05000366/LER-2025-003, Manual Reactor Scram Due to Trip of Both Reactor Recirculation Pumps

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Manual Reactor Scram Due to Trip of Both Reactor Recirculation Pumps
ML25315A010
Person / Time
Site: Hatch 
Issue date: 11/11/2025
From: Busch M
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
NL-25-0399 LER 2025-003-00
Download: ML25315A010 (1)


LER-2025-003, Manual Reactor Scram Due to Trip of Both Reactor Recirculation Pumps
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
3662025003R00 - NRC Website

text

~. Southern Nuclear Matt Busch Halch Nuclear Planl Vice President Plant Hatch 11028 Hatch Paricway North Baxley, GA 31513 November 11, 2025 Docket Nos.: 50-366 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Licensee Event Report 2025-003-00 912 453 5859 tel 912 3662077 fax NL-25-0399 Unit 2 Manual Reactor SCRAM Due to Trip of Both Reactor Recirculation Pumps Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), Southern Nuclear Operating Company hereby submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report.

This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact the Hatch Licensing Manager, Jimmy Collins, at 912.453.2342.

Respectfully submitted,

~

Matt Busch Vice President - Hatch MSB/CJC Enclosure: LER 2025-003-00 Cc:

Regional Administrator, Region II NRR Project Manager - Hatch Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch RTYPE: CHA02.004

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Licensee Event Report 2025-003-00 Unit 2 Manual Reactor SCRAM Due to Trip of Both Reactor Recirculation Pumps Enclosure LER 2025-003-00

Abstract

At 1704 EDT on 09/13/2025, with Unit 2 in MODE 1 at 70-percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to the loss of both reactor recirculation pumps during turbine control valve testing. Investigation determined that a procedure step to bypass the recirculation pump trip logic had not been performed, resulting in the recirculation pumps tripping during valve testing. The reactor trip was not complex, with all safety systems responding normally including the closure of containment isolation valves (CIVs) in multiple systems, as designed, due to reaching the actuation setpoint on reactor water level. The operating crew responded correctly to the event and stabilized the plant.

The event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as any event or condition that resulted in the manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph 10 CFR 50. 73(a )(2)(iv)(B ). Systems that actuated during this event that are listed in (a)(2)(iv)(B) include: the Reactor Protection System and CIVs in multiple systems.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

I

2. DOCKET NUMBER
3. LER NUMBER 00366 I

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV NUMBER NO.

~-I 003 1-G At 1704 EDT on 09/13/2025, with Unit 2 in MODE 1 at 70-percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to the loss of both reactor recirculation pumps (EIIS Code: P) during turbine control valve (EIIS Code: FCV) testing. The reactor trip was not complex, with all safety systems responding normally including the closure of containment isolation valves (CIVs)

(EIIS Code: ISV) in multiple systems, as designed, due to reaching the actuation setpoint on reactor water level. The operating crew responded correctly to the event and stabilized the plant. There were no inoperable systems that contributed to this event.

EVENT CAUSE ANALYSIS

The event was caused by inadequate place-keeping by licensed operators, which led to a missed critical step to bypass the recirculation pump trip logic resulting in the pumps tripping during valve testing.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND REPORTABILITY

There were no safety consequences as a result of this event with all safety related systems functioning as designed. The operating crew responded correctly to the event. The applicable abnormal and emergency operating procedures were properly entered and the plant was stabilized. The event was within the analysis of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapter 15.

The event is reportable per 10 CFR 50_73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as any event or condition that resulted in the manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(iv)(B). Systems that actuated during this event that are listed in (a)(2)(iv)(B) include: the Reactor Protection System (EIIS Code: JC) and CIVs in multiple systems.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Corrective actions include highlighting all critical procedural steps, followed by the supervisor reviewing the critical steps during the pre-job brief, implementing supervisor hold points prior to the execution of each critical step, and place-keeping page numbers during performance of any continuous use procedure. Also, lessons learned from the event have been communicated to site personnel.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

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