ML20207K928

Insp Rept 50-400/86-89 on 861117-21.Violation Noted: Inadequate Housekeeping Controls Around Reactor Vessel During Initial Fuel Loading

ML20207K928
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	12/12/1986
From:	Jape F, Mathis J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207K879	List: IR 05000400/1986089 ML20207K874 ML20207K905 ML20207K928
References
50-400-86-89, NUDOCS 8701090563
Download: ML20207K928 (5)

See also: IR 05000400/1986089

Text

-2+ + + - ma"-+

.

a [ nog . UNITE 3 STATES

g jo, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

,8 '

, REGION ll

$ 'j 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.

• * ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

"*., ...../

Report No.: 50-400/86-89

Licensee: Carolina power and Light Company

P. O. Box 1551

Raleigh, NC 27602

' Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-53

Facility Name: Harris

Inspection onducted: November 17-21, 1986

Inspector: .[. h & n

J. 2. Mathis' _

( 12.\ 8 (o

Oats Signed

Approved by: NI hkN. v ' h ~

l2./12/ f/7

F. ' Jap'e,' Section Chief DatW Sfgnaid

Engineering Branch' ,

Division of Reactor Safety

'

-

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, una'nnounced inspection was in the~ areas of initial fuel

loading witnessing. -

'

Results: One violation was identified - Inadequate housekeeping controls around

the reactor vessel during initial fuel loading.

,

4

E82o 8BN 8%!S$go

O

!

l

--

-

.

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

• J. Ha ness, CP&L Asstistant Plant General Manager

• R. A. Watson, Vice President Harris iuclear Project

• R. B. Van Meter, CP&L Manager Technical Support

• D. Tibbitts, Regulatory Compliance

• J. L. Dority, Start-Up Supervisor

• C S. Hinnant, Manager Start-Up

• M. G. Wallace, Regulatory Compliance Specialist

• H. W. Bowles, CP&L Director-Onsite Nuclear Safety

• C. H. Moseley, Jr. , Manager-0PNS QA/QC

• G. L. Forehand, Director QA/QC

R. Colthorpe, Power Ascension Lead Test Engineer

R. Duncan, Power Ascension Lead Test Engineer

D. Casada, Shift Test Coordinator

C. S. Olexik, Shift Test Coordinator

H. Carter, Shift Foreman

C. S. Matthews, Shift Foreman

T. D. Ward, Jr. , Power Ascension Technician

Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians,

operators, security force members, and office personnel.

Other Organization

F. Baskerville, Westinghouse Adv.

R. Kirk, Westingh.use

R. Nodvik, Westinghouse

A. Sabol, Westinghouse

NRC Resident Inspector

• P. E. Fredrickson, NRC, Section Chief

• G. F. Maxwell, Senior Resident Inspector

• Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

lhe inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 21, 1986, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the

areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No

dissenting comments were received from the licensee. One new item was

identified during this inspection as follows:

,.

. . . .. -- __~ - . ..

.

2

Violation 50-400/86-89-01, Inadequate Housekeeping Controls Around the

-

Reactor Vessel During Initial Fuel Loading (paragraph 5).

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided

to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.

5. Initial Fuel Loading Witnessing (72524)

Initial fuel loading for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP)

Unit 1, started on November 17, 1986, at approximately 5:06 p.m. The

sequence of fuel loading was in accordance with data sheet 10.d of procedure

9101-S-01, Initial Fuel Loading. Prior to the first bundle going into the

< reactor vessel, the inspector verified that the prerequisites and initial

conditions which ensure the following were satisfied: (a) Readiness of

equipment and associated systems required for a safe core loading (b) Veri- i

fication of equipment status and plant condition during core loading to

ensure planned conditions are maintained (c) compliance with the require-

ments which pertain to core loading that are identified in the Final Safety

Analysis Report (FSAR) and Technical Specifications (TSs).

i The initial core consists of 157 fuel assemblies. Each fuel assembly

contains a 17 x 17 rod array composed of 264 fuel rods, 24 rod cluster

'

control (RCC) guide thimbles and an incore instrumentation thimble. The

fuel loading pattern for Cycle 1 contains three regions of 53, 52, 52

assemblies, each with a different U-235 enrichment. The first two regions,

consisting of the two lower enrichments, are arranged in a checker board

e pattern toward the center of the core. Region 3, which contains the highest

enrichment, is arranged around the periphery of the core. Enrichments for

Cycle 1 are 2.1 w/o, 2.6 w/o, and 3.1 w/o in Regions 1, 2, and 3, respec-

,

tively.

. The inspector witnessed initial fuel loading from the control room,

refueling floor and spent fuel pool to verify the following:

,

a. A proper version of the procedure was in use and was being followed.

b. Inverse multiplication plots were being maintained in accordance with

.

procedural requirements.

-

'

c. Boron concentration was verified by proper sampling and analysis, at

the required frequency. ,

l

l *

- ~. . . - . - _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ . _ . . . _ - _ _ _ - _ - . ~ - . . - _ . . . - , _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - . . _ . _ - . _ . - .

.

3

. d. Shift turnover was performed in conformance with administrative

procedures.

e. Personnel access to refueling floor was controlled.

'

f. Deficiencies or difficulties encountered were recorded in the control

room log. Adequacy of corrective action, and the review and approval

of that action was verified.

On November 18, 1986, while witnessing initial fuel loading in the reactor

containment building, the inspector observed that control of personnel,

material and tools was not being recorded at the entry and exit point of the

access controlled area. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion II and the

accepted Quality Assurance Program (Final Safety Analysis Report, Section

17.2.2) collectively require that activities affecting quality shall be

accomplished under suitably controlled conditions.

Controlled conditions include the use of appropriate equipment and suitable

environmental conditions for accomplishing the activity, such as adequate

cleanliness. The SHNPP FSAR Section 1.8 commits to Regulatory Guide 1.39

(Rev. 2), September 1977, " Housekeeping Requirements for Water-Cooled

Nuclear Power Plants," which endorses ANSI N45.2.3-1973, " Housekeeping

During the Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants." ANSI N45.2.3

requires that for zones I, II and III a written record of the entry and exit

of all personnel and material shall be established and maintained. Failure

to maintain a record of the entry and exit of all personnel and material for

a Class B area, which is the designated cleanliness area around the reactor

vessel with the head off, is in violation of the above requirements. This

item is identified as violation 50-400/86-89-01, Inadequate housekeeping

controls around the reactor vessel during initial fuel loading.

In addition to the above incident at approximately 1:45 a.m., on November 18,

i 1986, the Lead Test Engineer in the Reactor Containment Building, overlooked

the requirement to perform the statistical reliability check of the

temporary nuclear instrument A and the source range instrument N31 as

required by step 6.7.2 of procedure 9101-S-01. The engineer did perform the

required baselining check on these nuclear instruments. The fact that the

data were missing was discovered by the lead test engineer on the day shift

and reported to the Shift Test Coordinator (STC) in the control room at

approximately 5:00 p.m. on November 18, 1986. Fuel movement was stopped and

an investigation started by the STC and the Shift Foreman. The lead test

engineer performed a statistical reliability check (chi square test) on the

detector using the baseline data taken in step 6.7.2 of procedure 9101-S-01.

The detectors failed the Chi Square Test meaning that the detectors were

inoperable due to excessive electronic noise. Technical Specification 6.8.1

requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and

maintained that meet or exceed the requirements and recommendations of

Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33. The failure to implement a statistical

reliability check per step 6.7.2 of procedure 9101-S-01 is a violation

against Technical Specification requirement 6.8.1.

4

,~ , , - - , , > - , - - - - , - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - , , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --

. - . . ..

4

Evaluation of the conditions involved in this incident in accordance with

the NRC enforcement policy indicates that this is a licensee identified and

corrected violation. Therefore, a Notice of Violation was not issued by the

NRC.

Fuel loading was completed at 1:46 on November 21, 1986. Soon after initial

fuel loading was completed the licensee video taped the core to verify the

loading pattern is in accordance with the initial core loading procedure.