CY-01-108, Proposed Technical Specification Change

Proposed Technical Specification Change

ML012630114
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	09/10/2001
From:	Heider K Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
-RFPFR, CY-01-108
Download: ML012630114 (53)

Text

• CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY HADDAM NECK PLANT 362 INJUN HOLLOW ROAD

• EAST HAMPTON, CT 06424-3099 September 10, 2001 Docket No. 50-23 CY-01 -108 Re: 10CFR50.90 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Haddam Neck Plant Proposed Technical Specification Change Introduction Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) hereby proposes to amend its Operating License, DPR-61, by incorporating the attached proposed changes into the Haddam Neck Plant (HNP) Technical Specifications.

The proposed changes to Technical Specification 3/4.9.7 and corresponding Bases address application of a Single-Failure-Proof Handling System, as defined by NUREG-0612 and NUREG-0554, for the handling of loads in excess of 1800 pounds near or over the Spent Fuel Pool. The anticipated types of heavy-loads include the combination of a spent fuel storage canister and transfer cask which are compliant with an NRC Certificate of Compliance per 10 CFR 72.214 and 10 CFR 72.238.

US NRC CY-01 -108/Page 2 Discussion The proposed changes address both: (a) the existing designs of the Fuel Handling Cranes within the Spent Fuel Building and (b) a Single-Failure-Proof Handling System that includes a Yard Crane upgraded to the single-failure-proof criteria of NUREG-0612 and NUREG-0554 by application of the X-SAM crane design. The X-SAM crane design is defined by: (a) NRC-approved Generic Licensing Topical Report EDR-I (P)-A, Revision 3, "EDERER'S Nuclear Safety Related eXtra-Safety And Monitoring (X-SAM) CRANES" Revision 3, Amendment 3, dated October 8, 1982, (b) the NRC Safety Evaluation for EDR-1, Revision 1, dated January 2, 1980, and (c) the NRC Safety Evaluation for EDR-1, Revision 3, dated August 26, 1983.

Within the previous decade, several other licensees have submitted similar proposed Technical Specification changes concerning Single-Failure-Proof Handling Systems; and the NRC has issued corresponding license amendments.

In support of this license amendment request, the following information is provided:

"* Attachment 1 provides: (i) a detailed description of the proposed changes, (ii) background and reason for the proposed change, (iii) regulatory analysis, (iv) technical analysis, (v) a no significant hazards consideration determination, and (vi) an environmental impact consideration determination.

"* In conformance with the NRC Safety Evaluations for EDR-1, Attachment 2 provides a plant-specific Appendix B Supplement to EDR-1.

"* In conformance with the NRC Safety Evaluations for EDR-1, Attachment 3 provides a plant-specific Appendix C Supplement to EDR-1, including information concerning seismic qualification.

"* Attachment 4 forwards the marked-up Technical Specification and Bases pages.

" Attachment 5 forwards the retyped Technical Specification and Bases pages.

As discussed in Attachment 1, the proposed changes have been reviewed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92, and it has been determined that the proposed changes do not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration (SHC). In addition, the proposed changes have been reviewed in consideration of 10 CFR 51.22, and it has been determined that the proposed changes meet the criteria for categorical exemption from requiring an environmental impact statement.

US NRC CY-01 -108/Page 3 Independent Review The Plant Operations Review Committee and Nuclear Safety Assessment Board have reviewed the proposed amendment request and concur with the above determinations.

State Notification In accordance with 1 OCFR 50.91(b), CYAPCO is providing the State of Connecticut with a copy of the proposed amendment request.

Commitments The following commitments are contained within this letter:

" For the Single-Failure-Proof Handling System, administrative controls will be used to maintain a vertical distance of greater than 1.5 feet between any crane load greater than 1800 pounds and any surface within the Spent Fuel Building which has not been demonstrated by evaluation to support safe operation of the facility following damage resulting from either a postulated failure of the drive train or single wire rope.

"* The Single-Failure-Proof Handling System will not be used to lift spent fuel assemblies from Spent Fuel Racks.

"* The Auxiliary Hoist of the upgraded Yard Crane will not be used for any crane load greater than 1800 pounds that is near or over the Spent Fuel Pool.

Schedule Required for NRC Approval The modifications to the Yard Crane are scheduled to be completed by the fourth quarter of 2001.

Therefore, CYAPCO requests that these proposed changes be reviewed and approved by the NRC Staff within 180 days of receipt. Finally, CYAPCO requests that the license amendment be effective upon issuance for implementation within 60 days.

US NRC CY-01 -108/Page 4 Conclusion The proposed changes have been reviewed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92 and have been determined to not constitute a Significant Hazards Consideration (SHC).

In addition, the proposed changes have been reviewed in consideration of 10 CFR 51.22; and it has been determined that the proposed changes meet the criteria for a categorical exemption from requiring an environmental impact statement.

If the NRC staff should have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. G. P. van Noordennen at (860) 267-3938.

Sincerely, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY KIJHeider Vice President -Operations and Decommissioning Attachments cc: H.J. Miller, NRC Region I Administrator J.E. Donoghue, NRC Senior Project Manager, Haddam Neck Plant R.R. Bellamy, Chief, Decommissioning and Laboratory Branch, NRC Region I E.L. Wilds, Jr., Director, CT DEP Monitoring and Radiation Division Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 2001 Date Commission Expires:

Docket No. 50-213 CY-01-108 Attachment 1 Haddam Neck Plant Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Description and Analysis September 2001

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission CY-01-108 Attachment 1/Page 2 of 11 Detailed Description of Change The proposed changes affect Technical Specification 3/4.9.7 "CRANE TRAVEL SPENT FUEL BUILDING," and corresponding Technical Specification Bases B 3/4.9.7.

The proposed Technical Specification Changes are:

" Revision of Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.9.7 to identify that the existing prohibitions on travel of crane loads in excess of 1800 pounds are not applicable to a Single-Failure-Proof Handling System including a Yard Crane that is compliant with the single-failure-proof criteria of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.2(1) and NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.6.

"* Revision of Technical Specification Bases 3/4.9.7 to identify that the continuing restrictions on the movement of loads in excess of 1800 pounds by any crane that is not qualified to single-failure-proof criteria supports both (a) the safety analysis described in FSAR Section 15.2.2 and (b) the referenced evaluation of the effect of load drop on spent fuel structural integrity.

" Revision of Technical Specification Bases 3/4.9.7 to identify that the Single-Failure-Proof Handling System, as defined by NUREG-0612, is applied for the handling of loads in excess of 1800 pounds near or over any area the Spent Fuel Pool, including certified spent fuel casks.

The proposed changes retain existing requirements concerning the travel of the Fuel Handling Cranes.

Background and Reason for Change The Technical Specifications for the Haddam Neck Plant (HNP) include a restriction on the movement of loads greater than 1800 pounds over any fuel assembly stored in the Spent Fuel Pool. Additionally, the licensing bases includes a restriction on the handling of spent fuel casks near or over any area of the Spent Fuel Pool.

As stated in the NRC Safety Evaluation for Facility Operating License Amendment 125, Reference (7), the required condition for the removal of the restriction is the completion of NUREG-0612 Phase II actions (which are defined in Generic Letter 85-11, Reference (8)).

To date, CYAPCO has not fully completed NUREG-0612 Phase II actions that fulfil the condition for the handling of spent fuel casks near or over the Spent Fuel Pool.

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission CY-01-108 Attachment 1/Page 3 of 11 CYAPCO anticipates future transfers of spent fuel from the Spent Fuel Pool in compliance with a Certificate of Compliance for an approved dry cask storage system.

Therefore, the reasons for the proposed changes are to provide revised Technical Specification requirements and Bases that:

"* Support the analytical assumptions for the safety analysis that is described in FSAR Section 15.2.2, Reference (9). (Existing restrictions are retained for cranes that are not qualified to the single-failure-proof criteria of NUREG-0612).

"* Identify that application of the single-failure-proof heavy load handling system, as defined by of NUREG-0612 Sections 5.1.2(1) and 5.1.6, fulfills the required condition for the movement of heavy loads, including spent fuel casks, near or over any area of the Spent Fuel Pool.

"* Restrict the handling of such loads to a crane and lifting devices that conform to the single-failure-proof heavy load handling system criteria of NUREG-0612 Sections 5.1.2(1) and 5.1.6.

Regulatory Guidance and Regculatory Analysis The proposed license amendment corresponds to application of a combination of design of systems, structures, components (SSCs), and procedures that support compliance with the applicable guidelines of NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," Reference (1).

Applicable Guidelines of NUREG-0612 The guidelines of Section 5.1 of NUREG-0612 provide a defense-in-depth approach to assure the safe handling of heavy loads near or over spent fuel at licensed commercial nuclear power plants.

General Requirements of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.1 In the Safety Evaluation for License Amendment 125, Ref. (7), the NRC acknowledged that the general guidance of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.1 (NUREG-0612 Phase I) was applicable to HNP heavy load handling near or over the Spent Fuel Pool. Specifically, the guidelines of Section 5.1.1 include guidance concerning: (a) safe load paths, (b) procedures, (c) qualifications of crane operators, (d) lifting devices, and (e) the inspection, testing, and maintenance of cranes and lifting devices used to lift heavy loads near or over irradiated fuel.

The proposed amendment supports conformance with this guidance.

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission CY-01 -108 Attachment 1/Page 4 of 11 Alternative Criteria Sets of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.2 In addition to identifying the applicability of the guidelines of Section 5.1.1, Section 5.1.2 (NUREG-0612 Phase II)also states that "heavy load handling operations in the spent fuel pool area" should satisfy one of four alternative sets of criteria.

The proposed license amendment corresponds to the first of the four alternative sets of criteria from NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.2, Alternative Criterion 5.1.2(1).

Specifically, Alternative Criterion 5.1.2(1) states:

"The overhead crane and associated lifting devices used for handling heavy loads in the spent fuel pool area should satisfy the single-failure-proof guidelines of Section 5.1.6 of this report. [Section 5.1.6 of NUREG-0612 concerns "Single-Failure-Proof Handling Systems."]

Unlike, the other three alternative criteria sets of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.2, Criterion 5.1.2(1) includes no requirements concerning analysis of postulated load drop or resulting consequences.

For the Haddam Neck Plant, the application of alternative criterion 5.1.2(1) is implementation of a Single-Failure-Proof Handling System that includes:

• An upgraded Yard Crane

• Special lifting devices

• Interfacing lift points such as lifting lugs and cask trunnions.

The proposed license amendment includes proposed changes to Technical Specifications and Bases that correspond to the application of a Single-Failure-Proof Handling System, as defined by NUREG-0612 Sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2(1), and 5.1.6, for the following types of crane loads:

"* Any load in excess of 1800 pounds that is moved over any fuel assembly in the Spent Fuel Pool

"* Any heavy load as defined in NUREG-0612, including a spent fuel cask, that is moved near or over any area of the Spent Fuel Pool.

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission CY-01 -108 Attachment 1/Page 5 of 11 Technical Analysis CYAPCO is presently awaiting NRC approval of the NAC International (NAC)

Request for Amendment of the Certificate of Compliance for the NAC, Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) System (Certificate No. 1025) to incorporate the Haddam Neck Plant spent fuel as approved contents. In describing operations for the transfer of spent fuel assemblies from a Spent Fuel Pool to a Transportable Storage Canister within a Vertical Concrete Cask (components of the MPC system),

the submitted NAC MPC SAR, Reference (10), refers to the application of a "cask handling crane" and specific handling devices that comply with the single-failure proof system criteria of NUREG-0612 for the movement of heavy loads over or near the Spent Fuel Pool.

The NAC-MPC SAR identifies a combined weight of a Transportable Storage Canister within a Transfer Cask that is within the approximate weight range for a Spent Fuel Shipping Cask (15 - 110 tons) as listed in the categories of heavy loads from Table 3.1-1 of NUREG-0612. The NAC-MPC SAR also identifies a weight for a fully loaded Transfer Cask and canister that is within the approximate weight range for a Spent Fuel Shipping Cask as listed in Table 3.1-1 of NUREG-0612.

Currently, CYAPCO has no cask handling crane that is qualified to one of the four alternative sets of criteria from NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.2. Therefore, in anticipation of transfers of spent fuel in compliance with a Certificate of Compliance for an approved dry cask storage system, it is necessary to upgrade the existing Yard Crane to meet the single-failure-proof criterion of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.2(1).

Additionally, as stated in the NAC-MPC SAR, anticipated transfer of spent fuel assemblies from a Spent Fuel Pool include the movement of a canister shield lid over irradiated fuel within a transportable storage canister located in the Cask Laydown Area of the Spent Fuel Pool. The NAC-MPC SAR identifies that the weight of the canister shield lid is greater than 1800 pounds, the maximum permissible weight over a fuel assembly as specified in existing Technical Specification 3/4.9.7.

Therefore, it is necessary to upgrade the existing Yard Crane to meet the single-failure-proof criterion of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.2(1).

Ederer Incorporated has been contracted to upgrade the existing Yard Crane.

The upgrade work is currently scheduled to occur during the third and fourth quarter of 2001.

The upgraded system will include: (a) the existing support structure, (b) the modified bridge, (c) the modified trolley from the Turbine Building Crane, and (d) an X-SAM main hoist.

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission CY-01-108 Attachment 1/Page 6 of 11 The resulting combination of bridge, trolley and hoist components for the upgraded Yard Crane corresponds to that described in Ederer Incorporated Generic Licensing Topical Report EDR-I(P)-A, entitled "Ederer's Nuclear Safety-Related Extra Safety and Monitoring (X-SAM) Cranes," Revision 3 (Reference (2)). That topical report describes the design and testing of the 'single-failure-proof' features which are intended for handling heavy loads near and over the Spent Fuel Pool.

By letter dated January 2, 1980, Reference (3), the NRC issued a Topical Report Evaluation concluding that" ... .the design features described in the topical report

[Revision 1] are acceptable for assuring that a single failure will not result in the loss of capability to safely retain a critical load." This NRC Topical Report Evaluation was later updated by a NRC Safety Evaluation issued on August 26, 1983, Reference (4).

In accordance with the stipulation in the NRC's January 2, 1980 Topical Report Evaluation, we have enclosed as Attachments 2 and 3, the Appendix B and Appendix C supplements to the generic licensing topical report EDR-I(P)-A.

These supplements provide a summary of plant-specific information supplied by Ederer Incorporated and CYAPCO.

No Significant Hazards Consideration CYAPCO has reviewed the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of Amendment," and concluded that the changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration (SHC). The proposed changes do not involve an SHC because the change would not:

1. Involve a significant increasein the probabilityor consequences of an accidentpreviously evaluated.

Concerning the application of a single-failure-proof handling system for handling heavy loads near or over the Spent Fuel Pool, NUREG-0612 "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" asserts that the probability of an accidental load drop while handling loads over the spent fuel is insignificant.

Under the proposed amendment, the evaluation criteria of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1 are satisfied by the combination of (a) the continued implementation of procedures and the practices for both the Fuel Handling Cranes and the Yard Crane that provide conformance with the guidelines of Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612, and (b) the application of a single-failure-proof handling system that satisfies the criteria of NUREG-0612 Sections 5.1.2(1) and 5.1.6 for the movement of any load with a weight greater than 1800 pounds either (i) over any spent fuel assembly in the Spent Fuel Pool or (ii) near or over any area of the Spent Fuel Pool, including the Spent Fuel Cask Laydown Area.

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission CY-01 -108 Attachment 1/Page 7 of 11 The proposed amendment retains existing restrictions on crane travel for the Fuel Handling Cranes, which are not qualified to the single-failure-proof criteria of NUREG-0612. These retained restrictions continue to support the existing safety analysis of Section 15.2.2 "Fuel Handling Accident" of the UFSAR, Reference (9).

Additionally, the proposed amendment corresponds to the application of a single-failure-proof handling system to fulfill the NUREG-0612 Phase II condition that is required prior to the handling of a spent fuel cask near or over any area of the Spent Fuel Pool.

Therefore, the proposed amendment will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes will allow the handling by a single-failure-proof handling system of loads in excess of 1800 pounds over fuel assemblies in any region of the Spent Fuel Pool, including the Spent Fuel Cask Laydown Area.

Additionally, the proposed changes correspond to the application of a single-failure proof handling system for the fulfillment of the required condition for the handling of spent fuel casks near or over any area of the Spent Fuel Pool. This required condition is identified in the documentation for the NRC Issuance of License Amendment 125, Ref. (7); and it is acknowledged in the CYAPCO submittal for the proposed license amendment that was issued as License Amendment 188, Ref. (5) and the NRC Issuance of License Amendment 195, Ref. (6).

NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.2 identifies that the capability of a single-failure-proof handling system to handle heavy loads has been identified as equivalent in risk to the capabilities of a non-single-failure-proof heavy load handling system that complies with the criteria of one of the other three alternative sets from NUREG-0612 (including alternative criteria that include analyses concerning postulated heavy load drops.)

A structural evaluation of the heavy load interfaces within the Spent Fuel Cask Laydown Area and the Cask Transfer Bay was performed per the requirements of EDR-1 Appendix B and C (Attachments 2 and 3). The results of the evaluation confirmed the design bases for the Spent Fuel Pool and the Spent Fuel Building are maintained.

As such, use of a single-failure-proof handling system precludes the possibility of a heavy load drop which could cause an accident outside of the existing design bases.

Additionally, the proposed changes retain existing restrictions on the travel of non-single-failure-proof cranes over fuel assemblies in the Spent Fuel Pool. These retained restrictions continue to support the existing safety analysis of Section 15.2.2 "Fuel Handling Accident" of the UFSAR, Reference (9).

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission CY-01 -108 Attachment 1/Page 8 of 11 Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Section 5.1.2 of NUREG-0612 identifies that each of the four alternative sets of criteria for the handling of heavy loads near or over the Spent Fuel Pool, including over fuel assemblies, provides a level of safety that is essentially equivalent to the level of safety provided by any of the other three alternative sets of criteria.

The proposed change corresponds to the application of the first of the four alternative sets of criteria, which is described in NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.2(1),

implementation of a single-failure-proof handling system.

Additionally, the proposed change includes the retention of existing crane travel restrictions for the Fuel Handling Cranes, therefore, maintaining the existing margin of safety concerning the operation of those other cranes.

Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Similar Changes In the March 6, 1986 Federal Register Notice, the NRC listed examples of changes which are considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations.

Example (iv) from the list states:

"A relief granted upon demonstration of acceptable operation from an operating restriction that was imposed because acceptable operation was not yet demonstrated. This assumes that the operating restriction and criteria to a request for relief has been established in a prior review and that it is justified in a satisfactory way that the criteria have been met."

The proposed amendment is similar to the above example. The "operating restriction" that has "been established in a prior review" is the prohibition on the movement of a crane load with a weight in excess of 1800 pounds over any fuel assembly by the application of any crane (existing LCO 3.9.7). The "criteria to be applied to a request for relief" that "have been established in a prior review' are the alternative criteria for a single-failure-proof handling system corresponding to Sections 5.1.2(1) and 5.1.6 of NUREG-0612.

Conclusion Thus, the proposed amendment to the Facility Operating License does not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10CFR50.92.

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission CY-01-108 Attachment 1/Page 9 of 11 Environmental Consideration CYAPCO has reviewed the proposed license amendment against the criteria of 10CFR51.22 for environmental considerations.

This amendment request satisfies the criteria specified in 10CFR51.22(c)(9) for a categorical exclusion from the requirements to perform an environmental assessment or to prepare an environmental impact statement. The criteria of 10CFR51.22(c)(9) are addressed as follows:

(i) The amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

As discussed in the "No Significant Hazards" Section above, the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

(ii) There is no significant change in the types or significantincrease in the amounts of effluents that may be releasedoffsite.

The proposed license amendment corresponds to the direct implementation of systems, structures, and procedures that satisfy the requirements of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.1 and the first of the four alternative sets of criteria from Section 5.1.2, Alternative Criterion 5.1.2(1), a single-failure-proof handling system for heavy loads.

As previously discussed, NUREG-0612 identifies that application of the single-failure-proof heavy load handling system criteria, defined by NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.2(1), provides an acceptable alternative to documented analysis of the radiological release consequences of a postulated heavy load drop. For any planned movement of a spent fuel cask or other heavy load near or over the Spent Fuel Pool, there will be application of an upgraded Yard Crane and handling devices that comply with the single-failure-proof criteria of NUREG-0612 Sections 5.1.2(1) and 5.1.6.

The proposed changes have been compared with the requirements of the Radiological Effluent Monitoring program and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

No changes to these radioactive monitoring and effluent programs are needed as a result of the proposed changes.

Therefore, the proposed changes involve no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of effluents that may be released offsite.

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission CY-01 -108 Attachment 1/Page 10 of 11 (iii) There is no significantincrease in individual or cumulative occupational radiationexposure.

As stated previously, the proposed license amendment corresponds to the direct implementation of systems, structures, and procedures that satisfy the requirements of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.1 and the first of the four alternative sets of criteria from Section 5.1.2, Alternative Criterion 5.1.2(1), a single-failure-proof handling system for heavy loads.

As previously discussed, NUREG-0612 identifies that application of the single-failure-proof heavy load handling system criteria, defined by NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.2(1), provides an acceptable alternative to documented analysis of the radiological release consequences of a postulated heavy load drop. For any planned movement of a spent fuel cask or other heavy load near or over the Spent Fuel Pool, there will be application of an upgraded Yard Crane and handling devices that comply with the single-failure-proof criteria of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.2(1) and NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.6.

Additionally, prior to use of the single-failure-proof handling system for activities corresponding to 10 CFR 72 Subpart K (General License for Storage of Spent Fuel at Power Reactor Sites), CYAPCO will perform written evaluations compliant with the requirements of 10CFR72.212(b). Among these are evaluations that:

(i) Establish that the conditions set forth in the applicable Certificate of Compliance have been met, (ii) Establish that the radioactive material requirements of 10 CFR 72.104 have been met, and (iii) Determine if the effectiveness of radiation protection program is decreased.

Therefore, the proposed changes to Technical Specifications involve no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Conclusion Thus, the proposed changes to Technical Specifications satisfy the criteria provided in 10CFR51.22(c)(9) for categorical exclusion from the requirements of an environmental impact statement or environmental assessment.

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission CY-01 -108 Attachment 1/Page 11 of 11 References (1) US NRC NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants,"

published July 1980.

(2) Generic Licensing Topical Report EDR-I (P) - A, "EDERER'S Nuclear Safety Related eXtra Safety And Monitoring (X-SAM) CRANES," Revision 3, Amendment 3, dated October 8, 1982.

(3) NRC Topical Report Evaluation for EDR-1 (P)-A, Rev. 1, included in letter from USNRC to Ederer Incorporated, "Review and Acceptance of Topical Report EDR-1, Ederer's Nuclear Safety Related eXtra-Safety And Monitoring (X-SAM) Cranes, Revision 1," dated January 2, 1980.

(4) NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Generic Licensing Topical Report EDR-1, Rev. 3 included in Letter from USNRC to Ederer Incorporated, "Acceptance for Referencing of Licensed Topical Report EDR-1 (P), Ederer Nuclear Safety-Related Extra Safety and Monitoring (X-SAM) Cranes,"

dated August 26, 1983.

(5) Letter from J.F. Opeka (CYAPCO) to USNRC, "Haddam Neck Plant Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Spent Fuel Pool Capacity Expansion,"

Letter Number B15136, dated March 31, 1995.

(6) Letter from T.L. Fredrichs (NRC) to R.A. Mellor (CYAPCO), "Haddam Neck Plant - Issuance of Amendment RE: Relocation of Requirements to Licensee Controlled Documents (TAC No. MA5756)," dated October 19, 1999.

(7) Letter from US NRC to CYAPCO, dated April 26, 1990, Issuance of Amendment 125.

(8) NRC Generic Letter 85-11, "Completion of Phase IIof 'Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants' NUREG-0612," dated June 28, 1985.

(9) Haddam Neck Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR),

Change 34, dated August 2, 2000.

(10) NAC-MPC Safety Analysis Report for the NAC Multi-Purpose Canister System Amendment for Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, Revision MPC-01 B, dated April 2001.

Docket No. 50-213 CY-01 -108 Attachment 2 Haddam Neck Plant Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Appendix B Supplement to Generic Licensing Topical Report EDR-1 September 2001

9L~c-Y D-7 KGW- &x- C)3 APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT TO GENERIC LICENSING TOPICAL REPORT EDR-1

SUMMARY

OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER, INCORPORATED HADDAM NECK PLANT YARD CRANE BECHTEL SUBCONTRACT NO. 24265-SC-i 17 EDERER S.O. NO. F2675 REVISION B SECHTL 24265 SUPPUER DOCUMENT REVIEW STATUS 07/02/01 2 0 RW P.

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OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER, INCORPORATED HADDAM NECK PLANT TABLE OF CONTENTS AND REVISION STATUS DESCRIPTION PAGE NO. REVISION TITLE PAGE i B TABLE OF CONTENTS & REVISION STATUS ii B iii B TOPICAL REPORT SECTION III.C (C.l.a) 1 B III.C (C.1.b) 1 B III.C (C.2.b) & III.E.4 1 B III.C (C.2.b) & III.E.4 2 B III.C (C.3.e) 2 B REG. GUIDE 1.104 (C.3.f) 3 B III.C (C3.h) & III.E.1 3 B III.C (C.3.i) 3 B III.C (C. 1.j) 4 B III.C (C.3.k) 5 B REG. GUIDE 1.104 (C.3.o) 5 B REG. GUIDE 1.104 (C.3.p) 5 B REG. GUIDE 1.104 (C.3.q) 6 B III.D. 1 6 B III.D.2 6 B

ii REVISION B 07/02/01 EDR-1 APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT

SUMMARY

OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER, INCORPORATED HADDAM NECK PLANT TABLE OF CONTENTS AND REVISION STATUS TOPICAL REPORT SECTION PAGE NO. REVISION III.D.3 7 B III.D.5 7 B III.D.6 7 B III.F. 1 7 B III.F. 1 8 B iii

REVISION B 7/2/01 Page I of 8 EDR-I APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT

SUMMARY

OF FACILITY SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR HADDAM NECK PLANT REG.GUIDE TOPICAL I. 104 REPORT INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA POSITION SECTION C. .a III.C (C. I.a) I. THE ACTUAL CRANE DUTY CLASSIFICATION THE CRANE HAS A CLASS "A" OF THE CRANE SPECIFIED BY THE APPLICANT CRANE DUTY CLASSIFICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH CMAA SPECIFICATION 170 - 2000.

C.I.b III.C (C.I.b) I THE MINIMUM OPERATING TEMPERATURE THE MAIN HOIST WAS DESIGNED AND OF THE CRANE SPECIFIED BY THE APPLICANT. FABRICATED FOR A MINIMUM OPERATING TEMPERATURE OF -25 0 F.

C.2,b III.C (C.2.b) I. THE MAXIMUM EXTENT OF LOAD MOTION THE MAIN HOIST WAS III.E.4 AND THE PEAK KINETIC ENERGY OF THE DESIGNED SUCH THAT THE LOAD FOLLOWING A DRIVE TRAIN FAILURE. MAXIMUM VERTICAL LOAD MOTION FOLLOWING A DRIVE TRAIN FAILURE IS LESS TtAN 1.5 FOOT AND THE MAXIMUM KINETIC ENERGY OF THE LOAD IS LESS THAN THAT RESULTING FROM ONE INCH OF FREE FALL OF THE MAXIMUM CRITICAL LOAD.

REVISION B 7/2/01 Page 2 of 8 EDR-I APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT

SUMMARY

OF FACILITY SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR HADDAM NECK PLANT REG.GUIDE TOPICAL 1.104 REPORT INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA POSITION SECTION C.2.b 2. PROVISIONS FOR ACTUATING THE 2. PROVISIONS FOR AUTOMATICALLY EMERGENCY DRUM BRAKE PRIOR TO ACTUATING THE EMERGENCY DRUM TRAVERSING WITH THE LOAD, WHEN BRAKE PRIOR TO TRAVERSING WITII REQUIRED TO ACCOMMODATE THE THE LOAD ARE NOT REQUIRED. PLANT LOAD MOTION FOLLOWING A DRIVE PROCEDURES WILL LIMIT TI IE HEIGHT TRAIN FAILURE. OF CRITICAL LIFTS TO GREATER THAN THAN 1.5 FEET ABOVE ANY SURFACE IN THE SPENT FUEL BUILDING WIIICII HAS NOT BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY EVALUATION TO SUPPORT SAFE OPERATION OF THE FACILITY FOLLOWING DAMAGE RESULTING FROM A DRIVE TRAIN FAILURE.

C.3.e III.C(C.3.e) I. THE MAXIMUM CABLE LOADING FOLLOWING I. THE MAXIMUM CABLE LOADING A WIRE ROPE FAILURE IN TERMS OF THE FOLLOWING A WIRE ROPE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ESTABLISI lED IN FAILURE IN THE MAIN SECTION III.C (C.3.e) HOIST MEETS THE MAXIMUM ALLOWED BY THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ESTABLISHED IN SECTION III.C (C.3.e).

REVISION B 7/2/01 Page 3 of 8 EDR-l APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT

SUMMARY

OF FACILITY SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR HADDAM NECK PLANT REG.GUIDE TOPICAL 1.104 REPORT INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA POSITION SECTION C.3.f I. MAXIMUM FLEET ANGLE 1. 3.5 DEGREES.

2. NUMBER OF REVERSE BENDS 2. NONE, OTHtER THAN THE ONE BETWEEN THE WIRE ROPE DRUM AND THE FIRST SHEAVE IN THE LOAD BLOCK.

3. SHEAVE DIAMETER 3. 16 X WIRE'ROPE DIAMETER, C.3.h III.C (C.3.h) I. THIE MAXIMUM EXTENT OF MOTION AND I. THE MAIN HOIST WAS II.E.I I PEAK KINETIC ENERGY OF THE LOAD DESIGNED SUCH THAT THE FOLLOWING A SINGLE WIRE ROPE FAILURE. MAXIMUM LOAD MOTION FOLLOWING A SINGLE WIRE ROPE FAILURE IS LESS THAN 1.5 FOOT AND THE MAXIMUM KINETIC ENERGY OF THE LOAD IS LESS THAN THAT RESULTING FROM ONE INCH OF FREE FALL OF THE MAXIMUM CRITICAL LOAD.

C.3.i III.C (C.3.i) I. THE TYPE OF LOAD CONTROL EDERER AC FLUX VECTOR SYSTEM SPECIFIED BY THE (MAIN HOIST)

APPLICANT.

2. WHETHER INTERLOCKS ARE 2. THE CRANE WILL NOT BE RECOMMENDED BY REGULATORY USED TO LIFT FUEL ELEMENTS GUIDE 1.13 TO PREVENT TROLLEY FROM THE REACTOR CORE OR AND BRIDGE MOVEMENTS WHILE SPENT FUEL RACKS. THEREFORE, FUEL ELEMENTS ARE BEING INTERLOCKS TO PREVENT LIFTED AND WHETIER THEY ARE TROLLEY AND BRIDGE MOVE PROVIDED FOR TillS APPLICATION. MENTS WHILE IIOISTING HAVE NOT BEEN PROVIDED.

REVISION B 7/2/01 Page 4 of 8 EDR-1 APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT

SUMMARY

OF FACILITY SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR HADDAM NECK PLANT REG.GUIDE TOPICAL I. 104 REPORT INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA POSITION SECTION C.3.j II.C (C.3.j) 1. THE MAXIMUM CABLE AND I THE ENERGY ABSORBING TORQUE MACHINERY LOADING THAT WOULD LIMITER (EATL) WAS DESIGNED RESULT IN THE EVENT OF A HIGH SUCH THAT THE MAXIMUM SPEED TWO BLOCKING, ASSUMING MiACHINERY LOAD, WHICH WOULD A CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ESULT IN THE EVENT A TWO BLOCKING THAT WOULD ALLOW TIlE FULL OCCURS WHILE LIFTING BREAKDOWN TORQUE OF THE MOTOR THE RATED LOAD AT TIlE RATED TO BE APPLIED TO TIlIE DRIVE SPEED AND THAT ALLOWS TIlE MOTOR SHAFT. FULL BREAKDOWN TORQUE OF THE MOTOR TO BE APPLIED TO THE DRIVE SHAFT, WILL NOT EXCEED 3 TIMES THE DESIGN RATED LOADING. IN ADDITION, THE EATL DESIGN DOES NOT ALLOW THE MAXIMUM CABLE LOADING TO EXCEED THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ESTABLISHED IN SECTION III.C (C.3.e) DURING THE ABOVE DESCRIBED TWO- BLOCKINGS.

2. MEANS OF PREVENTING TWO 2 THE 20 TON AUXILIARY HOIST HAS ONE BLOCKING OF AUXILIARY HOIST, ROTARY LIMIT SWITCH AND ONE BLOCK IF PROVIDED ACTUATED LIMIT SWITCH THAT EACH INDEPENDENTLY PREVENTS TWO BLOCKING.

THE AUXILIARY HOIST IS NOT BEING UPGRADED TO SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF CRITERIA; AND IT WILL NOT BE UTILIZED FOR CRITICAL LIFTS.

REVISION B 7/2/01 Page 5 of 8 EDR-I APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT

SUMMARY

OF FACILITY SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR ItlADDAM NECK PLANT REG.GUIDE TOPICAL I.104 REPORT INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA POSITION SECTION C.3.k III.C(C.3.k) I. TYPE OF DRUM SAFETY I. THE ALTERNATE DESIGN DRUM SUPPORT PROVIDED. SAFETY RESTRAINT SHOWN IN FIGURE III.D.4 OF EDR-I IS ARRANGED TO COUNTER GEAR AND BRAKE FORCES AS WELL AS DOWNWARD LOADS.

THESE BRACKETS ACT ON THE DIAMETER OF THE ENDS OF THE DRUM ON THE MAIN HOIST.

C.3.o I. TYPE OF MAIN HOIST DRIVE TO I. AC FLUX VECTOR.

PROVIDE INCREMENTAL MOTION.

C.3.p I. MAXIMUM TROLLEY SPEED 1. THE TROLLEY SPEED IS 50 F.P.M. REFERENCE CMAA SPECIFICATION 70, 1975 FIGURE 70-6, 100 TONS, SLOW SPEED.

2. MAXIMUM BRIDGE SPEED 2. TIlE BRIDGE SPEED WILL BE REDUCED TO 50 F.P.M. REFERENCE CMAA SPECIFICATION 70,1975 FIGURE 70-6, 100 TONS, SLOW SPEED.

3. TYPE OF OVERSPEED 3. BOTH THE TROLLEY AND BRIDGE DRIVES PROTECTION FOR THE ARE POWERED BY AC MOTORS THAT CANNOT TROLLEY AND BRIDGE DRIVES. OVERSPEED, SINCE THEIR MAXIMUM SPEED IS LIMITED BY THE 60 HZ LINE FREQUENCY.

THEREFORE, OVERSPEED SENSORS THAT ACTUATE THE TROLLEY AND BRIDGE DRIVE BRAKES HAVE NOT BEEN PROVIDED.

REVISION B 7/2/01 Page 6 of 8 FDI)R-I APPEND)IX B SUPPLEMENT

SUMMARY

OF FACILITY SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR IIADDAM NECK PLANT REG.GUIDE TOPICAL 1.104 REPORT INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA POSITION SECTION C.3.q CONTROL STATION LOCATION I. THE COMPLETE OPERATING CONTROL SYSTEM, INCLUDING THE EMERGENCY STOP BUTTONS, ARE LOCATED ON THE REMOTE RADIO CONTROL STATION AND THE BACKUP CRANE PENDANT STATION.

III.D.I THE TYPE OF EMERGENCY DRUM I. PNEUMATICALLY BRAKE USED, INCLUDING TYPE RELEASED BAND BRAKE WILL BE OF RELEASE MECHANISM. USED FOR THE MAIN HOIST.

2. THE RELATIVE LOCATION OF 2. THE EMERGENCY DRUM BRAKE TIlE EMERGENCY DRUM BRAKE. ENGAGES THE WIRE ROPE DRUM OF THE MAIN HOIST.

3. EMERGENCY DRUM BRAKE 3. THE MAIN HOIST EMERGENCY DRUM CAPACITY. BRAKE HAS A MINIMUM CAPACITY OF 125% OF THAT REQUIRED TO HOLD "THE DESIGN RATED LOAD.

III.D.2 I. NUMBER OF FRICTION SURFACES I. THE MAIN HOIST EATL HAS 21 IN EATL. FRICTION SURFACES.

2. EATL TORQUE SETTING 2. THE SPECIFIED EATL TORQUE SETTING IS APPROXIMATELY 130% OF THE MAIN HOIST DESIGN RATED LOAD.

REVISION B 7/2/01 Page 7 of 8 EIDR-i APPENDIX B SUI*PLEMENT

SUMMARY

OF FACILITY SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR I IADDAM NECK PLANT REG.GUIDE TOPICAL 1.104 REPORT INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA POSITION SECTION III.D.3 I. TYPE OF FAILURE DETECTION I. A TOTALLY MECHANICAL DRIVE SYSTEM. TRAIN CONTINUITY DETECTOR AND EMERGENCY DRUM BRAKE ACTUATOR HAVE BEEN PROVIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPENDIX G OF REVISION 3 OF EDR-I FOR THE MAIN HOIST.'

III.D.5 I. TYPE OF HYDRAULIC LOAD I. MAIN HOIST HYDRAULIC LOAD EQUALIZATION SYSTEM. EQUALIZATION SYSTEM INCLUDES BOTH FEATURES DESCRIBED IN SECTION III.D.5.

III.D.6 I. TYPE OF HOOK. I. THE MAIN HOOK HAS A SINGLE LOAD PATH.

2. HOOK DESIGN LOAD 2. THE MAIN HOOK DESIGN CRITICAL LIFT LOAD IS 100 TONS WITH A 10:1 FACTOR OF SAFETY ON ULTIMATE.

3. 1OOK TEST LOAD 3. THlE TEST LOAD FOR EACII LOAD PATH OF THE MAIN HOOK WILL BE 200 TONS.

III. F. I I. DESIGN RATED LOAD. I. MAIN HOIST - 100 TONS

2. MAXIMUM CRITICAL LOAD 2. MAIN HOIST- 100 TONS RATING.

REVISION B 7/2/01 Page 8 of 8 EDR-I APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT

SUMMARY

OF FACILITY SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR IHADDAM NECK PLANT REG.GUIDE TOPICAL I. 104 REPORT INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA POSITION SECTION III.F.1 3. TROLLEY WEIGHT (NET). 3. 90,000 LBS. (INCLUDING HOOKS).

4. TROLLEY WEIGHT (WITH LOAD) 4. 290,000 LBS.

5. HOOK LIFT. 5. MAIN HOOK- 76 FEET, 0 INCHES

6. NUMBER OF WIRE ROPE DRUMS 6. TIlE MAIN HOIST HAS ONE WIRE ROPE DRUM.

7. NUMBER OF PARTS OF WIRE. 7. MAIN HOIST - 4 PARTS PER WIRE ROPE, 2 ROPES, WITH (2) ROPES OFF DRUM.

8. DRUM SIZE (PITCH DIAMETER). 8. MAIN HOIST - 34 INCHES

9. WIRE ROPE DIAMETER 9. MAIN HOIST- I .25 INCH

10. WIRE ROPE TYPE. 10. MAIN HOIST-6x37 CLASS EEIPS/IWRC iI. WIRE ROPE MATERIAL. II. CARBON STEEL

12. WIRE ROPE BREAKING STRENGTH. 12, MAIN HOIST-2 15,800 LBS.

13. WIRE ROPE YIELD STRENGTH 13. MAIN HOIST- 172,640 LBS.

14. WIRE ROPE RESERVE STRENGTH. 14. MAIN HOIST- 0.582

15. NUMBER OF WIRE ROPES. 15. THE MAIN HOIST HAS TWO ROPES.

Docket No. 50-213 CY-01-108 Attachment 3 Haddam Neck Plant Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Appendix C Supplement to Generic Licensing Topical Report EDR-1 September 2001

onq9,*- Soo - "q c)- WyyN6: -Goo C..o- o*ýý APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT TO GENERIC LICENSING TOPICAL REPORT EDR-1

SUMMARY

OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT HADDAM NECK PLANT YARD CRANE BECHTEL SUBCONTRACT NO. 24265-SC-i 17 EDERER S.O. NO. F2675 BECHTEL 24M REVISION B fl SUPPLIER DOCUMENT REVIEW STATUS I st*wtmap 07/02/01 2 0 fPUtw iny iSdbýdaat&

4 0 ftVw*s.m..ymins

_sas ad -ssdy---~s..sh e I* PREPARED: a.

/

u__m' PROJECT ENGINEER, EDERER IjC ePORATED 6

V CHECKED:

EDERER, INCORPORATED REVIEWED: * '

QUALITY ASSURANCE MANAGER EDERER, INCORPORATED APPROVED CHIEF ENG9EER, INCORPORATED i

EDR-1 APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT

SUMMARY

OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT HADDAM NECK PLANT REVISION B 07/02/01 TABLE OF CONTENTS AND REVISION STATUS DESCRIPTION PAGE NO. REVISION TITLE PAGE i B TABLE OF CONTENTS & REVISION STATUS ii B TOPICAL REPORT SECTION III.C (C.1.b(1)) 1 B III.C (C. 1.b(3)) 1 B III.C (C.1.b(4)) 1 B III.C (C.4.d) 1 B III.C (C. 1.c) 1 B III.C (C.l.d) 2 B III.C (C.1.e) 3 B III.C (C. 1.f) 3 B III.C (C.2.b) III.E.4 4 B III.C (C.2.c) 4 B III.C (C.2.d) 4 B III.C (C.2.d) 5 B III.C (C.3.b) 5 B III.C (C.3.t) 6 B REG. GUIDE 1.104 (C.3.u) 6 B REG. GUIDE 1.104 (C.4.a) 7 B REG. GUIDE 1.104 (C.4.b) 7 B REG. GUIDE 1.104 (C.4.c) 7 B REG. GUIDE 1.104 (C.4.d) 7 B III.C (C.5.a) 7 B ii

REVISION B 07/02/01 Page 1 of 7 EDR-I APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT

SUMMARY

OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT HADDAM NECK PLANT REG.GUIDE 1.104 TOPICAL INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA REPORT POSITION SECTION ui.c(c. I.b.(i)) I. THE EXTENT OF VENTING OF CLOSED I. CLOSED BOX SECTIONS ARE NOT VENTED SINCE BOX SECTIONS. THE CRANE IS NOT HOUSED IN A PRESSURIZED CONTAINMENT BUILDING.

C. I.b(3) III.C(C. I.b(3)) I. THE NONDESTRUCTIVE AND COLD I. THE EXISTING CRANE BRIDGE, INCLUDING ALL C. I.b(4) PROOF TESTING TO BE PERFORMED ACCESSIBLE STRUCTURAL WELDS, WILL BE III.C(C. I.b(4))

ON EXISTING STRUCTURAL MEMBERS INSPECTED BY A COMPETENT STRUCTURAL C.4.d III.C(C.4.d) FOR WHICI I SATISFACTORY IMPACT ENGINEER. VISUAL INDICATIONS OF TEST DATA IS NOT AVAILABLE. STRUCTURAL DEGRADATION OF THE EXISTING BRIDGE WILL BE INVESTIGATED FURTHER BY THE APPROPRIATE NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION TECHNIQUES. THE AMBIENT TEMPERATURE WHEN THE 125% STATIC ILOAD TEST IS PERFORMED WILL BE THE MINIMUM OPERATING TEMPERATURE FOR TIlE CRANE. IN THE EVENT THAT THE CRANE MUST BE OPERATED AT A LOWER TEMPERATURE, ANOTHER 125% STATIC PROOF TEST WILL BE PERFORMED AT THE LOWER TEMPERATURE.

C.l.c III.C(C. I.c) I. THE EXTENT TIlE CRANE'S I. TIlE CRANE SUPPORT STRUCTURE, MODIFIED STRUCTURES WHICH ARE NOT BEING BRIDGE AND REPLACEMENT TROLLEY REPLACED ARE CAPABLE OF STRUCTURE FROM T1lE EX ISTING TURBINE MEETING THE SEISMIC CRANE, WITH TIlE NEW MAIN HOIST, ARE REQUIREMENTS OF REGULATORY SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED WHI-LE SUPPORTING GUIDE 1.29. THE MAXIMUM CRITICAL LOAD BASED UPON TIHE ACCELERATIONS USED IN CURRENT PLANT DESIGN.

REFERENCES:

FOR SUPPORT STRUCTURE - CY CALCULATION 97C2968(B)-0 I FOR BRIDGE AND TROLLEY STRUCTURES REPORT # 24265-500-VOO-MJKG-GOO 19

REVISION B 07/02/01 Page 2 of 7 EDR-I APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT

SUMMARY

OF REGULATORY POSITIONS 'I"O BE ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT IIADDAM NECK PLANT REG.GUIDE 1.104 TOPICAL INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA REPORT POSITION SECTION C. li.d III.C(C.I.d) 1. THE EXTENT WELDS JOINTS IN THE I. NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATIONS OF THE CRANE'S STRUCTURES, WHICH ARE EXISTING BRIDGE STRUCTURE WERE NOT NOT BEING REPLACED, WERE REQUIRED BY EXISTING REGULATIONS AT THE NONDESTRUCTIVELY EXAMINED. TIME OF CONSTRUCTION. HOWEVER, THIE X-SAM SYSTEM PROVIDES ADDITIONAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION, AND THE INSPEC2TIONS OF THE EXISTING STRUCTURE DESCRIBED IN C.I.b(3)

ABOVE ARE ADEQUATE TO ENSURE THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE EXISTING BRIDGE.

2. TilE EXTENT TIlE BASE MATERIAL, 2. THE WELD GEOMETRIES USED IN (A) THE AT JOINTS SUSCEPTIBLE TO EXISTING BRIDGE STRUCTURE AND (B) THE LAMELLAR TEARING, WAS REPLACEMENT TROLLEY STRUCTURE FROM THE NONDESTRUCTIVELY EXAMINED. EXISTING TURBINE BUILDING CRANE ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO LAMELLAR TEARING.

REVISION B 07/02/01 Page 3 of 7 EDR-1 APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT

SUMMARY

OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT 1lADDAM NECK PLANT REG.GUIDE 1.104 TOPICAL INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA REPORT POSITION SECTION C.I.e III.C(C. I.e) I. THE EXTENT THE CRANE'S I. THE YARD CRANE BRIDGE- ALL PAST AND STRUCTURES, WHlICHt ARE NOT BEING PROJECTED USE OF THE YARD CRANE BRIDGE, REPLACED ARE CAPABLE OF AT A MAXIMUM LOADING OF 100 TONS, IS WELL WITHSTANDING THE FATIGUE WITHIN THE CYCLIC LOADING CAPABILITY OF EFFECTS OF CYCLIC LOADING FROM THE EXISTING CRANE STRUCTURE. TIlE CRANE PREVIOUS AND PROJECTED USAGE, TROLLEY BEING UPGRADED F.ROM TIlE TURBINE INCLUDING ANY CONSTRUCTION BUILDING CRANE WAS DESIGNED FOR A RATED USAGE. CAPACITY OF 125 TONS WITH A 25% OCCASIONAL OVERLOAD AND A 33% ONE TIME CONSTRUCTION LIFT OVERLOAD CAPACITY FOR THE GENERATOR STATOR.

C.I.f III.C(C.I .f) I. THE EXTENT THE CRANE'S I. TIlE MATERIAL THICKNESSES OF (A) THE STRUCTURES WHICI I ARE NOT BEING EXISTING BRIDGE STRUCTURE AND (B) THE REPLACED, WERE POST-WELD HEAT REPLACEMENT TROLLEY STRUCTURE FROM THE TREATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUB EXISTING TURBINE BUILDING CRANE ARE SUCII ARTICLE 3.9 OF AWS DI.I, THAT PARAGRAtPH III.C (C.i.ff) OF EDR-I DOES NOT "STRUCTURAL WELDING CODE". REQUIRE POST-WELD HEAT-TREATMENT.

REVISION B 07/02/01 Page 4 of 7 EDR-I APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT

SUMMARY

OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT HADDAM NECK PLANT REG.GUIDE 1.104 TOPICAL INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA REPORT POSITION SECTION C.2.b III.C(C.2.b) 1. PROVISIONS FOR ACCOMMODATING EVALUATED AREAS IN THE SPENT FUEL CASK THE LOAD MOTION AND KINETIC LAYDOWN ARE.J AND THE CASK TRANSFER BAY IN ENERGY FOLLOWING A DRIVE TRAIN THE SPENT FUEL BUILDING ARE CAPABLE OF FAILURE WHEN THE LOAD IS BEING WITHSTANDING A MAXIMUM KINETIC ENERGY TRAVERSED AND WHEN IT IS BEING EQUIVALENT TO ONE (I) INCH OF FREE FALL OF THE RAISED OR LOWERED. LOAD, FOLLOWING A DRIVE TRAIN FAILURE, WITHlOUT COMPROMISING THE SAFE OPERATION OF THE FACILITY.

PLANT PROCEDURES WILL BE USED TO MAINTAIN A VERTICAL DISTANCE OF GREATER THAN 1.5 FEET BETWEEN A CRITICAL LOAD AND ANY SURFACE WITHIN THE SPENT FUEL BUILDING WHICH HAS NOT BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY EVALUATION TO SUPPORT SAFE OPERATION OF THE FACILITY FOLLOWING DAMAGE RESULTING FROM A DRIVE TRAIN FAILURE OF THE CRANE.

C.2.c IIlI.C(C.2.c) I. LOCATION OF SAFE LAYDOWN AREAS I. IN THE EVENT THAT SUCH REPAIRS TO THE FOR USE IN TIlE EVENT REPAIRS TO CRANE ARE REQUIRED, THE LOAD CAN BE THE CRANE ARE REQUIRED THAT PLACED IN T'HE EVALUATED SPENT FUEL POOL CANNOT BE MADE WITH THE LOAD CASK LAYDOWN AREA OR CASK TRANSFER BAY SUSPEN DED. WITIIIN THE SPENT FUEL BUILI)ING.

C.2.d III.C(C.2.d) I. SIZE OF REPLACEMENT COMPONENTS I. NOT APPLICABLE AS THE CRANE IS LOCATED THAT CAN BE BROUGHT INTO THE OUTSIDE THE SPENT FUEL BUILDING.

BUILDING FOR REPAIR OF THE CRANE WITtlOUT HAVING TO BREAK TIlE BUILDING INTEGRITY.

REVISION B 07/02/01 Page 5 of 7 EDR-I APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT

SUMMARY

OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT HADDAM NECK PLANT REG.GUIDE 1.104 TOPICAL INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA REPORT POSITION SECTION C.2.d III.C(C.2.d) 2. LOCATION OF AREA WHERE REPAIR 2. N/A WORK CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED ON THE FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE: (A) DOES NOT THE CRANE WITHOUT AFFECTING AUTHORIZE REACTOR OPERATIONS; AND (B)

TIlE SAFE SHUT-DOWN CAPABILITY PROHIBITS PLACEMENT OF FUEL IN REACTOR OF TIlE REACTOR.

VESSEL.

3. ANY LIMITATIONS ON REACTOR 3. N/A OPERATIONS THAT WOULD RESULT THE FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE: (A) DOES NOT FROM CRANE REPAIRS.

AUTHORIZE REACTOR OPERATIONS; AND (B)

PROHIBITS PLACEMENT OF FUEL IN REACTOR VESSEL C.3.b III.C(C.3.b) I. THE DESIGN MARGIN AND TYPE OF I. AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO A DUAL LOAD PATH LIFTING DEVICES THlAT ARE SYSTEM, TIlE NORMAL STRESS DESIGN FACTORS ATTACtlED TO THE HtOOK TO CARRY HAVE BEEN DOUBLED. EACH LIFTING DEVICE CRITICAL LOADS. ATTACHED TO THE HOOK TO CARRY CRITICAL LOADS WILL SUPPORT A LOAD SIX TIMES THE STATIC PLUS DYNAMIC LOAD BEING HANDLED WITHOUT PERMANENT DEFORMATION. TIlE SAFETY FACTOR IS 10:1 WHEN COMPARED TO ULTIMATE. THIiS IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH NUREG 0612- 1980, SECTION 5.1.6, PARAGRAPH I(A) AND ANSI N 14.6 - 1993, SECTION 7.2.1.

REVISION B 07/02/01 Page 6 of 7 EDR-I APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT

SUMMARY

OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT HADI)AM NECK PLANT REG.GUIDE 1.104 TOPICAL INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA REPORT POSITION SECTION C.3.t III.C(C.3.t) I. THE EXTENT CONSTRUCTION I. THE YARD CRANE BRIDGE- ALL PAST AND REQUIREMENTS FOR THIE CRANE'S PROJECTED USE OF THE YARD CRANE BRIDGE, IS STRUCTURES, WHICH WILL NOT BE A MAXIMUM LOADING OF 100 TONS. THE CRANE REPLACED, ARE MORE SEVERE THAN TROLLEY BEING UPGRADED FROM THE TURBINE THOSE FOR PERMANENT PLANT BUILDING CRANE WAS DESIGNED FOR A RATED SERVICE. CAPACITY OF 125 TONS WITH A 25% OCCASIONAL[

OVERLOAD AND A 33% ONE TIME CONSTRUCTION LIFT OVERLOAD CAPACITY FOR TIlE GENERATOR STATOR

2. A) AS DESCRIBED IN C. I.e THE CRANE TROLLEY

2. THE MODIFICATIONS AND WAS PREVIOUSLY UTILIZED ON THE TURBINE INSPECTIONS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BUILDING BRIDGE FOR MORE SEVERE LOADS ON THE CRANE FOLLOWING THAN THOSE FOR PERMANENT PLANT SERVICE.

CONSTRUCTION USE, WHICH WAS MORE SEVERE TtlAN 1"1lOSE FOR B) THE MAIN HOIST ASSEMBLY AND LOAD GIRT PERMANENT PLANT SERVICE. ARE BEING REPLACED AND THE INSPECTIONS OF "THE EXISTING MODIFIED TROLLEY DESCRIBED IN C. I.b (3) AND THE CHECKOUT TESTING DESCRIBED IN C.4.a ARE ADEQUATE TO ENSURE TI IE INTEGRITY OF THE TROLLEY ASSEMBLY. NO FUTURE CONSTRUCTION LIFTS ARE PLANNED TIIAT WILL BE MORE SEVERE THAN T]HE PERMANENT PLANT SERVICE.

C.3-.u 1. THE EXTENT OF INSTALLATION AND I . HIE INSTALLATION AND OPERATING OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS. INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE UPDATED BY EDERER TO FULLY COMPLY WIThI TIlE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION C.3.u OF REGULATORY GUIDE 1. 104 AND SECTIONS 7.1 AND 9 OF NUREG-0554 - 1979.

REVISION B 07/02/01 Page 7 of 7 EDR-1 APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT

SUMMARY

OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT HIADDAM NECK PLANT REG.GUIDE 1.104 TOPICAL INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED SPECIFIC CRANE DATA REPORT POSITION SECTION C.4.a 1. THE EXTENT OF ASSEMBLY I. PRIOR TO HANDLING CRITICAL LOADS, T1HE C.4.b CHECKOUT, TEST PROCEDURES, LOAD CRANE WILL BE GIVEN A COMPLETE ASSEMBLY TESTING AND RATED LOAD MARKING CHECKOUT, AND THEN GIVEN A NO-LOAD TEST C.4.c OF THE CRANE. OF ALL MOTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH C.4.d UPDATED PROCEDURES PROVIDED BY EDERER.

A 125% STATIC LOAD TEST AN.D 100%

PERFORMANCE TEST WILL ALSO BE PERFORMED AT THIS TIME IN ACCORDANCE WITH UPDATED TEST PROCEDURES PROVIDED BY EDERER. A NO LOAD TEST OF ALL MOTIONS AND A TWO BLOCKING TEST WILL BE PERFORMED BY EDERER PRIOR TO DELIVERY OF THE CRANE PER TOPICAL REPORT EDR- I. THE MAXIMUM CRITICAL LOAD IS PLAINLY MARKED ON EACH SIDE OF THE CRANE.

C.5.a III.C(C.5.a) I. THE EXTENT THE PROCUREMENT I. THE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS FOR (A) TI-E DOCUMENTS FOR THE CRANE'S EXISTING BRIDGE STRUCTURE AND (B) THE STRUCTURE'S, WHICH WILL NOT BE REPLACMENT TROLLEY STRUCTURE FROM TIlE REPLACED, REQUIRED THE CRANE EXISTING TURBINE BUILDING CRANE DID NOT MANUFACTURER TO PROVIDE A INVOKE IOCFR50 APPENDIX B, SINCE TIlE QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM CRANES WERE BUILT PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE CONSISTENT WITII TIlE PERTINENT OF THIS FEDERAL REGULATION. HOWEVER, PROVISIONS OF REGULATORY GUIDE BOTH CRANES WERE DESIGNED AND 1.28. MANUFACTURE[) BY MANNING, MAXWELL &

MOORE PER THE REQUIREMENTS OF AISC SPECIFICATION FOR THE DESIGN, FABRICATION AND ERECTION OF STRUCTURAL STEEL FOR BUILDINGS, AND THE ELECTRIC OVERIIEAD CRANE INSTITUTE SPECIFICATION. MATERIAL FOR STRUCTURAL PARTS WAS SPECIFIED TO CONFORM WITH TIlE LATEST REVISION OF SPECIFICATION FOR STEEL FOR BRIDGES OF THE ASTM DESIGNATION A-7.

Docket No. 50-213 CY-01 -108 Attachment 4 Haddam Neck Plant Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Marked Up Pages September 2001

December 14, 1999 INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY 3.0.1 D.ELE........ ..................... B 3/4 0-1

..................... B 3/4 0-2 3.0.2 ,............

3.0.3 DELETED 3.0.4 ............. ....... ,.............. 3/4 0-3 3/4 0-4 4.0.1 .... ,........

3/4 0-4 4.0.2 ..... ,..,.... ,......°..............

3/4 0-4 4.0.3 . . . ... .. . . . .. ,...................

0-5 3/4 4.0.4 ....... °,... ......................

3/4.1 DELETED 3/4.2 DELETED 3/4.3 DELETED 3/4.4 DELETED 3/4.5 DELETED 3/4.6 DELETED 3/4.7 DELETED 3/4.8 DELETED 3/4.9 SPENT FUEL BUILDING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 DELETED 3/4.9.2 DELETED 3/4.9.3 DELETED 3/4.9.4 DELETED 3/4.9.5 DELETED 3/4.9.6 DELETED 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL BUILDING .................... B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.8 DELETED 3/4.9.9 DELETED 3/4.9. 10 DELETED 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - SPENT FUEL POOL ......................... B 3/4 9--1, -3 3/4.9.12 DELETED 3/4.9.13 MOVEMENT OF FUEL IN SPENT FUEL POOL ................... B 3/4 9-x 3 3/4.9. 14 SPENT FUEL POOL - REACTIVITY CONDITION ................ B 3/4 9-> 3 3/4.9. 15 DELETED 3/4.9.16 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING - DEFUELED .................... B 3/4 9-) 3 3/4.10 DELETED 3/4 11 DELETED HADDAM NECK III Amendment No.125,127,158.17 5 ,.1 8 FS[NDEX.DOC

Beceember 14, 1'9997 SPENT FUEL BUILDING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL BLDING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.7 Loads > 1800 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool"!-:-

APPLICABILITY: With fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, place the crane load in a safe condition.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.7 Administrative controls reen the travel of loads > 1800 ounds over fuel assemblies ... l a lod 800pun.

• o*z L:.

HADDAM NECK 3/4 9-1 Amendment No. 125,158, 195 TS3S9. doc

Insert, A unless such loads are handled by the Single-Failure-Proof Handling System Insert B shall Insert C unless handled by the Single-Failure-Proof Handling System

rI A 1.-4,

)nnn 3/4.9 SPENT FUEL BUILDING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL SPENT FUEL BUILDING SI e estriction on move ent of loads in excess of the weight of a fuel and control rod assembly a d associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the spent fuel poo-ensures that in the event this load is dropped: (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the spent fuel pool racks will not result in a critical array. This is consistent with the activity release assumed in the safety analysis.

The restriction also ensures that the effects of any load drop on the spent fuel pool structural integrity is enveloped by the load drop analysis (Holtec Report HI-941225, Rev. 0, "Accident Analysis Report for CY Spent Fuel Racks,"

Dr. Yu Wang, Item 11, Holtec Project 40264) performed for License Amendment 188. 7 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL SPENT FUEL POOL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water inventory is available, so that in the event of a complete loss of forced cooling, the time to boil is > 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> (as of December 1997), based on an initial spent fuel pool temperature of 150 OF and no evaporative cooling.

3/4.9.13 MOVEMENT OF FUEL IN SPENT FUEL POOL The limitations of this specification ensure that, in the event of any fuel handling accident in the spent fuel pool, Keff will remain 0 0.95.

3/4.9.14 SPENT FUEL POOL - REACTIVITY CONDITION The limitations described by Figures 3.9-2, 3.9-3, and Figure 3.9-4 ensure that the reactivity of fuel assemblies introduced into the spent fuel pool racks, with no credit taken for soluble boron in the spent fuel pool, are conservatively within the assumptions of the safety analysis.

HADDAM NECK B3/4 9-1 Amendment No.125,158,175,188,193, 196 TSB3S9. doc

SPENT FUEL BUILDING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.16 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING - DEFUELED The primary basis for 150 OF is to limit thermal stresses on the spent fuel pool concrete structures due to the differential temperature across the internal and exterior surfaces of the walls and floor. The basis is further discussed in License Amendment No. 188.

As of May 1998, the spent fuel heat load was calculated to be

< 2.3E+06 BTU!hr. Each heat exchanger has the capability of removing this heat load. One spent fuel pool heat exchanger and one spent fuel pool cooling pump, that can be operated intermittently, is sufficient to remove the decay heat load.

Assuming no forced or evaporative cooling, the calculated May 1998 heatup rate is approximately 1.2 IF/hr. Thus, in the event of a complete loss of forced cooling arid assuming an initial spent fuel pool temperature of 150 OF, the time to boil, assuming no evaporative cooling, is > 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />. Therefore, sufficient time exists to either reestablish forced cooling or to provide makeup to maintain the spent fuel pool inventory.

HADDAM NECK B3/4 9-2 Amendment No. 125,115,188,193, 195 TS83S9.doc

Insert D FUEL HANDLING CRANES For the Fuel Handling Cranes, the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation and Surveillance Requirement provide a Insert E That restriction

Insert F SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF HANDLING SYSTEM Compliance with Alternative Criteria of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.2 Compliance with at least one of the alternative sets of criteria from NUREG-0612, "Controi of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," Section 5.1.2 is a requirement for the handling of heavy loads near or over any area of the Spent Fuel Pool.

Application of the Single-Failure-Proof Handling System conforms to the first of these alternative sets which is a combination of the criteria of Section 5.1.1 and the criteria of Section 5.1.2(1). Specifically:

Compliance with Criteria of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.1 Administrative procedures and controls for the Single-Failure-Proof Handling System support compliance with the general criteria of Section 5.1 .1. The general criteria of Section 5.1.1 address requirements concerning: (a) safe load paths, (b) procedures, (c) the training and qualification of crane operators, (d) special lifting devices, (e) lifting devices that are not specifically designed, and (f) the inspection, testing and maintenance of the crane.

in compliance with the criteria of Section 5.1.1, operating procedures include definitions of approved safe load paths for all areas within the Spent Fuel Pool.

Compliance with Criteria of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.2(1)

NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.2(1) identifies an alternative to the performance of specific analysis concerning a postulated drop of a heavy load near or over the Spent Fuel Pool, including over spent fuel assemblies. This identified alternative is the application of a handling system that consists of a single-failure-proof crane, defined by NUREG-0544, "Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants," and lifting devices and interfaces compliant with the criteria of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.6.

The Technical Specification LCO restriction is not applicable to crane loads near or over the Spent Fuel Pool that are handled by the Single-Failure-Proof Handling System.

(continued)

Insert F - Page 2 The design of the Single-Failure-Proof Handling System includes (a) Yard Crane modified to include bridge, trolley, and hoist features described in NRC-approved Generic Topical Report EDR-1 (P)-A, "EDERER'S Nuclear Safety Related eXtra-Safety And Monitoring (X-SAM) CRANES," Rev. 3 and (b) lifting devices and interfaces that comply with the criteria of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.6.

The main hoist of the Single-Failure-Proof Handling System was designed such that: (a) The maximum load motion following either failure of the drive train or a single wire rope is no greater than 1.5 feet; and (b) The maximum kinetic energy of the load following either failure of the drive train or a single wire rope is less than that resulting from one inch of free fall of the maximum evaluated load.

The Single-Failure-Proof Handling System will not be used to lift spent fuel assemblies from Spent Fuel Pool racks.

The auxiliary hoist of the Yard Crane is not qualified for crane lifts that require the use of the Single-Failure-Proof Handling System; and it will not be used for any crane load > 1800 pounds that is near or over the Spent Fuel Pool.

Administrative controls, subject to compliance with 10 CFR 50.59, are used to maintain a vertical distance of greater than 1.5 feet between any critical load (load > 1800 pounds) and any surface within the Spent Fuel Building which has not been demonstrated by evaluation to support safe operation of the facility following damage resulting from postulated failure of drive train or a single wire rope.

In the event that repairs to the crane are required that cannot be made with the load suspended, the load can be placed in the evaluated Spent Fuel Pool Cask Laydown Area or the evaluated Cask Transfer Bay within the Spent Fuel Building.

Docket No. 50-213 CY-01-1 08 Attachment 5 Haddam Neck Plant Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Retyped Pages September 2001

INDEX

£ SECTION PAGE 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY

. . . ........................................ oB 3/4 0-1 3.0.1 3.0.2 . .. . ........................................ B 3/4 0-2 3.0.3 DELETED

............................................ B 3/4 0-3 3.0.4

........................................... ° B 3/4 0-4 4.0.1 4.0.2 ........................................... ° B 3/4 0-4 4.0.3 ............................................ B 3/4 0-4

.. .......................................... B 3/4 0-5 4.0.4 3/4.1 DELETED 3/4.2 DELETED 3/4.3 DELETED 3/4.4 DELETED 3/4.5 DELETED 3/4.6 DELETED 3/4.7 DELETED 3/4.8 DELETED 3/4.9 SPENT FUEL BUILDING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 DELETED 3/4.9.2 DELETED 3/4.9.3 DELETED 3/4.9.4 DELETED 3/4.9.5 DELETED 3/4.9.6 DELETED 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL BUILDING .......... B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.8 DELETED 3/4.9.9 DELETED 3/4.9.10 DELETED 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - SPENT FUEL POOL .............. B 3/4 9-3 3/4.9.12 DELETED 3/4.9. 13 MOVEMENT OF FUEL IN SPENT FUEL POOL ......... B 3/4 9-3 3/4.9.14 SPENT FUEL POOL - REACTIVITY CONDITION ..... B 3/4 9-3 3/4.9 .15 DELETED 3/4.9.16 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING - DEFUELED .......... B 3/4 9-3 3/4.10 DELETED 3/4 11 DELETED HADDAM NECK III Amendment No.125,127,,*,,175,l884,l3,lSS TSINDEX.DOC

SPENT FUEL BUILDING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL BUILDING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.7 Loads > 1800 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool unless such loads are handled by the Single-Failure-Proof Handling System.

APPLICABILITY: With fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, place the crane load in a safe condition.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.7 Administrative controls shall prevent the travel of loads > 1800 pounds over fuel assemblies unless handled by the Single-Failure-Proof Handling System.

HADDAM NECK 3/4 9-1 Amendment No. 125,158, 195 TS3S9

3/4.9 SPENT FUEL BUILDING OPERATIONS 3/4.9 SPENT FUEL BUILDING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL BUILDING FUEL HANDLING CRANES For the Fuel Handling Cranes, the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation and Surveillance Requirement provide a restriction on movement of loads in excess of the weight of a fuel and control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool. That restriction ensures that in the event this load is dropped: (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the spent fuel pool racks will not result in a critical array.

This is consistent with the activity release assumed in the safety analysis.

The restriction also ensures that the effects of any load drop on the spent fuel pool structural integrity is enveloped by the load drop analysis (Holtec Report HI-941225, Rev. 0, "Accident Analysis Report for CY Spent Fuel Racks," Dr. Yu Wang, Item 11, Holtec Project 40264) performed for License Amendment 188.

SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF HANDLING SYSTEM Compliance with Alternative Criteria of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.2 Compliance with at least one of the alternative sets of criteria from NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," Section 5.1.2 is a requirement for the handling of heavy loads near or over any area of the Spent Fuel Pool.

Application of the Single-Failure-Proof Handling System conforms to the first of these alternative sets which is a combination of the criteria of Section 5.1.1 and the criteria of Section 5.1.2(1). Specifically:

Compliance with Criteria of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.1 Administrative procedures and controls for the Single-Failure Proof Handling System support compliance with the general criteria of Section 5.1.1. The general criteria of Section 5.1.1 address requirements concerning: (a) safe load paths, (b) procedures, (c) the training and qualification of crane operators, (d) special lifting devices, (e) lifting devices that HADDAM NECK B3/4 9-1 Amendment No.125,158,175,188,193,195 TSB3S9

3/4.9 SPENT FUEL BUILDING OPERATIONS 3/4.9 SPENT FUEL BUILDING OPERATIONS BASES are not specifically designed, and (f) the inspection, testing and maintenance of the crane.

In compliance with the criteria of Section 5.1.1, operating procedures include definitions of approved safe load paths for all areas within the Spent Fuel Pool.

Compliance with Criteria of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.2(1)

NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.2(1) identifies an alternative to the performance of specific analysis concerning a postulated drop of a heavy load near or over the Spent Fuel Pool, including over spent fuel assemblies. This identified alternative is the application of a handling system that consists of a single failure-proof crane, defined by NUREG-0544, "Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants," and lifting devices and interfaces compliant with the criteria of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.6.

The Technical Specification LCO restriction is not applicable to crane loads near or over the Spent Fuel Pool that are handled by the Single-Failure-Proof Handling System.

The design of the Single-Failure-Proof Handling System includes (a) Yard Crane modified to include bridge, trolley, and hoist features described in NRC-approved Generic Topical Report EDR-I (P)-A, "EDERER'S Nuclear Safety Related eXtra-Safety And Monitoring (X-SAM) CRANES," Rev. 3 and (b) lifting devices and interfaces that comply with the criteria of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.6.

The main hoist of the Single-Failure-Proof Handling System was designed such that: (a) The maximum load motion following either failure of the drive train or a single wire rope is no greater than 1.5 feet; and (b) The maximum kinetic energy of the load following either failure of the drive train or a single wire rope is less than that resulting from one inch of free fall of the maximum evaluated load.

The Single-Failure-Proof Handling System will not be used to lift spent fuel assemblies from Spent Fuel Pool racks.

The auxiliary hoist of the Yard Crane is not qualified for crane lifts that require the use of the Single-Failure-Proof Handling System; and it will not be used for any crane load > 1800 pounds that is near or over the Spent Fuel Pool.

HADDAM NECK B3/4 9-2 Amendment No.

TSB3S9

3/4.9 SPENT FUEL BUILDING OPERATIONS 3/4.9 BASES Administrative controls, subject to compliance with 10 CFR 50.59, are used to maintain a vertical distance of greater than 1.5 feet between any critical load (load > 1800 pounds) and any surface within the Spent Fuel Building which has not been demonstrated by evaluation to support safe operation of the facility following damage resulting from postulated failure of drive train or a single wire rope.

In the event that repairs to the crane are required that cannot be made with the load suspended, the load can be placed in the evaluated Spent Fuel Pool Cask Laydown Area or the evaluated Cask Transfer Bay within the Spent Fuel Building.

3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - SPENT FUEL POOL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water inventory is available, so that in the event of a complete loss of forced cooling, the time to boil is > 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> (as of December 1997), based on an initial spent fuel pool temperature of 150 'F and no evaporative cooling.

3/4.9.13 MOVEMENT OF FUEL IN SPENT FUEL POOL The limitations of this specification ensure that, in the event of any fuel handling accident in the spent fuel pool, Keff will remain

• 0.95.

3/4.9.14 SPENT FUEL POOL - REACTIVITY CONDITION The limitations described by Figures 3.9-2, 3.9-3, and Figure 3.9-4 ensure that the reactivity of fuel assemblies introduced into the spent fuel pool racks, with no credit taken for soluble boron in the spent fuel pool, are conservatively within the assumptions of the safety analysis.

3/4.9.16 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING - DEFUELED The primary basis for 150 'F is to limit thermal stresses on the spent fuel pool concrete structures due to the differential temperature across the internal and exterior surfaces of the walls and floor. The basis is further discussed in License Amendment No. 188.

As of May 1998, the spent fuel heat load was calculated to be

< 2.3E+06 BTU/hr. Each heat exchanger has the capability of removing this heat load. One spent fuel pool heat exchanger and HADDAM NECK B3/4 9-3 Amendment No. 125,175,188,193,195 TSB3S9

SPENT FUEL BUILDING OPERATIONS BASES one spent fuel pool cooling pump, that can be operated intermittently, is sufficient to remove the decay heat load.

Assuming no forced or evaporative cooling, the calculated May 1998 heatup rate is approximately 1.2 °F/hr. Thus, in the event of a complete loss of forced cooling and assuming an initial spent fuel pool temperature of 150 OF, the time to boil, assuming no evaporative cooling, is > 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />. Therefore, sufficient time exists to either reestablish forced cooling or to provide makeup to maintain the spent fuel pool inventory.

HADDAM NECK B3/4 9-4 Amendment No. 125,175,188,193,195 TSB3S9