At 0011 EST on 11/03/20, it was discovered that BOTH trains of salt water were simultaneously
INOPERABLE. While in a planned [limiting condition for operation] LCO window with the 21 salt water train
INOPERABLE for post-maintenance testing, debris intrusion in the 22 salt water
header rendered the redundant salt water train
INOPERABLE.
Due to this INOPERABILITY, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).
One train of salt water was restored to operable at time 0026 EST.
There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
This event did not affect Unit 1.
- * * RETRACTION ON 11/20/2020 AT 1218 EST FROM BRIAN FOVEAUX TO OSSY FONT * * *
Following the eight hour 10 CFR 50.72 notification made on 11/03/2020 (EN 54979), further engineering analysis determined that 22 Saltwater subsystem flow remained at levels sufficient to fulfill its safety function based on the conditions existing at the time of the event. Despite flow in 22 Saltwater subsystem falling below the short term (four hour) minimum value for approximately 15 minutes, engineering analysis was able to determine the increased heat removal capacity associated with the lower bay temperatures was sufficient to offset the reduced heat removal capacity associated with the lower 22 Saltwater subsystem flow. This demonstrated that actual heat transfer to the saltwater subsystem was sufficient to ensure all safety functions were fulfilled during the event.
Therefore, this event notification is being retracted as it is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), (B) and (D).
The NRC Resident has been informed.
Notified R1DO (Greives)