GO2-83-954, Final Deficiency Rept 275 Re Reactor Water Cleanup Sys Leak Detection.Initially Reported on 830727.Temp Elements Existing in Rooms R-509 & R-511 Not Requiring Leak Detection Relocated.Completion Expected Prior to Fuel Load
| ML20081H218 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1983 |
| From: | Carlisle C WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| To: | Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, 275, GO2-83-954, NUDOCS 8311070356 | |
| Download: ML20081H218 (2) | |
Text
h Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 3000 GeorgeWashington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509)372-5000 October 21, 1983 G02-83-954 Mr. J. B. Martin Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 d
Walnut Creek, California 94596 d
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Subject:
NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 10CFR50.55(e) REPORTABLE CONDITION #275 RWCU SYSTEM LEAK DETECTION
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References:
1.
Telecon QA2-83-179, dated July 27, 1983, L.C. Floyd to B. Dodds, same subject.
2.
Letter G02-83-778, dated Augsut 26, ISB3, C.S. Carlisle to J.B. Martin, same subject.
In accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e), your office was informed by the references above of the subject condition.
The attachment provides the Project's final report on Condition #275.
If there are any questions concerning this matter, clease contact Roger Johnson, WNP-2 Project QA Manager, (509) 377-2501, extension 2712.
C.S. Carlisle Program Director, WNP-2 JGT/kd
Attachment:
As stated cc:
W.S. Chin, BPA N.D. Lewis, EFSEC A. Toth, NRC Resident Inspector Document Control Desk, NRC B311070356 831021 PDR ADOCK 05000397 S
PDR 3E -
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j WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-397 LICENSE N0. CPPR-93 10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #275 RWCU SYSTEM LEAK DETECTION FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency The environmental analysis performed as part of the Equipment Qualifi-cation Program identified the sections of RWCU system piping, with the highest probability of rupture routed through rooms (R-313, R-408, R-509, and R-511) where no capability for pipe break leak detection could be identified. This condition could result in no automatic mitigation of RUCU syste": leaks in these rooms (Other than the system high flow indication which is not single failure proof) and no means of notifying the plant operators that there is an uncontrolled release of steam out-side of primary containment. Further review with the Architect Engineer resulted in the determination that leak detection temperature elements were installed in rooms R-509 and R-511.
Safety Implication A pipe break in the RWCU system will not be automatically isolated and cannot be readily identified, resulting in the potential for exceeding the offsite exposure guidelines of 10CFR100. This is considered a reportable deficiency under 10CFR50.55(e).
Cause of the deficiency Equipment qualification, using information generated as part of the Pipe Break and Missile Study, identified rooms with RWCU lines and no break detection instrumentation. General Electric requires as part of the original Leak Detection System design, that all pipe routing areas be monitored by leak detection instrumentation.
Probable cause for lack of leak detection temperature sensors for these rooms was reli-ance on the syste high flow isolation signal.
It may have been assumed that this signal is single failure proof as it is on all other similar system designs provided by General Electric.
Corrective Action Temperature elements existing in rooms R-509 and R-511 which no longer require leak detection, due to deletion of the RHR steam condensing mode, have been relocated along with additional elements to provide the necessary leak detection capability in appropriate areas. Tempera-ture elements are being installed in rooms R-313, R-408, and R-409 in accordance with Project Engineering Directive (PED) 218-E-B926 and 218-E-
-C245 to correct the deficiency. The work will be complete prior to fuel load.
Action to Prevent Recurrence Burns and Roe reviewed all pipe routing areas for systems with high energy lines to assure each area had appropriate monitors for detecting leaks.
No further actions other than those noted above are required.
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