IR 05000288/1990002
| ML20043H681 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Reed College |
| Issue date: | 06/04/1990 |
| From: | Blume M, Andrea Johnson, Qualls P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043H676 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-288-90-02, 50-288-90-2, NUDOCS 9006260289 | |
| Download: ML20043H681 (5) | |
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a U. S. NVCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION V
Report No:
50-288/90-02 Docket No:
50-288 I
Licensee No:
R-112
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Licensee:
Reed College Portland, Oregon 97202 Facility Name:
ReedReactorFacility(RRF)
Inspection at:
Reed College, Portland, Oregon
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Inspection Conducted
.May 16-7,
Inspector:
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(p//[fO P. Qualls, Rehetor Inspector Ddtet ig ed hh- --- >
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M. B egional Counsel Date 51 ned
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A. Joh on, Enforcement Officer Date Signed Approved by:
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G.P.(YubpPreparednessandRadiological s, Chief Date Signed
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Emergency Protection Branch l
Summary:
Inspection on May'16-17, 1990 (Report No. 50-288/90-02)
L Areas Inspected:
Special announced inspection to review and evaluate
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l allegations concerning the safety of operation of the Reed Reactor Facility
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(RRF).
l Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
No unsafe operations were identified.
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9006260289 900605 PDR ADOCK 05000288 PDC
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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- Dr. J. Powell, President
- Dr. D. Bennett, Vice President-Provost Dr.L.RubyIty, Chairman,RadiationSafetyCommittee Professor of Nuclear Science Dr. D. Garr Dr. D. Dalton, Chairman, Reactor Operator Committee Dr. D. Griffith, Professor Mr. J. Pollock, Acting Director, RRF Mr. P. Terdal, Senior Licensed Operator, RRF
- Mr. H. Moomey, Oregon State Department of Energy
- Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview.
2.
Followup of Allegation RV-90-A-0017 On March 13, 1990 an anonymous allegation was received in Region V asserting that the procedure for calibrating the stack gas monitor at the Reed Reactor Facility (RRF) had been improperly changed.
On March 16 1990,RegionVsentalettertothePresidentofReedCollegerequesting that the college evaluate the matter and inform the NRC of Reed's findings.
On A Region V received a letter from Reed (dated April 16, 1990)pril 19, 1990,which addressed the technical adequacy and nee
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procedural change, but not clearly answering the NRC s question as to whether RRF personnel understood the need to follow properly approved procedures.
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On April 17, Reed notified the NRC that Reed had replaced the RRF Director with the former Associate Director as Acting Director.
On May 16 and 17 a special inspection was conducted to verify that the Reed Reactor Facility had been and is continuing to be operated in compliance with regulatory requirements and in a safe manner.
In the days immediately preceding the inspection, RV received separate letters from the ex-Director, the Acting Director and a Senior Licensed Operator of the RRF. The concerns identified in the correspondence are listed and addressed in the following paragraphs.
While addressing the concerns neither the inspectors nor any of the individuals contacted identifled cases of previous or current plant operations which would jeopardize the health and safety of the public or the safe operation of the reactor.
Moreover, the inspectors identified no violations of regulatory requirements.
l A.
Allegation RV-90-A-0017, concerning an alleged improper change of procedures, was not substantiated.
The inspectors reviewed the
change to SOP 31, Gas Stack Monitor, for compliance with NRC regulatory requirements.
The procedural change was necessary due to system improvements which the licensee completed on the stack gas
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monitor suction piping.
The improvements resulted in the stack gas monitor high alarm being in continuous alarm at 100% power operation.
The procedure was char.ged by the ex-Director to
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appropriately reset the high alarm setpoint.
The revised procedure did not change the way in which the licensee computed its annual release of Argon-41.
Although the change to 50P31 did not receive Radiation Safety Committee (RSC) or Recctor Operations Committee (ROC) approval prior to implementation, the procedure was approved by the facility director.
Prior approval by the Committees was neither required by the licensee's administrative procedures nor by
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the facility technical specifications.
While Technical i
Specification 1.2. requires prior Committee approval for changes in
" Safety Standards " the term is not defined, either formally or i
informally.
Thelicenseestatedthatitwoulddefinethetermin the administrative procedures for future reference.
While the change to the )rocedure was not improper, one potential
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issue was identified.
T1e stack gas monitor is now reportedly measuring gases released by RRF more accurately than it did prior to
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the above-referenced system improvement.
Consequently, the licensee now plans to use the actual gas measurements as the basis for the 10 CFR 20.106 effluent release calculation for Argon 41.
The inspectors informed the licensee that prior to including dispersion of the gas in the calculation, a license amendment in accordance I
with 10 CFR 20.106 may be required, y
This item is' considered closed, i
B.
In an April 27, 1990 letter to the Region V Regional Administrator, the ex-Director questioned the competency of the RRF Acting Director.
However, when questioned by the inspectors, the ex-Director said that the Acting Director was competent to operate the RRF.
The inspectors compared the qualifications of the Acting Director to
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the criteria specified in section 4.2 of ANSI standard 15.4, t
Standard for Selection and Training of Personnel for Research Reactors, and found that the Acting Director satisfied the i
qualification guidelines listed in the standard, i
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In his letter of April 16, 1990 to the ex-Director the Provost had
notedhisunspecifiedsafetyconcernsassociatedwIththe
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ex-Director's management of the RRF.
When questioned by the inspectors about these concerns, the Provost explained that conflicts between the ex-Director and his Associate Director, between the ex-Director and student operators and between the ex-Directorandtheoversightcommittees,couldhaveledeventually to unsafe conditions at the facility, but that the situation had i
never deteriorated to the extent that it threatened the safe
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operation of the facility.
No evidence of unsafe activities was Director to Acting Director, the Provost'ppointment of the Associate identified by the inspectors.
With the a i
s concerns have been i
alleviated.
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I D.
In an April 27, 1990 letter to the NRC the ex-Director had expressed concern about the Acting Dire,ctor's failure to follow procedures in the past.
The Acting Director responded in a letter to the NRC dated May 10, 1900, noting that the procedures had been clarified and guidance given to operating personnel regarding the importance of-complying with procedures.
According to the Acting Director, all cases identified by the ex-Director involved deviations from licensee administrative procedures, and did not violate regulatory requirements.
The inspectors questioned personnel at the facility about the prevailing attitude toward procedural compliance, and about their familiarity with the content of their procedures.
The inspectors concluded that licensee staff appeared to be safety-conscious,
committed to compliance with procedures, and familiar with those procedures.
E.
Licensee managers, including the ex-Director, were questioned concerning the extent of the ex-Director's current involvement in the operation and management of RRF.
The inspectors were informed that the ex-Director had no current RRF responsibilities.
F.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's progress in correcting the l
excessive fluctuations in the linear power circuit output discussed
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in IR 50-288/89-01.
The licensee changed the direction of the pump discharge from the primary cooling water system such that the cooling water is now directed parallel to the side of the reactor pool rather.than into the core significantly reducing the fluctuationsobservedonthelInearpoweroutput.
i During the interviews, impression that it was not necessary forit was a G.
received an erroneous
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research reactors to strictly comply with NRC regulations and
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license requirements.
The inspectors emphasized to licensee personnel that deviations from specific NRC recuirements are i
permissible only by exemption or waiver grantec in accordance with
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NRC regulations.
3.
Inspection 89-01 Corrections
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In October 1989, the Acting Director issued to other licensee personnel a critique of NRC inspection report 50-288/89-01, identifying possible errors in the report.
After discussing the critique with the Acting Director, the inspectors concluded that the report contained the following errors:
a.
In paragraph 2.a., a professor at Pacific University was said to be an SRO, when in fact she was an R0.
b.
In paragraph 2.E, the inspector stated, apparently based on oral information, that a computer arogram had been reviewed by the R00.
In fact, the )rogram had not seen, and is not required to be, reviewed by tie RO __ _
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c.
In paragraph 2.g, discussing Health Physics-Book 2, the inspector lists several sample results as being from the January 10, 1989 sam)1e.
However, the January 10 sample had not been analyzed, and suc1 analysis is not required.
The numbers obtained were from a 3revious sample, whose data are attached to the facing page in the
)ook.
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In paragraph 2.h, the inspector stated that all procedures had been submitted to the ROC prior to implementation.
In fact, not all had been submitted to the R00.
Instead some had been submitted to the RSC prior to implementation.
TechnicalSpecificationsand administrative procedures do not specifically require that all procedures be reviewed or approved prior to implementation, e.
Section 2.1 should have been labelled " Training" rather than
"Requalification Training," and the first sentence of that section should state that "The licensee conducts an unlicensed operator training program...."
f, Paragraph 3.6 states that TLD's were on the " roof of the facility."
In fact, the licensee's data report continues to label these as being on the facility roof, where they were at one time installed.
However, the licensee had moved these such that they were no longer on the roof but were inside the facility to protect against vandalism.
Use of these badges is not an NRC requirement, but is of course a good practice, g.
Paragraph 4 imalies that RRF 3ersonnel observed a Troian emergency drill at "the lospital".
Alt 1oughthiso)tionisavailabletoRRF personnol, none had actually observed suc1 a drill at a hotpital.
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The errors in the report were minor and did not affect the conclusions therein.
4.
Exit Meetina On May 17, 1990, an exit meeting was held with the President and Provost of the licensee.
The results of this inspection were discussed at that-time.
The inspectors informed the licensee representatives that no violations of NRC requirements were identified and that the inspectors did not identify any unsafe conditions or activities at the facility.
In addition, the inspectors stated that.none of the individuals contacted reported that they were aware of any unsafe conditions or activities at the facility, f
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