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Entered date | Site | Region | Reactor type | Event description | |
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ENS 56779 | 5 October 2023 12:29:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1439 EDT on August 7, 2023, a spurious level spike on the unit 4 reactor coolant system (RCS) level instrument (4-RCS-LT160A, 'Hot Leg 1 Level') caused actuation of containment isolation, reactor trip, automatic depressurization system (ADS) stage 4, and in containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) isolation signals. The spurious level changes caused an invalid signal based on the incidental response of the 4-RCS-LT160A instrumentation due to water spray that was being used for reactor vessel cleaning (being performed prior to initial fuel loading). The level fluctuations resulted in engineered safety features actuation signals (containment isolation, ADS stage 4, and IRWST isolation signals) and a reactor trip signal, with the reactor trip signal already present. Three containment isolation valves closed due to the containment isolation signal that was generated. These valves were: 4-CAS-V014, 'instrument air supply containment isolation, air-operated valve,' 4-SFS-V034, 'spent fuel pool cooling system suction header containment isolation, motor-operated valve,' and 4-SFS-V035, 'spent fuel pool cooling system suction header containment isolation, motor-operated valve.' The other automatic containment isolation valves were either already closed at the time of the event or properly removed from service. All affected equipment functioned properly. The other actuation signals that were observed during this event (ADS stage 4, IRWST isolation, and reactor trip) did not result in any equipment changing position or automatically operating (i.e., the actuation signals occurred while the systems were properly removed from service). Units 1, 2, and 3 were not affected. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
ENS 56648 | 1 August 2023 11:48:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1506 EDT on July 31, 2023, it was determined that a contractor supervisor failed a test specified by the fitness for duty testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56632 | 21 July 2023 15:06:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1148 EDT on 07/21/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 32 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped on low reactor coolant pump (RCP) speed due to decaying RCP motor voltage during power ascension testing. The trip was not complex, with all safety-related systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam via steam generator power operated relief valves to the atmosphere, and startup feedwater is supplying the steam generators. Units 1, 2, and 4 are not affected. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56614 | 9 July 2023 16:57:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1328 EDT on 07/09/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 45 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped during power ascension testing due to low reactor coolant flow from decaying voltage to the reactor coolant pumps. The trip was not complex, with all safety-related systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam via steam generator power operated relief valves to the atmosphere, and startup feedwater is supplying the steam generators. Units 1, 2, and 4 are not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56497 | 2 May 2023 07:57:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0423 EDT on 05/02/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 14 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to securing all main feed pumps, due to sudden high differential pressure on their suction strainers. The trip was not complex, with all safety-related systems responding normally post-trip. No equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event or adversely impacted plant response to the reactor trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the steam dumps, and startup feedwater is supplying the steam generators. Units 1, 2, and 4 were not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56460 | 10 April 2023 04:34:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0048 EDT on 4/10/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 18 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to low reactor coolant flow due to voltage decaying to the reactor coolant pumps during main generator testing activities. The trip was not complex, with all safety-related systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam via steam generator power operated relief valves to atmosphere. Units 1, 2, and 4 are not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56415 | 16 March 2023 13:23:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0845 EDT on March 16, 2023, it was determined that a contract employee supervisor failed a for-cause FFD test. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56414 | 16 March 2023 01:26:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2157 EDT on 03/15/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 18 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to the loss of two reactor coolant pumps when their electrical buses failed to transfer after a main generator excitation protective relay tripped. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by steam generator power operated relief valves. Units 1, 2, and 4 are not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, nonemergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56367 | 16 February 2023 15:52:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0743 EST on February 16, 2023, it was determined that a contract supervisor failed a random fitness-for-duty (FFD) test. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56311 | 14 January 2023 14:05:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0721 EST on 01/14/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power and reactor trip breakers open, a manual actuation of the RPS occurred while conducting pre-criticality testing. The RPS manual actuation was procedurally driven in response to low gland steam pressure, resulting in the necessity to break condenser vacuum following a trip of the auxiliary boiler. The reactor trip breakers were in an open state at the time of the event. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the RPS. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56294 | 4 January 2023 06:08:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2259 EST on 1/3/2023, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, an actuation of the Unit 1 B and Unit 2 A emergency diesel generator (EDG) systems, as well as an actuation of the associated auxiliary feedwater (AFW) systems on each unit occurred. The reason for the EDG auto-starts was due to a loss of an offsite power source (loss of one of the two reserve auxiliary transformers (RAT) on each unit) to the Unit 1 B and Unit 2 A safety related buses. The EDG and AFW systems automatically started as designed when the valid undervoltage signal on the affected safety related bus was received. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator and the Auxiliary Feedwater Systems for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56231 | 17 November 2022 20:23:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56175 | 23 October 2022 11:14:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0405 EDT on 10/23/2022, with (Vogtle) Unit 3 in Mode 6 and the reactor subcritical for greater than 28 hours, it was discovered that all three required flow paths for the stage four ADS were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The diverse actuation system was operable for manual stage four ADS during this time period. At 0432 EDT on 10/23/2022, two of the three required flow paths were restored to operable status, which exited the reportable condition. All required flow paths were operable at 0447 EDT. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56147 | 6 October 2022 10:06:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0244 EDT on 10/06/2022, with Unit 3 Defueled at 0 percent power, an actuation of the RPS occurred during restoration of Division B Class 1E DC and uninterruptible power supply system. The reason for the RPS actuation was due to the opening of the Division B passive residual heat removal (PRHR) heat exchanger outlet flow control valve. The reactor trip breakers were in an open state at the time of the event when the RPS signal was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the RPS. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56115 | 17 September 2022 13:06:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the Southern Nuclear Company via email: At 2257 EDT on 09/16/2022, it was determined that there was a programmatic vulnerability of the Fleet FFD program. Specifically, it was determined that some individuals were not placed into the follow-up pool for additional screening when required by the program. All identified personnel were in the random FFD pool, and were subject to the behavioral observation program. This is reportable in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(4) for all Units and 10CFR26.417(b)(1) for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. See EN#s 56112, 56113, and 56114. |
ENS 56114 | 17 September 2022 13:06:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by Southern Nuclear Company via email: At 2257 EDT on 09/16/2022, it was determined that there was a programmatic vulnerability of the Fleet FFD program. Specifically, it was determined that some individuals were not placed into the follow-up pool for additional screening when required by the program. All identified personnel were in the random FFD pool, and were subject to the behavioral observation program. This is reportable in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(4) for all Units and 10CFR26.417(b)(1) for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. See EN#s 56112, 56113, and 56115. |
ENS 55875 | 3 May 2022 18:44:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1541 EDT on May 3, 2022, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 power, the reactor was manually tripped due to the loss of one of the main feed pumps. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. No equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event or adversely impacted plant response to the scram. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by Auxiliary Feedwater through the steam dumps to the condenser. Unit 2 is not affected. An automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) also occurred. The AFW auto-start is an expected response from the reactor trip. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, nonemergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight-hour, nonemergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 55735 | 7 February 2022 15:49:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via telefone: A non-licensed contractor superintendent had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 55552 | 29 October 2021 14:25:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | At 1010 EDT on October 29, 2021, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor attempted to subvert a random Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's badge has been confiscated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 55328 | 25 June 2021 15:27:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following is a synopsis of information received via E-mail: The individual informing the Commission is Michael J. Yox, 7825 River Road, Waynesboro, GA 30830. The activities which fail to comply include construction processes including, installation of some electrical and mechanical commodities, and control of measuring and test equipment at the Vogtle 3 and 4 construction project. The primary construction firm for the Vogtle 3 and 4 construction project is Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel). This report is being provided based on construction nonconformances including, installation of some electrical and mechanical commodities, and control of measuring and test equipment for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The nonconformances affect cable separation and other raceway structural elements. The extent of condition for the measuring and test equipment issue is under evaluation and may impact additional safety-related work. The identified construction nonconformances are a small fraction of the overall structures and components. There is no specifically identified substantial safety hazard (SSH) for these nonconformances. The nonconformances identified affect some safety-related components and based on this it was conservatively judged that the issues could be related to an SSH. These issues were discovered while the facility is under construction. The identified conditions will be corrected prior to completion of the facility. The evaluation for this report was completed on June 24, 2021. As stated above, there are no specifically identified basic components that have been identified to contain a defect for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The nonconformances identified affect some safety-related components and based on this it was conservatively judged that these conditions involve a failure to comply that could be related to an SSH. The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken include: Comprehensive extent-of-condition reviews and correction of identified conditions are being conducted. The actions to identify and resolve the nonconforming conditions are in process and will be completed in accordance with the site corrective action program. Bechtel, and other subcontractors as needed, will implement actions to correct the identified conditions and ensure that processes are in place to avoid future occurrences. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is the organization responsible for ensuring Bechtel and the other subcontractors complete the required actions to correct the nonconforming conditions and ensuring that processes are in place to avoid future occurrences. |
ENS 55185 | 9 April 2021 16:08:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant had been terminated. |
ENS 55055 | 3 January 2021 08:33:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 1414 EST on 12/31/2020, a planned maintenance outage commenced on the Vogtle 1and 2 Seismic Monitoring System. The work was to address abnormal indications on the uninterruptable power supply, and was scheduled for an eight (8) hour duration. During the restoration activities, the system did not respond properly and has remained Non-Functional. Compensatory measures for seismic event classification were implemented in accordance with Vogtle procedures prior to removing the system from service. Based upon the troubleshooting conducted, the system is not expected to be restored within 72 hours from the start of the planned outage. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the Seismic Monitoring System is the method for evaluating that an Operational Basis Earthquake (OBE) threshold has been exceeded following a seismic event in accordance with Initiating Condition 'Seismic event greater than OBE levels' and Emergency Action Level HU2. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Compensatory measures implemented include having a phone number to call to verify if an earthquake has occurred. |
ENS 54995 | 12 November 2020 21:14:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 1732 EST on November 12, 2020, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the steam generators through the steam dumps into the condenser. Unit 1 is not affected. An automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) also occurred. The AFW auto-start is an expected response from the reactor trip. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as well as in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 54963 | 21 October 2020 14:10:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2) as described in NEI 08-01, Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52, Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Construction is making this notification to the NRC for determining that Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.3.05.13a.ii (Index No. 344) for Unit 4 requires additional actions to restore the completed status. The ITAAC Closure Notifications for Unit 4 ITAAC 344 was submitted on July 22, 2020 (ML20204B029). On October 19, 2020, it was determined that maintenance activities for the Unit 4 Polar Crane auxiliary hoist holding brake used a different approach for Post Work Verification (PWV) than the original test described in the ICN (ITAAC Closure Notification) for ITAAC 344. The alternate PWV used a test method that is standard industry practice and in accordance with ASME B30.2 to demonstrate that the Acceptance Criteria was met. An ITAAC Post Closure Notification will be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2) and NEI 08-01. The 10 CFR 52.99(c)(4) All lTAAC Complete Notification has not been submitted for VEGP (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant) 4. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 54864 | 28 August 2020 00:00:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2), as described in NEI 08-01, 'Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52,' Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Construction is making this notification to the NRC for determining that Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.5.02.07a (Index No. 534) and ITAAC 2.5.02.07e (Index No. 538) for both units require additional actions to restore their completed status. The ITAAC Closure Notifications for ITAAC 534 were submitted on March 31, 2017 (Unit 3 ML17093A286, Unit 4 ML17093A535). The ITAAC Closure Notifications for ITAAC 538 were submitted on November 30, 2016 (Unit 3 ML16351A350, Unit 4 ML16351A334). On August 26, 2020, it was determined that a design change, issued for several Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) isolation barrier assemblies (ISBs), materially altered the basis for determining that the ITAAC 534 and ITAAC 538 Acceptance Criteria were met. The modified ISBs will require testing per IEEE 384-1981, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits, to demonstrate that the Acceptance Criteria is met. System function is not required while the plant is under construction. ITAAC Post Closure Notifications in accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2) will be submitted following completion of corrective actions. The 10 CFR 52.99(c)(4) All ITAAC Complete Notification has not been submitted for VEGP ((Vogtle Electric Generating Plant)) 3 and 4. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Upon successful completion of the work to correct the identified impact to ITAAC 534, it has been determined there was no material impact to ITAAC 538. Confirmation was made that the credible fault only affected PMS to PLS analog ISBs and not PMS to PLS relay isolation ISBs. It was also confirmed that the relay isolation ISB testing and qualification summary information was unaffected by the modifications made to the analog ISBs to correct the credible fault scenario condition. Resolution of the credible fault scenario did not result in modifications to the relay isolation ISBs which are the subject of ITAAC 538. Therefore, the ITAAC Closure Notifications submitted for ITAAC 538 on November 30, 2016 (Unit 3 ML16351A350, Unit 4 ML16351A334) continue to be valid and ITAAC Post Closure Notifications are not required. The licensee has notified NRC Region 2. Notified R2DO (Miller) and NRR Vogtle Project Office (via email). |
ENS 54776 | 13 July 2020 17:10:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | On July 13, 2020 at 0831 (EDT), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined an SNC supervisory personnel failed their fitness for duty test. The employee has been removed from the site and their access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 54650 | 8 April 2020 17:03:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | A licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 54596 | 21 March 2020 23:46:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 1644 EDT with Unit 1 in Mode 6 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Unit 1 Bravo Train Emergency Diesel Generator system (EDG) occurred during Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) testing. The reason for the EDG auto-start signal was a loss of voltage on the Bravo train safety related electrical bus due to the EDG output breaker opening. The EDG was already running at the time of the loss of voltage on the bus. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the EDG system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. There was no impact to Unit 2. | |
ENS 54359 | 29 October 2019 13:25:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | A contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's badge has been confiscated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 54318 | 9 October 2019 12:48:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 1023 EDT, on October 9, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, an actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems occurred. The reason for the Emergency Diesel Generator auto-start was the loss of power to the 4160V 1E electrical bus 2AA02 due to a fault at an offsite electrical switchyard. The Emergency Diesel Generator started and energized the 4160V safety bus, and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems automatically started as designed when the undervoltage condition on the safety bus was detected. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident has been notified. | |
ENS 54175 | 19 July 2019 13:05:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 0945 (EDT) on July 19, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to Loop 2 'B' Main Steam Isolation Valve failing shut. The Auxiliary Feedwater system (AFW) started automatically as a result of the automatic reactor trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam lines through the steam dumps and into the condenser. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Due to the valid AFW actuation from the reactor trip, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 1 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. All control rods fully inserted. | |
ENS 54018 | 22 April 2019 16:16:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | EN Revision Text: CONTRACT SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE ON A RANDOM FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST A contract supervisor tested positive for drugs on a random fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the facility has been revoked and his badge was confiscated. Additionally, the supervisor failed a follow-up test administered the previous day (see EN #54017).
On April 16, 2019, an individual was selected for a follow-up drug test. The same individual was selected again on April 17, 2019 for a random drug test. The results for both tests were ruled by the Medical Review Officer (MRO) on the same day and ruled positive for the same drug on April 22, 2019. These FFD violations were reported to the NRC on April 22, 2019, as EN #54017 and EN #54018, respectively. As allowed by 10 CFR 26.185(o), the MRO further reviewed the quantitation of the drug in both tests and determined that no further drug use had occurred since the first positive test. Therefore, the MRO concluded that this should be considered one FFD violation, and EN #54018 is being retracted. No changes are needed to EN #54017. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction. Notified R2DO (Heisserer) and FFD Group (email). | |
ENS 54017 | 22 April 2019 16:16:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | A contract supervisor tested positive for drugs on a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the facility has been revoked and his badge was confiscated. Additionally, the supervisor failed a random test administered the next day (see EN #54018). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
ENS 53967 | 31 March 2019 00:17:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 2130 (EDT) on March 30, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 30 percent reactor power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a main steam isolation valve failing closed. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam lines through the steam dumps and into the condenser. The expected actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 1 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. | |
ENS 53832 | 17 January 2019 16:00:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | A non-licensed contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 53789 | 13 December 2018 14:37:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 1700 EST on December 12, 2018, a contractor supervisor violated the licensee's Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program by subverting a follow-up Fitness for Duty Test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. No work was performed on safety related equipment. The licensee has made a PADs entry. | |
ENS 53643 | 4 October 2018 07:57:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | EN Revision Text: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING LOW POWER PHYSICS TESTING At 0544 EDT on October 4, 2018, with Unit 1 in Mode 2 with reactor power in the intermediate range performing low power physics testing, the reactor was manually tripped due to a rod control urgent failure alarm. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam system. Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. All control rods inserted as expected. The cause of the rod control urgent failure is being investigated.
This Event Notification is being updated to clarify that the reactor was not critical when this event occurred. Therefore, the reporting requirement is changed from 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). During Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement testing, Control Bank Charlie was inserted approximately 153 steps when the urgent failure occurred (CBC positioned at 75 steps out). Following the scram, additional analysis concluded that the reactor was subcritical when the Reactor Protection System was actuated." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (McCoy). | |
ENS 53628 | 27 September 2018 14:42:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 1000 EDT on September 27, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a random Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 53610 | 18 September 2018 08:28:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 1610 (EDT) on September 17, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 53599 | 12 September 2018 14:14:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 1115 EDT on September 12, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 53595 | 11 September 2018 17:53:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 1430 EDT on September 11, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 53563 | 24 August 2018 15:14:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 1034 (EDT) on August 24, 2018, a contractor supervisor violated the licensee's Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program by subverting a follow-up Fitness for Duty Test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | |
ENS 53538 | 7 August 2018 14:45:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 0909 (EDT) on August 7, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for alcohol during a random Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 53528 | 27 July 2018 13:41:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | A non-licensed contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
ENS 53526 | 26 July 2018 17:51:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 1040 (EDT) on July 26, 2018, a contractor supervisor violated the licensee's Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program by subverting the Fitness for Duty program. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
ENS 53517 | 19 July 2018 12:36:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 1300 (EDT) on July 18, 2018, a contractor supervisor violated the licensee's Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program by subverting the Fitness for Duty process. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | |
ENS 53515 | 18 July 2018 19:27:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | A contractor supervisor tested positive for alcohol during an access upgrade fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the facility has been suspended. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
ENS 53511 | 17 July 2018 17:01:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 1338 (EDT) on July 17, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 53499 | 9 July 2018 20:05:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 1515 (EDT) on July 9, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a for cause Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 53484 | 3 July 2018 12:00:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 0954 (EDT) on July 3, 2018, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to high steam generator water level. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam lines through the steam dumps and into the condenser. The expected actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. All control rods inserted and Unit 1 is in an electrical shutdown lineup. The cause of the high steam generator water level transient is being investigated. | |
ENS 53479 | 28 June 2018 13:05:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 0902 EDT on June 28, 2018, a non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 53469 | 22 June 2018 15:12:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 0900 (EDT) on June 22, 2018, a non-licensed supervisory contractor subverted a random Fitness for Duty test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | |
ENS 53403 | 16 May 2018 16:51:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 1133 EDT on May 16, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company determined a non-licensed contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random Fitness-for-Duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 53309 | 2 April 2018 18:33:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A contractor employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the site has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 53277 | 22 March 2018 09:31:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed contract supervisor attempted to subvert a random Fitness For Duty test using a subversion kit on their person. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 53221 | 20 February 2018 15:36:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | At 0925 (EST) on February 20, 2018, a non-licensed supervisory contractor subverted a random Fitness for Duty test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
ENS 53018 | 16 October 2017 17:59:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed supervisory contractor subverted a random Fitness for Duty (FFD) test. At 0851 (EDT) on October 16, 2017, a contractor supervisor was notified to report for a random FFD test and (the individual) did not report to the testing facility and left the premises. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
ENS 52992 | 26 September 2017 11:03:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At approximately 0543 (EDT), while (recovering from the performance of) 2B Emergency Diesel Generator and ESFAS testing, a (subsequent) valid undervoltage actuation signal was sent to the 2B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The 2B AC emergency bus (2BA03) was load shed, the 2B EDG automatically started, and tied to 2BA03. The 2BA03 bus was loaded by the automatic load sequencer. The actuation was identified by the Control Room operators and the 2B EDG was locally monitored while in service. This actuation is reportable due to the automatic actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). The reactor was not critical at the time of the event and not challenged throughout the event. Decay heat removal and spent fuel pool cooling were not challenged throughout the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the undervoltage condition is under investigation. |
ENS 52968 | 14 September 2017 09:10:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | On September 13, 2017, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a Contractor Manager confirmed positive for alcohol during a for cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 52763 | 18 May 2017 15:14:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | On May 17, 2017, at 1852 (EDT), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) contractor informed SNC that a contractor Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) collector failed to follow the process defined in both NRC Regulation 10 CFR 26.105(b) and contractor FFD procedures. The collector was fully trained, qualified, and knowledgeable of the process requirements. This determination was made based on initial department investigations and corroborated via independent investigations performed by the contractor. SNC has determined that this is reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(3). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and NRC Region II. |
ENS 52641 | 27 March 2017 16:02:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed contractor employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the site has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52619 | 17 March 2017 17:12:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At approximately 1517 (EDT), while restoring protective relay power to the 1B Reserve Auxiliary Transformer, a valid undervoltage actuation signal was sent to the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The 1B EDG automatically started and tied to the safety bus (1BA03). The 1BA03 bus was loaded by the automatic load sequencer. This actuation was identified by the Control Room Operators and the 1B EDG was locally monitored while in service. This actuation is reportable due to the automatic actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). The reactor was not critical at the time of the event and not challenged throughout the event. Containment Cooler Number 8 did not automatically start in 'Fast Speed' as expected. Containment Cooler Number 8 was successfully started in 'Fast Speed' manually by the Control Room Operators. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 52534 | 3 February 2017 18:56:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 1545 EST on 2/3/17, Vogtle Unit 1 was manually tripped from 100% power when loop 1 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) started to fail closed. Non-Safety Related 4160V bus 1NA01 failed to transfer to alternate incoming power supply automatically and was successfully manually energized. All control rods fully inserted and AFW (Auxiliary Feedwater) and FWI (Feedwater Isolation) actuated as expected. Unit 1 is in Mode 3 and stable with decay heat being removed by AFW. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52518 | 30 January 2017 14:38:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At approximately 1049 EST, an individual was discovered to be unresponsive at a site training facility outside of the Protected Area. The individual was transported via ambulance to the Burke County Hospital and was declared deceased at 1143 EST. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee notified the State of Georgia Department of Labor - OSHA at 1414 EST. |
ENS 52482 | 11 January 2017 13:52:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed supervisor tested positive for alcohol during a for-cause test. The individual's access to the site has been terminated pending the results of an investigation. The licensee notified RII (Patterson) and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52423 | 9 December 2016 23:46:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | On December 09, 2016 at 1734 EST, U2 Train-A NSCW (Nuclear Service Cooling Water) Transfer Pump #8 tripped during Return To Service Surveillance testing for Train-B NSCW Transfer pump #7. Technical Spec 3.7.9 Condition E entered at 1734 with Required Actions to be in M3 (mode 3, Hot Standby) in 6 hours AND M4 (mode 4, Hot Shutdown) in 12 hours. A unit shutdown was commenced at 2042 EST (as a conservative measure) to comply with TS 3.7.9 Condition E. At 1937, U2 B-train NSCW Transfer Pump #7 was declared operable and TS 3.7.9 Condition E was exited. The plant is currently raising power to 100%. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52412 | 7 December 2016 13:12:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2), Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Construction is making this notification to NRC for determining that Inspection, Test, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.6.01.02.ii (ECS System Seismic Category I Equipment Design Basis Loads) for both units requires additional actions to restore its completed status. The Closure Notification for this ITAAC (NRC Index No. 580) was originally submitted on May 17, 2016 (reference ML 16138A080 and ML 16166A030). On November 1, 2016, it was determined by the Vogtle 3&4 Contractor that modifications to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) breaker (i.e., switchgear) cabinet design were required to ensure compliance with the applicable portions of IEEE 384, 'Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits.' The modification involves an engineering change which adds different equipment to the RCP Breaker cabinet that function to trip the RCP. The new components were not previously qualified for use in the RCP breaker cabinet assembly. Additional seismic qualification type testing and analysis of components are being performed for the added components in the RCP breaker. Update of the Equipment Qualification Data Package and Equipment Qualification Summary Report for the RCP breaker to confirm the breaker withstands seismic design basis loads and Licensee's acceptance is in progress. The revised ITAAC Completion Notice will be submitted to the NRC once all related ITAAC activities have been completed. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52319 | 26 October 2016 16:35:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | During the evaluation of tornado missile vulnerabilities and the potential impacts to Technical Specification (TS) plant equipment, it was concluded that the following SSCs (Structures, Systems, and Components) were vulnerable to tornado generated missiles: The Turbine Driving Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump exhaust vent is not adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. A tornado could generate missiles capable of striking the exhaust piping on the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, crimping the piping resulting in reduced flow capacity and rendering the TDAFW pump inoperable. The Condensate Storage Tank (CST) vents are not adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. A tornado generated missile could strike the vent piping rendering it unable to relieve vacuum on the top of the CST and allow adequate water flow to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and rendering the CST inoperable. These conditions are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition is being addressed in accordance with EGM-15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 (enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents). The NRC Resident lnspector has been notified. |
ENS 52208 | 30 August 2016 16:05:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. |
ENS 52147 | 2 August 2016 16:22:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A member of the Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) staff violated the FFD policy in December, 2014 by responding to a call-in for unscheduled work after having consumed alcohol within the prohibited 5 hour period. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 51986 | 7 June 2016 14:10:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 51956 | 25 May 2016 04:54:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 0206 EDT 5/25/16, Vogtle Unit 2 tripped from 100% when SG (Steam Generator) #1 Level began to lower for an unknown reason. Cause for level issue is under investigation. All control rods fully inserted and AFW (Auxiliary Feedwater) and FWI (Feedwater Isolation) actuated as expected. Unit 2 is in Mode 3 and stable with decay heat being removed by Aux Feedwater. Prior to the trip, I & C (Instrumentation & Calibration) was performing a loop #1 narrow range instrument calibration. Unit 2 is in a normal post trip electrical lineup with all source of offsite power available. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 51875 | 21 April 2016 18:18:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed supervisory contractor admitted to attempting to subvert a Fitness for Duty test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
ENS 51343 | 25 August 2015 16:01:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | On August 25, 2015, at approximately 12:52 EDT, an unplanned loss of power to the Vogtle Meteorological Towers occurred. The loss of power was the result of an electrical disturbance in the Plant Wilson switchyard. Power was restored 14:45 EDT. The electrical disturbance impacted meteorological instrumentation only and did not impact operation of either Unit 1 or Unit 2. The TSC and EOF remained functional and compensatory measures existed within emergency plan implementing procedures to obtain meteorological tower data locally and with the National Weather Service. Meteorological information could have been provided via the emergency notification system to the NRC Operations Center. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.' The Emergency Response Organization was notified and necessary compensatory actions were established. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 51223 | 13 July 2015 07:50:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | On July 13, 2015, planned activities will be performed to upgrade the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Meteorological Towers and its communication equipment. The emergency response data system will be affected. The work will be completed within approximately 5 days. This activity requires the meteorological tower to be out of service greater than 72 hours rendering equipment used for emergency assessment non-functional. The TSC and EOF remain functional during the outage. Compensatory measures exist within emergency plan implementing procedures to obtain meteorological tower data via Savannah River Site and with the National Weather Service. Meteorological information will be relayed via the emergency notification system to the NRC Operations Center. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.' The Emergency Response Organization has been notified of the upgrade and necessary compensatory actions. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Vogtle primary and backup Meteorological Towers have been returned to service and functionality of equipment has been restored. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified R2DO (King). |
ENS 51219 | 9 July 2015 18:05:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The Vogtle Unit-1 control room received a fire alarm from inside the containment building. Per plant requirements, verification of the fire was not obtained within 15 minutes and an Unusual Event was declared. Plant personnel were able to enter containment and verify that there was no fire present. The reactor remained at 100% power throughout the event. Unusual Event entered: 1732 EDT Unusual Event exited: 1848 EDT The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local governments. Notified DHS, FEMA, and NICC. NuclearSSA (email) and FEMA NWC (email). |
ENS 50894 | 14 March 2015 19:19:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | On March 14, 2015 at 1207 EDT, operators were performing steps to disable an automatic actuation signal to the B-train Auxiliary Feedwater system (AFW), when a valid actuation signal was received on B-train only. Both motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were already running and feeding forward. The B-train discharge valves went from throttled to fully open. The AFW discharge valves were restored to their previous positions without any adverse impacts on the plant. Decay heat removal was still being removed through the Atmospheric Relief Valves. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50893 | 14 March 2015 08:07:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | Vogtle Unit 2 was operating in Mode 1 at 100% rated thermal power. At 0429 EDT a Unit 2 automatic Reactor Trip and Safety Injection / Steamline Isolation occurred. All systems operated as expected and all control rods fully inserted. The Safety Injection was terminated at 0447 EDT and the emergency operating procedures were exited at 0522 EDT. Unit 2 is stable in Mode 3 with decay heat removal via the Auxiliary Feedwater system and the atmospheric relief valves. A response team is investigating the cause of the event. Unit 1 was unaffected by the event. NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified and is at plant site for investigation. |
ENS 50857 | 2 March 2015 18:31:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | On March 2, 2015, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) had a non-licensed supervisory contractor employee confirmed positive result for alcohol during a fitness-for-duty test. The contractor employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. |
ENS 50798 | 9 February 2015 11:36:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | This is a 10 CFR 50.55 initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I), an agent for the Licensee of the Vogtle 3&4 Construction Project. In August 2014, deviations were found in sub-modules CA03-06, -08, and -09, which initiated the discovery and evaluation processes for both Part 21 and 10 CFR 50.55 . The conditions were determined to be not reportable by CB&I under 10 CFR 21, but an evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55 (4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55 (5)(i). The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. |
ENS 50574 | 29 October 2014 14:08:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A contractor employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The contractor employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50526 | 12 October 2014 12:41:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | VEGP (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant) Unit 2 was performing startup and had taken reactor critical at 0929 EDT. When attempting to stabilize power to collect critical data, control rods were inserted with Control Bank D the expected group to insert. Control Bank A inserted instead of Control Bank D. Power had reached 6 E-2 percent as indicated by IR (intermediate range) indication when control room crew performed a manual reactor trip. AFW (auxiliary feed water) was in service to support plant conditions prior to the trip and did not receive any actuation signal. All equipment operated as expected. Unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50441 | 10 September 2014 11:24:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | This is a 10CFR50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub-modules for the Vogtle 3 and 4 construction project. In March, 2014, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for welding program deviations associated with the fabrication of sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10CFR50.55(e)(5)(i). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50347 | 6 August 2014 05:36:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | This is a non-emergency notification per Vogtle U1 & U2 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) 13.13.1, Emergency Response Facilities, Action 8.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities on the TSC support systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions, and, actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10 CFR 50.54(q) evaluation has been prepared and approved for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
As of 1124 EDT maintenance has been completed and the TSC has been returned to service. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Nease). |
ENS 50314 | 27 July 2014 15:22:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | VEGP (Vogtle Electric Generation Plant) Unit One was at 100 percent power, with a Main Feed Pump (MFP) Turbine A trip mechanism test in-progress, when MFP A Trip alarm was received in the Main Control Room. Control Room crew identified MFP A speed and steam generator levels lowering and initiated a manual reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted and nothing unusual was noted. Auxiliary feed water and feedwater isolation actuated as expected. The unit is currently stable in MODE 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. A forced outage response team has been formed to determine the cause of the MFP A trip and determine restart criteria and time of restart. The unit is in a normal shutdown electric plant lineup. No effect on Unit 2. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50226 | 25 June 2014 11:48:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed contract employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's plant access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 50219 | 20 June 2014 16:39:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | This is a non-emergency notification. On June 20, 2014, at 1100 eastern daylight time (EDT), Vogtle Unit 2 identified a loss of emergency assessment capability due to both plant vent effluent monitors being out of service from March 16 to March 26, 2014. This condition was the result of an equipment failure concurrent with planned maintenance activities on the redundant monitor. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). During the time both effluent monitors were out of service Unit 2 was operating at 100% rated thermal power, steady-state conditions. Therefore, this condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or the operation of the facility. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50163 | 2 June 2014 16:47:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive result for a controlled substance. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50031 | 12 April 2014 23:20:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 2008 EDT, Vogtle Unit One was manually tripped in response to loop 1 outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve failing shut. All systems operated correctly in response to the reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted. System response allowed for an uncomplicated reactor trip response. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3 and cause investigation is in progress. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified. There was a normal post trip feedwater isolation due to low Tave. Offsite power remains available. Decay heat is being removed by the main condenser. The plant is stable in Mode 3. There was no impact on Unit 2. |
ENS 50006 | 8 April 2014 05:21:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | VEGP Unit 2 was at 100% power, normal activities, when digital feedwater trouble alarms were received on all 4 steam generators (SG) with level stable in all generators. Operating crew entered abnormal operating procedure for feedwater malfunction when SG #3 level began rapidly lowering. Operators attempted to take manual control of SG #3 main feedwater regulating valve and were unable to raise SG #3 level. SG #3 level lowered to the Lo-Lo Level setpoint causing an automatic reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted and SG #3 level remained off scale low on narrow range indications. Auxiliary feedwater and feedwater isolation actuated as expected. (Unit 2) is currently stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. A forced outage response team has been formed to determine the cause of the low SG water level and determine restart criteria and time of restart. All control rods fully inserted on the trip. Decay heat is being removed via auxiliary feedwater to steam generators steaming to the condenser steam dumps. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 49718 | 13 January 2014 03:28:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A condition is being reported per TRM 13.13.1, Emergency Response Facilities, Action 8.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 49595 | 2 December 2013 13:52:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | This is a 10 CFR 50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub-modules for the Vogtle 3 & 4 construction project. In September 2013, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for deviations associated with sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55(e)(5)(i). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Reference similar Summer Event (EN#49582). |
ENS 49461 | 22 October 2013 13:18:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 1144 EDT, Vogtle Unit Two was manually tripped in response to lowering Main Condenser vacuum. The Unit 2 Bravo Main Feed Pump was tagged out for scheduled maintenance and the casing was being removed when condenser vacuum started lower due to isolation valve not holding pressure. Main Condenser vacuum lowered to less than procedural limits for continued plant operation. All systems operated correctly in response to the reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted. AFW was placed in service to control Steam Generator levels. System response allowed for an uncomplicated reactor trip response. Plant is stable in Mode 3 while performing a cause investigation. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified and at plant site. The plant is in a normal post-trip electrical line-up. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to the Main Condenser. |
ENS 49453 | 19 October 2013 09:36:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | VEGP (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant) unit two was at 100% power, normal activities, when the unit two turbine tripped causing an automatic reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted and nothing unusual was noted. Auxiliary feed water and feedwater isolation actuated as expected. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. A forced outage response team has been formed to determine the cause of the turbine trip and determine restart criteria and time of restart. During the transient, no relief valves lifted. The electrical grid is stable and supplying plant safety loads. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the condenser. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 49272 | 13 August 2013 07:41:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 emergency response facilities action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to a failure to start of the TSC HVAC unit. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The Technical Support Center HVAC system was returned to service at 1100 EDT on August 14, 2013. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Musser). |
ENS 49186 | 11 July 2013 15:26:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A Plant Vogtle employee on site complained of medical issues while performing work inside Unit 2 containment at 1127 EDT. After being transported offsite to Burke County Hospital, Plant Vogtle was notified at 1426 EDT that the individual was deceased. The (NRC) Resident Inspector has been notified. The death was not known to be related to work performed at the site, and the employee was not contaminated when transported offsite. The licensee will notify OSHA.
The licensee notified OSHA at 1625 EDT and will also be making a media/press release. Notified R2DO (Nease). |
ENS 49144 | 24 June 2013 04:49:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A condition is being reported per TRM 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on the backup diesel generator that supplies TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54 (q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
The backup diesel generator was returned to service at 1641 EDT on 6/27/13 which restored the TSC to functional status. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Franke). |
ENS 49140 | 21 June 2013 10:50:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A condition is being reported per TRM 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The Functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54 (q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Exit TRM 13.3.1: The functionality of the TSC has been restored and scheduled maintenance activities performed complete and satisfactory at 1410 EDT on 6/21/13. The NRC resident inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Desai). |
ENS 48988 | 1 May 2013 10:41:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A condition is being reported per TRM 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2 The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee anticipates the maintenance will be complete at 1630 EDT on 5/1/13. * * * UPDATE FROM PARKER TO SNYDER AT 1702 EDT ON 5/1/13 * * * The TSC was returned to service at 1607 EDT on 5/1/13. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue).
The TSC has been taken out of service to perform planned maintenance. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue). * * * UPDATE FROM PARKER TO SNYDER AT 1747 EDT ON 5/2/13 * * * The TSC was returned to service at 1733 EDT on 5/2/13. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue). |
ENS 48985 | 30 April 2013 13:15:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A condition is being reported per TRM (Technical Requirements Manual) 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on TSC support systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. At 102 EDT on 4/30/13, the "TSC has been restored to a functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |