultant changes in policies or procedures were scheduled for completion by the licensee on Aug'!st 1,1975.
. e O g . A }}