IR 05000073/1979001
| ML19263E904 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vallecitos Nuclear Center |
| Issue date: | 05/16/1979 |
| From: | Canter H, Faulkenberry B, Miller L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19263E901 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-073-79-01, 50-73-79-1, NUDOCS 7906250442 | |
| Download: ML19263E904 (7) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report No.
50-73/79-01 50-73 R-33 Docket No.
ttcen,, go, Safeguards croup General Electric Compar.y Licensee:
Vallecitos Nuclear Center Pleasanton, California 94566 Facility Name:
Nuclear Test Reactor (NTR)
Inspection at:,_Vallecitos Nuclear Center Inspection conducted:
March 27-29,1979 Inspectors:
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s/fr./79 fp H. L. Canter, Reactor I specfyb
"ste Signed
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- bn.m Shc /79 v L. F. MIfler, Reactor In pectTr Date Signed Date Signed Approved By:
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~t B. F. Faulkenberry, Chief, Reac r Projects Section 2 Date Signed Reactor Operations and Ny ear upport Branch Surrma ry :
Inspection on March 27-29,1979 (Report No. 50-73/79-01)
A_reas Inspected: A routine, unannounced inspection of facility uperation, maintenance and surveillance for the previous year's activities; operator requalification program; procedures, logs and records; independent review and audit of facility activities by the Nuclear Safety Group; licensee event reports; and experiment program administration.
The inspection involved 44 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results: No items ol noncompliance or deviations were identified.
RV Form 719 p)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- P. Ketchel, Manager, GETR Operations
- C. Leighty, Manager, flTR
- D. Smith, Reactor Analyst
- E. Strain, fluclear Safety Engineer The inspectors talked with several other licensee employees in-cluding reactor operators.
- Dcnotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Facility Operation and Tour _
The inspectors conducted a tour of the control room, the north and south exposure rooms, and the reactor cell.
During the tour the inspectors observed:
a.
The control room operator was knowledgeable of reactor and experimental operating conditions, b.
Radiation controls appeared to be properly established.
c.
Auxiliary equipment and systems appeared to be operating normally.
d.
Experiments were being conducted utilizing approved authort-zations which were consistent with technical specification limi tations.
e.
The reactor room area radiation monitor was not permanently mounted in the reactor room.
Instead, the monitor was located on the floor, shielded by portable lead bricks.
In response to the inspector's concern that this arrangement might result in unreliable indications from the monitor, the licensee agreed to consider mounting the detector in a fixed location in the room, tio items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Organization, Logs and Records The inspectors determined that the basic organizational structure for the administration of flTR operations remained unchanged since the last inspection.
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The following records of maintenance and operation of the NTR facility for the period April,1978 through March,1979 were examined and found to document that those activities were performed consistent with the conditions of the facility license.
a.
fiTR Console Log b.
Shift Supervisor's Log c.
ORF Log d.
P.M. Log e.
Reactor Flow Strip Chart tio items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Requalification Training The inspector reviewed the records of requalification training for 1978, and interviewed licensee personnel regarding the program.
Records which were examined included the weekly and annual requalifi-cation examinations, documentation of control rod manipulations, and personnel evaluations.
The inspector noted several instances in which the implemented program did not follow program procedures.
These included:
no lectures, per se, on Administrative Procedures; annual requalifi-cation examinatTons not given in the two-hour time limit; and performance evaluations of operators maintained in separate files from other requalification training records.
The licensee stated that the requalification program procedures were being rewritten and the new procedures will accurately reflect the manner in which the program will be implemented.
The records for control rod manipulations were conmingled with operating information in the console logs. The licensee stated that a system had been developed to document each operator's com-pletion of the required number of control rod manipulations, and that the use of this system will be initiated within the near future.
No 'iems of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Review and Audits The inspector examined the review and audit records accumulated since April 1978 of independent reviews of facility activities.
The audit functions required by the technical specifications were verified to have been implemented by personnel from fluclear Safety and by the Vallecitos Technological Safety Council.
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e The question of appropriate charters for the flSC and VTSC was discussed. The licensee stated that the fluclear Safety Technology group may review the requirements for charters to determine if changes are necessary.
No icems of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Procedures The procedures for facility operations addressing the activities described in Technical Specification 9.3 were examined by the inspector.
Changes to procedures as prescribed in Operational Change Notices (OCil's) during August,1978 - February,1979 were reviewed. These changes were in accordance with the technical specification requirements, and with the Standard Operating Pro-cedure (50P) 9.25, " Operations Change Notices and SOP Review." The procedures listed below were also reviewed for technical adequacy, clear delineation of responsibility, conformance to the technical specifications, operational practicality, correct sequence of review and approval, and availabil.ty to the operator of the latest revision.
9.1 Reactor Log Books 9.2 Control Roo Entry 9.3 Required Personnel Coverage of Reactor Facility 6.2 Start-up Summary 3.2 Safety Rods It was observed by the inspectcr that during a reactor start-up the operator attempted to withdraw twe safety rods simultaneously by pushing the "WITliDRAW" buttons for two safety rods.
Such a simulta-neous withdrawal, if it occurred, would violate Technical Specification 5.2.3 which states, "No more than one safety rod shall be moved out at a time." Also, NTR's S0P 6.2, Paragraph 6.2.3.7 requires that the operator " withdraw all four safety rods sequectially by depressing push button switches," and S0P 3.2, Paragraph 3.2.21.f notes that
" Safety rods may be withdrawn one at a time...." Discussions of this start-up with f cility personnel revealed that operators routinely rely on a control system interlock, the " drive out" limit microswitch, to prevent their action of simultaneously pushing two safety rod " WITHDRAW" pushbuttons from allowing two safety rods to be withdrawn simultaneously. The inspector reminded the licensee that this reliance on a control interlock to protect the reactor from the operator was a poor practice. The licensee stated that each licensed operator would be reminded of the necessity to not rely on control interlocks to protect against an operator's mistakes.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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7.
Surveillance Periodic control rod measurements, instrument calibrations, re-activity measurements, and safety system tests have been performed by the licensee.
A review of the facility records for the past year verified that the required calibration and tests had been performed consistent with technical specification requirements.
The following specific calibration / surveillance requirements were examined:
a.
Log fi scram b.
Pico high flux scram c.
High coolant temperature scram d.
Safety rod scram times No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Experiments The experimental prograr was essentially unmodified since the previous inspection.
u,>eriments pertaining to neutron radiography, power plant detector calibrations, reactivity testing, sample irradiations, and '"Nclepore" irradiations were performed.
More detailed procedures for overall type approval of experiments were being prepared.
The inspector examined the records of experiments conducted during July-September,1978 to verify that they had been performed in accordance with the requirements of the licensee's administrative procedures, experiment type approvals and the technical specifications.
It was noted that the licensee had reported in its annual report that "No types of experiments were performed which are different from those.... of the Summary Safeguards Report... APED-4444-A,"
whereas, in fact, numerous neutron detector type experiments were performed in 1974-1978 even though this type of experiment is not described in APED-4444-A.
The licensee stated that this error in their report will be corrected for future reports. The inspector stressed the importance of factual submissions to the NRC and the public.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Nonroutine Reports Selected records and logs were examined to verify that events were properly reported and reviewed, and that corrective action was timely and appropriate. Two events have been determined to be reportable to the Commission since April,1978.
The first event occurred on September 11, 1978 when it was discovered that the 2214 273
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Log N was reading low by one decade and would not have functioned as a high power scram as designed.
However, during this time, there were three picoammetcr channels operating which also provided high power scram signals to the protection system.
The inspector verified the circumstances associated with the event and the described corrective action by review of records and by discussion with licensee representatives.
The second event which was reported to the flRC since April,1978 occurred on February 20, 1979. This event dealt with air entering the primary coolant flow differential pressure transmitter which caused high flow indications on the control room recorder (s).
The high flow indications could have resulted in the low flow scram signal occurring at a lower flow than required by the technical specifications. The inspector verified that the corrective actions described in the event report have been accomplished.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Independent Inspection Effort The inspector noticed that the latest change (12-14-78) to the NTR technical specifications was not transcribed accurately.
The licensee immediately conducted a review of license and technical specification amendments and found two more transcription errors.
The errors were corrected prior to the conclusion of this inspection.
A special effort to review future changes for accuracy will be instituted by the licensee.
A console log examination indicated a number of pico channel malfunctions over the last year.
The three pico channels provide a high power scram and a period trip safety function.
The period trip was not affected by the malfunctions. Normally, the pico flux trips occur in a 2-out-of-3 coincidence. When one channel malfunc-tions, the logic shifts to 1-out-of-2 which is a more conservative condition.
During the pico malfunction events, not only had the logic shifted to a more conservative condition, but the Log N high flux trip was operative, thereby providing a redundant safety function. The pico malfunctions seem to occur low in the source range which prevent the reactor from being started up.
The licensee's picos are not manufactured anymore and spare parts are hard to come by. The licensee stated that they will actively pursue purchasing spare picos so as to have operable spares on board in an attempt to decrease pico malfunctions.
(79-01-01)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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11.
Exit Interview A joint GETR/NTR exit interview was held at the conclusion of these inspections on March 29, 1979. The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Faragraph 1) and summarized the scope and findings of GETR inspection 50-70/79-01 and NTR inspection 50-73/79-01.
A licensee representative committed by telephone on April 3,1979 that by the end of April,1979, a determination on pursuing a design change to the pico system will be completed.
Until that time, the licensee will pursue the purchase of spare pico systems from a similar shutdown reactor, and will investigate the spare p rts acquisition for the current picos.
(See Paragraph 10, 79-01-01)
No items of noncompliant ' or deviations were identified.
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