IR 05000005/1987001
| ML20206Q899 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pennsylvania State University |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1987 |
| From: | Elsasser T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206Q873 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-005-87-01, 50-5-87-1, NUDOCS 8704220060 | |
| Download: ML20206Q899 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Reprt N /87-01 Docket N License N R-2 Priority: --
Operations Class: II
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Licensee: The Pennsylvania State University University Park, Pennsylvania 16802 Facility Name: Breazeale Nuclear Reactor Inspection At: University Park, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: January 13-15, 1987 Inspector s: F. Casella, Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit 3 D. Haverk p, Pr t Engineer, Reactor Projects Section 3C Approved by: L "
MM 7 T. C. Els ~ Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3C Da~te l Inspection Summary: Inspection on January 13-15, 1987 (Report No. 50-05/87-01)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced facility tour and inspection (30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />) of l facility organization, action on previous NRC findings, logs and records, reviews t and audits, procedures, surveillances, experiments, radiation control, compli-ance with show cause order and requalification trainin Results: No violations were identifie PDR ADOCK 0500
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TABLE'0F CONTENTS PAGE Persons Contacted.................................................... 1 Organization.................................................... .... 1 : Plant Tours.......................................................... 1 .
- Licen see Action on Previous - Inspection Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Logs, Records, and Procedures........................................ 2' Safety Review Committee.............................................. 3 Linear- Power' Level Indication Accuracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Annual Audit......................................................... 5
, Plant Operations..................................................... 5 :
10. Compliance with Show Cause 0rder..................................... 5 1 Requalification Training............................................. 6 1 Exit Interview....................................................... 7
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DETAILS Persons Contacted ,
- Dr. M. H. Voth, Director, Breazeale Nuclear Reactor
- Mr. I. B. McMaster, Deputy Director, Breazeale Nuclear Reactor
- Dr. E. Klevans, Department Head, Nuclear Engineering (Acting)
Mr. R. E. Totenbier, Operations Supervisor Mr. T. L. Flinchbaugh, Reactor Supervisor, Nuclear Education Specialist Mr. D. C. Raupach, Reactor Supervisor, Reactor Utilization Specialist Mr. D. E. Hughes, Reactor Supervisor, Nuclear Education Specialist '
Mr. K. E. Rudy, Senior Engineering Aid - Mechanical Services Mr. D. S. Vonada, Research Technologist, Instrumentation and Controls
- Denotes those present at the exit intervie . Organization The organization operating the Pennsylvania State University Breazeale Nuclear Reactor (PSBR) is as follows:
Cirector M. H. Voth*
Deputy Director I. B. McMaster (Senior Reactor Operator (SRO))
Facility Operators D. C. Raupach, SR0 J. J. Bonner, SR0 Training Coordinators T. L. Flinchbaugh, SRO D. E. Hughes, SR0 Instrumentation and Control D. S. Vonada (Reactor Operator (RO))
Machine Shop K. E. Rudy, R0
- Dr. Voth plans on completing SRO qualification and licensing by July 198 . Plant Tours The inspector toured the facility on January 13 and accompanied the reactor operator during performance of the Daily Checkout, in accordance with Standard Operating Procedure 2, on January 14. During these times, the inspector observed the general condition of pumps and piping systems including pool water filters and demineralizers, electrical systems, radiation and air monitoring systems, ventilation equipment, fire fighting and safety equip-ment, plant housekeeping and storage of radioactive materials, as well as crrangement of experimentation equipment. The inspector noted that daily smear surveys are taken in representative areas of the facility. No un- ,
satisfactory conditions were identifie In the beam port room, rubber inflatable plugs and a manual air pump were readily available to stop water flow through a beam port, should water tight integrity be lost. However, the emergency fill hose and connection between the university water system and pool drain piping was located in a pit below l
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. 2 floor level in the beam port room. In the event of a port failure, installa-tion of this hose would require a person to enter the flooding area. The licensee was aware of this situation and had installed an alternate piping run and hose connections to allow heat exchanger secondary flow to be diverted
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to the pool at the main floor leve The inspector had no further questions in this are . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Inspector Follow Item 05/84-03-01: Potentially hazardous storage of contaminated components. The licensee's storage area for contaminated components has been reconfigured from two shielded " caves" to one storage area. The storage facility was surrounded by lead bricks, and equipment was completely contained within the storage area. The potential for
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problems to arise, as a result of poor storage, had been adequately cor-recte (Closed) Inspector Follow Item 05/84-03-02: Persons giving the written requalification examinations have been exempt from taking the examination for ten years. Administrative Procedure AP-3, " Operator and Senior Operator Requalification," dated February 6, 1986, was revised such that the appointment of the training officer and assignment of other persons to conduct the oral exams and portions of the written exam shall rotate, so that no examining responsibility is duplicated during successive two year requalification programs. Also, for the 1985 written requal-ification examinations, those persons were examined who previously had been exempt from taking the examination. This item has been corrected satisfactoril (Closed) Inspector Follow Item 05/83-02-01: Assure the safety channel scram is at or below 110% of full power. The inspector reviewed the
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procedure for Reactor Thermal Power Calibration, CCP-2, along with recent calibration records, and was satisfied that the procedure is being properly' implemented. Additional discussion of the power cali-bration process is contained in paragraph 7 of this report; no safety or compliance concerns were identified. This items is close . Logs, Records, and Procedures The inspectors examined PSBR Operating Logs 40, dated 12/11/85 to 6/20/86 and 41, dated 6/23/86 to 1/14/8 Entries were made for pertinent operational and experimental evolutions. The log was reviewed against technical specifi-cations for compliance with limiting conditions for operation; no discrepan-l cies were note Lapses in proper logkeeping were noted, however; there were l between-the-lines additions on 6/27/86, uninitialed and obliterated line-outs on 9/4/86 and 9/9/86, and missed experiment completion times on 7/30/86 and l 8/7/86. These problems were infrequent and minor in nature, but since the l log is a legal record of facility operation, completeness, traceability, and l
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. 3 accuracy in logkeeping are important. This comment was made at the exit interview by the inspector and acknowledged by the licensee representa-tives. The inspector had no further comments on operating log Administrative Policy AP-4, " Procedure for Identifying, Evaluating, and Docu-menting Failures of Safety Systems, Abnormal and Operation Events," was re-viewed and used as a basis for examining the facility's Event Evaluation Forms from 6/17/85 to 1/14/87. The event forms were reviewed for detail, ap-propriateness of immediate and long-term corrective action, analysis of root cause, and review by senior management. In addition, the inspector reviewed other records and interviewed personnel to determine compliance with and timeliness of actual corrective actions. The inspector had no questions about the event review process and performanc The inspector reviewed the newly created Change Procedure, AP-12, dated-November 4, 1986, and attempted to review a facility modification package against that procedure. However, none have been initiated since the pro-cedure became effective. Modification of the rod position indication (RPI)
system to a new digital display driven by bidirectional rotary pulse generators began about a year before AP-12 was in effect. A pulse genera-tor has been installed on the fission detector drive unit and the digital outputs were temporarily mounted on the main control board, wired in parallel with the existing RPI, for functional testin The staff elec-tronics designer commenced a design change review of this modification in accordance with AP-12, but had not completed enough of it to warrant NRC inspectio The inspector noted to the licensee that AP-12 may be in need of improvemen Extensive preparation of documents and procedures are required before a de-cision cn safety significance is even made. The cumbersome nature of the process may induce excessive delays and breed reluctance to make modification The licensee agreed to review the procedure. The Facility Changes Procedure will be reviewed in a future inspectio (Inspector Follow Item (IFI)
05/87-05-01).
A sample of surveillance procedures and surveillance completion forms were reviewed for compliance with respective technical specification No dis-crepancies were note . Safety Review Committee
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The meeting minutes from the July 7 and 0ctober 10, 1986 meetings of the Penn State Reactor Safeguards Committee (PSRSC) were reviewed in detail. In addi-
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tion to verifying proper meeting frequency and quorum, the inspector looked for performance of the review responsibilities mandated by Technical Specifi-cations. Minutes conveyed a very questioning attitude on the part of members toward safety and compliance issues. No concerns were raised during this revie o
. 4 Linear Power Level Indication Accuracy Cf note in the October 10, 1986 PSRSC minutes was a question raised about a series of four power calibrations done between August 6 and 12, 1986 where the as-found power level was actually higher (less conservative)
than the indicated power level. Power calibrations are performed at 400 KW, which is the singular point where the pool heat dissipation rate is accurately known. The PSRSC member's concern was that after operation at or near the 1 MW technical specification 3.1.1.a limit do such non-conser-vative calibration results mean that the limit had been exceeded? Ensuing discussion centered around single point calibration accuracy, linearity of linear power indication, and the frequency of non-conservative calibra-tions over the life of the reacto This concern was assigned to the deputy director for resolutio This concern was next addressed in a draft memorandum from the deputy director to PSRSC, dated January 14, 1987. The memo concluded that linear power indication was indeed linear and that as-found non-conservative cali-brations could mean the reactor had been operated above the 1 MW limi This conclusion was based on a power indication linearity check experiment performed on January 7,1987, where power level from a fission chamber was plotted against linear power indication at ten power levels from 100 KW to 1 MW. The resulting curve showed little deviation from being a straight lin The inspector considered the following points: (a) the licensee does a single point power calibration at 400 KW because an early research project was successful in measuring pool heat dissipation at that point - accurate knowledge of heat loss is essential to an accurate calibration; (b) prior to the January 7, 1987 linearity experiment, the non-linearity of power readout to actual power had been assumed and discussed extensively with no firm conclusion reached; (c) a licensee review of calibration results from August 1966 to August 1986 showed there only have been 12 non-conservative results from 68 calibrations over the 20 year period, the highest of which was one 438 KW measurement; (d) Technical Specification LC0 3.1.1.a states,
"The operating power level of the reactor shall not be intentionally raised above one megawatt except for pulse operation;" (e) Safety Analysis Report Section IX and Technical Specification Basis 3.1.1 consider variations of up to 15% above 1 MW (1.15 MW) to be acceptable with natural convection cooling, these conditions will not exceed a 600 degree F fuel temperature; and (f) the Safety Limit for fuel temperature is 1150 degrees F, the Limiting Safety System Setting for fuel temperature is 700 degrees F and '
(g) fuel temperature is measured at the highest temperature fuel element in the center of the core; three thermocouples are installed in that ele-ment: one is connected to a recorder, one provides a digital display and .
one is a spare; monitoring of this temperature by operators is required by l procedure and was observed by the inspector during reactor operatio l
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, 5 The inspector concluded that in the worst case, power level did not exceed 1.15 MW and fuel temperature was well within the safety margins; hence, there was no safety concern. Further, if power did exceed 1 MW, there is no indication that it was done intentionally; there has been no violation of technical specification The inspector was satisfied with licensee performance on this issue and had no further question . Annual Audit The inspector verified that the licensee is performing an annual third party audit of reactor operations. The most recent report, of an audit conducted September 25-26, 1986, was reviewed during the inspection. It had been performed by a utility power reactor manager who was also a mem-ber of the PSRSC. The audit covered procedures, technical specification compliance, the operator requalification program, event evaluations and corrective actions, maintenance and modifications, radiological controls, emergency planning, and facility cleanliness. There were no significant problems identified by this audit. The inspector also reviewed the January 13, 1987 licensee response to the annual audit and was satisfied that the licensee has agreed to incorporate appropriate improvements suggested by the audi These improvements were items that exceeded NRC requirement . Plant Operations The inspectors observed seven reactor startups, four pulse operations, and the performance of one startup checkout. These were conducted at various times and by various combinations of both R0s and four of the SR0s. The pulse operations were of 14.8 Megawatt, 88 Megawatt, 296 Megawatt, and 400 Megawatt magnitude Facility operation was by procedure and in accord-ance with plant technical specifications. Pulse power rod positions were determined with current integral rod worth tables; with one exception the pulse produced was within 2% of the targeted power level. In the one exception, the actual pulse was approximately 50% less than calculated, due to pulsing soon after a steady state power Xenon buildup that could not be accounted for in calculations. The inspectors witnessed bridge manipulations as the core position was varied with respect to the deuterium oxide tank and beam port four. In all cases, communications, operator coordination, and reactor and personnel safety were acceptabl . Compliance with Show Cause Order The NRC imposed an Order on September 27, 1985 requiring non power reactor licensees to reduce the quantity of high enriched uranium (HEU) to an amount consistent with normal operational requirements. The licensee response, dated October 19, 1985, was to consent to the order without exception and removed all Materials Testing and Research (MTR) Reactor unirradiated fuel elements to the Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (DOE) within 120 days of the date of response.
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- , 6 The MTR Reactor preceded the current Test, Research, Isotope, General Atomic (TRIGA) Reactor, operated from August 15, 1955 to December 19, 1986, and utilizing 93.3 WT% enriched fuel. Seven unirradiated MTR fuel ele-ments had been retained in a storage vault in the reactcr building for the past 21 year The inspector reviewed shipping and shipping audit documentation that showed the seven elements, numbers 119P, 121P, 122P, 123P, 124P, 125P, and 126P were shipped to Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. at Oak Ridge, Tennesse DOE Form 284, signed by D. B. Mabe on Febt uary 20, 1986, indicated that the shipment had been received at Oak Ridge on January 24, 198 The inspector reviewed the quarterly Material Balance Reports, DOE /NRC Form 742, on DOE owned nuclear materials for the quarters ending December 31, 1985 and March 31, 1986. The enriched uranium sections of the reports shows that on 12/31/85 there were on site 69,330 gms of U-235 in 934,846 gms of uranium, distributed as low enriched TRIGA and PATHFINDER fuel, high en-riched MTR fuel, and 3 high enriched fission detectors. On 3/31/86, there were on site 68,658 gms of U-235 in 934,144 gms of uranium. The differ-ence between the two material balance reports is documented as 1 gm TRIGA fuel U-235 fission and transmutation, and 668 gms U-235 in 716 gms of uranium (93.3 WT% U) scrapped. This scrap is documented on Uranium Scrap Declaration CDW-85-1, part of the shipping documentation for the MTR fuel elements. The inspector was satisfied that the only HEU remaining on site is in the 3 fission detector Compliance time for this order was set at 120 days. Between the date of the licensee response letter and the date of fuel shipment off site 94 days elapsed. The inspector had no further questions in this are . Requalification Training In accordance with Administrative Policy AP-3, " Operator and Senior OperatJr Requalification," dated February 6, 1986, records were maintained of the biennial written examinations, the biennial facility walkthrough oral examinations, the annual oral examinations of facility procedures, and reactivity manipulations checklists. The written examinations are con-ducted as proctored exams at the facilit Console performance checklist records were prepared to document evaluations of operating performance, as required by the current requalification program; however, these evaluations were planned to be completed later during the 1986-1987 requalification period. A summary of the test results for all of the licensed operators was on file. Documentation was found to be complete and readily accessibl For the 1985 written requalification examination, one of the nine operators received a grade of 68% in one area, instrumentation and control. As this was less than the grade of 70% required to pass any subject area, the operator was instructed and upon examination received a grade of 85%. The inspector found that the requalification training program was being effec-tively administere . . . - . - - . .
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, 7 12. Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on January 15, 1987. The inspectors presented the scope'and findings of their inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings and indicated that corrective actions would be taken where appropriat :
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