IR 05000057/1993001
| ML20035H762 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | University of Buffalo |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1993 |
| From: | Bores R, Dragoun T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035H759 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-057-93-01, 50-57-93-1, NUDOCS 9305070016 | |
| Download: ML20035H762 (10) | |
Text
i U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
,
'
Report No.: 50-57/93-01 Docket No.: 50-57 License No.: R-77 d
Licensee:
State University of New York at Buffalo
,
Rotary Road. South Campus Buffalo. New York
'
Facility Name:
Buffalo Materials Research Center Inspection At:
Byffalo. New York Inspection Conducted:
March 3-5.17. and April 2.1993 Inspector:
-
erywa
%
/9
?
Thomas Dragoun, Projec/ Scientist, Effluents date t
Radiation Protection Section (ERPS), Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch (FRSSB)
f/23/98 Approved By:
v Robert f/ Bores, Chief, ERPS, FRSSB, date Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Areas Reviewed: Implementation of the Emergency Plan, conduct of the annual emergency drills, and reactor operator training.
Results: Emergency preparedness at the facility was determined to be adequate. As the result of potential programmatic issues identified by the inspector, a supplemental exit meeting was held between licensee and NRC managers on March 17, 1993. The information provided at the supplemental exit meeting resulted in a better understanding about the oversight of reactor operations provided by the Nuclear Safety Committee, the relationship between the University and the Buffalo Materials Research, Inc. (the licensee's contractor responsible for the day-to-day operation of the reactor), the current decreased level of 9305070016 930428 PDR ADOCK 05000057
.
-
-
- - -
- -
.. ~ -.
_
.. -
.
-
--
-
.
..-
.
- _
_ -. _ _ _ _.
l i
,
staffing at the reactor and the status of funding. Assurances were provided by licensee
'
management that the University will soon address the staffing and funding issues. Neither of j
the latter issues was considered by the NRC to have a current effect on the safety of operations.
l During much of the period that the reactor was shut down for repairs to the reactor tank liner, the licensee failed to conduct certain required annual emergency drills and failed to.
conduct specified annual reviews of the Emergency Plan and the Emergency Procedums.
.
These were identified as violations.
.
t
&
t
i i
.
l l
l l
l i
l
.
-
i
l r
DETAILS i
'
1.0 Persons Contacted 1.1 Licensee Personnel M. Adams, BMRC Operations Manager
- A. Dolman, Acting Director, Environmental Health & Safety (SUNY)
,
'
l o* L. Henry, BMRC General Manager and Acting Director
'
- D. Landi, Vice President for Research (SUNY)
R. Linde, Lt., University Public Safety (SUNY)
,
- R. Nayler, Associate Vice President, Facilities (SUNY)
,
- M. Pierro, Radiation Safety Ofncer (SUNY)
l J. Slawson, BMRC Health Physics Supervisor l
1.2 NRC Personnel
- R. Cooper, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, Region 1
- J. Joyner, Chief, Facilities Radiation Safety and Safeguards Branch, Region 1
l
- S. Weiss, Director, Non-Power Reactors and Decomm. Project Directorate, NRC-HQ o Attended the exit interview on March 5,1993. Other personnel were contacted or interviewed during the inspection.
- Attended the management meeting on March 17, 1993.
2.0 Purpose of Insoection The inspection was conducted to review the status of safety of operations at the facility, with emphasis on the status oflicensee implementation of and compliance with the NRC-approved Emergency Plan. The facility licensed by the NRC includes a PULSTAR authorized to operate at power levels up to 2 megawatts. The State University of New York at Buffalo (SUNY Buffalo or SUNY) is the licensee, but
)
day-to-day operation of the reactor facility is performed by a mix of licensee and l
contractor personnel. The Buffalo Materials Research, Inc. is the contractor (also see Section 7.4), and employs most of the staff who operate the facility, known as the Buffalo Materials Research Center (BMRC). Three of the NRC-licensed reactor operators are employed by SUNY Buffalo, the remainder of the staff (comprised of both licensed and non-licensed personnel) by the contractor.
3.0 Status of Previousiv Identified Items 3.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-57/92-02-011; Licensee to evaluate unanticipated opening of containment isolation dampers caused by a power transient. The manual " scram" push button for the dampers was replaced by a
'
on-off toggle switch and the circuit rewired to prevent a bypass by contacts on the damper controller. The changes were reviewed and approved in accordance with requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.59. This matter is resolved.
3.2 (Closed) Followup Item (50-57/92-02-02): Evaluate cause of sticking control rods during core reload. Evaluate performance of control rod drives with full core in place and at normal operating pool temperatures. A partial draft report was available during the inspection. On March 12, the licensee submitted a report that analyzed the root cause and safety significance of the problem.
The report was found to be satisfactory. This matter is closed.
3.3 (Open) Inattentive Operator: On November 6,1992, the licensee reported to the NRC that a reactor operator was alleged to have been observed inattentive (sleeping) at the control console. The operator denied the allegation. The operator was relieved of duties and assigned to non-licensed activities pending the outcome of an investigation by the BMRC General Manager and the SUNY Personnel Office. At the time of the inspection, the licensee had not yet completed a review and resolution of the incident.
Although the event was reported about four months ago, there was no estimate of the time needed to reach a conclusion. This matter remains open (50-57/93-01-01).
4.0 Emereency Preparedness Research reactor licensees are required by 10 CFR 50.34(b) to have and maintain an NRC-approved Emergency Plan (EPlan). The current version of the Buffalo Materials Research Center (BMRC) Emergency Plan is dated November 1988. The inspector reviewed the implementation of selected portions of this plan.
Section 2 of the EPlan requires an annual review of the EPlan and the implementing emergency procedures by the Facility Operating Committee, which is a subgroup of the. Nuclear Safety Committee. This review is designed to satisfy the provisions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.IV.G, which stipulates that the Eplan and procedures be kept up to date. However, for the years of 1989,1990,1991, and 1992, the BMRC General Manager acknowledged that these reviews were not done. This failure constitutes a violation of the requirements of the EPlan (50-57/93-01-02). The BMRC General Manager showed the inspector a draft revised EPlan that contained several major revisions (described by the licensee as improvements) but no date was projected for final issuance.
Section 3 of the EPlan delineates the emergency organization and support to be provided by other organizations. The inspector noted that the BMRC General Manager is designated as the prime Emergency Director who will supervise
-
.
_ - --____
_ _ _
_ - _
.
emergency response. He also serves as the Emergency Planning Officer, responsible for details of the Eplan such as maintaining equipment and updating procedures. He also has been filling the role of Facility Director for a few years. The need for one individual to fill multiple responsible positions indicates some understaffing. The inspector was advised by the BMRC General Manager that he has frequent contact with the campus, city and county emergency personnel to ensure the support described in the EPlan. A tour of the University Public Safety Dispatch facility confirmed the ability to notify key personnel and support organizations at any time.
Section 4 of the EPlan provides basic guidelines for emergency action. The inspector posed an accident scenario to two staff Health Physicists as an exercise. Although the basic responses were satisfactory, the HPs appeared unfamiliar with the credible accidents described in the facility's Safety Analysis Report (SAR). The licensee stated that the HP staff would be trained to recognize SAR accidents. This matter will be reviewed in a future inspection (50-57/93-01-03). All initial evacuations of the reactor building will be to the emergency support center located in the Clark Gym. The inspector toured this facility and verified that the equipment in storage was inventoried and operationally checked semiannually as required by Section 9.4 of the EPlan. The inventories were completed by HP personnel, but there was no procedure assigning this responsibility or establishing a formal schedule. The licensee
'
stated that this assignment would be incorporated into the emergency procedures.
Section 14 of the EPlan specifies that two evacuation drills and one action drill be conducted each year. For the period 1989 through 1992, the licensee had conducted only one of the required action drills, that in March 1992. Failure to conduct the required drills is a violation of the EPlan (50-57/93-01-04). During much of this period, the facility was shut down to repair leaks in the pool liner. However, the reactor core was in storage on site. Records of the March 1992 drill indicated that the drill was well planned and executed with several lessons learned and incorporated into a draft revision to the EPlan.
l 5.0 Reactor Ooerator Trainine The licensee completed a two-plus year outage for reactor tank repairs early in 199'
l and reloaded the core in June 1992. In October 1992, the NRC conducted initial and requalification examinations at the facility. The inspector reviewed the available records and attempted to verify performance of console manipulations by selected operators through a review of records. No individual files are maintained for each operator to document manipulations, however, entries were made in the console operating log. No problems were noted during a spot check of the log. To determine the amount of training provided, the inspector interviewed selected operators and reviewed their class notes. No major omissions were noted. The inspector concluded that required operator training and performance of required console manipulations were conducte.
,
6.0 Exit Interview The inspector met with the BMRC General Manager on March 5,1993 and i
summarized the scope and findings of this inspection.
'
7.0 Supolemental Exit Meetine On March 17,1993, representatives of NRC and licensee management (as denoted in j
Section 1.0) met to discuss the inspector's findings, observations, and perceptions J
related to safe operation of the facility. The agenda for the meeting is Attachment A to this report.
7.1 Procram Oversight The licensee's Technical Specifications require that the Nuclear Safety Committee (NSC) meet twice per year. The BMRC General Manager explained that, during the reactor tank repairs, the NSC met much more often than required (four times in the past year), to review and discuss the repair -
activities and that, as needed to support the repair activities, consultants were hired to provide specific expertise. In addition, the NSC reviewed the sticking control rod problem. He further noted that only once in about the past five years had the NSC not been able to meet for lack of a quorum. He also described the function of the Operating Committee (OC), a subgroup of the NSC consisting, among others, of the BMRC General Manager, the University's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), and the BMRC Operations Manager. The latter three individuals act on routine matters related to facility operation for the OC, and pass on issues for consideration of the full OC or the full NSC as deemed necessary. Minutes of meetings of each of these three groups are maintained. The licensee acknowledged that some changes to the process of selecting the NSC are being considered, since the members are selected by the BMRC General Manager, and the NSC currently reports to the BMRC General Manager.
The involvement of the NSC in the sticking control rod issue (Section 3.2) and in the alleged inattentive reactor operator (Section 3.3) was described by the
.
BMRC General Manager as aggressive and very timely. The NRC l
acknowledged that the licensee had provided prompt notification of both issues, prompt action from a safety perspective, and periodic updates upon request. While more comprehensive reports were not required by NRC regulations for these events, the NRC believed that the licensee had committed to provide them. The BMRC General Manager explained that final reports had not been provided to the NRC sooner in either case, partly because the licensee did not understand the NRC's expectations relative to the submission of the reports. For the control rod drive, other priorities prevented the BMRC l
i
!
-
I
,
l j
General Manager from completing a comprehensive report. A report provided
'
to the NRC on March 12,1993, after a special request from NRC, was considered to have acceptably addressed the issue, but the BMRC General
,
Manager noted that he plans to complete, and provide to NRC, a more complete report. No commitment was provided as to the date of submission of this more comprehensive report.
Relative to the alleged inattentive operator, the requirements of the collective I
bargaining agreement have resulted in protracted resolution of the matter. The licensee assured the NRC that potential generic causes of the alleged inattentiveness had been considered (such as extensive overtime by the operators, or frequent shift changes that could interfere with sleep patterns),
!
l and that a broad problem had been ruled out. The inattentive operator was discussed at a special NSC meeting. The licensee was asked to provide to
,
l NRC a schedule for furnishing the final report on the inattentive operator and
addressing the generic issue of inattentiveness among the operators. The licensee agreed to provide the information requested by the end of March
-
1993.
The BMRC General Manager, in a letter dated March 29,1993, provided the status of resolution of the matter, but the letter did not address the licensee's review of the generic issue described above. On April 22,1993, the licensee was asked to supplement its response. The licensee committed to provide this information by the end of April,1993.
7.2 Health Physics The licensee addressed the NRC's perceived concern that there was insufficient involvement in the reactor facility's health physics program by the University's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO). The BMRC General Manager described the staff turnover experienced early in the reactor tank liner repairs, but noted that
,
'
outside expertise with reactor outage experience had been brought in to assist the facility health physics (HP) staff. In addition, a Certified Health l'hysicist I
had reviewed the training program for the workers involved in the tank repairs
and the work procedures. The BMRC General Manager also noted his own earlier involvement with the HP program during reactor repair activities in
'
1977-78. The University RSO noted that he was comfortable with the HP coverage provided by the facility HP staff, and that he had visited the facility several times a month during the repairs. He also noted that the repairs were completed without any uptakes of radioactive material by the workers and with minimal radiation exposure. Further, currently he reviews and approves HP procedures, facility changes that have potential radiological safety impact, the personnel radiation monitoring service, radioactive waste service, and conducts audits of the HP operation. The Operating Committee, of which he is a
.
l
.
.
member, has met monthly since the reactor restarted. The facility currently has the equivalent of 3.5 HPs on the staff. The NRC stated that the inspector assigned to inspect the reactor facility will meet with the RSO during the next inspection to discuss the RSO's activities during routine operations. The frequency of the RSO's audits, and the frequency of his visits to the reactor facility, also will be reviewed during those discussions (50-57/93-01-05).
7.3 Facility Staffinn The NRC representatives noted that it was their understanding that the facility formerly had a staff of about 20, but that it was now about 13. The Operations Manager acknowledged that there are fewer members of the staff, reflective of the lower level of utilization of the reactor. He described the staff turnover over the past few years, including the hiring of several reactor operators, all of whom are now qualified as Senior Reactor Operators by the NRC He noted that two key positions were not filled after the incumbents left, the Assistant Operations Manager and the Director, who reported to the BMRC General Manager and who was responsible for day-to-day operations, while the BMRC General Manager focused on the business operations. The BMRC General Manager now performs both jobs. However, the BMRC General Manager now believes it appropriate to fill the Director position so that he can focus on the business end of the operation. The NRC representatives noted to the licensee that staffing was a concern that deserved their attention, including the issue of succession planning among the staff.
More importantly, the NRC viewed the accelerated hiring of a qualified individual to assume the Director duties of the BMRC General Manager as of utmost importance, to assure that the Director focuses his/her attention solely on day-to-day operations of the facility and divests involvement with business I
activities. The NRC representatives requested that the licensee review these issues (staffing and succession planning) and provide the NRC with a position or plan for addressing them by the end of April 1993.
The licensee also noted that most of the staff is "home grown," having been degreed by, and only worked professionally at, the Buffalo facility. They l
believe they have sufficient HP staff, and as they rebuild their business, they I
would expect to hire additional operators as needed, preferably some with l
experience at other facilities. The facility meets the staffing levels specified in the Technical Specifications, and the licensee feels they currently have l
sufficient staff to assure the facility is operated safely.
Morale of the facility staff was discussed. While the staff reportedly has some concerns about the viability of the operation, they remain dedicated, according to the BMRC General Manager. The current difficult financial straits of the contractor that operates the facility for the licensee, BMR, Inc. and employs
. -
- -
-
-
-
-
-
-
___ -
_
-
i
-
I
j most of the staff, has contributed to this concem, but the University remains supportive of continued operation at this time. The licensee Vice President for Research, Dr. Landi, who assumed his post since the beginning of 1993, noted that he had not yet met with the facility staff, but that he would do so in the near future.
7.4 Fundine
I
'
l
'
The University contracts with the Buffalo Materials Research, Inc. to operate the facility. This corporation is owned by Materials Engineering Associates, i
Inc. (MEA). Ownership of MEA recently changed hands, and the new president, Yair Henkin, was scheduled to meet with Dr. Landi later on March 17. A better understanding of the new owner's plans for the company is expected to be gained from the meeting. The licensee agreed to inform the NRC of the results of those discussions (see Section 7.6). The new owner i
thus far has been financially supportive of the BMRC.
7.5 Emerzency Plan i
The BMRC General Manager acknowledged the apparent violations identified during the inspection. He noted that he has been active in emergency planning activities with the Erie County (New York) Emergency Planning Board, and i
has established a good relationship with the Board and the local fire department. Further, he had assumed responsibilities for emergency planning that previously were assigned to the facility health physicist, one of those who
,
l left the facility in the past few years. The NRC noted that it was important to l
meet the requirements associated with the NRC license. It was also noted that the licensee could have requested some relief from the Emergency Plan requirements from the NRC during the period that the reactor was apart for
the reactor tank liner repairs. It was also noted that waivers of compliance l
had been granted during that period, upon request of the licensee, for certain I
surveillance requirements.
l
The BMRC General Manager noted that they had reviewed an event that l
required declaration of an emergency at another university reactor in 1992 l
(Reed College, Portland, Oregon) for applicability to their facility, and noted l
specific differences between the two facilities that would further minimize the l
effects of a similar event at the Buffalo facility. The NRC was provided the l
date of the next EP exercise and invited to observe.
.
l l
l
.
.
10 7.6 Conclusion
!
The NRC representatives reviewed the commitments made during the meeting.
Mr. Cooper noted that the meeting had resulted in a better understanding on the part of the NRC of the issues discussed, but noted that some of the discussions confirmed our concerns. In particular, he noted that the State University of New ' York at Buffalo is the licensee, not BMR, and that the University needs to assure that appropriate oversight of the contractor's operations is provided. Mr. Cooper requested that, following Dr. Imdi's meeting with the new owner of BMR on the afternoon of March 17, Dr. Landi l
contact Mr. Cooper and advise him of the results of the meeting. Dr. Landi
subsequently completed this commitment on March 19, 1993. During the i
March 19 telephone discussion, Dr. Imdi noted that Mr. Henkin, the new l
owner of BMR, had committed to provide the licensee a plan shortly for l
recruiting a new Director (see Section 7.3). Dr. Imdi committed to submit to l
NRC by the end of April 1993 the plan for hiring the new Director, in i
addition to the succession planning scheme to which Dr. Landi previously committed (Section 7.3).
!