GO2-83-824, Final Deficiency Rept 248 Re Anaconda Flexible Conduit. Initially Reported on 830321.Internal Water Seal Will Be Installed at Flex conduit-device Interface.Conduit Will Be Replaced W/Approved Flexible Conduit Meeting Svc Conditions
| ML20080J510 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 09/12/1983 |
| From: | Carlisle C WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| To: | Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, 248, GO2-83-824, NUDOCS 8309260377 | |
| Download: ML20080J510 (3) | |
Text
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Washington Public Power Supply System P.C. Box 968 3000 GeorgeWashingtonWay Richland, Washington 99352 (509)372-5000 Docket No. 50-397 h
cA Aw 46 September 12, 1983 4
Ig G02-83-824 Mr. J. B. Martin
-d Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596
Subject:
NUCLEAR PROJECT N0. 2 10CFR50.55(e) REPORTABLE CONDITION #248 ANACONDA FLEXIBLE CONDUIT
References:
- 1) Telecon QA2-83-062, dated March 21, 1983, L.C. Floyd to J. Elin.
- 2) Letter G02-83-358, dated April 20, 1983, C.S. Carlisle to J.B. Martin.
- 3) Letter G02-83-640, dated July 20, 1983, C.S. Carlisle to J.B. Martin.
In accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e), your office was notified of the above subject condition as stated in References 1, 2, and 3.
The attachment provides a final report on Condition 248.
If you have any questions regarding this subject, please contact Roger Johnson, WNP-2 Project QA Manager at (509) 377-2501, extension 2712.
Program Director, WNP-2 LCF/kd
Attachment:
As stated cc:
W.S. Chin, BPA N.D. Lewis, EFSEC A. Toth, NRC Resident Inspector Document Control Desk, NRC B309260377 830912
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PDR ADOCK 05000397
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WASHIllGT0li PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT [10. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-397 LICENSE N0. CPPR-93 10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #248 ANACONDA FLEXIBLE CONDUIT FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency In response to an NRC Open Item from the Environmental Qualification Audit in February 1983, a pressure temperature test was performed March 15 and 16, 1983 on the Anaconda flexible conduit (UAP sealtight) used inside con-tainment to hook up safety-related electrical equipment. The design require-ment of this conduit is to seal the electricai Levice froa uoisture intru-sion (moisture inside electrical equipment eventually results in equipment failure by shorting).
This test was the first in a series of tests planned to determine the con-duit's ability to seal the electrical interface from LOCA effects. The test was performed to the pressure / temperature profile as defined in FSAR 3.11 for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (340 F for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, 320 F for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, 250 F for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />, all steam conditions, and 45 psig for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, dropping to 25 psig for remainc' of test).
The failure mode was melting, bubbling, and dripping of the polyethylene copolymer jacket material which exposed the convoluted flexible metal core.
This allowed aoisture to penetrate the conduit into the device housing (rep-resented in the test by a typical junction box arranged in the test chamber to collect any moisture).
Visual inspection at the end o# the test revealed the following.
1.
Melting of the polyethylene copolymer jacket.
2.
Dripping of the jacket.
3.
Blistering of the jacket.
4.
Water collection in the bottom of the junction box, verifying moisture intrusion.
Safety Implication The electrical conduit inside the containment is required to seal the elec-trical devices from moisture intrusion which could eventually result in equipment failure by shorting of the electrical connections. This condition related to safety system equipment is considered to be a reportable defi-ciency.
Cause of the Deficiency The condition, failure to specify an installation capable of precluding moisture intrusion for safety-related electrical equipment under post LOCA or iiSLB condition in specific areas of WNP-2, represents a design omission by the Architect Engineer (AE).
FR 248 Page 2 of 2 Action to Prevent Recurrence The Project recognized that certain environmental conditions impose unique failure mechanisms upon exposed equipment resulting both from manufacture and installation. The Supply System Equipment Qualification group was formed which established a progran to perform qualification reviews and to assure design requirements and installation conditions of safety-related equipment meet environmental requirements for plant operation.
Implementation of Technical-Directorate Procedure TDP-3.32 and PIil 6-8 should preclude such an omission in the future.
Corrective Action The Project has conducted a survey of areas at UNP-2 that potentially exper-ience high temperature ( 300 F) and a concurrent steam environment. Safety-
. related electrical equipment in these areas; primary containment and the main steam tunnel, which must function during and after a LOCA or main steam-line break accident have been identified. The configuration of the defi-cient flexible conduit at the equipment is covered by two conditions.
Condition 1.
The flexible conduit is installed such that moisture can physically drain into the safety-related device.
Condition 2.
The flexible conduit is installed such that moisture can-not physically drain into the device.
Corrective action for Condition 1 is to install an internal water seal at-the flex conduit-device interface. The conduit's sole function will be to physically protect the cable.
Corrective action for Condition 2 is to replace the existing conduit with a qualified and approved flexible conduit meeting the service conditions.
Implementation-of the corrective action is in progress in accordance with SLT-S109.0-1.under Startup direction with the work being done oy Bechtel under.their procedure SWP/P-E-1, Rev. 3.
The work is scheduled to be com-plete prior to fuel load.
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