IR 05000062/1993006
| ML20059G326 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | University of Virginia |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1994 |
| From: | Barr K, Kreh J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059G293 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-62-93-06, 50-62-93-6, NUDOCS 9401240102 | |
| Download: ML20059G326 (13) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 M ARIETTA STREET. N.W., SUITE 2900
j ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199 o
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JE 121994 Report No.:
50-62/93-06 Licensee: University of Virginia Charlottesville, VA 22901 Docket No.:
50-62 License No.:
R-66-
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Facility Name:
University of Virginia Reactor Facility Inspection Conlucted:
December 15 17,c1993
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Inspector:
f7t M
/2 d(n, /M r
J. /. Kreh, Radiation Specialist Date Signed Accompanying Person
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G. W. Salyers, NRC Region II e
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Approved by:
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K.
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Barr, Chief'
[ Tate / Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety
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and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
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This routine, announced inspection was conducted to determine whether the licensee's emergency preparedness program was maintained in a state of
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operational readiness since the last inspection (November 1992), and to evaluate the annual emergency response exercise staged on December 16, 1993 from 6:00 a.m. to 9:10 a.m.
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Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. The licensee's emergency preparedness program appeared to have been maintained in y
an adequate state of operational readiness since the last inspection. The emergency response organization performed very capably during the exercise.
The inspection disclosed that the licensee had not yet revised the Emergency Plan and associated implementing procedures to address the concerns identified by the December 1992 Reactor Safety Committee audit (see Paragraph 4).
9401240102 40112 PDR ADOCK 05000062 j
G 9 PDR,
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l REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Licensee Employees Contacted -
- P. Benneche, Reactor Services Supervisor
- J. Farrar, Reactor Administrator
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- R. Flack, Chairman, Department of Mechanical, Aerospace, and Nuclear Engineering
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- D. Krause, Senior Reactor Operator (Emergency Planning Coordinator)
R. Hulder, Director, Reactor Facility
- R. Piccolo, Radiation Safety Officer,- Office of Environmental Health and Safety
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included reactor operators, radiation specialists, University police, and
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administrative personnel.
- Attended exit interview on December 17, 1993 An index of abbreviations used throughout this report will be found in l
the last paragraph.
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2.
Emergency Response Drill (82745)
Section 10.2 of the licensee's Emergency Plan required that-periodic drills and exercises be conducted to test the adequacy of timing.and
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content of implementing procedures and methods, to test emergency equipment, and to ensure that emergency personnel are familiar with-
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their duties.
Further, the Emergency Plan required that an onsite-emergency drill.be conducted annually, and that such drills at least
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biennially.contain provisions for coordination with local offsite emergency organizations for testing communications and notification-
procedures.
Since the referenced biennial requirements were satisfied
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by the November 1992 drill (see NRC Inspection Report No. 50-62/92-03),
I this year's drill was nominally-a " licensee only" function.
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The licensee submitted information on the scope, objectives, and
.i scenario'(in the form of Revision 0 of the attachment) to the NRC
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several weeks before the drill. This information was reviewed by the.
inspector and discussed with a licensee representative prior to the inspection.
On the day before the drill, the inspector " walked through"-
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the scenario with the licensee's lead drill controller and reviewed the controller messages to be provided to the players. This process did_ not identify any significant problems or inconsistencies in the licensee's-drill preparation efforts, although it did prompt the licensee to generate some minor adjustments to the scenario.
The remainder of this paragraph makes references to conditions involving jeopardy or threat to the Reactor Facility as well as personnel casualties. These conditions were postulated to have occurred for purposes of the annual drill in order to effect activation of the licensee's ERO. All such conditions referenced herein were simulated,
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although the licensee's responses actually occurred (to the extent practicable) and were evaluated by NRC and licensee observers.
t On December 16, 1993, the licensee staged the annual emergency drill,
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which included the participation of local response organizations (to the
extent required by conditions).
For this drili, outside participating
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organizations were the University police force 'and the Charlotte.sville-i Albemarle Rescue Squad.
The drill was designed in part to test the
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ability to marshal the ERO during off-hours, with the starting time held confidential from the players. The scenario included forced entry into-
the Reactor Facility by a lone saboteur, incidental injury and contamination of a student who surprised the perpetrator, and a subsequent telephoned bomb threat to the Reactor Facility. The attachment to this report provides the licensee's detailed advance description of the drill scope, objectives, and scenario.
The drill began when a University police officer on his normal off-hour
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rounds (apparently with no prior knowledge that he would be involved in
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a drill) discovered tampering at a side door of the Reactor. Facility.
This door, locally alarmed and designated as an " emergency exit only,"
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Immediately upon this
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discovery, a' controller emerged from the building to advise'the officer i
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that a drill was in progress. The officer quickly called for backup assistance, properly assuming that the physical evidence (as furnished by the scenario) suggested a perpetrator was still inside the facility.
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This call al.so initiated the process of notifying the Reactor Facility i
staff, which was achieved-by 6:11 a.m. (based on overheard police radio traffic). The inspector observed that by 6:30 a.m. the Facility
Director (now serving as ED) and two of his staff plus five University police officers had arrived at the scene.
Lengthy discussions ensued as
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to how the situation should be handled. The police realistically and appropriately urged a very cautious approach to entry and search of the facility because of concerns about personnel safety. At about 6:55 a.m., the ED went to the designated alternate location for the ESC i
(at the OEHS, approximately 75 meters from the. Reactor Facility) with a
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University police official to establish a base of operations.
The first entry into the Reactor Facility was made at 7:01 a.m. by a mcmber of the staff accompanied by three officers. However, at about
the same time, the telephoned bomb threat was received by the University police, and the search party was instructed over police radio at 7:05 a.m. to evacuate the facility immediately. The bomb threat included the information that the perpetrator had been forced to render i
unconscious the student who was unexpectedly present in the building.
Further entries into the Reactor Facility were made primarily to locate-i the injured individual; identifying the location of the bomb during the search for the missing individual would have been considered a " bonus."
As it turned out, the injured student was not found until about 8:30 a.m. during the fourth entry into the facility. The searchers were
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hampered by the insistence of the police officials that no installed
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lights were to be energized (only flashlights were allowed) and no radio transmissions were to be made from inside the facility. These i
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restrictions, which were realistically and consistently enforced, were due to the likely presence of a bomb (based on the credible threat that had been received) and the resultant risk of accidental detonation.
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The inspectors observed most aspects of the drill, which encompassed various activities such as (a) management of the res'ponse/ mitigation efforts by the ED and his staff at the alternate ESC, including offsite notifications, (b) handling and treatment of the contaminated injured i
individual, including health physics practices, (c) preparations for i
radiological monitoring in the event of bomb detonation, and (d) communications among onsite response personnel.
The following emergency classifications and associated notifications were made during the course of the drill:
A NOUE was declared at 6:45 a.m. by the ED based on the EAL,
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" Threats or breaches of security." The State was notified at 7:05 a.m. (The Alert declaration occurred before the NRC could be notified of the NOVE.)
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An Alert was declared at 7:15 a.m. based on the EAL providing for
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a discretionary declaration if an event meets the definition of an Alert (as found in Section 4.1 of the Emergency Plan) but does not match any of the specific EAls.
The State was notified-of the
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Alert declaration at 7:30 a.m. and the NRC at 7:20 a.m.
The emergency declarations and associated notifications / updates during the drill were made in a timely manner and were consistent with the requirements of the licensee's EPIPs.
In accordance with normal
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practice, updates to the NRC Operations Center (following the initial NRC notification at 7:20 a.m.) were simulated.
The " flow" of the scenario was somewhat different from what was expected by the licensee (see attachment).
For example, the ESC was not
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established on an interim basis at its primary location. in the Reactor Facility because of the cautious approach to reentering the facility, as discussed above. Also, because no one except the four-person search party and the injured student was believed to be.in the building at the time of the bomb threat, the normal " building evacuation" did not occur, since sounding of the evacuation alarm and conducting an accountability of personnel did not appear necessary. These and other departures from the expected progression of the scenario events did not diminish the training benefit derived from participation in this challenging drill by licensee personnel and local support organizations.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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3.
Exercise Critique (82745)
As required by the Emergency Plan, the licensee conducted a cri.tique during which verbal comments from controllers, evaluators, observers, and players were received. The inspectors attended the critique and
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determined it to be a fully candid and thorough self-assessment.
Several minor response problems and issues were identified and will be tracked by the licensee to ensure that suitable corrective actions are considered and implemented, if necessary. These included-(a) the ED's need for an access code to place long-distance calls from the OEHS (b) providing for ready availability of keys to the OEHS, (c) consideration of the OEHS as the primary ESC location, and (d) developing a p'rotocol for determining in a particular case whether a contaminated injured individual's injuries should take precedence over contamination control (i.e., criteria for determining whether injuries
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are life-threatening).
Future NRC inspections will review the licensee's written critique and the adequacy of those corrective actions which were identified for implementation.
4.
Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures (82745)
The Emergency Plan and EPIPs were reviewed to assess changes that were made since the last inspection (November 1992) and to determine what impact the changes may have had on the overall state of emergency
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preparedness at the facility.
The only changes made to the Plan and EPIPs since the last inspection were identified as Revision 15, dated May 10, 1993, and sent to the NRC on May 12, 1993. This package of changes primarily concerned the deletion of EPIP-15 and EPIP-17 (which were_ basically emergency
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equipment inventories) and incorporation of their content into an Attachment to the Plan Appendix.
Updates of the rosters of ER0-personnel and their telephone numbers were also issued with this revision package.
The inspector's selective, preliminary review did not identify any decrease in the effectiveness of the Emergency-Plan as a result of the changes made in Revision 15.
The conclusions from the
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NRC's formal review of Revision 15 changes will be the subjcct of-separate correspondence.
Section 10.4 of the Emergency Plan stated that "the Emergency Plan and the Appendix will be reviewed and, if necessary,' updated by the Reactor Safety Committee every two years." This biennial review, which was due in calendar year 1992, was not yet completed at the time of the November 1992 inspection. The inspector reviewed the report, dated December 23, 1992, which documented the results of the RSC audit.
The audit found that the Plan " badly needs to be updated and revised," and that the EPIPs need to be simplified and streamlined. As of the date of the inspection, the licensee had generated only preliminary efforts to address this finding.
The completion of appropriate corrective actions for the referenced RSC audit concerns will be tracked as an IFI.
IFI 50-62/93-06-01:
Revising the Emergency Plan and EPIPs to appropriately address the findings of the 1992 RSC audit.
In accordance with Section 10.4(1)(c) of the Plan, the licensee maintained a file of current LOAs (updated biennially) with offsite support organizations. The inspector's review of this file disclosed
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t that all LOAs requiring updating were renewed during 1992 -(except for an agreement with Virginia Electric and Power Company for whole-body counting services, dated March 9, 1993).
LOAs with the Charlottesville Fire Department and the Charlottesville Police Department are no longer being renewed because of the statutory responsibility of those-
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organizations to respond to an emergency at the Reactor Facility if requested.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Facilities, Equipment, Instrumentation, and Supplies (82745)
Section 8.0 of the Emergency Plan described the various facilities,
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equipment, and instrumentation available for use in responding to an
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emergency condition. Attachment I to the Plan Appendix provided an
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" Emergency Supplies Inventory."
l Review of licensee documentation for 'the period November 1992 to
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November 1993 disclosed that the licensee was mair,taining emergency supplies and equipment in-accordance with surveillance requirements specified in the Plan. The inspector's examination of the two
designated emergency lockers disclosed that their contents were-
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consistent with the referenced Plan inventory, and that the calibrations of dosimeters and radiological-survey instruments were current.
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Functional and battery checks of survey instruments produced satisfactory results.
The inspector discovered that the dosimeter
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charger in the main-floor locker was nonfunctional-(apparently because.
of a leaking battery), and that each of the lockers contained an antiseptic solution in a visibly deteriorated condition. A licensee representative promptly corrected these deficiencies, and the inspector verified the operability of the dosimeter charger following battery repl acement.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Training (82745)
Section 10.1 of the Emergency Plan stated that the " training program for Facility personnel will include at least two~ classroom training sessions and practical drills yearly..."
The inspector reviewed the records of emergency response training for
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the nine individuals currently listed as facility personnel. These training records indicated that the referenced Plan requirements for
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training in this area had been satisfactorily met for calendar year 1993.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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-a.
(Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-62/92-03-01:
Lack of adequate medical attention to injured / contaminated victim.
During the December 16 drill, adequate medical attention was
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provided to the victim after he was discovered. However, the licensee's critique emphasized that additional planning coordination with the Rescue Squad and Fire Department was still needed to ensure expeditious transport of an injured / contaminated individual to a medical facility.
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(Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-62/92-03-02:
Inadequate demonstration of radiological monitoring and control capabilities.
The licensee assembled radiological control equipment and supplies into " grab bags" to expedite the response to an incident.
Proper instrumentation was used during the December 16 drill to perform contamination surveys of the victim.
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(Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-62/92-03-03:
Lack of command and control by the Emergency Director.
Command and control by the Emergency Director during the December 16 drill was determined by the inspector to be exemplary.
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(Closed) IFI 50-62/92-03-04:
Ensuring adequacy of information provided during the initial request for. offsite support.
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The licensee provided staff training in offsite communications, and obtained a cellular phone which was dedicated to emergency response. Also acquired was a portable transceiver which used the same frequency as the Charlottesville Fire Department, e.
(Closed) IFI 50-62/92-03-05:
Ensuring alternative lighting in the event of a loss of power.
The licensee installed two new emergency lighting units in the ESC (both were found to be operable when tested by the inspector) and an uninterruptible power supply for the PA and building evacuation alarm systems. The inspector reviewed documentation of a semiannual facility evacuation drill conducted on May 28, 1993,
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during which the evacuation alarm was satisfactorily operated for seven minutes using the backup power supply.
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8.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on December 17, 1993
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with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection results.
The licensee was informed that five findings from the November 1992 inspection were considered closed, as delineated in Paragraph 7.
Proprietary
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information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee. The item listed below was identified
through NRC management review of the inspection findings; the categorization of this item as an IFI was conveyed to the licensee during a telephonic discussion on January 12,-1994 between the inspector and the Emergency Planning Coordinator.
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Item Number Cateaorv Description, and Reference 50-62/93-06-01 IFI - Revising the Emergency Plan and EPIPs to appropriately address the' findings of the 1992 RSC audit (Paragraph 4).
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Index of Abbreviations Used in This Report EAL Emergency Action Level ED Emergency Director EPIP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure ER0 Emergency Response Organization ESC Emergency Support Center IFI Inspection Follow-up Item LOA Letter of Agreement NOVE Notification of Unusual Event
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OEHS Office of Environmental Health and Safety
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RSC Reactor Safety Committee
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Attachment (5 pages):
Licensee's Presentation of Drill Scope, Objectives, and Scenario
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SCH00L OF ENGINEERING dB
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& APPUED SCIENCE NUCLEAR RE4CTOR FACILITY Department of Mechanical,
' Aerospace & Nuclear Engineering University of Virginia '
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Charlottesville, VA 22903-2442
804-982-5440 ' FAX: 804-982-5473
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University of Virginia-
Nuclear Reactor Facility 1993 Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario for i
December 16,1993 lu only Not f
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' tribution j
Revision 2: 15 December,1993
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i University of Virginia Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenarioi
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Nuclear Reactor Facility for 16 December 1993 Scope and Objectives The 1993 Emergency Drill for the University of Virginia Nuclear Reactor Facility is
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scheduled for 16 December, starting at approximately 0600 and running 2 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
The scenario encompasses the facility response to a suspected security breach and a subsequent bomb threat. The immediate situation is to be an unsecured door with evidence of tampering. Depending on the Facility response, the follow-up bomb threat will be made to maintain scenario continuity. The outside agencies expected to be involved will be the local 911/EOC, rescue squad (limited), University Police, and the fire department (limited).
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The contaminated-injured person will have minor contamination and injuries that will be debilitating but not life threatening. The injury is expected to occur prior to the initial building evacuation and require search and treatment while evacuation and personnel
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accountability procedures are in progress. The scenario will encompass treatment up to
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placement of the contaminated-injured person into the rescue squad vehicle.
The drill will terminate after finding the bomb and upon completion of the request for assistance from the bomb disposal unit, by the University Police Department.
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radiological monitoring, and 2.
notification of the inhabited building surrounding the facility.
If this happens the request will be noted and aid from the state will be simulated.
All communications, requests for assistance, notifications etc. will be made (ie. no simulations).
The Objectives of this drill are:
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To test the emergency assessment, job familiarity, and decision making of facility personnel.
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To test the UVA Nuclear Reactor Facility communications system, and information transmitting ability of personnel.
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To test the contamination control abilities of the staff.
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To test the adequacy of timing and content of the implementing procedures and methods, and emergency equipment.
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' 4 University'of Virginia Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario.
Nuclear Reactor Facility for 16 December 1993 Expected Actions Scenario ESC local T - 90 minutes None None Early Dursday morning, Facility is vacant. Break-in occurs at Mezzanine level entrance Perpetrator tapes door latch to prevent locking, places bomb in facility (general access area)
T - 50 None None Grad student arrives to i
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work on experiment, i
T - 40 None None Perpetrator is surprised by student and student is knockedeut.
T - 30 None None Perpetrator places student out of sight in lab cabinet knocking over a beaker of Sr-90 solution causing the student to be placed in the spill. He perpetrator then leaves the building.
T =: 0 (start actual drill)
None Police building check finds door Contaminated student unlocked:
w/ concussion still 1. calls dispatcher; unconscious and in 2. remains at door.
cabinet. Door still Dispatcher calls facility unlocked & bomb has representative to come in and been placed.
investigate.
T + 20 None Facility rep arrives:
Contaminated student 1. confers with police w/ concussion still officer; unconscious and in 2. starts building cabinet. Door still inspection for unlocked & bomb has unauthorized personnel.
been placed.
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University of Virginia Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario Nuclear Reactor Facility for 16 December 1993
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Expected Actions Scenario ESC Local T + 60 As staff arrive establish ESC with Upon finding contaminated injured Building search in most senior staff member available.
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progress.
1. call for help - PA - have Re-announce call for help.
Police Officer call 2 other staff members dispatcher to call 911 and arrive to start daily Start calling for assistance from Facility Emergency Call
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checklist.
Emergency Call list.
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2. begin treating victim, Determine victims condition -
determine condition, and l
whether contaminated.
l Follow-up call to 911
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When established, inform ESC of -
Enter emergency plan (Unusual
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Event) when determination of 1. contamination control contamination is made:
measures (EPIP's 6,7,8,1,2,13,12,10,9)
2. progress of first aid measures Assign other personnel to continue with building inspection.
Stabilize victim Decontaminate as possible l
T + 70 Confirm entry into Emergency Plan Stop building search and evacuate.
l Ikimb threat called in to (Unusual Event - EPIP's Reactor Facility 1,2,11,14,18,).
Move victim to assembly area -
maintaining contamination control.
Initiate building evacuation.
l Pass bomb threat info on to Police.
l Re. locate ESC to remote center at l
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l Coordinate with University Police
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and assign personnel for building l
search.
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University of Virginia Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario Nuclear Reactor Facility for 16 December 1993 Expected Actions Scenario ESC Local T + 70 (cont.)
When bomb found:
Upon finding the bomb:
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1. Police request assistance 1. notify ESC; of bomb disposal unit.
2. note size, type, and 2. Upgrade Emergency location;.
Class to Site Area when 3. evacuate building;
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bomb found (possibly).
4. no attempt to remove 3. Request State bomb should be made.
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Emergency Services come to scene and stand-by in
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case of explosion.
T + 180 Re-entry / recovery paperwork
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Drill Terminated when:
1. Victim removed.
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2. Bomb located - Disposal Unit summoned.
i 3. ECS Relocation i
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Contamination Specifications:
Victim is contaminated about the feet and legs from a radioactive liquid spill.
Isotope Sr-90,10 microcuries in about 100 ml water.
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