05000331/FIN-2017001-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Maintenance Instructions for Containment Purge Valves Led to Violation of Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 |
| Description | Green: A Green finding and an associated NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.3 was self-revealed due to the failure to ensure the outboard containment purge valve was operable when the rector was placed in Mode 2 on October 30, 2016. Specifically, the licensee performed maintenance on the outboard containment purge valve during the refueling outage using procedures which failed to contain acceptance criteria to ensure critical dimensions necessary for reliable containment purge valve sealing could be re-established following valve stroking. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report (CR) 2181838. Corrective actions included establishing the critical dimensions necessary to actuate the drywell purge valve seals, revising the procedure for containment isolation valve maintenance, developing a new test procedure for containment isolation valve testing and developing just-in-time training to be used during future containment isolation valve maintenance. The inspectors determined that the failure to have the outboard containment purge valve operable while operating in Modes 1 and 2 as required by TS 3.6.1.3 was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the System, Structure and Component (SSC) and barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (e.g., containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. This finding was of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment, containment isolation system, or heat removal components, nor did it involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance area of Resources, because NextEra personnel did not ensure that procedures were adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, maintenance procedures for the drywell purge valves did not contain steps to ensure that a critical dimension for valve operability was re-established following valve stroking. [H.1] |
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
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| Report | IR 05000331/2017001 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2017 (2017Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Bergeon C Norton G Hansen J Cassidy J Steffes J Wojewoda K Stoedter |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.1, Resources |
| INPO aspect | LA.1 |
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Finding - Duane Arnold - IR 05000331/2017001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Duane Arnold) @ 2017Q1
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