05000446/LER-2004-001, Regarding Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Channel Inoperable
| ML040830600 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/2004 |
| From: | Blevins M TXU Electric |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CPSES-20040552, TXX-04024 LER 04-001-00 | |
| Download: ML040830600 (7) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 4462004001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
TXU
-.Wx 0 O TXU Energy Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station P.O. Box 1002 (E01)
Glen Rose,TX 76043 Tel: 254 897 5209 Fax: 254 897 6652 mike.blevins@txu.com Mike Blevins Senior Vice President & Principal Nuclear Officer Ref: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
CPSES-200400552 Log # TXX-04024 March 12, 2004 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)
DOCKET NO. 50-446 CONDITION PROHIBITED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 446/04-001-00 Gentlemen:
Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 04-001-00 for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Unit 2, "Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Channel Inoperable."
This communication contains no new licensing basis commitments regarding CPSES Units 1 and 2.
A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance Callaway Comanche Peak Diablo Canyon Palo Verde South Texas Project Wolf Creek
TXX-04024 Page 2 of 2 Sincerely, TXU Generation Company LP By:
TXU Generation Management Company LLC, Its General Partner Mike Blevins By:_
Mitch L. Lucas Director of Nuclear Engineering GLM/gm Enclosure c -
B. S. Mallett, Region IV W. D. Johnson, Region IV M. C. Thadani, NRR Resident Inspectors, CPSES
Enclosure to TXX-04024 NRC FORM 366 U.& NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (7-2001)
EXPIRES 07/31/2004
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor. and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection Facility Name (I)
Docket Number (2)
Page (3)
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT 2 05000446 1 OF 5 Title (4)
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l LER Number 6 6Reort Date (7)
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7 -1 in SUMMARY OF THE EVENT, INCLUDING DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES On January 6, 2004, Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) Unit 2 was in Mode 1 operating at 99.5 percent power. At 0804 hours0.00931 days <br />0.223 hours <br />0.00133 weeks <br />3.05922e-4 months <br />, an Instrument and Control (I&C) Technician (utility, non-licensed) was performing sensor response time testing on Channel III Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) level transmitter 2-LT-0932 [EIIS:(BQ)(TK)(LT)]. During this test, a reference leg isolation valve [EIIS:(BQ)(LT)(ISV)] is closed and then reopened. During performance of the test the valve was closed, however, due to personnel error it was inadvertently left in the closed position after completion of the test. With the valve closed, the level transmitter was not able to properly respond to changing water level in the RWST after completion of the test.
On January 13, 2004, at 1520 hours0.0176 days <br />0.422 hours <br />0.00251 weeks <br />5.7836e-4 months <br />, while investigating an RWST low level alarm [EIIS:(BQ)(TK)(LA)], Operators (utility, licensed) in the Unit 2 Control Room discovered that the reference leg isolation valve associated with level transmitter 2-LT-0932 was closed. RWST level channel 2-L-0932 was declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.3.2 was entered. This Technical Specification requires that the inoperable channel be placed in bypass within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or the affected Unit must be in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Channel 2-L-0932 was inoperable from January 6, 2004 to January 13, 2004, and this exceeded the TS completion time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to be in Mode 3. Therefore, a reportable condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications occurred.
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Enclosure to TXX-04024 (If more space isequired use additional copies of (Iftmore space is required, use additional copies of (Ifmore space is required, use atdditional copies ofNRC Form 366A) (17)
V.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Upon discovery, the reference leg isolation valve was opened, a channel check was performed, and channel 2-L-0932 was declared operable on January 13, 2004, at 1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br />. The reference leg isolation valves associated with the three other RWST level channels on Unit 2 and the four RWST level channels on Unit I were checked and verified to be in the correct position. The eight affected response time test procedures for Units 1 and 2 were revised to include the missing steps related to manipulation of the reference leg isolation valve.
Expectations were reinforced with the I&C Technician that performed the sensor response time test.
As a part of the CPSES corrective action program, the following actions will be taken to prevent recurrence:
- 1. The Maintenance procedure revision process will be enhanced to aid Maintenance personnel in the identification of procedures that require revision as a result of modifications to the plant.
- 2. Management expectations regarding the expected response to an inadequate procedure will be reinforced with appropriate personnel.
VI.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
There has been one other reportable event in the last three years that involved valves left in the incorrect position (see LER 446/03-003). However, the cause of that event was sufficiently different such that the previous corrective actions could not have prevented this event.