05000016/LER-1999-001, :on 990604,protected Area Access Was Found Unlocked.Caused by Human Error.Reinforced That Custodial Agent Issued Key Is Responsible for Ensuring That Protected Area Access Gate Is Locked

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:on 990604,protected Area Access Was Found Unlocked.Caused by Human Error.Reinforced That Custodial Agent Issued Key Is Responsible for Ensuring That Protected Area Access Gate Is Locked
ML20209B390
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/25/1999
From: Gipson D
DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
CON-NRC-99-0074, CON-NRC-99-74 LER-99-001, LER-99-1, NUDOCS 9907060449
Download: ML20209B390 (3)


LER-1999-001, on 990604,protected Area Access Was Found Unlocked.Caused by Human Error.Reinforced That Custodial Agent Issued Key Is Responsible for Ensuring That Protected Area Access Gate Is Locked
Event date:
Report date:
0161999001R00 - NRC Website

text

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s' Douglas R. Gipson 4-E.

Senior Vlec President, Nuclear Gener. tion Fermi 2 6400 North Dixie lhyy., Newport, Michigan 48166 Tel: 734MG.6201 Fax: 734.686.4172 Detroit Edison June 25,1999 NRC-99-0074 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn.: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference:

1) Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit No.1 NRC Docket No. 50-16 NRC License Number DPR-9

Subject:

Licensee Event Renort 99-001 Detroit Edison is submitting this Licensee Event Report (LER)99-001 as required by Section I.8 of the Fermi 1 Technical Specifications as a condition prohibited by Section B.1 of the Technical Specifications. Per Section I.8, this report contains a description of the event and the steps taken to correct the situation.

Fermi 1 is a sodium-cooled, fast breeder reactor permanently shut down in 1972 and is currently in SAFSTOR status. During the decommissioning process, the fuel and blanket O,

subassemblies were removed from the reactor and shipped offsite. Virtually all the sodium was removed from plant systems; however, approximately 425 gallons of residual radioactive sodium remain in the Reactor and Sodium Buildings within the Protected Area.

Section B.1 requires that access to the Protected Area shall be through locked gates in the G['

fencing or doors that are secured from the inside or permanently closed when work is not in progress and there are no pertonnel within. On June 4,1999, at 0730 hours0.00845 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.77765e-4 months <br />, the Protected Area access gate was found unlocked. Investigations determined that the Fermi 1 key had j

been returned to the Fermi 2 Radiation Protection Control Point at 1615 hours0.0187 days <br />0.449 hours <br />0.00267 weeks <br />6.145075e-4 months <br /> on June 3,1999, by the Custodial Agent (authorized person) who had been issued the key that morning. At the time the key was returned, workers were still within the Protected Area.

These workers routinely exit the Protected Area between 1700 and 1730 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.58265e-4 months <br /> daily. When the key has been returned, the Custodial Agent escorting the workers locks the gate after checking everyone out.

9907060449 990625 PDR ADOCK 05000016 S

POR A DTE Energy Coinpany

3

, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 25,1999

' NRC 99-0074

- Page 2 Inspection of the Protected Area key logs for Fermi 1 and Fermi 2 verified that the keys hail not been signed out and no entries had been made into the Protected Area between 1615

. hours on June 3 and 0600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> on June 4 when the key was signed out by a Custodial Agent. A walkdown of the Protected Area on June 4 verified that there were no unauthorized persomiel within, no damaged or missing equipment, and the access doors within were secured.

Immediate corrective actions were initiated on June 4 reinforcing that the Custodial Agent issued the key is responsible for ensuring that the Protected Area access gate is locked and the key is returned to its point ofissue when entry is complete and no individuals remain inside.L A temporary procedure change was implemented to require the access gate to be verified locked by a second Custodial Agent who shall check the gate and report the verification to the point of key issue in person or by telephone. Verifications are recorded in the key log. Additionally, it is now the responsibility of the Custodial Agent returning the

. key to ensure that the second Custodial Agent verifies the gate is locked. These corrective actions were incorporated into the Fermi 1 procedures on June 15,1999, and all Custodial Agents were issued a memo explaining the procedure change.

The unlocked gate condition was evaluated and determined not to be safety significant.

Access to the Protected Area is controlled to prevent unauthorized individuals from accessing those areas of the facility in which residual radioactive sodium is located. As stated previously, the bulk of the sodium is within the Reactor and Sodium Buildings, both of which are secured by locked access doors that require the Fermi 1 key for entry. Since the Protected Area key log showed that no keys had been signed out during the period the gate was unlocked, an individual remaining within or entering the unlocked perimeter could not gain access to the buildings in which the majority of the sodium residues are located. Also, during the walkdown of the Protected Area, the two doors were observed to be locked.

The investigation of the event determined that the cause was in the design and implementation of the access contro! program that resulted in a breakdown of the program by a single human error, failure to lock the gate. A review of the Fermi 1 Annual Reports to the NRC from 1975 to the present indicated that this was the only recorded occurrence of an event of this type.

Detroit Edison is confident that clarifying the responsibility for ensuring the gate is locked and requiring independent verification of the action will prevent recurrence of the event. As part of the corrective action process, an evaluation program is incorporated that is designed to confirm the effectiveness of the corrective action.

V..**

, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 25,1999 NRC 99-0074 Page 3 There are no commitments made in this letter. If there are any questions, please contact Lynne Goodman, Director, Fermi 1 at (734) 586-1205.

Sincerely, j

cc: NRC Regional Administrator, Region III S. W. Brown S. Campbell P. Lee, NRC, Region III D. Minnaar, State of Michigan

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