05000269/LER-2004-003, Loss of Containment Spray Due to Test When Redundant Train Inoperable
| ML043280603 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  (DPR-038) |
| Issue date: | 11/11/2004 |
| From: | Rosalyn Jones Duke Power Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| O-04-5938 LER 04-003-00 | |
| Download: ML043280603 (13) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 2692004003R00 - NRC Website | |
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Duke olPower A Duke Energy Company RON A. JONES Vice President Oconee Nuclear Site Duke Power ONO1 VP / 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672 864 885 3158 864 885 3564 fax November 11, 2004 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555
Subject:
Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269 Licensee Event Report 269/2004-03, Problem Investigation Process No.:
Revision 0 0-04-5938 Gentlemen:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Sections (a)(1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report 269/2004-03, Revision 0, regarding a three minute period of operation with both trains of the Reactor Building Spray System inoperable.
This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v) as a loss of safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.
V ruly yours, R. A. Jones Attachment www. dukepower.com
Document Control Desk Date: November 11, 2004 Page 2 cc:
Mr. William D. Travers Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 61 Forsyth Street, S. W., Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303 Mr. L. N. Olshan Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. M. C. Shannon NRC Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station INPO (via E-mail)
Abstract
On 9-12-04, Oconee Unit 1 was operating at 100% in Mode 1 with Channel 7 of the Engineered Safeguards Actuation System out of service. As a result, the 1A train of the Reactor Building Spray (RBS) System had been declared out of service (OOS).
At 15:55 the 1B RBS Train was declared out of service to stroke test 1LP-22, a pump suction valve.
At 15:58 the stroke test was complete and the 1B RBS Train was returned to service.
When logging the Technical Specification (TS) condition entry, an operator recognized that both trains had been OOS simultaneously, which placed Unit 1 in TS 3.0.3 for three minutes.
At 19:14 on 9-12-04 an ENS notification per 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) was completed (Event Number 41037).
The root causes of the event were a procedure adherence error (a Senior Reactor Operator forgot to perform a required log review for OOS components) and a work process error (a scheduling code indicated the train as available during the test activity).
Corrective actions include counseling and revising the test activity code.
This event is considered to have no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.
NRC FORM 366 (7-2001)
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(BWST) to the 'lA' LPI and 'lA' RBS trains, and lLP-22 isolates suction on the 'B',LPI and 'lB' RBS Trains.
Therefore, stroke testing each valve will render the associated trains Inoperable per TS while the valve is not open. Because the time required to stroke each valve full cycle is short, the trains have been considered available for Maintenance Rule purposes while performing this portion of the test.
Therefore, this procedure was coded as available during ORAM-Sentinel risk assessment evaluations.
TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.5 contains the requirements for RBS and RBC System Operability.
In Modes 1 and 2, the LCO requires two RBS trains to be Operable.
If one train of RBS becomes Inoperable in Modes 1 or 2, the Required Action is restoration within 7 days.
If both trains of RBS become Inoperable in Modes 1 or 2, then LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately, which requires unit shutdown to Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, to Mode 4 within 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />, and to Mode 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.
Operations personnel officially track entry into TS conditions using a Technical Specifications Tracking Log.
This is a paper system using a notebook with a log sheet to document each entry into a TS condition.
In addition, a computerized program, Technical Specification Action Item Log (TSAIL), is under development and is available for general use.
Some shift personnel use TSAIL to generate entries in the computerized Reactor Operators' log.
Currently site processes and management expectations do not require TSAIL to be used in "real time" (i.e.
before the actual removal from service of the equipment).
One advantage of TSAIL is that it automatically checks against items already logged as out of service, and identifies all applicable TS conditions.
Each shift crew includes several licensed Senior Reactor Operators (SROs), several licensed Reactor Operators (ROs) and several non-licensed Nuclear Equipment Operators (NEOs).
SRO positions include the Operations Shift Manager (OSM), a Work Control Center SRO (WCC SRO), and, on each unit, a Control Room SRO (CRSRO).
Each unit also has an RO "at the controls" (OATC) and a Balance of Plant (BOP) RO.
Prior to this event Unit 1 was operating at 100% power with no safety systems or components out of service that would have contributed to this event.
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
There were no releases of radioactive materials, radiation exposures or personnel injuries associated with this event.
This event is not considered reportable under the Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX) program.