GO2-96-190, Responds to Exercise Weakness in Insp Rept 50-397/96-13. Corrective Actions:Each Operating Crew Has Received Addl Training on Use of High Range Stack Monitor & Participated in Simulator Training
| ML17292A536 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 10/02/1996 |
| From: | Webring R WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| GO2-96-190, NUDOCS 9610160049 | |
| Download: ML17292A536 (5) | |
Text
CATEGORY 1 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9610160049 DOC.DATE: 96/10/02 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397
~
~
~
~
AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION EBRING,R.L.
Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Responds to exercise weakness in insp rept 50-397/96-13.
Corrective actions:each operating crew has received addi training on use of high range stack monitor
& participated in simulator training.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
IE01D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR i ENCL 0 SIZE:
TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Violation Response NOTES:
E RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD4-2 PD INTERNAL: ACRS EODp49TC FILE CENTER DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRPM/PERB OE DIR RGN4 FILE 01 COPIES LTTR ENCL RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME COLBURNFT AEOD/SPD/RAB DEDRO NRR/DISP/PIPB NRR/DRPM/PECB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS3 COPIES LTTR ENCL ERNAL: LITCO BRYCEFJ H
NRC PDR NOAC D
E N
NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)
ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 19 ENCL B.
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM PO. Box 968
~ 3000 George Washington Way
~ Richland, Washington 99352-0968
~ (509) 372-5000 October 2, 1996 G02-96-190 Docket No. 50-397 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station Pl-37 Washington, D. C.
20555 Gentlemen:
Subject:
WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-21 NRC INSPECTION REPORT 96-13 RESPONSE TO EXERCISE WEAKNESS
Reference:
Letter, dated August 22, 1996, KE Brockman (NRC) to JV Parrish (SS), "NRC Inspection Report 50-397/96-13" The Washington Public Power Supply System hereby replies to the exercise weakness identified in your letter dated August 22, 1996.
Our reply, pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.F, provides a description of the corrective measures to be taken and the schedule for completion of the actions.
Section P4, "Observations and Findings," of the Reference Inspection Report includes the following observed weakness during emergency preparedness exercise walkthroughs with three operating crews using a dynamic simulation on the plant specific control room simulator:
One of the crew's performance was unsatisfactory in its implementation of the emergency plan procedures.
Most noticeably, was the inability of the shift technical advisor to produce an offsite dosage calculation in order to assist in recommending additional protective action recommendations (PARs).
The failure to perform an offsite dose estimate calculation was due in part to the shift technical advisor's unfamiliarity with the digital recorder for the reactor building release radiation monitor. The individual erroneously selected a voltage output rather than a radiation measurement output.
When the individual attempted to use the value in the offsite dose estimate, the computer would not accept the value. The individual attempted to use the backup system, but was unfamiliar with it and could not enter the correct inputs.
Additionally, during the same time period alternate instruments (area radiation monitors) had indicated maximum readings (10,000 Rem/hr) for over five minutes.
The shift manager and 9610i60049 96i002 PDR ADOCK 05000397 8
Page 2 RESPONSE TO EXERCISE WEAKNESS the control room supervisor did not question the incongruence between the low readings of the shift technical advisor and what the alternate instruments indicated.
Had a second individual been dispatched to verify the shift technical advisor's PRM-RE-1C readings the er'ror could have been detected.
As such, the shift manager erroneously concluded that no core damage had been sustained.
Further, local notifications from the control room were not made within the required 15 minutes by the second I'same] crew. The facsimile was sent out 17 minutes after the general emergency declaration and the "Crash Call" was made 18 minutes after the General Emergency declaration.
The failure to make a timely notification of the General Emergency and the failure of the shift technical advisor to make an appropriate dose assessment calculation were identified as an exercise weakness.
rr tive Mea ures The Supply System concurs with the weakness identified with the one crew.
However, we believe it was an isolated case based on observation that the two other crews performed well in the simulator and conclude that the weakness was an isolated case.
Appropriate corrective measures were implemented.
Each operating crew has received additional training on the use of the high range stack monitor and participated in a simulator training exercise involving a radioactive release.
The shift technical advisor with the identified weakness received remedial training on the operation of the stack monitor readout and reviewed procedures for performing offsite dose calculations.
The individual also performed as the shift technical advisor in a simulator training exercise involving a radioactive release that required additional PARs with evacuation and sheltering.
Contrary to management expectations, the shift manager and control room supervisor failed to recognize that an offsite release was in progress during the training exercise.
Both the shift manager and control room supervisor were aware of the area radiation monitor alarms throughout the reactor building, but failed to question the erroneously low dose readings provided by the shift technical advisor.
Consequently, the shift manager and control room supervisor involved received remedial training to ensure that they clearly understand the necessity to "peer-check" and criticallyevaluate issues that are not thoroughly understood.
They were also reminded of the importance of performing followup actions as necessary to validate previous conclusions.
As a preventive measure, the shift manager and control room supervisor willbe reevaluated on a similar emergency plan scenario.
om lei n ch ul Allof the identified corrective measures have been completed.
Page 3 RESPONSE TO EXERCISE WEAK%MS Should you have any questions or desire additional information regarding this matter, please call me or Ms. L. C. Fernandez at (509) 377-4147.
Respectfully, R. L, Webring Vice President, Operations Support/PIO Mail Drop PE08 cc:LJ Callan - NRC RIV KE Perkins, Jr. - NRC RIV, Walnut Creek Field Office NS Reynolds - Winston & Strawn TG Colburn - NRR DL Williams - BPA/399 NRC Sr. Resident Inspector - 927N