ML20135D929

Informs of No Comments on Staff Commission Paper Re Subj Rulemaking 10CFR60, Design Basis Events. Copy of Final Rule Requested

ML20135D929
Person / Time
Issue date:	12/06/1996
From:	Bell M NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:	Bell H NRC OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (OIG)
References
FRN-61FR64257, RULE-PR-60 NUDOCS 9612100259
Download: ML20135D929 (23)

Text

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December 6,'1996 MEMORANDUM T0: Hubert T. Bell, . Inspector General Office of the Inspector General 4

FROM: Michael J. Bell, Chief

Engineering and Geosciences Branch DJB for MJB j Division of Waste Management 1

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

SUBJECT:

10 CFR PART 60 DESIGN BASIS EVENTS RULEMAKING - FINAL RULE i

In a memorandum dated May 15, 1995, the Acting Inspector General stated

! that he had no comments on the staff's Commission paper on the subject i

rulemaking (10 CFR Part 60 Design Basis Events) but requested that I provide a ,

1

copy of the final rule when it was published. Accordingly, attached is a copy of the final rule that was published in the Federal Reaister on December 4, t

1996.

l

Attachment:

As stated

CONTACT

D. Dancer /ENGB/NMSS j 415-6618 I i

! DISTRIBUTION: (*w/att)_

i Central File

• JGreeves MFederline NMSS r/f ENGB r/f PUBLIC l

! DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DWMtENG8\De\MEM0!G.D8E

! 0FC ENGB ENGB _ ENGB NAME DDan$ 9/eb/PdMd s k RWellYr [Mb DATE 12/ (/96 12/(/96 12)(/96 l i 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY l

! ACNW: YES NO '

IG : YES N0 '

Delete file after distribution: Yes / No

, LSS : YES NO gCp 96 0 nil 0 iTg gr3TER COPY ,

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l 9612a00259 PDR ORO 961206 NRCIO c.

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December 6, 1996 MEMORANDUM T0: Hubert T. Bell, Inspector General

Office of the Inspector General FROM

Michael J. Bell, Chief Engineering and Geosciences Branch DJB for MJB

. Division of Waste Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

SUBJECT:

10 CFR PART 60 DESIGN BASIS EVENTS RULEMAKING - FINAL RULE In a memorandum dated May 15, 1996, the Acting Inspector General stated that he had no comments on the staff's Commission paper on the subject rulemaking (10 CFR Part 60 Design Basis Events) but requested that I provide a copy of the final rule when it was published. Accordingly, attached is a copy of the final rule that was published in the Federal Reaister on December 4, 1996.

Attachment:

As stated CONTACT: D. Dancer /ENGB/NHSS 415-6618 DISTRIBUTION: (*w/att)

Central File

• JGreeves MFederline NMSS r/f ENGB r/f PUBLIC DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DWM\ENG8\DMD\MEMOIG.DBE OFC ENGB ENGB _ ENGB NAME DDanieY/eb/Prfs read RWel1Yr

/' kkh DATE 12/ (/96 12/(/96 12)h/96 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY ACNW: YES N0 '

IG : YES N0 ' Delete file after distribution: Yes # No LSS : YES N0 '

l i

1 December 6, 1996 i

l MEMORANDUM T0: Hubert T. Bell, Inspector General )

Office of the Inspector General  !

FROM: Michael J. Bell, Chief Engineering and Geosciences Branch DJB for MJB Division of Waste Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

SUBJECT:

10 CFR PART 60 DESIGN BASIS EVENTS RULEMAKING - FINAL RULE In a memorandum dated May 15, 1996, the Acting Inspector General stated that he had no comments on the staff's Commission paper on the subject rulemaking (10 CFR Part 60 Design Basis Events) but requested that I provide a copy of the final rule when it was published. Accordingly, attached is a copy of the final rule that was published in the Federal Reaister on December 4, 1996.

I

Attachment:

As stated CONTACT: D. Dancer /ENGB/NMSS 415-6618 DISTRIBUTION: (*w/att)

Central File

• JGreeves MFederline NMSS r/f ENGB r/f PUBLIC DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DWM\ENG8\DMD\MEMOIG.DBE OFC ENGB ENGB _ ENGB NAME DDani /eb/Prf ared l' RWellYr^ kh DATE 12/ (/96 12/(/96 12)h/96 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY ACNW: YES NO '

IG : YES NO ' Delete file after distribution: Yes # No LSS : YES NO '

. . . . - - - -- ~_ . ..

December 6, 1996 l MEMORANDUM T0: Hubert T. Bell, Inspector General

) Office of the Inspector General l

l FROM: Michael J. Bell, Chief Engineering and Geosciences Branch DJB for MJB l

i Division of Waste Management l Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

SUBJECT:

10 CFR PART 60 DESIGN BASIS EVENTS RULEMAKING - FINAL RULE In a memorandum dated May 15, 1996, the Acting Inspector General stated that he had ne comments on the staff's Commission paper on the subject rulemaking (10 CFR Part 60 Design Basis Events) but requested that I provide a copy of the final rule when it was published. Accordingly, attached is a copy of the final rule that was published in the Federal Reaister on December 4, 1996.

Attachment:

As stated CONTACT: D. Dancer /ENGB/NMSS 415-6618 DISTRIBUTION: (*w/att)

Central File

• JGreeves MFederline NMSS r/f ENGB r/f PUBLIC DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DWMtENG8\DMD\MEM0!G.DBE OFC ENGB ENGB _ ENGB NAME DDanieI/eb/Pand k RWellYr (kh DATE 12/ (/96 12/(/96 12)[7/96 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY ACNW: YES N0 '

IG : YES N0 ' Delete file after distribution: Yes # No LSS : YES NO '

i 1

I

December 6, 1996 4

MEMORANDUM T0: Hubert T. Bell, Inspector General Office of the Inspector General FROM: Michael J. Bell, Chief Engineering and Geosciences Branch DJB for MJB Division of Waste Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

SUBJECT:

10 CFR PART 60 DESIGN BASIS EVENTS RULEMAKING - FINAL RULE In a memorandum dated May 15, 1996, the Acting Inspector General stated that he had no comments on the staff's Commission paper on the subject rulemaking (10 CFR Part 60 Design Basis Events) but requested that I provide a copy of the final rule when it was published. Accordingly, attached is a copy of the final rule that was published in the Federal Reaister on December 4, 1996.

Attachment:

As stated CONTACT: D. Dancer /ENGB/NMSS 415-6618 DISTRIBUTION: (*w/att)

Central File

• JGreeves MFederline NHSS r/f ENGB r/f PUBLIC DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DWM\ENG8\DMD\MEM0!G.DBE OFC ENGB ENGB _ ENGB NAME DDani /eb/rd"*ds k RWellYr (h4h DATE 12/ (/96 12/(/96 1hh /96 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY ACNW: YES NO '

IG : YES N0 ' Delete file after distribution: Yes # No LSS : YES N0 '

December 6, 1996 MEMORANDUM T0: Hubert T. Bell, Inspector General Office of the Inspector General FROM: Michael J. Bell, Chief Engineering and Geosciences Branch DJB for MJB Division of Waste Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

SUBJECT:

10 CFR PART 60 DESIGN BASIS EVENTS RULEMAKING - FINAL RULE In a memorandum dated May 15, 1996, the Acting Inspector General stated that he had no comments on the staff's Commission paper on the subject rulemaking (10 CFR Part 60 Design Basis Events) but requested that I provide a copy of the final rule when it was published. Accordingly, attached is a copy of the final rule that was published in the Federal Reaister on December 4, 1996.

Attachment:

As stated  ;

i CONTACT: D. Dancer /ENGB/NMSS 415-6618 l

i DISTRIBUTION: (*w/att) ,

Central File

• JGreeves MFederline NMSS r/f I ENGB r/f PUBLIC DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DWM\EN68\DMD\MEMOIG.08E OFC ENGB ENGB _ ENGB NAME DDan$ heb/Pd%k RWellYr hjhg DATE 12/ (/96 12/(/96 12)h/96  ;

0FFICIAL RECI)RD COPY ACNW: YES NO '~'

IG : YES Delete file after distribution: Yes # No N0 LSS : YES NO '

December 6, 1996 MEMORANDUM T0: Hubert T. Bell, Inspector General Office of the Inspector General FROM: Michael J. Bell, Chief Engineering and Geosciences Branch DJB for MJB Division of Waste Management l Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

SUBJECT:

10 CFR PART 60 DESIGN BASIS EVENTS RULEMAKING - FINAL RULE i

i In a memorandum dated May 15, 1996, the Acting Inspector General stated that he had no comments on the staff's Commission paper on the subject

^

rulemaking (10 CFR Part 60 Design Basis Events) but requested that I provide a copy of the final rule when it was published. Accordingly, attached is a copy j of the final rule that was published in the Federal Reaister on December 4, 1996.

1

Attachment:

As stated CONTACT: D. Dancer /ENGB/NMSS 415-6618 l

I DISTRIBUTION: (*w/att)

Central File

• JGreeves MFederline NMSS r/f ENGB r/f PUBLIC DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DWM\ENG8\DMD\MEMOIG.DBE 0FC ENGB ENGB _ ENGB NAME DDanie[/eb/PdRd s k RWellYr Ikh ,

DATE 12/ (/96 12/(/96 12)(/96 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY  !

ACNW: YES N0 IG : YES NO ' Delete file after distribution: Yes # No LSS : YES N0 ' i

l l December 6, 1996 l

MEMORAHDUM T0: Hubert T. Bell, Inspector General Office of the Inspector General l

FROM: Michael J. Bell, Chief Engineering and Geosciences Branch DJB for MJB Division of Waste Management '

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

SUBJECT:

10 CFR PART 60 DESIGN BASIS EVENTS RULEMAKING - FINAL RULE In a memorandum dated May 15, 1996, the Acting Inspector General stated that he had no comments on the staff's Commission paper on the subject rulemaking (10 CFR Part 60 Design Basis Events) but requested that I provide a copy of the final rule when it was published. Accordingly, attached is a copy of the final rule that was published in the Federal Reaister on December 4, 1996.

Attachment:

As stated CONTACT: D. Dancer /ENGB/NMSS 415-6618 DISTRIBUTION: (*w/att)

Central File

• JGreeves MFederline NHSS r/f ENGB r/f PUBLIC DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DWM\ENG8\DMD\MEMOIG.DBE OFC ENGB ENGB _ ENGB NAME DDanieY/eb/Prfs md t-RWel1Yr khh DATE 12/ (/96 12/(/96 12)h/96 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY ACNW: YES N0 IG : YES NO '

Delete file after distribution: Yes / No LSS : YES NO l

l

December 6, 1996 MEMORANDUM T0: Hubert T. Bell, Inspector General Office of the Inspector General FROM: Michael J. Bell, Chief Engineering and Geosciences Branch DJB for MJB Division of Waste Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

SUBJECT:

10 CFR PART 60 DESIGN BASIS EVENTS RULEMAKING - FINAL RULE In a memorandum dated May 15, 1996, the Acting Inspector General stated that he had no comments on the staff's Commission paper on the subject rulemaking (10 CFR Part 60 Design Basis Events) but requested that I provide a copy of the final rule when it was published. Accordingly, attached is a copy of the final rule that was published in the Federal Reaister on December 4, 1996.

Attachment:

As stated CONTACT: D. Dancer /ENGB/NMSS 415-6618 DISTRIBUTION: (*w/att)

Central File

• JGreeves MFederline NMSS r/f ENGB r/f PUBLIC l

DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DWM\ENG8\DMD\MEMOIG.DBE OFC ENGB ENGB _ ENGB NAhE DDanIM/ab/Pd % // RWellYr hh DATE 12/ (/96 12/(/96 12)(/96 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY ACNW: YES NO '

IG : YES NO '

Delete file after distribution: Yes / No LSS : YES NO

j . Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 234 / Wednesday, December 4,1996 / Rulcs and Regulations 64257 limes and 2.402,987 bushels of imported change the regulatory period to January that this rule, as hereinafter set forth, umes, wem shipped to the fresh market 1 througn May 31 from a continuous, will tend to effectuate the declared during the January through May year round, implementation. policy of the Act.

production period. In comparison, Minimum grade, size, quality, and 257,178 bushels of Flonda limes and maturity requirements for hmes List of Subjects in 7 CFR Par 1911 5,980,669 bushels of imported 11mes, imported into the United States are Limes, Marketing agreements, were shipped to the fresh snarket during currently in effect under S 944.209 (7 Reporting and recordkeeping .

the peak production period of June CFR 944.209). This rule increases the requirements, through December. minimum size requirement Sr imported For the reasons set forth above,7 CFR

' This rule needs to be effective 1 - limes from 1% inches to 2 inches in part 911 is amended as follows:

January 1,1997, because durim diameter during the period of January 1 1. The author ty citation fcir 7 CFR January through May period ao through May 31. By mcreasing the part 911 continues to read as follows:

generally higher while lime uhty is minimum size, this rule will result in Authority: 7 U.S.C. 60t-674.

lower. Market demand hon < s er, more imported limes passing the 42 remains the same as in the peak percent juice content requirement, PART 911-LIMES GROWN IN production period. These factors have providing higher quality fruit at a FLORIDA resulted in an incentive to pack low reasonable cost. ggg g quality fruit. Also, the juice content The largest exporter of times to the requirement for times shipped to the United States is Mexico, with the 2. In Section 911.344, paragraph (a)(3)

! fresh market is 42 percent. If andlers heaviest volumes oflime shipments the words "at least 1% mches" are occurring between June 1 and December revised to read 'at least 2 inches have had difficulty meeting the Dated: November 27,1996 requirement.during the low production 31. Mexico exported 6,075,685 bushels period because limos are less mature of fresh limes to the United States Robert C. Keeney, and have thicker skins. The thicker- during the 1994-95 season, while other . Director. Fruit and vegetable Division.  !

' [FR Doc. 96-30860 Filed 12-3-96; a:45 aml skinned limes tend to have lower juice import sources shipped a total of .

, content. 201.053 bushels, combined. swNG CODE WO.42-P Limes that are 2 inches or larger in The 1% inches in diameter size diameter have a higher juice content requirement is not specifically stated in than smaller limes. The larger limes, the lime import regulation. The..J.,x, NUCLEAR REGULATORY

• the4re, have a greater chance of no change is needed in the text of COMMISSION meeting the 42 pe. cent juice content S 944.209.

requirement. Incmasing the rninimum The proposed rule concerning this 10 CFR Part 60 J size to 2 inches in diameter is expected action was fisued on July 31,1996,and RIN 3150-AD51 j to resuli L more fresh limes rnecting the was published in the August 5,1996, 42 percent juice content requirement. Federal Register (61 FR 40551). with a Disposal of High-Level Radioactive These times are more likely to pass 6aday comment period ending October Wastes in Geologic Repositories; inspection without the expense of 4,1996. No comments were received. Design Basis Events repacking and regrading the fruit which liowever, a request to extend the will reduce handling costs. conunent period to October 31,1996, ^GENCY: Nuclear Regulatory i C, **iSSI "-

The increase in nunimum size has a was received. This request was denied ositive cost effect on consumers as the proposed rule elready had an ACTION: Final rule.

ecause it allows handlers of limes to cxtended 60-day comment period.

a

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory provide the corsumer with higher ,Therefore, the Department continues to quality fruit at a reasonable cost. Commission is amending its regulations helieve that this was sufficient time to on the protection of public health and Accordmg to the Committee ,the file comments. This rule needs to be safety from activities conducted at a mdustry s past sales records mdiu.te implemente I by January 1. Due t" ository operatiot .rea that consumers have a preference for the market conditions, the period from geologic H;ROA) be ref> ore permanent closure. I hirger sized limes. Prmincers and January through May is a hen the prices particular, the final rule addresses the importers of hmes wdl also benefit by for limes tend to be higher and th" nmasures that are required to provide ex eriencmg higher return rates.  ;

quality of times tends to be lower. This defense in depth against the

. sction 8e of the Act provides that creates an incentive to pack low quality consequences of" design basis events."

when certam domestically produced fruit that can hurt the marketing of These measures include prescribed commodities, mcluding times, are limes. Hecause of this situation, th" regulated under a Federal marketing design requirements, quality assurance Department has determined not to requimments, and the establishment of order, imports of that commodity must reopen the comment period. a preclosure controlled area from which meet the same or comparable grade, After thoroughly analyzm.g th" size, quality, an members of the public can be excluded.

Since this rule m,d maturity creases requirements.

the minimum ' conunents received and other available information, the Departrnent has ErrECTIVE DATE: January 3,1997.

size requirement for Florida times, a FOR FURTHER INFORMATI0N, CONTACT: Dr.

concluded Ihat this final rule is corresponding change also applies to appropriate.

Richard A. Weller, Dm,sion of Waste imports. in accordance with section Be of the Managanent, Office of Nuclear Mater,m i in a separate rulemaking action, as Act, the United States Trade Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear finalized in the Federal Register on Representative has concurred with the Regulatory Commission, Washington, August 21.1996 (61 FR 43141), the issuance of this final rule. DC 20555, telephone (301) 415-7287.

Department reduced the regulatory AIter consideration of all relevant SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

period for Florida limes and limes matter presented, including the

, imported into the United States. That information and recommendations llackground action modified language in both the submitted by the Committee and other Under the Nuclear Waste Poiicy Act domestic and import regulations to available information,it is hereby found of 1982, as amended, the U.S. Nuclear

• -enn

64258 Federal Register / Vol. 61. No. 234 / Wednesday, December 4,1996 / Rules and Regulations Regulatory Commission exercises the Federal Register notices cited above. Wisconsin Electric Power Company:

licensing and related regulatory As noted in the Federal Register notice and (10) Mr. Marvin I. lewis.

authority with respect to geologic for the proposed rule (60 FR 15180) and The principal issues raised in the repositories that are to be constructed as intemded in subsequent discussions comments are summarized below.

and operated by the U.S. Department of in this notice, unless the specific (Comments that are duplicative.

Energy (DOE) for the disposal of high- context suggests otherwise, the terms editorial, or beyond the scope of the leve! radioactive waste.The " provisions," " requirements," rulemakin>; are not discussed herein but Commission's regu'ations pertaining to " standards," and " criteria" are generally have been considered in the analysis of these geologic repositories appear at to used interchangeably; the term " limit" the public comments.) For the reasons CFR part 60. In recent years, NRC, in (as in " dose limit") is generally used to indicated, the Commission has decided conjunction with its Federally-Funded refer to a specific type of requirement or to adopt the amendments substantially Research and Development Center, the criterion; and the term " rule"is in the form proposed in the March 22, Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory generally used to refer to the entire set 1995 Federal Register notice (60 FR Analyses, completed a comprehensive of requirements or criteria (e.g., part 601. 15180) but with the changes noted that review of the requirements of part 60 This final rule completes NRC action reflect the Commission's analysis of the regarding their clarity and sufficiency to related to PRM-60-3. public comments.

protect public health and safety. NRC Lastly, the Commission notes that, focused particular attention on any consistent with the mandates of the L Conte lled Area-WasteIsolatw.n matters that may be ambiguous, Energy Policy Act of 1992, the DOE 'wted that the supplementary insufficient for their intended purpose, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) information in the proposed rule or inconsistent with other expressions is developing site-specific referred to the " controlled area" as one ofits regulatory policy. Independently, environmental radiation protection "* * * (within which waste isolation is DOE conducted a similar review of part standards for a potential repository at to be ensured after permanent closure),"

60. Yucca Mountain, Nevada. In this regard. DOE observed that this is inconsistent The NRC review identified the Act specifies that, within one year with the part 60 definition of deficiencies twarding the clarity and after promulgation of the EPA " controlled ama." which does not refer sufficiency of the current part 60 standards, the Commission must to waste isolation. DOE recommended re<pairements to protect publi.: health promulgate a rule so that Commission that the Commission delete the and safety for the fu4 range of credible regulations are consistent with the new parenthetical phrase in the conditions or events that may occur at EPA standards. Although the primary supplementary information.

an operating repository, including those focus of the new EPA standards is en The Commission agrees that the low-probability events that have the postclosure period of repphy parenthetical phrase does not properly potentially serious consequences. NRC performance, the staff will ensure that characterize the definition of also noted that certain elements of the current modifications to part 60 " controlled area." liowever, rather than existing part 60 differ from counterpart proposed herein, which focus on the deleting the parenthetical phrase requirements in other NRC rules where period of repository operations before altogether, the Commission has greater consistency in language would permanent closure. are consistent with modified the phrase to accurately reflect be bensficial. DOE's independent the new EPA standards. To the extent the definition of" controlled area" and review of Part 60 requirements any inconsistencies between NRC and its focus on postclosure activities.

hientified similar deficiencies in these EPA requirements are identified, they requirements. To address these issues, will be addressed in the planned future 2. Multiple failure Scenarios DOE filed a petition for rulemaking rulemaking by NRC to address new EPA DOE noted that the supplementary (PRM), PRM-60-3, on April 19,1990. standards. information under S 60.136 snemed to In response to the DOE petition and indicate that multiple independent the results of the NRC review of part 60, Public Comments on the Proposed Rule failure scenarios would be considered to the Commission published a proposed A period of 90 days was specified in be Category 2 design basis events and rule for public comment in the Federal the Federal Register for public observed that, typically, nuclear safety Registir on March 22,1995 (60 FR comments on the proposed rule. The analyses are net required to assume 15180) to clarify the requirements for Commission specifically sought public multiple failures of safety-related protection of public health and safety comments on: (t) The appropriateness systems unless they are all credible related to activities conducted at a of the proposed 0.05 Sv (5 rem) dose consequences of the initim.ng event.

GROA before its permanent closure. In limit in new to CFR 60136 as the DOE recommended that the particular, the proposed rule provided repository design basis for protection of Commission clanfy how it intends to new and modified definitions for certain public health and safety during accident review the acceptability c.f repository terms (including the definition of conditions, and (2) the rationale systems, structures, and components in "important to safety " with reference to supporting the proposed 0.05 Sv (5 rem) the context of the new rule.

structures, systems, and components), dose limit. Ten sets of comments were The Commission agrees with this dose criteria for accident conditions, received on the proposed rule from the comment and has revised the and requirements for the establishment following organizations and individuals: supplementary information to clarify of a proclosure controlled area from (t) The Clean Water Fund of North how it intends to review the analysis in which members of the public can be Carolina (CW FNCh (2) Mr. Vernon J. the DOE license application to excluded when necessary. In an Brechin;(3) DOE Office of Civilian demonstrate compliance with the accompanying notice (March 22,1995: Radioactive Waste Man %ement; (4) requirements of S 60.136.

60 FR 15190) the Commission also EPA, Office of Federal Activities;(5) .

grented in part, and denied in part, the Nye County, Nevada, Nuclear Waste 3. Probability Bounds for Design Basis specific proposals in the DOE petition. Repository Project Office;(6) Virginia EV""f8 For a fuller discussion of the PRM, the Power Company; (7) Nuclear Energy In the Section-by-Section Analysis of proposed rule, and the partial grant / Instit ute (NFI); (8) Environmental 5 60.136 in the proposod rule, the partial denial of the DOE petition, see Coalition on Nuclear Power (ECNP); (9) Commission indicated that the lower l

l 1

l Federd Registrr / Vol. 61. No. 234 / Wednesday, December 4,1996 / Rules and Regulations 642!i9 bound for Category 2 design basis events observed that it is clearly the intent of proposed rule to address DOE's is on the order of 1x10 -9 per year (i.e., the regulation to apply the definition to concerns about the differences between events with probabilities of occurnmco engineered systems, not natural part 20 and the EPA standards.

less than 1x10M per year would systems. The Commission disagrees with l generally be screened from further The Commission agrees with this Virginia Power that part 20 limits are l consideration due to their negligible comment and has revised the defini' ion inappropriate. The Commission's i contribution to overall risk). DOE and of"important to safety" to clarify this numerical radiation protection NEl objected that this lower bound is intent. standards are codified in part 20 and l much too low and unjustified. DOE 5. ApplicobdifyofEnvironmental apply to operations at a geologic 1 recommended a lower bound of 1x10-6 Protection AgencyStandards to the rep sitory by virtue of to CFR 20.1002 l

er year and NEl recommended a lower Management and Storage ofHigh-lael and S 60.111(a). However, it is not the ound in the range of 1x10e* per year Waste Commission's intent that it is necessary ,

to 1x10M per year. On the other hand, to use the annual limits in part 20 to ECNP recommended that the most DOE stated that the proposed rule did evaluate specific Category 1 design basis improbable sequences and combinatiom, n t address all of the regulatory . events on an individual basis. Instead of events and accidents (Category 2 and uncensinty associated with dose h.mits the Commission intends that the sum of beyond) should be evaluated in f r design basis events because both th" the annual doses, exposures, and existing rule and the proposed rule releases from oilCategory 1 design basis repository accident The Commission analysis.,th agrees wi DOE and appear to require comphance with both events shall not exceed the limits NEl that the lower pmbability bound EPA radiation protection standards and specified in part 20 arid in the EPA discussed in the proposed rule for Part 20 radiation standards and there is standards.

Category 2 design basis events is too low an inmnsistency letween these two and is unjustified. The Commission standards. Virginia Power noted that the 6. Pmelosum Contmlled Areo considers that, on the basis of repository definition of "important to safety" DOE expressed a concern that the use risk pers establishes the pad 20 hmits that are of the word "immediately"In the  ;

bound obective, a lower xt oe* per year isprobability mferenced in 10 CFR 60.111(a) as the definition of "preclocure controlled  !

appropriate for these events. The acwptance critena for the Category 1 area" could lead to an implication that j Commission mmgnizes that the design basis events and conclude,d that the boundary must be next to the GROA.

estimated consequences from Category 2 this seems to be in1ppropriate. Virgmia DOE also expressed a concern that the design basis events are somewhat Power stated that part 20 establishe,s use of the word " nearest" in S 60,136(h) aupati nel dose hmits and radiati (i.e., " * *

• no individuallocated on limited and would not likely exceed dose hmits for members of the pubh,on c- or beyond the nearest boundary of the several tenths of Sv (several tens of l rem). At this consequence level, the that Omse lunits am expressed as annual preclosure controlled area * * *") is i hmits, and that these h,mits am estimated risk of umcer fc. ..ity from confusing. .

associated with normal hcensed The Commission agrees with these j events with a probability lower than 1x1tW per year is less than 1x10< s appesW hsgn basis events; comments and has:(1) deleted the word  ;

Virgima Power considemd that it is not "immediately"in the definition of 1 per year. To put this risk in perspective. 8PPmpriate to use part 201imits t "preciosure controlled area"in 10 CFR the International Conunission on ,

evaluate specific mnts. t,irgima Power 60.2, (2) changed the phrase "riearest Radiological Protection 8 notes that a urdwr considered that acceptanc" fatal cancer risk in the range of 1x10- boundary" to "any point on the criter a f r design basis mnts am boundary"in the definition of

-6 to 1x10 " per year from exposure ass ciated with the specific "important to safety" in S 60.2 and in to radiation would likely be accektable

"" #9 """" * " " the design reqdrements of the to members of the public. As suc .,

"U * 'I E"* " " ' """ "

~

Category 2 design basis eveats which 7,", g$,,],0 6

,v r ts a d i a result in fatal cancer nsks on the order [3 )*

appropriate accept r.ce criteria will of 1x10< 8 per year or lower do not need to be developed if Category 1 7. Definition of Site contribute significantly to nydividual design basis events are ret 6ned by the DOE recommended that the definition nsk. Auordingly, events with final rule.

probabilities of occurrence lower than of 'siwshould include "preclosure" The Commission agrees with DOE and "postclosure controlled areas."

1x10<6 per year pan be screened from that both the dose limits and the The Commission agrees with this further consideratmo in repository nsk methodology for calculating doses to comi.ient and has modified the analysis. , members of the public in the EPA definition of " site" to mflect its meaning The Commission has revised the standards differ from the dose limits during the period before permanent Section-hy Section Analysis of S 60.136 and methodology for calculating doses repository closure (i.e, the operational to refhr.:t a lower bound for Category 2 to members of the public in part 20 design hasis events on the order of 1 x period), as well as the period following subpart D. Notwithstanding the permanent closure.

to

• pn year. differences hetween these standards, the

4. Definition of "Importont to Safety"- staff does not consider that there is any 8. Effluent Contml Engineered Features regulatory uncertainty regarding DOE s'1ted that, with the deletion of applicable dose limits for Category 1 the term "during normal operations,"

DOE noted that the phrase ,

" engineered structures, systems, and design basis events. In DOE s , the ap[dication of the part 20 effluent demonstration of comphance, either the hmits mvoked by S 60.111(a) is not components," currently in the EPA standards or the part 20 standards clear. DOE recommended that to CF,R definition of "important to safety," was removed from the new definition and may be more limiting o controlling 60.132(c)(1) he revised to clarify that the than the other, but that does not reline latter section is ap licable only to 9 "' E " "

8 Remmmendations ut the Internanonal commmaion on kadioingital emic.1 ion icgp Wh MaMaa". M mA,'tW l W W[ um. N."em w m W.h'&n.

rutAcanon n. unuary im Commission has made no changes to the comment and has revised S 60.1320 li t)

Ij I

I 1

I

.m 1

m. _ _ _ . __._

F G42 fin Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 2M / Wednesday,1)ecember 4,1996 / Rules and Regulations to clarify that this section is applicable Category 1 design basis events would II. Iladiation Protection Standards omy to Category 1 design basis events. not generally be considered as CWFNC stated that a 0.005 Sv (0.5 R Criticality Control accidents, especially those events rem) limit would not he overly CU" "8 T H" Y "" '"I Y protective of public health and safety IX)E noted that the Commission f quently."Ilowever,certam?lower intended to clarify the requirements and there is no reason to seek a weaker pertaining to criticality control *9"""CY

'YI """

) "" * * "

• standant. CWFNC suggested modifying but

" "8 part 20 to clarify any ambiguities in currently that some confusion in 10 concerning CFR 60.131(b)(h)"

t "P"" "hose" E "'"""" a ap"ty and am radiation protection standards for emm n wn as an d repositories. ECNP offered a number of requirements remains. DOE pointed out oper Honal oaunence,ggp have at U nes comments related to radiation that the proposed criticality control requiremuts in S 60.131(h) refer to f.'"""""'". identified as accidents., Ilut protection standards:

" isolation of radioactive waste," a Y "'" P"'""""I"""'*"'**,,

• The Commission should require phrase with postclosure connotations,

" * " " """ I" ""al"Per86 " DOE to provide design basis accident w am not to he mnfused with the analyses for more than undefined w hile noting that systems "must im unlikgdy, but credible and potentially

" critical design basis events, singly" designed occurrence of fordesign criticalitbasis events," asafety signifu antassuming Category 2 design basis and should require demonstration that phrase which has preclosure "'.its. As such, the current definition doses would be kept far below the unplications. Furthermore, DOE argued of"unponant to safety"is unclear with maximum permissible dose limits, with that the last sentence in $ 60.131(h) respect t its m, tended applicability to an as low as is reasonably achievable could be interpreted as requiring a the design of structures, systems, or requirement at least comparable with deterministic demonstration of c p nents for normal operations. that for operating reactors.

criticality safety over the entire period including anticipated operational . The part 60 limits must be much of regulatory concern. Ilowever, given occurrences. Further, with the focus on more stringent than for operating tha tirne frames involved, IX)E protection of members of the public in nuclear facilities.

considered probabilistic "yses to be unrestricted areas, the current definition . The limit of radiation espasure an essential part of demonstrating long- of "important to safety" does not should be no higher than the most term criticality safety. explicitly address protection for the restrictive exposure limit tL.. EPA The Commission considers that the occupational work force. The imposes for any licensee or nther source applicability of the criticality control uncertainty is not related to interpreting of regulated nuclear activity.

requirements proposed in S 60.131(h) is the meaning of" unrestricted area" but, . A 0.005 Sv (0.5 rem) limit should be ch ar with respect to preclosure rather,is related to the narrow focus of impermissible for an individual dos:

considerations but agrees with DOE that Public exposure in unrestricted areas. from a waste site.

uncertainty remains with respect to the Lastly, the value of 0.005 Sv (0.5 rem)

• The most stringent level of worker applicability of the criticality control as a dose limit in unrestricted areas for protection, better than part 20, should requirements to the postolosure period. " accident" conditions lacks consistency be required.

Ilowever, the Commission intends to with a corresponding limit in Part 72

• Part 20 standards are not restrictive addmss this remaining uncertainty in a and with dose values established as enough for the purpose of public health future rulemaking to make the NRC guidance for selected accidents (fuel protection with respect to the storage requirements ccmsistent with the handling and cask drop events) at Part and disposal of radioactive waste.

ruvised EPA standards that are currently 50 facilities (commercial power

• The definitional alteration of the under development, as mandated by the reactors). term "important to safety"is not Energy Policy Act of 1992. Accordingly* Motwithstanding the commi att adequate to assure health protection for m this final rulo,5 60.131(h)is the public because the proposed offered by ECNP, the Commission promulgated, as proposed in the Categories 1 and 2 numerical hm,ts i for considers that the definition of" design proposed rule. radiation exposures are based on basis events"in the Proposed rule does standards that have failed to take into -

10. The Use of the Terms "Important to adequately define that term and that the account the noncancer but adverse Safety " " Accidents," " Normal supplementary mformation m the health eIfects of chronic low-dose Conditions," " Anticipated Operational proposed rule does adequately describe radiation exposures that have been Occurrences,"and " Design Basis the rela *ionsh,p i between tlye terms

, reported in the literature since hents" m part 60. normal conditions,' " anticipated development of NRC's part 20 revision.

CWFNC stated that there was not any operational ccurrences, accidents *,,

• Extremely conservative radiation ambiguity in the current use of the and design basis events. In this protection standards should be utilized terms "important to safety" and regard,it was the Commission's mient in mpository design and performance

" accidents" in part 60. ECNP stated that to supplant undefined terms in ihe rule criteria, and a zero relecse facility the terms " normal conditions," Ow "nonnal conditions " " anticipated design goal should be required for all

" anticipated operational occurrences," Operational occurrences, and radioactive waste management.

" accidents") with a defmed term (c.e., . An acceptable rationale for the 0.05 and " accidents" aru not equivalent to

" design basis events"). Sv (5 rem) dose limit proposed in the nor adequately described by the term

" design basis events." Fc>r the above reasons, the proposed rule is totally absent.

The Commission disagrees with Commission has not revised the The Commission acknowledges that CWFNC that there is no ambiguity in definitions in the prorosed rule for the 0.005 Sv (0.5 rem) dose limit in the the current use of the terms "important " design basis events." As discussed ira definition of "important to safety" in to safety" or " accidents" in part 60. The items 4 and 6 above, editorial changes the existing rule could be construed to latter term is undefined in part 60, and have been made to the definition of be an implicit basis for designing there is uncertainty about its meaning "important to safety," but these changes structures, systems, and components to with respect to the range of events the are unrelated to the arguments advanced pmvent or mitigate the consequences of term encompasser.. The full range of by CWFNC or ECNP. accidents at the boundary of the

Federd Register / Vol. 61, No. 234 / Wednesday, December 4,1996 / Rules and Regulations 642G1 unrestricted area. On the other hand, the standards as they would anniv to an restricted area are occupational doses.

0.005 Sv (0.5 sem) dose limit could also operating repository are beyond the The size of the preclosure controded be interpreted more narrowly, to scope of this rulemaking. area is not specified by the regulations identify only those structures, systems, The Commission agrees with ECNP because it will be dependent upon the  !

and components that are subject to that the term " critical design basis particular activities conducted during additional design requirements and a events"is undefined and,in the the operational period.

quality assurance program to ensure Section-by-Section Analysis of S 60.21 .

perfonnance ofintended functions. See of this final rule, has changed " critical 13. Defindian of Design Base.s Events S 60.131(b) and S 60.151. In short, the design basis eve'n ts" to " Category 2 Virginia Power and NE!

0.005 Sv (0.5 rem) dose limit in the desi;;n basis events." With regard to the recommended that the definition :f definition of"important to safety"in scope of design basis accidents that " design basis events" should make clear the existing rule is,in the Commission's should be considered in the license that the normal operations associated view, subject to conflicting application, the Commission previously with receiving, handling, packaging.

interpretations. addressed this issue in the discussion of storing, emplacing, and retrieving high-As previously discussed, the probability bounds for Category 2 design level waste are not design basir. events.

Commission's comprehensive review of basis events and determined that events The Commission disagrees with this part 60 identified deficiencies in both with probabilities of occurrence ~ lower comment, It is the Commission's intent the clarity and sufficiency of than 1 x 10-6 per year could be that events occurring regularly or requirements to protect workers and screened from further consideration due frequently during the course of norrnal public health and safety. Among the to their negligible contribution to operations are considered as Category 1 identified deficiencies is the regulatory individual risk. design basis events. Category 1 design l uncertainty created by possible Regarding the rationale for the 0.05 Sv basis events effectively embody j conflicting interpretations that could be (5 rem) dose limit in 9 60.136, the repository activities and conditions l given to the 0.005 Sv (0.5 rem) dose , Commission continues to believe that previously identified in part 60 as limit in the "important to safety" the potential risks to members of the " normal operations, including definition described above and by the public from an operating repository are anticipated operational occurrences."In absence of an explicit design basis dose very small. In light of this limited risk. this regard, the Commission intends the limit in Subpart E of the existing rule. the 0.05 Sv (5 rem) dose limit provides part 20 dose limits to be applicable to An objective of this rulemaking is, an adequate margin of safety and an the conduct of repository activities, therefore, to resolve t he uncertainty in appropria'e basis for the design " such as receiving. :.andling, packaging, part 60, as well as remedy the repository structures, systems, and storing, placing, and retrieving high-incomplete definition of "important to components to prevent or mitigate the level waste.

safety" that fails to address protection of conse( uences of low probability, but both workers md members of the public credib e events. The Commission's R D initi n f" Imp riant to l S l#'F -F""CU""

during Category 1 design basis events reasoning behind the 0.05 Sv (5 rem)

(i.e., "nonnal conditions," including dose limit can be found in the Section- Virginia Power noted that in the

" anticipated operational occurrences"). by-Section Analysis of S 60.136 that proposed rule, the definition of ,

The Commission has addressed these appears later in this notice. "important to safety" refers to "* *

• l deficiencies with Ihe addition of new (1J to pr vide reas nable assurance that  !

$ 60.136, which now provides explicit 12. &clusion of the Public Froin high level waste can be received, Pelosure Controlled Area design basis accident dose enteria for handled, packaged, stored, emplaced, repository structures, systems, and Vernon J. Brechin objected to the use and retrieved without exceeding the components, and modification of the of the word "can" versus "will" in the requirements of (10 CFR) 60.111(a) for definition of "important to safety" to description of preclosure controlled Category 1 design basis events; or include the broader interests of both area. **

• " Virginia Power recommended worker and punlic health and safety for The Commi sion disagrees with this that this part of the nefinition should be the full range of conditmns or events cmument. It is not the Commission's revised to make it clear that the focus of that may occur before repository intention to generally exclude members important to safety is design basis closure.'The Commission beheves that of the public from the preclosur" events and not the normal operations these amendments, as well as the others controlled area (which would be th" that are described by the definition in as described herein, clarify and enhance "controlk d area" as defined in 10 CFR the provisions in the rule to protect 20.1003). Iloweser, access to the the T biroposed e Commission rule.disagrees with this worker and public health and safety. pnmlosure controlled area can be comment. As explained in item 13, the It was not the intent of this limited by the licensee for any reason Commission intends that events rulemaking to modify, in any way, the (not necessarily one related to radiation occurring regularly or frequently during Commission's numerical radiation protection). %ithin the preclosure the course of normal operations are protection standards. As discussed controlled area will be a " restricted considered as Category 1 design basis earlier, these standards are codified in area"(as defined in 5 60.2 and events.

part 20 and apply 1o operations at a 520 1003). Access to a restricted area geologic reposito'ry by virtue of must be controlled for purposes of E U"li"ition / "ImPortant to S 20.1002, as well as S 60111(a).The radiation protection. Members of the Safety"-Quahly As.surance issues Commission believes that these public in the preclosure controlled area Virginia Power and NEl stated that the standards continue to be appropriate for will be subject to the dose limits for definition of "important to safety" its licensees and provide adequate members of the public in 10 CFR proposed in the proposed rule would protection of worker and public health 20.1301. Ilowever, an individual who apply full Quality Assurance (QA) and safety at a repository. As such, receives occupational dose in the requirements to almost esery system comments by CWFNC and ECNp about pnx.losure controlled area will be and component of the repository, and possible modifications to the subject to the occupational dose limits that the latter definition does not Commission's radiation protection of part 20, subpart C. All doses in a establish a graded QA system to m

__. = _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ ~ . __ _ _ _ _ _ _.

64262 Federal Register / Vol. 61 No. 234 / Wednesday, Ikcember 4, imlfi / Rules and Regulations properly distinguish systems that are The Commission disagrees with this "irnportant to safety" and ensure that which the licensen exercises control of comment. The phrase "at all times" was activities to meet regulatory the full QA program is only applied to originally included in the n gulation to requirements. Cont rol includes the those systems, emphasize the need to design the GROA power to exclude members of the The Commission disagrees with this such that retrieval activities,if found public,if necessary. Because part 60 comtnent. When identifying items necessary, would be conducted in (unlike part 72) involves ongoing "importat to safety,"if it is determined accordance with part 20. The underground operations and timeframes that a particular structure, system, or Commission continues to interpret the of concern over centuries and millennia, cmnponent is essential to maintaining regulation in this rnanner but has language in the definition is included i~

doses below part 20 limits during removed the phrase "at all times" from that, consistent with its function, limits normal operations (or during any S 60.111 in the rule to clarify that the the area to the surface and limits the a

Category 1 design basis event), tlmn that limits of part 20 apply to Category I duration to the period up to, and structure, system, or component must be design basis events and that the separate including, pennanent closure.

designated a5 "itnportant to safety." The design bases of S 60.136 apply for The existing tenn " controlled area" is list of structures, systems, and Category 2 design basis events. Further, renamed "postclosure controlled area "

components "important to safety," as the Commission recognizes that to avoid any confusion or i well as the list of engineered barriers conformance to the regulations should misunderstanding about this term in i

"important to waste isolation " are not hinder any actions that are re!ation to its use in parts 20 and 72.

collectively refened to as the "Q-list" necessary to protect public health and How"ver, no substantive change is and are subject to the QA provisions of safety, such as lifesaving or maintaining intended for the "postclosure controHed part 60, subpart G. The Commission confinement of radioactive materials area because this is a change m 4

supports a graded approach to meeting (May 21,1991; 56 FR 233651. The n menclature only. Consistent with this the QA provisions of part 60. Such an phrase "at all times"is ambi nomenclature change, the term approach is consistent with the NRC this respect and was therefor'guouse removed. in "c ntrolled area"is changed to staff's " Technical Position on items and "posta ,um controued area," whem it Activities in A ilich l.evel Waste '"5"""""" f W "" " "PPe irs in the definitions for

! Geologic Repository Program Subbct to * " " " " " ' "

QA Requirements (NUREG-1318)." The " " ", e,armsible site.envirgmment," "distu rbed guidance given in that technical ECNP recommended that NRC adopt ",he term "important to safety', is position (TP) is still applicable under an AllARA standard with respect to a aended to address the issues ,

the rule's changes. The TP describes a criteria for the design of the GROA. previously discussed. The existing graded application of QA rneasures ECNP states that the purpose of such a pr visi n is unclear and fails to ensure consistent with that applied to other standard would be to provide an extra pmper levels of protection of pubhc and facilities le g., nuclear power reactors) measure of conservatism in the design. w rker health and safety for the broad licensed by the Commission. In this ECNP furth'e r states that, for an range of conditions or events that might i occur at a repository site. This is an regard, the application of QA program operating nuclear facility, regulatory i requirements to repository structures, changes over time that mandate tighter imPortant term because it is the 4

' systems, and components would standards and reduced eInissions can be predicate for required design features as generally be commensurate with their accommodated by means of backfitting, well as required qualit, assurance importance to safety. but this is not so readily accomplished "" 5""8 diat pmvide dyfense-in-depth.

! at a disposal facility. The Comrm.ssion is retaimng the

16. Design Bases-Sirnilarities Between uantitative features of the existing CHOA Facility and Other Facs/ities The Commission disagreca with this comment and considers that the i ennitmn but is specifymg different '

Licensed by NBC numerical h,mits for en F of the two requireracom of part 60, as amended in ECNP stated that it is wrong to liken an 2o es gn asis this rulemaking, are sufficient to ensure [^j],'I"g. g ,g design basis for a waste repository (or public health and safety. The

, lon;l-term storage) facility to design Commissmn also considers that components "important to safety" are basis for an operating nuclear reactor or backfittmg,if necessary,can be those necessary:(1) To provide other contemporary nuclear facility accomplished at a disposal f.acility* reasonable assurance that the because of the longevi+y of the hazard requirements of 5 60.111(a) would be Section hy-section Analysis observed for Category 1 design basis and uncertamties of future momtoring

and control. Section 60.2. De[irnfions events; or (2) to prevent or mitigate CaWory 2 design basis events that The Commission disagrees with this The amendments involve 10 could result in doses equal to, or greater comment. The design bases provided in definitions needed in part 60. than, the values specified in (new)

, the rule are for operations at ilm CROA The term "preclosure controlled area" 5 60.136 to any individual located on or and not for postclosure performance, is new. It is essentially the same as the beyond any point on the boundary of Decause operations at the repository are term "preclosure control area" proposed the preclosure controlled area.

expected to be similar to operations at by DOE in its petition (PRM-60-3) and Although the term " design bases"

other facilities licensed by the corresponds closely to the term appears in existing part 60,in Commission (e g.,10 CFR part 72 " controlled area," as defined in 10 CFR $ 60.21(c)(2),it was not defined. As the facilities), the Commission believes that 72.3. The term "preclosure controlled previous discussion makes clear, it is appropriate that their design bases area" is adopted because part no already " design bases" should be understood in

, be comparable, refers to a "o 'roHed area" (c.hich area relation to that range of events.

t 7. The l'hrase "At AU Times" has in en anunitted to use as a geologic including external natural or man-repository and from which incompatible induced events, that is taken mio ECNP recommended that the phrase actisities would be restricted following account in the design, and,in particular, "at all times" should be retained permanent closure). The function of the in relation to conditions that could throughout part 60. new term is to delimit an area over result in radiohgical consequences

Federal Register / Vol. 61. Nd. 234 / Wednesday. December 4,1996 / Rules and Regulations 64263 beyond specified limits. The definition definition of"important to safety," the The final rule also refleca the in part 72 is inserted, without change, phrases " features of ine repository" and position that tne applicant must into the list of defined terms in 5 60.2. " nearest boundary"in the proposed rule demonstrate that the requirements of ,

The inclusion of a definition of were changed to " engineered features of part 20 and the EPA standards will be

" design basis events" serves two the repository" and "any point on the met, assuming the occurrence of I purposes. F'rst,it identifies a set of boundary," respectively;(3)in the Category 1 design basis events. For this '

events (referred to elsewhere as definition of"preclosure controlled analysis, the applicant would calculate Category 1 design basis events) that area", the phrase "immediately the sum of the doses, exposures, and must be taken into account in surrounding the geologic repository releases from allCategory 1 design basis demonstrating compliance with the operations area"in the p oposed rule events to ensure that these results do requirement to show, with reasonable was changed to " surrounding the not exceed the limits specified in part i assurance, that the provisions of part 20 CROA": and (4) in the definition of 20 and in the EPA standards. I will be met. (This ret of events is " site", the phrase " location of the The Commission also is eliminating l destnbed as , , those natural and postclosure controlled area

• was certain terms in Part 60 that are human-induced events that are changed to" location of the preclosure undefined and may be subject to i reasonably likely to occur regularly, controlled area, or of the postclosure differing interpretations--specifically, 1 moderately frequently, or one or mme controlled area, or both. , The rationale the terms " normal conditions," I times before permanent closure of the for the revised definitions of" restricted "antici joted operational occurrences."

geologic repository operations area. I area ' and " unrestricted area"is I and .,a dents.., . hose terms Second, it identifies an additional set of provided in the preceding paragraph.

events (previously referred to as The rationale for the other changes is , P.I basis events. 7Desides enhancing clarity Category 2 design basis events) that discussed under " Response to Public must be taken into account in applying f expression, the new language better Comments on the Proposed Rule." reflects the articutated regulatory the Commission's defense-in-depth philosophy. (This set of events is Sectw.n 60.8. Information Collection framework. Lastly, where the term described as those "* *

• other natural N"9"immentMfB Approval " controlled area" appear in the and human-induced events that are NRC is updating to CFR 60.8, language of this section,it is changed to considered unlikely, but sufficiently "Information Collection Requirements: "postclosure controlled area."

credible to warram wusideration, taking OMB Approval," to n.flect the fact that Section 60.43. License Specification into account the ; atential for significant subsequent to the onginalissuance of radiological impacts on public health part 60, NRC regnested, ans' obtained The term " controlled area" is changed and safety ") The Commission Office of Management and nudget to "postclosure cow"ed area." {

recognizes that the criterion of (OMil) approval for the part 60 t "Information Collection Requirements." Secti n 60.46. Particular Activities "sufficiently credible to warrant consideration" is inexact, leaving its Section 60.8 was to be corrected the first U"4"Iri"# EIC ,e Amendment application to a consideration of the time other revisions were made. The term "contr olled area" is changed particular site and design that are the The amendment of 5 60.8 adopted .in to "postclosure controlled area."

suhrets of a licensn application. this fmal rule differs from the Generally, the Commission would amendment of $ 60.8 in the proposed Section 60.51. License Amendmentfor .

expect that such design basis events rule (60 FR 15180) in that the term Permanent Closure i would include as broad a range of " Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980," in The term " controlled area,' is changed external phenomena as would be taken the proposed rule, has been change i to into account in defining the design basis the term " Paperwork Reduction A . of to "postclosure controlled area.

for other regulated facilities, including 1995" in the final rule. Section 60.102. Concepts nuclear reactors. The Co nmission Section 60.?!. Con u nt of Application The term ocontrolled area,, is changed would also expect that the analysis of a .

spe< ific design basis event would The DOE petition suggested that to "postclosure controlled area." l require an analysis which includes an I rosision for accident analysis might be I Section 60.111. f,erformance of the initiating event le g , an earthquake) and accomplished by amendment of

% 60.111. The Commission, instead, is cologic Repository Operations Area the associated comtunations of (7hrough Permanent Closure repository system or component failures requiring on accident analysis as part of

~

that can potentially lead to exposure of the contynt of the application section The Commission is deleting the the pubhc to radiation. (ce., S 60.21). The language requires that p g,,,,at all times" from the The definitions of " restricted area" the application address the potential . performance objective of $ 60.111(a).

and "m, restricted area" are amended to dose, to any indmdual located on or This change clarifies that this conform with the definitions in part 20. heyond any point on the proclosure requirement does not apply to radiation The current definitions in part 60 do not controlled area boundary,that is exposures, levels, and releases from precisely conform to the current part 20 attributablo to Category 2 design basis Category 2 design basis events.

becauso no change was made to these events. The procedure that is envisaged part 60 definitions w hen part 20 was is that the applicant would address the Section 60121. Requirements for revised. Category 2 design basis events, singly. Ownership and Control of fnterests in The amendments of S 60.2 adopted in and demonstrate, by its analysis, that fond this final rule differ from the the doses to any individual located on The term " controlled area" ,si changed amendments of % 60.2 proposed in the or bevond any point on the preclosure proposed rule l Man.h 22,1995; 60 FR contr'olled area boundary would be in to "postclosure controlled area.

15180) in the following respects: (1) The accordance with the applicable Sectmn 60. r 22. Siting Criteria reused definitions of " restricted area" requirements. The language serves the and " unrestricted area" were not same purpose as the counterpart section The term " controlled area" is changed proposed in the proposed rule;(2) in Ihe of part 72 (namely.10 CFR "2 241ml). to "postclosure controlled area.'

G42G4 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 234 / Wednesday. December 4,1996 / Rules and Regulations Section 60.tJo. S< ope of IA sign As discussed under "Public related dose limits, would also be used Criterio for the Geologic ifeposetory Comments on the Proposed Rule," the to analyze and identify structures.

Operations Areti Commission considers the applicability systems, and cornpones.:s that are The Commission is modifying the title of the cridrahty contn>l yequin ments in important to safety under unusual of this soction to the term " General palal(h) to las clear wdh mspect to mnditions that have heretofore been ,

Considerations" and is adding clarifyiny' pnwaisum consideradons. The characterized as Category 2 design basis language, to the existing dist.nssion, to Commhsion also believes that events-credible.yet not hkely to occur l indicate that h4 60.131 through 60.134 um.enamty remains with respect to the during the period of operations. The specify the minimum criteria for the app @ ability of the criticahty control issue that is presented concerns the design of those structmes, systems, and ."I.he "I*"'*"" dose hmits to ensure that the Cmnnu.'"!o the postclosuru period.

components important to safety, or nmn intends to mMmss de tunsequenws of any pen!s which occur ,

impo. tant to waste isolation. These mmaining uncenainty in a futum pn ,ent no unn asonaMe n4to me '

changes am mn:essary to provide I"'.naung to make the NRG heahh and safety of the pubhc.

consistency with the modified " Tun ments consistent with the meleases nisulting imm category 1 definition of "important to safety" mvised WA standants that are cunently design basis events would not be 1

(% 60 2). as well as to clarify the purpose under daefopment, as nmndated by dm enuitted to cause doses exceeding the of these c.riteria. These changes alm Enngy Po y Act d m2. inuWan 20% Umnumon  ;

provide consistency with the Section 60. f.U. AdditionallA sign adopts the basic provisions of part 72-corresponding " minimum" design ""*" '" U # I ** * " " ' "

Criteria for Surface Facilities in the '

criteria, for an MRS, in part 72. Geologic Ifepository Opemtions Area  ;[;""j*g""f(ct

[ y ll Section 60.IJr. Cencrollh sign Section 60.132(c)(1) requires that the part 20 system of dose limits (see Criteria for the Geologic Ifcpository surface facilities must be "* **  % 20.12011al). In addition to providing Opemtions Area designed to control the release of for separate dose limits for individual Consistent with the modifications to mdioactive materials in offluents during organs and tissue, the lens of the eye.

% 60.130, as descritaJ aove, the " and the skin. the uso of" total effective Commission is deleting the reference to "pedonnance

""" I " P""N """ "" "* '"p*"". '1 1dose 69o 1 (a) . ..

equivalent"(TEDE) in part 20

" Structures, systems, and components e design shouM mhnanh he explicitly accounts foy psures via the important to safety," in the title of sufficient to pr vide reasonable mgestion and inhalatum dose athwa S 60.131(b). and re numbering the assuraxe of meedng pad o not only M dification of the 0.05 Sv 5 rem) ys.

current criteria In %S 60,131(b)(1) dunng nonnal oranadons,Imt even for dose hmit, to reflect the part 20 system through 60.131(b)(10), as appropriate. events that are likely to occur of dose umits, results in a famd, of dose l' Ins change ch,rmnates the confusion m moderately frequently or one or more

. limits: A TEDE of 0 05 Sv (5 rem); or the times before permanent closure of the sum of the deep-dose equivalent and the

the existing rule related to the . pd & imy (i all h ry 1 committed dose equivalent to any identification of only the criten.a in

$ 60,131(b) as 'important to ylety., It design basis events). Deleting the phrase individual organ or tissue (other than also resolves the present incongruity "during normal operations," broadens the lens of the eye) of 0.5 Sv (50 rem);

the scope of t with 560.131(b)(7), ' criticality control,,, go,;,s;og.his s provision intent moretoaccurately, reflect the anrem);

eye and dose equivalentdoseof o.15 Sv to (15 i a shallow equivalent, l regarding the reference to waste. The amendment of %60.132 adopted skin, of 0.5 Sv (50 rem).2 The eye and "isolr. tion" (a postclosum term) m the i mqunement.

n this final rule differs from the skin dose limits are adequate to ensure

'I he current rule employs the tenn amendment of $60.132 in the proposed that no observable effects (e.g.,

rule in that the phraso "in etiluents"in induction of cataracts in the lens of the

", normal and accident conditans, ' or the proposed rule was changed to "in eye) will occur as a result of any similar expression, a,n several places' Ilowever, the conditions that must he effluents during Category 1 design basis accidental radiation exposure. In l events"in the final rule. The rationale implementing this provision, dose addressed under this language aru not for this change was discussed in the well-de r;ned. The Cmnmission is calculations should be made solely with ,

..Ruponse to Public Comments on the reference to the consequence of the 1 remedying this situation by replacing Proposed Rule." Specific Category 2 design basis event, current terminology with references to . not cumulatively with other design

" design basis events," thereby ensuring Section 60.133. Additional Design basis events. To clarify this matter l that the design appropriately takes into Criterio for the Underground Fac,ility further, the analysis of a specific account the consequences of all design As in the case of the changes to 10 Category 2 design basis event would l hasis events (i.e., as discussed in this CFR 60.131, a reference to design basis require an analysis which includes an document, Category 1 and 2 design basis events is substituted for the less precise initiating event (e.g., an earthquake) and events). Accordingly, paragraphs " normal operations and * *

• accident the associated combinations of (b)(5)(i), (b)(7), and (b)(a) are modified conditions."

repository system or component failures l for this section. The Commission also is I revising the language in $ 60.131(b)( t). Section 60.136. Preclosure Controlled that can potentially lead to exposure of A" the public to radiation. An example which refers to " anticipated" natural design basis event is a postulated phenomena and environmental The final rule adopts the petitioner's earthquake (the initiating event) which conditions, so as to encompass all concept of a preclosure control area under the name "preclosure controlled results in:(1)The failure of a crane design basis events. The "necessary lifting a spent fuel waste package inside safety functions" that must be area." The term delimits an ar-a over a waste handlinp building,(2) damage to accommodated in the design, pursuant which the licensee exercises control of the tending veritilation filtration 1

to that paragraph, include whatever is activities to meet regulatory system,(3) the drop and breach of the

] necessary to meet the quantitative limits requirements. Control would include

. set out in the Commission's rules (i.e., the ability to exclude members of the i n,a,,iion expo,,,. iceminoingy is as used in in % tM1111a) and 5 60.136). public,if necessary. Tho zone, and - pari zo tss FR 23360. May 2t.19'i0

l Federcl Register / Vol. 61, No. 234 / Wednesday, December 4, W96 / Rules and Regulations 642fi5 waste package,(4) damage to the spent Moreover, the dose limb is consistent to risks regularly accepted in everyday fuel,(5) partitioaing of a fraction of the with the au;id. nt-dose valut es.o., Sv (5 life for stochastic phenomena,a fatal i radionuclide inventory to the budding rem) ef fectis e dm.e equivalent) proposed cancer risk in the range of t x 10-6 to atmosphere, (6) release of some by DOS in its PRM. 1 x to" per year from exposure to radioactive material through the flowever, whilo consistency between radiation would likely be acceptable to damaged ventilation filtration system, the proposed 0.05 Sv (5 rem) dose limi' individual members of the public.Thus, and (7) public exposure to the released for part 60 and other Commission rules while the risk associated with the

, radioactive material. It should be noted or guidance documents is important, consequences of a repository event at I

that it is not necessary to assume consistency alone does not necessarily the dose limit and upper bound multiple failures of safety-related ensurc that there would be no probability of occurrence exceeds this systerns unless these multiple failures unreasonable nsk to the health and range by a small factor, and is at a level are credible consequences of the safety of the public associated wsth the that the Commission considers safe for initiatmg event. An analysis of a proposed hmit. As such, a perspective specific event for a real repository is provided on tim ri>Ls associated with occupatynal eximsunts., the would be dependent on the particular an operational repository and the Comnussmo believes this result features of the facility design and appropriateness of the proposed 0.05 Sv significantly userestimates the actual related olmrating procedures. In general, (5 rem) dose limit as the design basis for nsk of an operating repository, credit for the proper functioning of protection of public health and safety Simitady, the Commission considers repository structures, systems, and from Category 2 design basis events. that the lower bound of Category 2 components in an anal) sis would be llased on estimates provided by the design basis events is on the order of 1 commensurate with the merits of the National Council on Radiation x 10" per year (i.e., events with design. In the example cited above, a Protection and Measurements *, the probabilities of occurrence less than 1 x waste package designated "important to lifetime risk to individuals in the 10 -6 per year would generally be safety" would not necessarily be general populatian is 0.05 fatal cancers screened from further consideration due assumed to breach in a drop event if the per Sv of exposure. Therefore, the to their negligible contribution to maximum hypothetical drop falls lifetime risk of fatal cancer from an overall risk). In the proposed rule within the design parameters of the assumed 0.05 Sv (5 rem) exposure (March 22,1995; 60 FR 15180), the waste package to w.thstand such ar. resulting from a postulated Category 2 Commission had considered a event. Similarly, reposborv .entilation design basib event is 0.0025 (i.e.,2.5 x probability of occurrence of 1 x 10 "

filtration systems would be analyr.ed for 10y) per mdividual exposed. W. ~ per year as an appropriate lower bound.

their capability to withstand natural t'us assessment provides perspective on Ibevm upon furts' analysis as phenomena (e.g., carthquakes) and the nsk associated with a hypothetu:al discussed below, the Commission detect, isolate, or filter radioactive exposure of a 0.05 Sv (5 rem) dose,it .

Inaterialin sentilation flow, does not provido perspective on the c nsiders that a lower bound of 1 x The only other noteworthy deviation estimated actual risk associated with the 1M per year is too low and unjustified, spectrum of possible Category 2 design and that a lower bound of 1 x 10-6 per from part 72 is to refer in S 60.136 to doses attributable to any " Category 2 basis events at a repository during its year is appmpriate. Screemng out design basis event" w hereas the operational lifetime (estimated to be events with probabilities of less than 1 corresponding section (i.e.,10 CFR about 100 years). x 10-6 is expected to provide 72.106) in part 72 refers to doses Perspective on actual risk must con 5"rvative estimates of risk. A higher attributable to any " design basis include consideration of the frequencies s( reening criterion could probably be accident." The tenu " design basis (i.e., probabilities) of occurrence of justified given the magnitude of the event" is used because it is a defined these events, as well as their consequences and risks from this term in part 60. The change in consequences, as " risk" is defined as facility, but this criterion is not terminology is not intended to be one of "the probabilits of an event times its expected to cause an ovcessive substance as Category 2 design basis consequentes.' With respect to the analytical burden for demonstrating events would generally be considered as range of probabilities of Category 2 com'pliance with % 60.136, consistent accidents- design basis esents, the upper bound is with the Conunission's guidance on the The 0.05 Sv (5 rem) dose limit is roughly 1 x 10 2 per year (i.e., events application ol probability risk being adopted by the Commission as the with pmhabilities of acurrence greater assessment methods in licensing. It is appropriate design basis for protection than 1 x 10 ^ 2 per year would generally important to note that the arguments of public health and safety from be considered to be Category i events). advanced for this screening criterion Category 2 design basis events at a Accordingly, assuming event apply solely to the period of repository GROA and w;ll harmonire part 60 with consequences equivalent to the 0.05 Sv operations before permanent closure.

part 72. In this regard, the Commission (5 rem) dose hmit for part 60, the notes that part 72 applies to those hypothetical upper bound on individual Assuming bounding repository event facilities (MRS installations) most risk is 2.5 x 10 - 5 latal cancers per year. consequences of roughly 0.2 Sv (20 similar to the surface facilities of a To put this risk in perspective, the rem), a lifetime risk to individuals in the repository and for which the kinds of International Commission on general population of 0.05 fatal cancers design basis events are also espected to Radiological Protection 5 notes that, per Sv of exposure, and a lower bound I be similar. Further, the dose limit is based on a review of information related of 1 x to ~ 6 per year for the probability l consistent with dose values (0.06 Sv in of occurnmce of Category 2 design basis

! rem) to the whole body) established as

• N41pm.d cmsm d on Radiabon liotevnem ,out events, the estimated risk of caiu er guidance for both fuel-handling MeasurementJ RM lanmates for Hade.,Unn f fatality from these low probabilitv accidents and spent. fuel cask-drop Pnm hon /' NCRP Report Na in. Da endu .n. ,

thi5idIdE!"b[.3S"[cb."nlo% erummenhuons of the Ininnanun,d l{ vents which result in risks at or below Review of Safety Anatum Reports for Nuclear commmmn un R. wholey,iral Protorton IcRP Power Plants." funn 19tt7 Poblaannn ?s. janucy io77 l

f I

l l

l .m l

. _ - . __ . . . - _ _ ~ _ - . _ .- _

i

'V l

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G42GG Federal Register / Vol. 01, No. 234 / Wednesday, _ _ .

December 4,1996 / Rules and Regulations this level do not contribute significantly of the aforerr.entioned preliminary risk With respect to the appropriateness of to repository r,isk to an individual and, assessment by DOE of a conceptual as such, can be neglected in the overall the proposed 0 05 Sv (5 rem) dose limit repository design at Yucca Mountain, for Part 60 as the design basis for nsk assessment. Nevada. In that assessrnent,IX)E Perspective on actual repository risk protection of public health and safety considered 149 events for a variety of from Category 2 design basis events, the can be obtamed by developing an internally and externally initiated understading of the spectrum of IX)E risk assessment indicates the events. Of the 149 events, only 7 potential for events with offsite potential Category 2 design basis events resulted in of fsite doses in ev.ess of consequences on the order of several and estianating the consequeences of these wquences, as well as their 0 005 Sv (0.5 rem) to the critical organs hundredths to several tenths of Sv of a maximally exposed individual and (several tem to several tens of rem),

probabilities of occurnmce. In th,s i also had associated probabilities of depending on design and siting factors.

regard, the Commiss60n recognizes that occurrence greater than 1 x 10" pc/ The event consequences in this range, there is no high-level wasto repository year. The highest estimated offsite dose coupled with the estimated event operating ex erience, and that only corKeptual a esigns have been fnim the IK)E risk assessment was 0 021 probabilities of occurrence, result in developed for these facilitlos. Sv (2.1 rem) with an as.sociated estimated risks that would likely be probability of occurrence of 5 x 10-7 acceptable to members of the public.

Nonetheless, some perspective can b" per year.

gained from the preliminary ris ,'  !!u-meo given the lack of repository assessment by IX)E6 of a comsptual The dow estimates M t'n e IX)E risk design, siting and operating experience esign for a repository at Yucca assessment are only reflective of a and the supporting data base for ountain, Nevada, as well as frorn conceptual design for a repository at probabilistic risk assessment, the Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Nonetheless' Commission believes there is onsideration of risk assessments of i the Commission believes they provide considerable uncertainty in the I r is t i Las$ss ts for peppective on the magnitude of the estimates of both the consequences and nuclear power plants, the spectrum of estunated conquenas to members of the pnababiiines of occurrence of possible repository design basis events ilm puWc fmm p stulated Category 2 postulated Category 2 design basis j includes bom internally and externally mn basis mnta, and that variations events. As such, the Comimssion , j initiated 4 ats. Internally initiated in n posdory des,gni or site selection believes that establishing a dose hmit in 4 events would include waste transporter would not likely vary these estimates by Part 60 to the 0.05 Sv (5 rem) value collisions, trane failures or other types m re than an order of magnitude. The would provide an adequate margin of j of fuel assembly, waste package or cask results Ithe fK)E risk assessment also safety and an appropriate design basis drop events, building or facility exhaust provide some perspective on the for protection of members of the pubhc l filter fires, and exhaust filter bypass or estunated probabilities of occurrence of from unlikely, but credible events.

failure. Externally initiated events the postulated repository design basis Further, the Commission believes that a l would include those resulting from events and, as such. perspective on single dose limit is appropriate for the earthquakes, tornados, and flooding. actual risk imm an operating repository, broad range of possible event Regardless of the type or nature of the In general, the Commission would frequencies, given the limited potential  ;

initiating event, the Commission expect the potential higher consequenco for offsite consequences at repository =

believes that, for several reasons. both events to have correspondingly lower facilities.

the variety of credible events and the probabilities of occurrence. This Lastly, the amendments of S 60.136 resulting potential consequences to "xP"ctation is consistent with the adopted in this final rule differ slightly members of the public will be somewhat results of the IX)E risk assessment as the from the amendments of $60.136 limited at repository facilities. First,in estimated probabilities of occurrence for proposed in the proposed rule (60 FR comparison with a nuclear power plant, the seven events which rest.ited in 15180) in that the phr, "on or beyond an operating repository is a relatively offsite coses in excess of 0.005 Sv (0.5 the nearest boundary"in the proposed simple facility in which the primary rem) vary from 1 x 10 ' to 5 x 104 per rule was changed to "on or beyond any activities are waste receipt, handling, par. The corollary to this is the point on the boundary"in the final rule storage,and emplacement. A repository expnctation that higher frequency events and the phrase "may not exceed" in the does not require the variety and .would have correspondingly lower proposed rule was changed to "shall not ,

complexity of active systems necessary offsite consequences, and perspective exceed"in the final rule. The rationale i to support an operating nuclear power on actual risk from an operating for the latter change is to improve plant. Further, the conditions are not repository necessitates consideration of clarity and the rationale for the former present at a repository to generate a these events, as well as lower frequency change was discussed earlier in the radioactive source term of a magnitude events. Review of the DOE risk " Response to Publir. Comments on the that, however unlikely,is potentially assessment indicates that some higher Proposed Rule "

capable at a nuclear power plant (e g., frequency, but lower consequence, from a postulated loss of coolant event). events are j,ust as important to actual Section 60.181 Cnminal Penalties As such, the estimated consequences risk as the lower frequency, but higher in the proposed rule, a conforming resulting from limited source term consequence, events. With respect to change was made to this section to generation at a repository would be actual risk from the broad spectrum of include S 60.136 (pertaining to the correspondingly limited. This all events coesidered in the DOE risk preclosure controlled area) among the conclusion is consistent with the results assessment, the estimated actual risk of regulations that are not issued under an operating repository is roughly two sections 161b,1611, or 1610 of the

• U S Department of Energy," Site Characterizanon Plan. Yucca Mountain Soe, to three orde% of magnitude lower than Atomic Energy Act, for purposes of I "

the range of fatal cancer risks that would section 223 of the Act.On

$"[M*g'gn,7,,,jjpment Area. Nevada." likely be acceptable to members of the reconsideration, the Commission has

'NUREGrl15a. " Severe Accident leks. An public (t e., a fatal cancer risk of 1 x 10 6 decided not to revise this section (ce.,

Assessment for Iive LLS Nuclear Power Plants.- to 1 x 10 5 per year as noted in ICRP criminal penalties are authorized for tu ember Urm Publication 26). violations of S 60.136).

1 Federd Regist:r / Vol. 61. No 234 / Wodnesday, December 4,1990 / Rules and Regulations 64267 Smill Bu:liess Regul: tory Enforcement Bickfit An: lysis Design bases rneans that information I* I'"'** ^ The NRC has determined that the that identifies the specific functions to backfit rule, to CFR 50.109, does not be performed by a structum, system, or in accordance with the Small c mponent of a facility and the specific Business Regulatory Enforcement . apply to this final rule and, therefore, Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has that a backfit analysis is not required for values or ranges of values chosen for this final rule, because these controlling parameters as reference determined that this action is not a bounds for design. These values may be major rule and has verified this amendments da not involve any Provisions tha: would impose backfits restramts derived from generally determination with the Office of accepted state-of-the-art, practices for Information and Rogulatory Affairs of as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1). j achieving functional goals or ,

OMB. 1.ist of Subjects in to CFR Part 60 requirements derived.from analysis I Environmental Irnpact: Categorical Criminal penalties, liigh level waste, (based on calculation or experiments) of Exclusion Nuc ear power plants and reactors, f the effects of a postulated event under Nucicar materials, Reporting and which a structure, system, or  !

The NRC has determined that this record-Leeping requirements, and Waste component must meet its functional regulation is the type of action treatment and disposal. goals. The values for controlling described in to CFR 51.22(c)(2), For the rmms set out in the parameters for external events include:

pertaining to tha promulgaGon af preamble and under the authority of the (1) Estimates of severe natural events technical requirem6nts and criteria that Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; to be used for deriving design bases that the Cornmission will apply in approving the Energy Reorganir.ation Act of 1974, will be based on consideration of or disapproving applications under part as amended; the Nuclear Waste Policy historical data on the associated

60. brefore, neither an environmental Act of 1982, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. Parameters, physical data, or analysis of impact statement nor an environmental 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting the upper limits of the physical processes assessment has been prepared for this following amendments to part 60. involved; and final rule. (2) Estimates of sevem external man-PART 60-DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL induced events, to be used for deriving Paperwork Reduction Act Statement RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN GEOLOGIC design bases, that will be based on This final rule dm not contain a new REPOSITORIES "ysis of human activity in the region, E

" " n P t 60 is acte st cs and e ris associated req ment s b ct t the I rk an e o cad as 01 ow Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501, with the event.

et seg ). Existing requirements were Authority: Sets. 51,53,62,63.65,a1,161, Design basis events means:

182,183,6a Stat 929 930,932,933. 935, (1)(i) Those natural and human.

approved by OM3, approval number 948. 953,954. as amended (42 U.S C 2071, 3150-0127* induced even: . hat are reasonably 2073,2092,2093,2095,2111,2201,2232-likely to occur regularly, moderately 2233 s s 202 2 88 et 1 4 4 Public Protection Notification g 5 5g , g d b I ' "" '

• oNw I'"9"*"II ' losum

'" II""* before geologic pennamnt c The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, 9 Moi. 92 Stat. 2951142 U.S.C 2021a and "

and a person is not required to respond ub to, a collection of infonnation unless it $ 51l[S

( U 33 91;1M;

, , 83jtatg 853 9, ) er t tal a induced Std 220@'8. as amended 142 events that are considered unlikely, but displays a currently valid OMil cnntrol USC 10:34 101411. and Pub. L. 102-480, sufficiently credible to warrant number. sec. 2902, los Stat. 3123142 U.S.C 58511 consideration, taking into account the Regulatory Analysis 2, Section 60.2 is amended by adding p tential for significant radiological definitions of " Design bases,"" Design impacts on public health and safety.

The Commission has prepared a basis events," aml "Preclosure (2) The events described in paragrap h regulatory analysis on this final rule. controlled area " revising the definitions (t)(i) f this definition are referred to as The analysis examines the costs and of " Accessible environment," " Category 1" design basis events. The benefits of the alternatives considered " Disturbed zone.""Important to safety," events described in paragraph (1)(ii) of by the Commission. The analysis is this definition are referred to as available for inspection in the NRC ".. Restricted area," " Site," and "Camgory 2" design basis events.

Unrestricted area," revising the name Public Document Room,2120 L Street of the defined term " Controlled area" to NW (Lower Level), Washington, DC. ..Postclosure controlled area" and Disturbed zone rneans that portion of Single copies of the analysis may be presenting this renamed term without the postclosure controlled area, the obtained U.S. Nuclear from Dr. Richard Regulatory A. Weller',change for the convenience of the user, physical or chemical properties of Commission and alphabetizing the definitions to read which have changed as a result of Office of Nuclear Material Safety and as follows; underground facility construction or as Safeguards, Division of Waste a result of heat generated by the Management. Washington, DC 20555, $ 60.2 Definitions. emplaced radioactive wastes, such that Telephone (301) 415-7287. * * * *

• the resultant change of properties may Accessible endronment means have a significant effect on the Regulatory Flexibility Cenification (1) The atmosphere; performance of the geologic repository.

As required by the Regulatory (2) The land surface; . . . . .

Flexibility Act of 1980,5 U.S.C. 605(b), (3) Surface water; Imponant to safety, with reference to the Commission certifies that this rule (4) Oceans; and structures, systems, and components, will not have a significant economic (5) The portion of the hthosphere that means those engineered features of the impact on a substantial number of small is outside the postclosure controlled repository whose function is:

entities. The only entity subject to area. (1) To provide reasonable assurance regulation under this rule is IX)E. *

• that high-level waste can be received,

l 64268 feder:I Register / Vol. 61, No. 234 / Wednesday, December 4,1996 / Rules and Regulations j 1

handled, packaged, stored, emplaced, this part appear in SS 60.62,60 63, and (3) A description and analysis of the and retrieved without exceeding the 6065. design and performance requirements requirements of 5 60.111(a) for Category 4. In S 60.21, paragraphs (c)(1)(1), for structures, systems, and components 1 design basis events; or (c)(1)(ii)(B), (c)(3), and (c)(8) are revised of the geoh>gic repository that are (2) To prevent or mitigate Category 2 to read as follows:

design basis events that could result in important to safety. The analysis must j l

doses equal to or greater than the values 9 60.21 Contentof appucation. include a demonstration that-(i) The requirements of 5 60.111(a) l specified in S 60.136 to any individual * * * *

• will be met, assuming occurrence of hicated on or beyond any point on the (c) * *

• Category 1 design basis events, and l boundary of the preclosure controlled (1) * * * (ii) The requirements of 5 00.136 wih l area. (i) The description of the site shall

+

be met, assuming occurrence of .

also include the following information Category 2 design basis

• events.

) Postclosure controlled area means a regarding subsurface conditions. This . . . . . )

1 l surface location, to be marked by description shall, in all cases, includ" '

(a) A description of the controls that I

suitable monuments, extending this information with respect to the horizontally no more than 10 kilometers postclosure controlled area. In addition, the applicant will apply to restrict in any direction from the outer where subsurface conditions outside the access and to regulate land use at the boundary of the underground facility, site and adjacent areas, including a postolosure controlled area may affect conceptual design of monuments which and the underlying subsurface, which isolation within the postclosur" would be used to identify the area has been committed to use as a controlled area, the description shall postclosure controlled area after geologic repository and from which include information with res[mct to permanent closure.

incompatible activities would be subsurface conditions outside the , , , , ,

restricted following permanent closure. postclosure controlled area to the extent Preclosure controlled area means that the information is relevant and material. S 60.43 [ Amended) surface area surrounding the geologic The detailed information referred to in 5. In S 60.43(b)(5), the term repository operations area f~ which the this paragraph shallincludu licensee exercises authority over its use, (A) The onentation, distributinn. " controlled area"is revised to read "postclosure controbm. araa."

in accordance with the provisions of aperture in. filling and origin of this part, until permanent closure has fractures, discontinuities, and 560.46 (Arr. ended) been completed. heterogeneities; 6. In S 60.46(a)(3), the term l . . . . (D) The presence and characteristics " controlled area"is revised to cad Restricted area means an area, access of other potential pathways such as "postclosure controlled area."

to which is limited by the licensee for solution features, breccia pipes, or other the purpose of protecting individuals potentially permeable features; 5 sast (Amended) l agilnst undue risks from exposure to (C) The geomechanical properties and 7, in S 60.51(a)(2)(i) and (a)(2)(ii), the I

radiation and radioactive materials. conditions. including pore pressure and term " controlled area"is revised to read l

Rertricted area does not include areas ambient stress conditions; "postclosure controlled area."

used as residential quarters, but separate (D) The hydrogeologic pperties and rooms in a residential building may be conditions; $ 60.102 [ Amended) set aside as a restricted area. (E) The geochemicarproperties: and 8. In S 60.102(ch the gnn ,tontrolled

. . . . . (F) The anticipated response of the area, is revised to read

• postclosure Site means the location of the geomechanical, hydrogeologic, and c ntrolled area."

g preclosure controlled area, or of the geochemical systems to .he maximum postclosure controlled area, or both. design thermal loading, given the to read as f to s-l . . . . . pattern of fractures and other 5 80.111 Performance of the geologic Unrestricted area means an area, discontinuities and the heat transfer repository operations area through access to which is neither limited nor Pr Perties of the rock mass and permanent closure.

controlled by the licensee. Er undwater- (a) Protection against radiation

. . . . . (ii) *

• exposures and releases of mdioactive (B) Analyses to determine the degree material. The geologic re ository

3. Section 60.8 is revised to read as lows. to which each of the favorable and operations area shall be esi ed so that t l potentially adverse conditions, if until permanent closure has n 5 60.8 information Collection Present, has been characterized, and the completed, radiation exposures and Ra .L.sts: Approval. extent to which it contributes to or radiation levels, and releases of

• l (z) The Nuclear Regulatory detracts from isolation. For the purpose radioactive materials to unrestricted l Commission has submitted the of determining the presence of the areas, will be maintained within the ,

I information collection requirements of Potentially adverse conditions, limits specified in part 20 of this i general applicability contained in this investigations shall extend from the chapter and such generally applicable  !

, part to the Office of Management and surface to a depth sufficient to environmental standards for

• Budget for approval as required by the determine critical pathways for radioactivity as may have been i Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 radionuclide migration from the established by Environmental Protection l 4

U.S.C. 3501, et seq.). The Office of undeq;round facility to the accessible Agency. l Management and Budget has approved environment. Potentially adverse . . . . .

the information collection requirements conditions shall be investigated outside contained in this part under control of the postclosure controlled area if they $ 60.121 [ Amended) number 3150-0127. affect isolation within the postclosure 10. In S 60.121(a) and (b), the term (b) The approved information controlled area. " controlled area"is revised to read collection requirements contained in * * * * *

"postclosure controlled area."

1 I

Federal RegistIr / Vol. 61. Nn. 234 / Wednesday, December 4,1996 / Rules and Regulations 64269 5 60.122 prrundat) explosion a id fire detection % cvents. The calculated effecthe

11. In $ 60.122(b)(6) and (c) systems and appropriate suppression multiplication factor (k.n) must be introductory text, the tenn " controlled systems with sufficient capacity and sufficiently below unity to show at least area" is revised to read "postclosure capability to reduce the adverse effects a 5 percent margin, after allowance for controlled area." of fires and explosions on structures, the bias in the method of calculation

' 12. Section 60.130 is revised to read systems, and components important to and the uncertainty in the experiments as follows: used to validate the method of safety, (4) T he geologic repository operations calculation

$60.130 Generalconsiderations. area shall be designed 1o include means Pursuant to the provisions of (1)Instruinentation and control to protect systems, structures, and systems. The design shallinclude

$ 60.21(c)(2)(i), an application to components important to safety against provisions for instrumentation and re&ive, possess, store, and dispose of the adverse effects of either the high-level radioactive waste in the control systems to monitor and control operation or failure of the fire the behavi;r of systems important to geologic repository operations area must suppression systems, safety, assuming occurrence of design include the prtacipal design criteria for (e) Amergency capability. (1) The basis events.

a proposed facility, The principal design structures, systems, and components (j) Compliance with mining criteria establish the necessary design, important to safety shal1 be designed t regulations. To the extent that DOE is fabncation, construction, testing, maintam control of radioactive waste maintenance, and performance not subject to the Federal Mine Safety and radioactive effluents, ami permit and licalth Act of 1977, as to the requirements for structures, systems, prompt terminat2on of operations and construction and operation of the and components important to safety evacuation of personnel during an and/or important to waste isolation. emerg cy. geologic repository operations area, the l Sections 60.131 through 60.134 specify (2) e ologic repository o rations design of the geologic repository mmimum requirements for the principal area shall designed to inclu e onsite operations area shall nevertheless design criteria for the geologic facilith's and services that ensure a safe include provisions for worker protection and timely response to emergency necessary to provide reasonable repository operations area.

These design criteria are not intended conditions and that facilitate the use of assurance that all structures, systems, to be exhaustive. liowever, omissions in available offsite services (such as fire, and components im rtant to safety can 55 60.131 through 60.134 do not relieve police, medical, and ambulance service) P"'I rm their inten ed functions. Any DOE from any obligation to provide that may aid in recovery from deviation from relev -t design such featurns in a specific facility emer encies. requirements in 30 CFR, chapter 1, needed to achieve the performance (f) ltility services. (1) Each utility subchapters D, E, ana N will give rise objectives. service system that is important to to a rebuttable presumption that t his

13. In 5 60.131, paragraph (b) is safety shall be designed so that essential requirement has ne been met.

revised, and paragraphs (c) through (k) safety functions can be performed, (k) Shaft conveyances und m, are added to read as follows: assu ng occurrence of the design basis io I oists

{steh 7

ljn

$ 60,131 General design criteria for the (2) The utility services important to preclude cage free fall.

geologic repository operations area. safety shall include redundant systems (2) lioists important to safety shall be to the extent necessary to maintain, with designed with a reliable cage location (b) Protection against design basis adequate capacity, the ability to perform system.

ever.ts. The structures, systems, and their safety functions. (3) Loading and unloading systems for components important to safety shall be (3) Provisions shall be made so that hoists important to safety shall be designed so that they will perform their if there is a loss of the primary chctric designed with a reliable system of necessary safety functions, assuming power source or circuit, reliable and interlocks that will fail safely upon occurrence of design basis events. timely emergem.y power can be malfunction.

(c) Protection against dynamic effects provided to instruments, utility service (4)lloists important to safety shall be of equipment failure and similar events. systems, and operating systems, designed to include two independent The structures, systems, and including alarm systems, important to indicators to indicate when waste components important to safety shall be safety. packages are in place and ready for designed to withstand dynamic effects (g) Inspection. testmg, and transfer, such as missile impact:, that could maintenance. The structures, systems, 14. In S 60.132, paragraph (c)(1) is result from equipment failure, and and components important to safety revised to read as follows:

similar events and conditions that could shall be designed to permit periodic lead to loss of their safety functions. inspection, testing, and maintenance, as $ 60.132 Additional design criteria for (d) Protection against fires and necessary, to ensure their continued ""d***'** * *'" ' " 9" '*9 " P '" 4 explosions. (1) The structures, systems. functioning and readiness. f'$ "* *,"*' , ,

and components important to safety (h) Criticality control. All systems for shall be designed to perform their safety processing, transpmting, handling, (c) Radiation control and functions during and after credible fires storage, retrieval, emplacement, and monitoring--(2) Effluent control. The or explosions in the geologic repository isolation of radioactive waste shall be surface facilities shall be designed to designed to ensure that nuclear control the release of radioactive op(erations area.practicable, the

2) To the extent criticality is not possible unless at least materials in effluents during Category 1 geologic repositorv operations area shall two unlikely, independent, and design basis events so as to meet the be designed to inc'orporate the use of concurrent 'or sequential changes have performance objectives of $ 60,111(a).

noncombustible and heat resistant occurred in the conditions essential to materials. nuclear criticality safety. Each system 15. In S 60.133, the introductory texts (3) The geologic repository operations must be designed for criticality safety of paragraph (g) and paragraph (g)(2) are area shall be designed to include assuming occurrence of design basis revised to read as follows:

l

,, 1 1

64270 Federal Register / Vol. 61 No. 234 / Wednesday. Ih comlntt 4,1996 / Rules and Regulations

$ 60.133 Additional design criteria for the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

l underground facility. Timotby P. Smyth, Aerospace Engineer,

• a a

• Federal Aviation Administration Small Airplane Directorate 1201 l (g) Underground facility ventilaimn. "" '" '

l 14 CFR Part 39 64106; teh: phone (H16) 4264941

'l.lm ventilation system shall be designed M f hue M 61

[ Docket No. 96-CE-41-AD; Amendment 39-l

. . . .

• 9843; AD 96-25-C2] SUPPLF.MENTARY INFORMATION:.The FAA has received several fatal accident (21 Assure the ability to perform RIN 2t20-A A64 mpods fm certain Mitsubishi MU-2Il

, essential safety functions assuming senes airplanes. A common factor m occurrence of design basis events. Airworthiness Directives; Mitsubishi these accidents was flying into freezing I a e * =

• Heavy industries, LTD. Models MU- rain and haczing drizzle without

! . 28-10 20, ~25, -26, -20A, -30, recognizing specific cues and exiting 1fi. A new undesignated center -35, -36, -36A, -40, and -60 Airplanes these conditions. Freezing rain and heading and 5 60.136 are added to nmd freezing driule (also referred to as as follows: AGENCY: Federal Aviation Supercooled Large Droplets (*iLD)) are i nn n. DOT. beyond the capability of the MU-2fl i Prer.hisure Controlled Area ACTION: gat f mal rule: request for series airplane Icmg proterJ,mn system. l

$ 60.136 Proclosure controtied area. com ments. Continued operation in these conditions wiU cause the airplane to develon (a) A pnx.losure controlled area must

SUMMARY

This amendment adopts a unusual ico formations and ice bhild-up he established for the geologic new airworthiness directive ( AD) that in areas where the airplane does not repository operations ama. applies to Mitsubishi lleavy industries, have ice protection. h.e accretion to this (b) The geolot;ic repository operations I.TD. Models MU-2ft-lo,-15, -20. -25 degree can cause increased drag.

area shall be designed *.o that, for -26. -26 A. -30. -3 5. -36. -36 A, -4 0. . increased angle of attack, and Category 2 uu mu hasis events, no and -60 airplanes. This actinr requires aerodynamic flow separation resulting individual ' ated on or beyond any revising the Limitations Section. the in uncontrollable rolling and piti.hing.

Pmcedums Section, and the Master If the airplane is being flown by the point on the houndary of the pnv:Josure controlled area will roccive the more Wnimum Equipment List (MMEL)of autop,i lot m hazanlous icmg. the dut Auplane Wght Manual (A@ hicmaw ,

limiting of a total effective dose aaplaneinto $nadrag stau wdl decelerate that is weH ab the

"'" * "I "" "4"I" "* Mung a equivalent oIO 05 Sv (5 reml, or the sum nunimum airspeed for sustam.ed level normal stall speed. There wdi not be an of the deep-dose equivalent and the flight in icing conditions, limitations for artificial stall warning by stick shaker.

committed dose equivalent to any ihe use of flaps for flight in icing The natural pre-stall bulfet will be individual organ or tissue (other than conditions, cues for recognizing shorter and stronger, or the airplane the lens of the eye) of 0.5 Sv (50 rem). hazardous conditions. exiting may stall with no warning. Stalling on The eye dose equivalent shall not procedures in icing conditions that are the autopilot can cause a spin or near exceed 0.15 Sv (15 rem), and the spec fic to Mitsubishi MU-2B series vertical spiral, neither of which may be shallow dose equivalent to skin shall airplanes, and ensuring the wing recoverable. Using the autopilot while not exceed 0.5 Sv (50 rem). The illumination and taxi lights are operable operating in icing conditions could minimum distance from the surface prior to liight at night into known or mask the cues of deceleration and the facilities in the geologic repository forecast : :ag conditions. Sneral fatal autopilot may cross control the airplane operations trea to the boundary of the accidents. involving certain Ntitsubishi while attempting to maictain altitude preclosure controlled area nust be at MU-2B senes airplanes while flying in and heading. Sidesl at t211 can also be seast 100 meters. icing conditions, prompted this action. induced during the oceleration by The actions specified by this AD are improper propener pitch settings and/or fc) The Preclosure controlled area mtendedto revent operating in engme fuel control settings that are not may be traversed by a highway, rad. road in accordance with the manufacturer's or w6 terway, so long as appropriate and' conditions t at are beyond the Specifications.

capability of the icing protection effective arrangements are made to Since an unsafe condition has been system, prevent aerodynamic stall at controiiraffic and to protect pubhc higher than normal airspeed because of identified that is likely to exist or j health and safety, icing conditions, and immediately develop in other Mitsubishi MU-2B i Dated in Rockville. Maryland.tSit 25th provide the ilot with cues for series airplanes of the same type design. l day of November,19%. recognizing azardous conditions and this AD requires revising the H Aiting these conditions, which if not Limitations Section, Procedures Section, For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

followed, could result in loss of the and the Master Minimum Equipment Irh" C. IloI e* l List (MMEL) of the Airplane Flight Secretary of the Commission.

airplane' DATES: Effective December 27,1996.

. Manual ( AFM). These revisions require:

IFR Doc 9&-30710 Filed 12-3-9th 8-45 aml (1) Establishing a minimum airspeed Comments for mclusion in the Rules for sustained level flight in icing Docket must be received on or before conditions, -

January 27,1997. (2) Limited use of flaps while flying l i ADDRESSCG: Submit comments in in icing conditions, triplicate to toe Federal Aviation (3) Recognizing cues for hazardous Administration (FAA), Central Region, icing conditions specific to the Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel. Mitsubishi Model MU-2B airplane, i Attention: Rules Docket 9G-CE-61-AD, (4) Operable wing illumination and

{

Room 1558. 601 E.12th Street, Kaasas taxilights prior to flight at night into l City, Missouri M10G. known or forecast icing conditions, and