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05000348/FIN-2018003-0130 September 2018 23:59:59FarleySelf-revealingUnit 1 Pressurizer Safety Valve Lift Pressure Outside of Technical Specification Tolerance BandA self-revealed SL IV NCV of TS 3.4.10, Pressurizer Safety Valves, was identified when a routine lift pressure test revealed that pressurizer safety valve Q1B13V0031C was lower than allowed by TS SR for a duration that was longer than the conditions TS required action completion time.
05000348/FIN-2018014-0130 June 2018 23:59:59FarleyNRC identifiedFailure to Complete System Operator Rounds as Required per ProceduresDuring an NRC investigation completed on November 16, 2017, a SL IV Notice of Violation (NOV) of plant Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a was identified when system operators failed to complete rounds as required per procedures. Specifically, on multiple occasions occurring from July 2016 through September 2016, four system operators (SOs) failed to complete various rounds as prescribed by documented instructions and procedures.Specifically, card reader data showed that the four SOs did not enter the rooms to record operating logs during their watch station rounds in accordance with the approved schedule, as required by NMP-OS-007-001, Conduct of Operations Standards and Expectations, and FNP-0-SOP-0.11, Watch Station Tours and Operator Logs.
05000348/FIN-2018014-0230 June 2018 23:59:59FarleyNRC identifiedFailure to Provide Complete and Accurate Information Related to System Operator RoundsDuring an NRC investigation completed on November 16, 2017, a SL IV NOV of 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information, was identified when system operators failed to provide complete and accurate information related to system operator rounds. Specifically, on multiple occasions occurring from July 2016 through September 2016, information required by regulations to be maintained by the licensee was not complete and accurate in all material respects. Four SOs failed to comply with the procedural requirements of NMP-OS-007-001, Conduct of Operations Standards and Expectations, and FNP-0-SOP-0.11, Watch Station Tours and Operator Logs, in that on multiple occasions the SOs recorded data for certain readings without ever entering the corresponding area.
05000348/FIN-2017009-0131 December 2017 23:59:59FarleyNRC identifiedFailure to Report a Condition Which was Prohibited by Technical SpecificationsThe NRC identified a Severity Level IV (SL IV) non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(b) for failure to report plant operation prohibited by Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.2. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform a past operability evaluation and failed to recognize for having two steam flow channels on the 1 C steam generator inoperable longer than allowed by TS 3.3.2. Consequently, this condition was not discussed and reported on the Licensee Event Report (LER) 2016-007-00 or 2016-007-001. The issue was entered into the licensees CAP as condition report 10413856.This violation adversely affected the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function; the NRC relies on licensees ability to identify and report conditions or events meeting the criteria specified in the regulations. The licensee did not evaluate past operability and failed to recognize, for the purpose of reportability, that the point of discovery occurred when the data was collected. Because this issue affected the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function, it was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process. Consistent with the guidance in Section 6.9, Paragraph d.9, of the NRC Enforcement Policy and Guidance in Section 2.3.2.a, this finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV non-cited violation. This finding has no cross-cutting aspect as it was strictly associated with a traditional enforcement violation.
05000348/FIN-2016003-0430 September 2016 23:59:59FarleyLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationThe following Severity Level IV violation was identified by the licensee and was a violation of NRC requirements which met the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy, for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation. 10 CFR55.21, Medical examination, states, in part, that a licensee shall have a medical examination by a physician every two years. Contrary to the above, on August 30, 2016, the licensee identified that a licensed operator did not complete the required biennial NRC medical examination by May 2016, which was the two year due date. The due date for the licensed operators medical examination was incorrectly entered into the licensees learning management system (LMS) database when the operator received his previous physical while in the initial license training program to upgrade to a senior operator. The inspectors determined that the violation was consistent with a Severity Level IV violation because the licensed operator was not actively performing licensed duties in the control room. This issue was entered in the licensees corrective action program as CR 10267379.
05000348/FIN-2014007-0830 June 2014 23:59:59FarleyNRC identifiedFailure to Update the FSAR with the Safety Analysis Performed in Response to GL 2008-01The team identified a Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.71, Maintenance of Records, Making of Reports, for the licensees failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Specifically, the UFSAR was not updated to reflect the analysis requested by the NRC in GL 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as condition report 823270. The team determined the failure to update the UFSAR with the analyses performed for GL 2008-01 was a performance deficiency. Failures to update the UFSAR are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process instead of the SDP in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Block TE2, because they potentially impede or impact the regulatory process. Specifically, failures to update the UFSAR challenges the regulatory process because it serves as a reference document used, in part, for recurring safety analyses, evaluating license amendment requests, and in preparation for and conduct of inspection activities. As a result, the team compared the performance deficiency against the examples in Section 6.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and determined it constituted a more than minor traditional enforcement violation because it rose to a SL-IV violation. Specifically, SL-IV violation example d.3 stated A licensee fails to update the UFSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) but the lack of up-to-date information has not resulted in any unacceptable change to the facility or procedures. The team determined an evaluation for cross-cutting aspect was not applicable because this was a traditional enforcement violation.
05000348/FIN-2013005-0231 December 2013 23:59:59FarleyLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified Violation10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Immediate notification requirements for operating nuclear power reactors (3) Eight-hour reports, required the licensee to notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to make the required notification within 8 hours of an issue associated with certain unfused direct current (DC) ammeters in the main control room. CR 476438 was written on June 27, 2012, which describes the potential fire vulnerability to alternate shutdown capability. Technical evaluation (TE) 451064, completed on July 12, 2012, confirmed the vulnerability in that the ammeter circuits do not contain fuses which would provide overcurrent protection. TE 449432 was completed on August 21, 2012 and incorrectly concluded that this issue was not reportable. CR 723304 was written on October 24, 2013, to reevaluate the reportability requirements of this issue. The licensee notified the NRC of this issue on December 16, 2013, via event notification (EN) 49638. Since this finding impacted the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function, it was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process. The inspectors concluded that failure to make the required notification within 8 hours was a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with Section 6.9(d) of the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
05000348/FIN-2013002-0331 March 2013 23:59:59FarleyLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified Violation10 CFR 50.54(q) states, in part, that licensees may make changes to their emergency plans without Commission approval only if the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans. Contrary to the above, on August 13, 2007, the licensee implemented a change to their emergency plan, specifically the Emergency Action Levels (EALs), which decreased the effectiveness of the approved plan. A note was added to an approved EAL (Notice of Unusual Event HU2), which would delay declaration of an Unusual Event for fires in containment under certain conditions. This decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan. Since the violation affected the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function, it was evaluated under traditional enforcement. The inspectors concluded that implementing this change was a Severity Level IV violation based on its similarity to the example in section 6.6(d) of the Enforcement Policy. The licensee took immediate actions to eliminate the note from the EAL and entered the issue in their corrective action program as CR 571572.
05000348/FIN-2011202-0230 September 2011 23:59:59FarleyNRC identifiedSecurity
05000348/FIN-2010004-0230 September 2010 23:59:59FarleyNRC identifiedFailure to Adopt Appropriate Procedures to Evaluate Deviations and Failures to Comply with 10 CFR 21 EvaluationsAn NRC identified violation of 10 CFR 21.21, Notification of failure to comply or existence of a defect and its evaluation, was identified for an inadequate procedure, resulting in the licensees untimely reporting of a substantial safety hazard. Specifically, the licensees station procedure FNP-0-AP-62, Evaluation of Defects and Noncompliances Potentially Reportable Under 10CFR21, failed to identify the appropriate timeliness aspect required by 10 CFR 21.21(a), and allowed the term discovery to be the date of the Plant Review Board (PRB) approval, regardless of the date of discovery of the deviation. This resulted in a substantial safety hazard being reported approximately 260 days after the deviation was identified. The NRC received the Part 21 report on July 6, 2010 (approximately 260 days after discovery of the deviation). The inspectors determined the inadequate procedure allowing untimely reporting of substantial safety hazards was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because if the procedure was left uncorrected, a more serious safety concern could occur. Specifically, failure to evaluate deviations and to perform notifications within the specified time frame, 60 days, does not allow for timely evaluation of other components that could be subject to the deviation. Because this issue affected a potential reporting requirement and the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function, it was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process. Consistent with the guidance of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation was categorized at Severity Level IV NCV. This finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect in the CAP component of the PI&R area in that problems should be thoroughly evaluated such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. This includes properly classifying, prioritizing, and evaluating for operability and reportability conditions adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee was untimely in evaluating and reporting the substantial safety hazard (P.1(c)).
05000348/FIN-2002006-0130 September 2002 23:59:59FarleyNRC identifiedFailure to Obtain NRC Approval Prior to Implementing Changes to the Approved Fire Protection ProgramA Severity Level IV NCV of Farley Unit 1 Operating License Condition 2.C.(4) and Farley Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.(6) was identified for the licensee making a change to the approved fire protection program (FPP) without prior Commission approval. On January 20, 1992, and February 20, 1998, the licensee inappropriately used the 10 CFR 50.59 change process to revise the FPP to accept five fire areas (Fire Areas 51, 1-004, 1-042, 2-004, and 2-043) that did not satisfy the fire detection and suppression requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3. These five fire areas contained unprotected, redundant electrical cables for both main control room (MCR) air conditioning (A/C) units. On Unit 1, the change decreased the effectiveness of the program in the event of a fire, while on Unit 2 the change adversely affected the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown (SSD) in the event of a fire The team concluded that the finding had a credible impact on safety because the licensees failure to properly evaluate changes to the FPP could adversely affect or degrade the reliability of SSD capability from the MCR. However, the team determined that this finding was of very low significance because the overall SSD capabilities in the affected fire areas and related FFP features were still adequate to ensure SSD capability. Therefore, this finding is characterized as Green.