05000366/LER-2016-004, Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Inoperable PCIV

Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Inoperable PCIV

ML17004A231
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	01/03/2017
From:	Vineyard D Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NL-16-2794 LER 16-004-00
Download: ML17004A231 (6)

LER-2016-004, Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Inoperable PCIV

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
3662016004R00 - NRC Website

text

David R. Vineyard Vice Pres1dent-Hatch January 3, 2017 Docket Nos.: 50-366 Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Edwm I Hatch Nuclear Plant 11028 Hatch Parkway North Baxley. Georg1a 31513 Tel 912 537 5859 Fax 912 366 2077 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2016-004-00 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR A SOUTHERN COMPANY NL-16-2794 Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Inoperable PC IV Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) hereby submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report.

This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Greg Johnson at 912-537-5874.

Respectfully submitted, L9cJ~~

D. R. Vineyard Vice President - Hatch DRV/jcb Enclosure: LER 2016-004-00

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-16-2794 Page2 cc:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. S. E. Kuczynski, Chairman, President & CEO Mr. D. G. Bost, Executive Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer Mr. D. R. Vineyard, Vice President - Hatch Mr. M.D. Meier, Vice President-Regulatory Affairs Mr. D. R. Madison, Vice President-Fleet Operations Mr. B. J. Adams, Vice President - Engineering Mr. G. L. Johnson, Regulatory Affairs Manager-Hatch RTYPE: CHA02.004 U. S. Nuclear Requlatorv Commission Ms. C. Haney, Regional Administrator Mr. M. D. Orenak, NRR Project Manager-Hatch Mr. D. H. Hardage, Senior Resident Inspector-Hatch

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 2 LEA 2016*004-00 Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Inoperable PCIV

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 315().()104 EXPIRES: 10131/2018 (06-2016)

Estimated burden per respoose to comply with this mandatory collectioo request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.

,............ ~

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Reported lessoos learned are incorporated into the licensing process and led back to industry.

~~ ~

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and lnlormation Collections

\\.... ~1 (See Page 2 for reqLired number of digits/characters for each block)

Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioo, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory

{See NUREG-1 022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form Affairs, NEOB-10202, (315D-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collectioo does not display a currently valid OMB control h!!J2://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-<:ollections/nurggs/staff/sr1022/r3/l number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the infnnnolinn r.nliAr.tiM

1. FACILITY NAME

~ - DOCKET NUMBER

.PAGE Edwin I. Hatch Unit 2 05000366 1 OF3

4. TITLE Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Inoperable PCIV

5. EVENT DATE

6. LEA NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 11 07 2016 2016

- 004

- 00 01 04 2017

9. OPERAllNG MODE

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: Check all that apply) 1 0 20.2201(b) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 0 20.2201 (d) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 0 20.2203(a)(1) 0 20.2203(a)(4) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 0 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 0 73.71 (a)(4) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 0 73.71(a)(5) 100 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 0 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 0 73.77(a)(1) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 0 73.77(a)(2)(i) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 18150.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 0 73.77(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 00THER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEA ICENSEE CONTACT

~~LEPHONE NUMBER (fndude Aroa Code)

Edwin I. Hatch I Carl James Collins - Licensing Supervisor 912-537-2342

13. COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE FACTURER TOEPIX FACTURER TOEPIX A

BJ ISV 0245 y

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED

15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR 0 YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

~NO SUBMISSION DATE

~BSTRACT (Umit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On November 7, 2016 at 2355 EST, while performing a main control board panel walkdown, it was discovered that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) vacuum breaker motor operated isolation valve 2E41 F111 had been left in the open position with its breaker turned off. Upon further review of the associated tagout, it was determined that this primary containment isolation valve (PCIV) had been in this inoperable configuration greater than allowed LCO time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The 2E41 F111 was then declared inoperable and the 2E41 F1 04 redundant penetration motor operated isolation valve was closed and deactivated to meet the required action per Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) LCO 3.6.1.3, Condition A.1.

The inoperable as-found condition of the 2E41 F111 PC IV was due to supervision failing to recognize that the tagout preparer did not possess the proper skill set to perform the task. Although the 2E41 F111 was left in the open position with its breaker turned off, the manual HPCI turbine exhaust valve 2E41 F021 was tagged in the closed position per the tagout instructions. Therefore, closure of the 2E41 F021 ensured the affected piping was isolated such that primary containment boundary functions were maintained. Expectations were instituted to ensure individuals assigned with preparing tagouts associated with TS equipment are trained on the basics of TS.

NRC FORM 366 (06-2016)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric-Boiling Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System codes appear in the text as (EllS Code XX).

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I NUMBER 2016

- 004 REV NO.

- 00 On November 7, 2016 at 2355 EST, with Unit 2 at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP), while performing a main control board panel walkdown, it was discovered that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) vacuum breaker motor operated isolation valve 2E41F111 (EllS Code ISV) had been left in the open position with its breakertumed off. Upon subsequent investigation, it was determined that since the valve provides a primary containment isolation function, it is required for operation in the current plant condition. The 2E41 F111 was then declared inoperable and the 2E41 F1 04 redundant penetration motor operated isolation valve was closed and deactivated to meet the required action per Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) LCO 3.6.1.3, Condition A.1.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The unacceptable as-found condition of the 2E41 F111 primary containment isolation valve (PCIV) was due to supervision failing to recognize that the tagout preparer did not possess the proper skill set to perform the task. This led to assigning an individual to prepare the tag out who did not have the appropriate knowledge of basic TS. Additionally, invalid assumptions were made by the tag out reviewer concerning the PC IV TS Bases when rendering a PCIV inoperable.

REPORT ABILITY ANALYSIS AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. Upon review of the tagout, it was determined that the valve had been in a condition prohibited by TS for greater than the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> LCO completion time.

Although the 2E41 F111 was left in the open position with its breaker turned off, the manual HPCI turbine exhaust valve 2E41 F021 was tagged in the closed position per the tagout instructions. This allowed the associated piping to be isolated such that primary containment boundary functions as assumed in the safety analyses were maintained. However, because the valve is Appendix J, Type A tested instead of being Appendix J, Type C tested this is a condition prohibited by TS per the Unit 2 Hatch TS Bases LCO 3.6.1.3, Condition A.1 which states that the device used to isolate a penetration must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve. Therefore, if the inoperable valve is Appendix J, Type C tested, the device used to isolate the associated penetration flow path must also be Appendix J, Type C tested per current Hatch TS Bases. TS required actions were met once the 2E41 F1 04 isolation valve was closed since this valve is also Appendix J, Type C tested. Based on this information, the event is considered to have very low safety significance.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Expectations were instituted to ensure individuals assigned with preparing tagouts associated with TS equipment are trained on the basics of TS. Enhancement actions were also taken to label all PC IV equipment in the clearance and tagging database as containment related components. In addition, guidance will be provided to determine when a pre-job brief is required to be conducted before developing a tagout. (06-2016)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

CONTINUATION SHEET (See NUREG-1 022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form htto://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collectionslnureas/stafflsr1 022/Ql)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.

Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and led back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and lnlormation Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3. LEA NUMBER Edwin I. Hatch Unit 2

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Other Systems Affected: None.

Failed Components Information

Master Parts List Number: 2E41 F111 Manufacturer: Dresser Industries 05000-366 Model Number: Hancock Type 950 W Motor Operated Gate Valve Type: Isolation Valve Manufacturer Code: D245 EllS System Code: BJ Reportable to EPIX: Yes Root Cause Code: A EllS Component Code: ISV Commitment Information: This report does not create any licensing commitments.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

None.

NRC FOAM 366A (06-2016)

YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REV NUMBER NO.

2016

- 004

- 00 Page3 of3