ML17326B414
| ML17326B414 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/1988 |
| From: | ALEXICH M P AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORP. |
| To: | MURLEY T E NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17326B415 | List: |
| References | |
| AEP:NRC:0967L, AEP:NRC:967L, NUDOCS 8808160160 | |
| Download: ML17326B414 (21) | |
Text
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&EMACC4ESSI'GN NBR:8808160160 DOC.DATE:
88/08/09NOTARIZED:
NODOCKETFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,Indianaa05000315AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION ALEXICH,M.P.
AmericanElectricPowerServiceCorp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION MURLEYiT.E.
DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)
SUBJECT:
Application foramendtoLicenseDPR-58,requesting relieffromTechSpecsurveillance requirements tillUnit1outage.DISTRIBUTION CODE:A001DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR
/ENCL/SIZE:/'F)lPTITLE:ORSubmittal:
GeneralDistribution NOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1LASTANG,JCOPIESLTTRENCL1011RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1PDCOPIESLTTRENCL55hINTERNAL:
ARM/DAF/LFMB NRR/DEST/CEB 8HNRR/DEST/MTB 9HNRR/DOEA/TSB 11.NUDOJS-ABSTRACT FOl1011~111.11111NRR/DEST/ADS 7ENRR/DEST/ESB 8DNRR/DEST/RSB 8ENRR/PMAS/ILRB12 OGC/HDS1RES/DSIR/EIB 111111111101EXTERNAL:
LPDRNSIC1111NRCPDR11~~gf&l7ShTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
LTTR22ENCL19
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'AmericanElectricP~ServiceCorporatio~
1Riverside PlazaColurnbos, OH432156142231000AEP:NRC:0967LDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit1DocketNo.50-315LicenseNo.DPR-58Surveillance IntervalExtensions forUnit1Cycle10U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Attn:T.E.MurleyAugust.9,1988
DearDr.Murley:
Thisletterconstitutes anapplication foramendment totheTechnical Specifications (T/Ss)fortheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit1.Specifically, werequestanextension forcertainsurveillances whichtheT/Ssrequiretobeperformed beginning February26,1989.Wearerequesting relieffromtheseT/Srequirements untiltheUnit1refueling outagewhichiscurrently projected tobeginbyMarch1989.Thesesurveillances aredifficult orimpossible tocompletewiththeunitinoperation.
Therefore, toavoidunnecessary shutdownoftheplantandtoallowforoutageplanningonotherunits,weaskthatyourespondtousbyFebruary1,1989.Adescription oftheproposedchangesandouranalysesconcerning significant hazardsconsiderations arecontained inAttachment 1tothisletter.TheproposedrevisedT/Spagesarecontained inAttachment 2.Alloftherequested surveillance extensions areassociated withsurveillances normallyperformed duringoutages.Thecurrentrefueling cyclehasbeenlengthened duetoaself-imposed limitofoperation at90%ofratedthermalpower.Thissubmittal includesproposedchangestoPages3/43-12,3/43-31,and3/43-33.Changestothesepageswerealsorequested inourletterAEP:NRC:0916W, datedMarch26,1987.Duringdiscussions onJuly19,1988,yourstaffindicated thechangesproposedinAEP:NRC:0916W wereexpectedtobegrantedinthenearfuture..Therefore, wehaveincludedthesependingchangesinourpresentsubmittal.
PursuanttoarequestbyyourstaffonJuly28,1988,wewillbesubmitting arequesttodeletethefootnotes associated withthesurveillance intervalextensions whichhavebeengrantedat8808160160 880809PDRADC}CK05000~>5PPNUQ tt't'~I'ls,"Ot,g~~
Dr.Murley-2-AEP:NRC:0967L varioustimesforbothoftheCookNuclearPlantunits.Weanticipate thissubmittal willbemadebySeptember 15,1988.Thiswillbeanadministrative change,intendedonlytocleanuptheaffectedT/Spages.Wearealsoinvestigating possibilities foreliminating theneedforsurveillance intervalextensions.
Forexample,thefrequency ofrefueling outage-related surveillances couldbeincreased from18monthsto24months.Thistopicwillbethesubjectofafuturesubmittal.
Webelievethattheproposedchangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificant changeinthetypesofeffluents orasignificant increaseintheamountofanyeffluents thatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.
TheseproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommittee (PNSRC)andwillbereviewedbytheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommittee (NSDRC)attheirnextregularly scheduled meeting.Incompliance withtherequirements of10CFR50.91(b)(1),copiesofthisletteranditsattachments havebeentransmitted toMr.R.C.CallenoftheMichiganPublicServiceCommission andMr.G.Bruchmann oftheMichiganDepartment ofPublicHealth.Pursuantto10CFR170.12(c),
wehaveenclosedanapplication feeof$150.00fortheproposedamendments.
Thisdocumenthasbeenpreparedfollowing Corporate procedures whichincorporate areasonable setofcontrolstoensureitsaccuracyandcompleteness priortosignature bytheundersigned.
Sincerely, M.-.AlichVicePresident ldpAttachments cc:D.H.Williams, Jr.W.G.Smith,Jr.-BridgmanG.Bruchmann R.C.CallenG.CharnoffNRCResidentInspector
-BridgmanA.B.Davis-RegionIII Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0967L Reasonsand10CFR50.92Significant HazardsEvaluation forChangestotheTechnical Specifications fortheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit1 Attachment 1forAEP:NRC:0967L Page1Introduction Asdiscussed inthecoverletter,thepurposeofthisproposedamendment istopreventanunscheduled surveillance outagein~Unit1priortoournextrefueling outagecurrently scheduled tobeginbyMarch1989.Thissubmittal requestsextensions forsurveillances thatmustbeperformed duringshutdownorthatpresentsuchoperational difficulty thatperforming thesurveillance isnotpractical atpower.Weproposetoaddthefollowing Technical Specification (T/S)toSection4.0oftheT/Ss.4.0.7.Byspecificreference tothissection,thosesurveillances whichmustbeperformed onorbeforeApril1,1989,maybedelayeduntiltheendoftheCycle10-11refueling outage(currently scheduled tobeginduringthelatterpartofthefirstquarterof1989).Forthesespecificsurveillances underthissection,thespecified timeintervals requiredbySpecification
4.0. 2willbedetermined
withthenewinitiation dateestablished bythesurveillance dateduring,theUnit11989refueling outage.Wereference thisspecification byfootnoteinallsurveillances thatrequirethisextension.
Thisfootnotewillbeapplicable tothefollowing T/Sswiththeindicated surveillance duedate.DatesgivenincludethegraceperiodallowedbyT/S4.0.2.TSAffectedDescritionofChaneDueDate(1)4.6.5.1.b.2 (2)4.6.5.1.b.3 DelayicebasketweighingDelayicecondenser flowpassageinspection 2/26/893/05/89(3)4.6.5.3.1.b.l-b.5 4.6.5.4.c Delayicecondenser inletdoor3/05/89testingandinletdoorpositionmonitoring systemtesting1(4)Table4.3-1,Items7and84.3.2.1.2 Table4.3-2,Itemsl.fand4.dTable4.3-7,Items2,3andllDelayRTDCalibrations 3/26/89 Attachment 1forAEP:NRC:0967L Page2Unit1Cycle10iscurrently projected toendbymid-February 1989.Allofthesurveillances forwhichwearerequesting extensions falldueaftertheanticipated outagedate.Thechangesarebeingrequested toallowmarginforunplanned outageswhichmayoccurpriortotherefueling outage.Theextensions mayalsobenecessary iftheUnit2steamgenerator replacement/
refueling outageenddateisdelayed.Theoutageiscurrently onscheduleandisexpectedtoendinJanuary1989.Intheeventitisdelayed,itmaybedesirable tooperateUnit1atreducedpowerinordertostretchthecyclelengthandtherebyavoidhavingbothunitsoutofserviceatthesametime.Alloftherequested extensions havebeenrequested previously, eitherforUnit1orUnit2.Thetablebelowprovidesinformation onourpreviousrequests.
ItemUnitSubmittal 5DateAmendment
~Date1IceBasketWeighing12FlowPassages&RelatedInspections 3InletDoorTestingAEP:NRC:0967H (2/10/87)
AEP:NRC:0967H (2/10/87)
AEP:NRC:0967F (1/9/87)108(5/8/87)108(5/8/87)107(4/17/87) 4RTDCalibrations AEP:NRC:0916AF (1/11/88)
Requestwith-drawnsincerefueling outagebeganpriortosurveillance duedate(seeAEP:NRC:0916AK dated5/2/88)Inadditiontotheabovesurveillance extensions, wearerequesting aminoreditorial changetoT/STable4.3-2.Theeditorial changeisdiscussed inconjunction withtheRTDcalibration extension request(Group4).Thereasonsand10CFR50.92analysesforeachofthefoursurveillance groupsarediscussed separately below.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0967L Page31)IceBasketWeihinWearerequesting anextension ofthesurveillance intervalfortheicecondenser icebasketweighings
~requiredbyT/S4.6.5.1.b.2.
Thesurveillance waslastperformed inMarch1988.Theduedate,including graceperiod,forthesurveillance isFebruary26,1989.Thesurveillance isdifficult toperformatpowerbecausebasketsinRows1and9havehistorically becomefrozeninplace.(Row1islocatedclosesttothecontainment wall,andRow9isclosesttothecranewall;seedrawinginAttachment 4.)Tofreethebasketsrequiresmanualscrapingoficeordefrosting oftheicecondenser.
Neitheroftheseareacceptable sincelooseormeltedicemaylandonthelowerinletdoorspotentially freezingtheminplace.Problemswithfreezingofthedoorsasaresultofdefrostoperations hasbeenencountered inthepastandisdiscussed inthethirdsectionofthisattachment.
Freezingofthedoorsposesasignificant problemsincethedoorsarenotaccessible duringpoweroperation duetoALARAconsiderations.
Thus,itisunlikelythatthefreezingcondition wouldbeidentifiable orcorrectable.
Inthepastsevensurveillances (performed inApril1985,June1985,September 1985,December1985,June1986,July1987,andMarch1988)allicebasketweightsforbaysandrowgroupshavemettheacceptance criteriaofT/S4.6.5.1.b.2.
Thissurveillance historyshowsthatmain-tainingtherequirediceweighthasnotbeenaproblem,andtherefore webelievethattheicecondenser willhavesufficient iceweighttoperformitssafetyfunctionduringtheextension period.Inadditiontothesurveillance history,wehaveperformed calculations ofanticipated icelossduetosublimation.
Thesecalculations supportourbeliefthatthisextension willnotimpacttheabilityoftheicecondenser toperformitssafetyfunction.
Thesecalculations, whicharesummarized inAttachment 3tothisletter,showthatbyApril1,1989,allbutonebayandtworow-groups areexpectedtocontainatleast1220poundsoficeatthelower95%confidence levelasrequiredbyT/S4.6.5.1.b.2.
Theicecondenser totaliceweightisexpectedtobewellovertheminimumof2,371,450 poundsrequiredbyT/S4.6.5.1.b.2.
Thecalculations usedknowniceweightsfromthebeginning ofthissurveillance intervalandextrapolated expectedicebasketweightsbasedontheaverageicelossfromthepastseveniceweighings.
Thecalculations determined theminimumaverageweightsexpectedatthelower95%
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0967L Page4confidence levelthroughApril1,1989.(Amoredetaileddescription ofthecalculation iscontained inAttachment 3).Theexpectedvaluesfortheonebayandtworow-groups thatmayfallbelowtheT/Saveragevalueof1220poundsperbasketareBay24(1200pounds),Row8Group3(1206pounds)andRow9Group3(1166pounds).Whilethesebaysandrow-groups mightfallbelowtheT/Slimit,theyareallabovethe1098poundsstatedinthebasesastheminimumacceptable averagebasketweight(reference-BasesPageB3/46-4).Thesebasesstatethat,"theminimumweightfigureof1220poundsoficeperbasketcontainsa10percentconservative allowance foricelossthroughsublimination..."
Thisstatement indicates thatthepurposeofthe1220poundsurveillance limitistoensureaminimumiceweightof1098poundsattheendofthesurveillance intervaled Therefore, webelievethatsinceallbaysandrow-groups areexpectedtohaveicebasketweightswellover1098pounds(withmostbaysandrow-groups havingicebasketweightswellover1220pounds),theicecondenser hassufficient capability toperformit'ssafetyfunctionduringtherequested extension period.10CFR50'2Evaluation Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously
- analyzed, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety,Ourevaluation oftheproposedchangewithrespecttothesecriteria, basedontheaboveinformation, isprovidedbelow.Criterion 1Onthebasisofthesurveillance historyoftheicebaskets,thecalculations ofthesublimation rates,andtherelatively shortperiodofthisextension, webelievethattheextension willnotresultinasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated accident.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0967L Page5Criterion 2Thesurveillance extension willnotresultinachangeinplantconfiguration oroperation.
Therefore, thischangewillnotgyratethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated.
Criterion 3Webelievethatanextension ofthesurveillance intervalwillnotresultinasignificant reduction inthemarginofsafetybasedontheexcellent surveillance performance ofthissystem,thecalculations ofsublimation ratesandtherelatively shortperiodofthisextension.
Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.
Thesixthoftheseexamplesreferstochangeswhichmayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofapreviously analyzedaccident, buttheresultsofwhicharewithinlimitsestablished asacceptable, Webelievethesechangesfallwithinthescopeofthisexampleforthereasonscitedabove.Therefore webelievethischangedoesnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration asdefinedin10CFR50.92.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0967L Page62)FlowPassaeInsectionsWearerequesting anextension ofthesurveillance intervalforicecondenser flowpassageinspections requiredbyT/~4.6.5.1.b.3.
Thesurveillance waslastperformed inMarch1988.Theduedate,including thegraceperiod,isMarch5,1989.Theinspection cannotbecompleted atpowerbecauseportionsoftheinspection mustbeperformed fromlowercontainment whichisinaccessible duringpoweroperation duetoALARAconsiderations.
T/S4.6.5.1.b.3 requiresvisualinspections ofthelatticeframes,intermediate andtopdeckfloorgratings, thelourinletplenumsupportstructures andturningvanes,andatleast2oftheflowpassagesineachofthe24icecondenser bays.TheT/Srequiresthatifaflowpassageisfoundtohaveanaccumulation offrostgreaterthan3/8inches,anadditional 20flowpassagesfromthesamebaymustbevisuallyinspected.
Morethanonerestricted flowpassageperbayisconsidered bytheT/Stobeevidenceofabnormaldegradation.
TheT/Slimitofnomorethanonerestricted flowpassageperbayisextremely conservative whencomparedtotheassumptions usedinsafetyevaluations performed forusbyWestinghouse ElectricCorp.(Westinghouse).
Theevaluations ofshort-term containment pressureresulting fromtheblowdownphaseofaLOCAassumedthat20%oftheflowareaineachbayisblocked.(Onecompletely blockedpassagerepresents lessthan1%oftheavailable flowareainabay.)Wehavereviewedtheas-foundsurveillance historyoftheT/S4.6.5.1.b.3 testingfrom1983tothepresent.Onlytwofailureswerenoted.ThefirstfailuredetectedwasinJuly1987.Frostaccumulation greaterthan3/8incheswasfoundinatotalof124flowpassagesin7ofthe24bays.Theworstcaseblockage, though,didnotexceed11%intheworstbay.Theicecondenser wasdefrosted andmanuallycleanedtoremovetheaccessible frostandicebuildup.InMarch1988,aninspection againrevealedfrostbuildupgreaterthan3/8inchesinmorethanoneflowpassageperbay.Thistime,however,t'eblockagewaslimitedtoatotalofonly12flowpassagesin4ofthe24bays.Theworstblockageinanybaywaslessthan3%ofthetotalflowareaofthebay.Theicecondenser wasmanuallycleanedtorestoretheflowpassagestowithinT/Srequirements.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0967L Page7Althoughsomefrostbuilduphasbeenidentified duringsurveillance testing,thebuilduphasneverapproached levelsassumedintheWestinghouse evaluations.
Theworstcasedegradation seeninanybaysince1982stillhadapproximabely 50%margintotheevaluation limit.Additionally, therequested extension periodshouldbeverybrief.Thesereasonsgiveusconfidence thattherequested extension willnotresultinflowpassageblockageinexcessofwhatispresently evaluated.
Forthesereasons,webelievetheextension willnotsignificantly impactpublichealthandsafety.10CFR50.'92Evaluation Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously
- analyzed, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Ourevaluation oftheproposedchangewithrespecttothesecriteriaisprovidedbelow.Criterion 1Thesurveillance historyoftheflowpassageandrelatedinspections givesusconfidence thatthefrostbuildupwillnotexceedthatassumedintheevaluations performed byWestinghouse.
Inaddition, thesurveillance extension periodisexpectedtobebrief.Forthesereasons,webelievetheextension willnotresultinasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated
- accident, norwillitresultinasignificant reduction inthemarginofsafety.
Attachment 1toAEP;NRC:0967L Page8Criterion 2Thesurveillance extension willnotresultinachangeinplantconfiguration oroperation.
Therefore, thischangeisnotex~edtocreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated.
Criterion 3SeeCriterion 1above.Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.
Thesixthoftheseexamplesreferstochangeswhichmayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofapreviously analyzedaccident, buttheresultsofwhicharewithinlimitsestablished asacceptable.
Webelievethischangefallswithinthescopeofthisexampleforthereasondiscussed above.Therefore, webelievethischangedoesnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration asdefinedin10CFR50.92.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0967L Page93)IceCondenser LowerInletDoorsWearerequesting anextension fortestingoftheicecondenser lowerinletdoorsandinletdoorpositionmoni~ngsystemrequiredbyT/Ss4.6.5.3.1.b and4.6.5.4.c.
ThetestingisrequiredbyT/Sstobeperformed duringshutdown.
Itcannotbedoneatpowerbecausethedoorsarelocatedinareasofcontainment whichareinaccessible becauseofALARAconcerns.
Thetestingwaslastperformed inMarch1988,inconjunction withflowpassageandrelatedinspections described previously inthisletter.Thenextsurveillance duedate,including graceperiod,isMarch5,1989.WehavereviewedUnit1surveillance datafrom1985throughthepresent.Nofailureswerefoundintheinletdoorpositionmonitoring system.AsforthelowerinletdoortestingrequiredbyT/S4.6.5.3.1.b, nofailureswerefoundinsurveillances performed inAprilorSeptember 1985'nasurveillance doneinDecember1985,sevendoorsfailedduetoiceaccumulation.
Aftertheicewasremoved,allofthedoorspassedtheretestandshowednosignsofmechanical failure.Anothersurveillance wasperformed inJune1986,withalldoorssuccessfully passing.ThefailuresfoundduringtheDecember1985surveillance arebelievedtohaveoccurredasaresultofoutageworkperformed duringtheUnit11985refueling outage.Someofthisworkinvolveddeliberate defrosting oftheicecondenser, andwasdoneaftertheSeptember 1985inletdoorsurveillances wereperformed.
Itisbelievedthatwaterandicefromthedefrostoperation accumulated onthedoors,causingtheopeningtorquestoexceedT/Slimits.Topreventrecurrence, theicecondenser defrostprocedure nowrequiresthatthedooropeningtorquesbetestedfollowing adefrostoperation.
Additionally, operations personnel makeathoroughvisualinspection ofthecontainment priortostartupafteranextendedoutage.Theseinspections nowincludethelowerinletdoorsandwouldbeexpectedtodiscloseexcessive frostbuilduponthedoors,shoulditbepresent.NofurtherproblemshavebeendetectedsincetheSeptember 1985test.Itistherefore ourbeliefthatthefailuresdiscovered inDecember1985wereanisolatedincident, andthatadequatecorrective actionhasbeentakentopreventrecurrence.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0967L Page10Wealsonotethattheperiodoftheextension shouldbeverybrief.Forthesereasons,webelievetherequested extension willnotsignificantly impactpublichealthandsafety.10CFR50.92CriteriaPer10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously
- analyzed, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Ourevaluation oftheproposedchangewithrespecttothesecriteriaisprovidedbelow.Criterion 1Onthebasisofthetesthistoryoftheicecondenser lowerinletdoorsaswellasthebriefperiodoftimet'eextension shouldbenecessary, webelievetheextension willnotresultinasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated accident.
Criterion 2Thesurveillance extension willnotresultinachangeinplantconfiguration oroperation.
Therefore, thischangewillnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated.
Criterion 3Webelievethatanextension ofthesurveillance intervalwillnotresultinasignificant reduction inamarginofsafetyforthereasonsgiveninCriterion 1above.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0967L Page11Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.
Thesixthofthseeexamplesreferstochangeswhichmayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofapreviously analyzedaccident, buttheresultsofwhicharewithinlimitsestablished asacceptable.
Webelievethischangefallswithinthescopeofthisexampleforthereasonscitedabove.Therefore, webelievethischangedoesnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration asdefinedin10CFR50.92.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0967L Page124)RTDCalibrations Extensions arerequested forthecalibration ofresistance temperature detectors (RTDs).TheT/Ssurveillances inv~ngtheRTDcalibrations arelistedbelow.1)Table4,3-1,Item7Overtemperature deltaTchannelcalibration 2)Table4.3-1,Item8Overpower deltaTchannelcalibration 3)4.3.2.1.2 Totalinterlock functiontestforP-124)Table4.3-2,ItemSteamflowintwosteamlinesl.fand4.dhighcoincident withTavelow-lowchannelcalibrattons 5)Table4.3-7,Item2Reactorcoolantoutlettemperature
-THOTchannelcalibration 6)Table4.3-7,Item3Reactorcoolantinlettemperature
-TCO~channelcalibration 7)Table4.3-7,Item11Reactorcoolantsystemsubcooling marginmonitorchannelcalibration Theextension isneededfromMarch26,1989,untiltherefueling outage.Theextensions requested inthiscategoryareforthecalibration ofthetemperature sensorsonly.Thecalibration procedure requiresdatatobetakenatRCStemperatures rangingfromapproximately 250Fthroughoperat-ingtemperatures.
Thisprocedure cannotbeperformed atpowerbecauseofthelowtemperatures necessary forthecalibration.
ThechannelsinvolvedwiththeRTDsaresubjecttoT/Srequiredchannelchecksand/orchannelfunctional tests.Thistesting,whichwillcontinueduringtheextension period,wouldbeexpectedtoprovideindication ofRTDdrift.WehavefoundRTDsattheCookNuclearPlanttobeverystable,andhavenotexperienced significant driftingproblems.
TheUnit1RTDsarerelatively new,havingbeenreplacedduringtherefueling outagewhichendedinNovember1985.(Thereplacements weremadeinordertosatisfyequipment qualification requirements andnotbecauseofproblems Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0967L Page13withthepreviousRTDs.)Thisincreases ourconfidence inthedependability ofthedevices.Lastly,theextension periodisexpectedtobeverybrief.Forthesereasons,webelievetherequested extension willnot'ignificantly impactpublichealthandsafety.10CFR50.92CriteriaPer10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously
- analyzed, (2)createtheprobability ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpre~iously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Ourevaluation oftheproposedchangewithrespecttothesecriteriaisprovidedbelow.Criterion 1RTDsattheCookNuclearPlanthavetraditionally beenverystable.Channelsinvolving theRTDsaresubjecttoT/Srequiredchannelchecksand/orchannelfunctional tests,whichwillcontinuetobeperformed duringtheextension period.Also,theextension periodisexpectedtobeverybrief.Forallthesereasons,webelievetheextension willnotresultinasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated
- accident, norwillitresultinasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 2Thisextension willnotresultinachangeinplaneconfiguration oroperation.
Therefore, theextension shouldnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously evaluated oranalyzed.
Criterion 3SeeCriterion 1abo~e.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0967L Page14Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.
Thesixthoft~examplesreferstochangeswhichmayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated
- accident, buttheresultsofwhicharewithinlimitsestablished asacceptable.
Webelievethischangefallswithinthescopeofthisexample,forthereasonscitedabove.Thus,webelievethischangedoesnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration asdefinedin10CFR50.92.Editorial ChaneWearealsoproposing aminoreditorial changetoFunctional Unitl.fofTable4.3-2.Thedescription ischangedfrom"T--Low"to"T-Low-Low."
Thiscorrectsanerrorinthetext.gThetextwillN5nbeconsistent withtheFunctional Unitdescription forthesamesignalinTable3.3-4.Thischangeispurelyeditorial, andwillnotresultinanincreaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously analyzedaccident, willnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, andwillnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.
Attachment 2toAEP:NRC:0967L ProposedRevisedTechnical Specification Pages