05000259/FIN-2008003-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Conspicuously Post, Barricade and Control Access to a High Radiation Area During Power Ascension |
| Description | A Green, self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1 was identified for the licensees failure to conspicuously post, barricade, and control access to a high radiation area (HRA) with dose rates not exceeding 1.0 rem per hour at 30 centimeters from the source. On June 13, 2007, operations personnel raised Unit 1 reactor power from 25 percent rated thermal power (RTP) to 34 percent RTP, resulting in general area dose rates in the Unit 1 turbine building moisture separator room increasing to greater than 100 millirem/hour (mrem/hr), making it an HRA. But contrary to TS 5.7.1., the room was posted and controlled as a radiation area at the time of the power increase. Three individuals working in the room received electronic dosimeter dose rate alarms of 140 mrem/hr, 212 mrem/hr, and 215 mrem/hr. Once the change in radiological conditions was recognized, radiological control personnel immediately posted and controlled the work area as an HRA. The finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Evaluation Report 126211. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone attribute of exposure control and it affected the associated cornerstone objective because the failure to post, barricade, and control access to an HRA did not ensure the adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. The finding was evaluated using the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not involve a substantial potential for overexposure and did not affect the ability to assess dose. The cause of this finding was directly related to the work activity coordination cross-cutting aspect in the work control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because operations and health physicists personnel failed to effectively communicate and coordinate the activities associated with the power increase (H.3(b)) |
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000259/2008003 Section 2OS1 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2008 (2008Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Or Safety |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71121.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Stancil T Ross A Nielsen R Hamilton H Gepford E Guthrie D Jones K Korth |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Browns Ferry - IR 05000259/2008003 | |||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Browns Ferry) @ 2008Q2
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