IR 05000029/1987003

Safety Insp Rept 50-029/87-03 on 870330-0401.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness & Annual Emergency Exercise Performed on 870331

ML20215H575
Person / Time
Site:	Yankee Rowe
Issue date:	04/09/1987
From:	Conklin C, Lazarus W, Schumacher J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215H571	List: IR 05000029/1987003 ML20215H568
References
50-029-87-03, 50-29-87-3, NUDOCS 8704200420
Download: ML20215H575 (6)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /87-03 l

Docket N I' I

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License N DPR-3 j Licensee: Yankee Atomic Electric Company 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 10701 Facility Name: Yankee Nuclear Power Station ,

Inspection At: Rowe, Massachusetts Inspection Conducted: March 30 to April 1, 1987

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Inspectors: - M' -'

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date PJ C.YonklinfeamLeader,EPS,EP&RPB,DRSS he - - -

4l'9l17 macher, Senior EP Specialist, EPS, dat'e RPB, DRSS H. Eichenholz, Senior Resident Inspector W. Thomas, EP Specialist, EPS, EP&RPB, DRSS G. Martin, Bate 11e G. Stoetzal, Bate 11e D. Schultz, Bate 11e V. Ramsdell, Bate 11e K. McBride, Bate 11e T. Earle, Bate 11e E.< Villiams, HQ

, Approved By: / 'h ag4ted [7 l W. J. Lazarus : Emergency Preparedness date  ;

Section P; DRSS Inspection Summary: Inspection on March 30 to April 1, 1987 (Report No. 50-29/87-03)

Areas Inspected: Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise performed on March 31, 1987. The inspection was performed by a team of ten NRC Region I, headquarters and contractor personne Results: No violations were identified. Emergency response actions were determined to be adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi PDR ADOCK 05000029 G POR _ _ _ _

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DETAILS l

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1. Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on l April 1, 198 G. Babineau, Radiation Protection Manager B. Drawbridge, Assistant Plant Superintendent J. Gedutis, Senior Chemist J. liaseltine, Yankee Project Manager L. Heider, Vice President

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K. Jurentkuff, Plant Operations Manager l A. Kadek, Vice President J. Kay, Technical Services Manager l T. LaFlam, Chief of Security l M. Lupien, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator -

l E. May, Senior Plant Engineer l W. McGee, Public Affairs Director

! R. Mellor, Assistant Technical Director W. Riethle, Manager Radiation Protection

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J. Robinson, Director Environmental Engineering R. Sedgwick, Security Supervisor -

N. St. Laurent, Plant Superintendent R. Williams, Reactor Engineering Manager The team observed and interviewed several licensee emergency response personnel, controllers and observers as they performed their assigned functions during the exercis . Emergency Exercise The Yankee Nuclear Power Station Partial-participation exercise was conducted on March 31, 1987 from 5:00 AM to 11:00 A , ,

2.1 Pre-exercise Activities Priortotheemer8encyexercise,NRCRegionIrepresentativeshel)d-meetings and had telephone discussions with licensee representatives to discuss objectives, scope and content of the exercise scenario. As a result, changes were made in order to clarify certain objectives, revise certain portions of the scenario and ensure that the scenario

) provided the opportunity for the licensee to demonstrate those areas previously identified by NRC as in need of corrective actio NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on March 30, 1987, and participated in the discussion of emergency response, actions expected during the various phases of the scenario. The licensee stated that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviation or disruption of normal plant operation ,

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The exercise scenario included the following events:

- Main Coolant specific activity greater than Technical Specification limits;

- Steam line break with associated steam generator tube rupturc;

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- Release of activity through the steam break;

- Declaration of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area and General Emergency Classifications; i

2.2 Activities Observed -

l During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, ten NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the I emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, I and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed: Detection, classification and assessment of scenario events;

. Direction and coordination of the emergency response; After hours augmentation of the emergency organization and response facility activation; 4 Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies of pertinent plant status information: Communications /information flow, and record-keeping; Assessment and projection of off-site radiological dose and ,

I consideration of protective actions; Formulation and communication of protective action recommendations; Provisions for in-plant radiation protection; Performance of off-site and in-plant radiological surveys:

1 Maintenance of site security and access control; l

11. Performance of technical support, repair and corrective actions; 12. Assembly and accountability of personnel; and 13. Management of recovery operation . . .

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3.0 Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team also noted the following actions that were indicative of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:

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Positive command and control of all emergency response facilities was demonstrated by the respective facility managers;

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State notifications and personnel augmentation notifications were prompt;

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Habitability surveys were routinely performed and radiological control practices were generally maintained;

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All emergency response facilities demonstrated good use of procedures and checklists, facility logs and status boards;

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Metpac and !!P-41 dose calculations were performed routinely and resultant protective action recommendations were appropriate and conservative; and

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The EOF environmental laboratory was setup in a timely manner and the counting and analysis capabilities were very goo .1 Areas Requiring Followup i The NRC team identified the following areas which could have degraded the response and need to be evaluated by the licensee for corrective action. These items are tracked as Inspector Follow-up Items (IFI).

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The process of Emergency Response Facility (ERF) activation and subsequent transfer / relief of responsibilities should be formalized in the activation procedures and appendices (50-29/87-03-01).

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Field team results were not displayed or distributed to response personnel in the EOF. This information was apparently not discussed or effectively utilized to update Protective Action Recommendations (PAR's), even though the state frequently requested this information. Additionally, Dose Assessors did not pursue the reasons for differences between projected and actual doses. Some actual doses were discounted because of an uncertainty as to whether they were centerline values. However, plume traversing was not performed where possible to confirm centerline readings (50-29/87-03-02).

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- Emergency response personnel in transit from the ERF's to the Access Control Point, or other areas of the plant, are normally not given self reading dosimeters (50-29/87-03-03).

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Emergency Action Levels (EAL's) should be evaluated for inconsistencies and to the guidance of NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 (50-29/87-03-04).

4.0 Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items The following items were identified during the previous exercise (Inspection Report No. 50-29/85-08 and 50-29/86-06). Based upon observations made by the NRC team during the exercise the following Open Items were not repeated and are closed:

- (CLOSED) 50-29/85-08-01 (IFI): Notification message provided to Vermont contained inaccurate informatio (CLOSED) 50-29/86-06-01 (IFI): Self r.eading dosimeters were not issued and dosimetry records not maintained for CR and TSC staff from the early stages of the scenario. Also, OP-3330 does not specify dose ranges for each type of SR (CLOSED) 50-29/86-06-02 (IFI): Official log not maintained in CR, TSC or EO (CLOSED) 50-29/86-06-04 (IFI): TSC habitability deficient - no high range dosimeters or documentation of survey result (CLOSED) 50-29/86-06-05 (IFI): TSC briefings informal, not organized so that all personnel received key technical informatio (CLOSED) 50-29/86-06-06 (IFI): No criteria in OP-3330, App. II to consider environs or radiological conditions when selecting respiratory protection equipment (SCBA, full face respirators).

- (CLOSED) 50-29/86-06-07 (IFI): Accountability procedure inefficien (CLOSED) 50-29/86-06-08 (IFI): Identification badges not issued to all player (CLOSED) 50-29/86-06-09 (IFI): Radio transmission problems observed between FCP, mobile vehicles, offsite field teams and EO (CLOSED) 50-29/86-06-10 (IFI): Set-up, arrangement and initiation of key EOF functions not efficient due to lack of EOF activation procedur (CLOSED) 50-29/86-06-11 (IFI): Turnover in emergency organization / direction and control of emergency by single individua . .

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- (CLOSED) 50-29/86-06-12 (IFI): Methodology for providing PAR's to off-site authorities lacks structure and is not procedurally complete in that the basis is made on dose projections, and does not consider NRC guidance (Plant conditions).

5.0 Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on April 1, 1987, during which the key licensee controllers discussed observations of the exercise. The critique was improved over previous licensee critiques and clearly highlighted all of the areas noted by the inspection team as requiring corrective action. The licensee indicated these areas would be evaluated and appropriate corrective actions take Specific improvements areas which were identified by the licensee related to: review of EAL procedures to clarify operator response; notify the NRC in a more timely manner; modify or develop activation procedures for the TSC, OSC and ENC; and evaluate reasons for operators not carrying out all steps of the Steam Generator Tube Rupture procedur .0 Exit Meeting and NRC Critique The NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report at the end of the inspection. The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercis The licensee was informed that previously identified items were adequately addressed and no violations were observed. Although there were areas identified for corrective action, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appropriate action would be taken regarding the identified open item At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.

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