ML17333B038
| ML17333B038 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 09/15/1997 |
| From: | FITZPATRICK E INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 50-315-97-09, 50-315-97-9, 50-316-97-09, 50-316-97-9, AEP:NRC:1260H, NUDOCS 9709230028 | |
| Download: ML17333B038 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000315/1997009
Text
CATEGORYlREGULATORY
INFORMATION
DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM(RIDS)DOCKET0500031505000316NOTES:CCESSIONNBR:9709230028
DOC.DATE:
97/09/15NOTARIZED:
YESFACIL:50-315
DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM,50-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaMAUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION
FITZPATRICK,E.
IndianaMichiganPowerCo.RECIP.NAME
RECIPIENT
AFFILIATION
DocumentControlBranch(Document
ControlDesk)SUBJECT:RespondstoNRC970815ltrreviolations
notedininsprepts50-315/97-09
a50-316/97-09
on970505-23.Corrective
actions:calculation
DC-D-1-SI-F101
revisedarevisedsafetyreviewincorporating
correctMDAFWpumpstarttimeapproved.
DISTRIBUTION
CODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR
ENCLSIZE-TITLE:General(50Dkt)-Insp
Rept/Notice
ofViolation
ResponseINTERNAL:
RECIPIENT
IDCODE/NAME
PD3-3PDAEOD/SPD/RAB
DEDRONRR/DISP/PIPB
NRR/DRPM/PECB
NUDOCS-ABSTRACT
OGC/HDS2COPIESRECIPIENT
LTTRENCLIDCODE/NAME
11HICKMANiJ
1AEODf&T~1+FILECEHTE~RQN
1/DRC@HHFB
1NRR/DRPM/PERB
1OEDIR1RGN3FILE01COPIESLTTRENCL111111111111110REXTERNALLITCOBRYCEgJHNRCPDR11NOAC11NUDOCSFULLTEXT1111D0N0NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION
REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION
LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,
CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION
415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
LTTR18ENCL18
0
indianaMichiganPowerCompany500CircleOriveBuchanan,
Mi491071395
INDIANAItrIICHIGAN
PWERSeptember
15,1997AEP:NRC:1260H
10'CFR2.201DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
ATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington,
D.C.20555Gentlemen:
DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2NRCINSPECTION
REPORTSNO.50-315/97009
(DRP)AND50-316/97009
(DRP)REPLYTONOTICEOFVIOLATION
ThisletterisinresponsetoaletterfromG~E.Grant,datedAugust15,1997,thatforwarded
anoticeoftwoviolations
ofNRCrequirements
toCookNuclearPlant.Theviolations
wereidentified
duringtheoperational
safetyteaminspection
(OSTI)conducted
bytheNRCfromMay5,1997,toMay23,1997.Theattachment
containsourresponsetotheseviolations.
Commitments
weremadebyCookNuclearPlantpersonnel
totheNRCOSTI.Theinspectors
identified
concernsrelatedtovalvedescriptions
onlabels,drawings,
andinprocedures,
andtheyhadconcernsrelatedtoourprogramforsealedvalves.Thecharacterization
anddetailofthesecommitments
intheinspection
reportreflectsourintent.whenthecommitments
weremade.Thesecondviolation
relatestotheissueofdesigncontrol.Whilereviewing
theOSTIreportandpreparing
thisresponse,
CookNuclearPlantunderwent
anNRCarchitect
engineering
(AE)teaminspection.
TheAEinspection
identified
designcontrolissues,somethataresimilartothosecitedinthisviolation.
Resolution
oftheoveralldesigncontrolissuewillrequireactionbeyondthatwhichiscommitted
tohere.Thoseactionswillbedefinedinthecourseofaddressing
theAEteaminspection
issues.Thenuclearengineering
organization,
alongwithourentirenucleargeneration
group,understands
theimportance
oferrorfreehumanperformance
andattention
todetail,andtohavingadesignbasisthatisclear,understandable,
andretrievable.
WebelievethatafirststepwastakenonSeptember
2,1997,whenstandards
fortechnical
information
exchangeanduseinthenuclearengineering
9'709'230028
9709i5PDRADQCK050003%58PDRr.~~0,<iQ,,sllllllllilllliIIIJlllllllllllliillilf
ill
U.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
Page2AEP:NRC:1260Horganization
wereformallyestablished.
Theobjective
oftheguidanceistoprovideassurances
thattechnical
information
isaccurate,
basedonsoundengineering
principles,
properlyconveyed,
andproperly,
documented.
Sincerely,
E.E.Fitzpatrick
VicePresident
SWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBED
BEFORE-ME
THISI'5DAYOF~LV',1997NotaryPublicMyCommission
ExpiresvlbAttachments
JANWA%0NCAARYPQSC,BBNKNcoWn,
eMYCOMMSSOM
EXPtRESFEL10,1999c:A.A.BlindA.B.BeachMDEQ"DW&RPDNRCResidentInspector
J.R.Padgett
ATTACHMENT
TOAEP:NRC:1260HREPLYTONOTICEOFVIOLATION:
NRCINSPECTION
REPORTNOS.50-315/97009
(DRP)AND50-316/97009
(DRP)
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1260H
Page1OnMay23,1997,theNRCcompleted
anoperational
safetyteaminspection
(OSTI)ofCookNuclearPlantunits1and2reactorfacilities.
Twoviolations
ofNRCrequirements
wereidentified
duringthisinspection.
Inaccordance
withthe60FR34381,'GeneralStatement
ofPolicyandProcedures
forNRCEnforcement
Actions",
datedJune30,1995,theviolations
andourresponses
areprovidedbelow.NRCViolation
I"10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
V,'Instructions,
Procedures,
andDrawings,
'equires,
inpart,thatactivities
affecting
qualitybeprescribed
byprocedures
ofatypeappropriate
tothecircumstances
andbeaccomplished
inaccordance
withtheseprocedures.
Contrarytotheabove,OnMay10,1997,theinspectors
identified
thatsafetyrelatedTemporary
Modification
(TM)1-95-1,whichdidnotrequireanoutageforrestoration,
hadbeenassigneda(administrative)
dateofAugust27,1996,buthadnotbeenmadeapermanent
installation
throughadesignchangeorbeenremovedasofMay10,1997asrequiredbyPlantManagersProcedure
'Temporary
Modifications,'evision
7.B.OnMay7,1997,theinspectors
identified
thatanactivityaffecting
quality,thedeenergization
oftheDG2ABinverter,
wascompleted
withoutplacing2-DGAB-INV-CB2
and2-DGAB-INV-
CB1tooff,contrarytosteps2.1.2and2.1.3ofprocedure
02-OHP4021.032.008
'Aligning
DG2ABSubsystems
ForStandbyOperation,'evision
4,Attachment
7.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation
(Supplement
I)."ResonsetoNRCViolation
ITheletterfromMr.Grant,andthenoticeofviola'on,
statethatCookNuclearPlant'sstaffprovidedtheNRCwithsatisfactory
information
regarding
thereasonsfortheviolation,
andthecorrective
actionstakenandplannedtocorrectbothexamplesoftheviolation
andpreventrecurrence.
Thelettergoesontosaythat,unlessourcorrective
actionsorourpositionarenotaccurately
reflected
intheinspection
report,wearenotrequiredtofurtherrespondtothisviolation.
Wehavereviewedinspection
reportno.50-315/316)-97009
anddetermined
thatitreflectsthecircumstances
oftheexamplesintheviolation
ascited,aswellasthecorrective
actionstakenforeach.Notwithstanding,
forconsistency
inunderstanding,
thereisinformation
inthediscussion
sectionoftheinspection
reportthatwewishtoclarify.Severalcondition
reports(CRs)arelistedashavingbeenreviewedinconjunction
with'he2ABEDGvoltageregulator
work.Inparticular,
CR97-1452islistedwiththetitle"PartialClearance
AdditionDetermined
AsRootCauseforBlownFuseOn2ABEDGInverter."
Wewouldliketoclarifythatthefailuretodeenergize
theEDGinverterusingtheappropriate
procedure
isnot
0
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1260H
Page2considered
tobetherootcausefortheinverterfuseblowingduringreenergization.
Subsequent
investigation
hasdetermined
thatthefailuretofollow'thedeenergization
procedure
wasrecognized
beforeactionsweretakentoreenergize.
Priortousingtheprocedure
toreenergize
theinverterandplaceitbackinservice,theinvertercircuitalignment
wascorrected
andtheintegrity
ofthefusewasverified.
Thefusedidblowcoincident
withperformance
oftheprocedure
toreenergize
theinverter.
NRCViolation
ZZ"10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
ZZZ,requires,
inpart,thatmdasuresbeestablished
toassurethatthedesignbasisarecorrectly
translated
intospecifications,
drawings,
procedures,
andinstructions.
Designcontrolmeasuresshallprovideforverifying
orcheckingtheadequacyofdesign.Contrarytotheabove,designcontrolmeasureswerenotadequatetoassurethatthedesignbasiswascorrectly
translated
intodesignmodification
documents:
b.OnMay7,1997,theinspectors
identified
thatcalculation
DC-D-1-SZ-F101,
'StressAnalysis&LoadGeneration
forSystem1-SI-F101
Per12-MM-590,'sed
thewrongmomentarmandhadamissingreactionforceandmoment.OnMay13,1997,theinspectors
identified
thatincorrect
andnon-conservative
designinputwasusedforthemotor-driven
auxiliary
pumpstarttimeintheSafetyReviewMemorandum
fortheSetpointValuesfortheTimeDelayPickupRelaysintheAFWFlowRetention
Circuits,
datedJanuary15,1997,fordesignchangepackage12-DCP-0817,
'ReviseAux.Feedwater
FlowRetention
Circuit.',
OnMay13,1997,theinspectors
identified
thatacalculation
fortheseismicdesignadequacyofminormodification
12-MM-337wasnotperformed.Thedesignpackagefor12-MM-337
indicated
thiscalculation
existedasDC-D-12-ES-116.
ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation
(Sur,v>lement
I)."ResonsetoNRCViolation
ZZ1.Admission
orDenialoftheViolation
Weadmittoviolation
ZIascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
ReasonsfortheViolation
,Theexamplescitedintheviolation
represent
issuesintheareaofdesigncontrol.Concurrent
withthereviewoftheOSTIreportandpreparation
ofthisresponse,
CookNuclearPlantunderwent
anNRCarchitect
engineering
(AE)teaminspection.
Thisinspection
identified
designcontrolissues,somethataresimilartothosecitedintheviolation.
Ztisrecognized
thatthethreeexamplescitedinthisnoticeofviolation
mustbe
0
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1260HPage3considered
alongwithanynewissuesidentified
bytheAEteaminspection,
relativetotheoverallissueofdesigncontrol.Thecircumstances
ofeachissuecitedinthisnoticeofviolation
arediscussed
below.Calculation
DC-D-1-SI-F101,
"StressAnalysisandLoadGeneration
forSystem1-SI-F101
per12-MM-590",
wasperformed
insupportofaddingapermanent
ventlinetothesafetyinjection
system(SIS)piping.Theinspector's
reviewofthedesignchangepackageidentified
errorsmadebytheauthorsandoverlooked
bythecalculation
reviewers.
Theerrorsarecharacterized
asinsufficient
attention
todetailonthepartoftheengineers
performing
andreviewing
thedesignchangepackage.Whencalculating
reactionforces,thelengthvalueofapipingspan,usedasamomentarminthecalculation,
wastranscribed
fromtheinputdatapresentation
totheactualalgebraic
presentation
incorrectly,
from37-5/8"to35-5/8".Thisdiscrepancy
causedthemaximumreactionforceresulttobeincorrect,
butinaconservative
direction.
Inanothersectionofthepackage,valuesforreactionforceandmomentwereomittedfromasummaryformat.Thesediscrepancies
consisted
ofnumberscorrectly
derivedinthebodyofthecalculation
ononepage,butomittedfromthesummaryonthefollowing
page.Thisproblemwasadministrative
innature;noincorrect
information
waspresented
orusedasaresult.Athirddiscrepancy
relatedtothisdesignchangepackagewasnotedinthebodyoftheinspection
report,butnotspecified
inthenoticeofviolation.
Theinspector
madeanobservation
thatincorrect
designinformation
wasstatedinthesafetyreviewdocumentation.
Ourinvestigation
concluded
therewasnodiscrepancy
inthesafetyreviewinputinformation.
Thevaluesofdesigntemperature
andpressureusedbythesafetyreviewerwerecorrectforthespecificlocationwherethenewventvalvewastobeinstalled.
Theengineerperforming
thedesigncalculation
conservatively
usedthehighestboundingdesigntemperature
andpressurefortheSISasawhole.Thisapproachisoftenadoptedwhentheinherentsafetymarginofadesignissuchthatthemorestringent
designrequirements
canbeaccommodated.
Thethoughtprocessinvolvedintakingthisapproachwasnotclearlydocumented
inthecalculation
package.Designchange12-DCP-0817
wasdeveloped
toaddatimedelayrelaytotheauxiliary
(AFW)flowretention
actuation
circuittopreventspuriousactuation
frommomentary
outletpressurespikes,especially
thosethatoccurwhentheAFWpumps
0
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1260H
Page4automatically
start.Asafetyreviewwasperformed
bythedesignengineering
organization
fortheadditionofthetimedelaypick-uprelaytotheAFWsystemcircuits.
Thenuclearsafetyandanalysissectionwasaskedtoperformanevaluation
ofthesetpointvalueforthetimedelayrelay.Thereviewperformed
bythisgroupwasintendedtodemonstrate
thatthemagnitude
ofthetimedelayintheflowretention
circuitswouldnotadversely
impactrelatedaccidentanalysisassumptions
orsafetymargins.Inordertocompletethisreview,theengineerneededtoknowhowquicklythemotordrivenAFWpumpswouldstart.An'incorrect
valueofthirtysecondswasused,basedonatelephone
conversation
withtheAFWsystemengineerattheplantsite.Thesystemengineercommunicated
thattheturbinedrivenAFW(TDAFW)pumpsstartandcomeuptospeedwithinthirtyseconds.Surveillance
dataontheTDAFWpumpswasavailable
onthesystemengineers
deskatthetime.Whatthesystemengineerintendedwasthatthirtysecondswouldboundthestarttimeonthemotordrivenpumps.Mostoften,inrelationtosafetyanalysisorT/Ssurveillance,
theinformation
ofconcernisatimewhichboundsthepumpstart,time.However,thesafetyreviewerunderstood
thatthethirtysecondswouldcharacterize
thestarttimeforthemotordrivenauxiliary
(MDAFW)pumps.Basedonsurveillance
measurements,
thecorrectstarttimeforthemotordrivenpumpsisthreeseconds.Investigation
intothereasonforthisincorrect
inputtothesafetyreviewconcluded
thatitwaspoorcommunications
betweentheinvolvedengineers,
andanincomplete
understanding
onthepartofthesystemengineerastotheintendeduseoftheinformation.
Oneengineerbelievedtheboundingstarttimewasneeded,whiletheotherwastryingtodetermine
theshorteststarttimeforthepumps.Minormodification
12-MM-337
wasperformed
toreplacetheemergency
dieselgenerator
(EDG)startingairsystemsafetyvalves.TheNRCinspector
indicated
thatthecalculation
fortheseismicadequacyofthenewvalvetypewasnotperformed.
Thedesignchangepackagereferenced
calculation
DC-D-12-ES-116.
Thisreferenced
calculation
wasnotintendedtofollowthetypicalformatinwhatwasthenthecalculation
procedure.
DC-D-12-ES-116
wasarecord-keeping
andretrieval
fileforanumberofindividual
reviewspreparedforthereplacement
ofnon-identical
valves.Thefiledidcontainthefinalapprovalletterfromthestructural
designsectiondocumenting
thatthevalvechangehadbeenreviewed.
However,wewouldhaveexpectedtofindinformation
inthisfilerelatedto
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1260H
Page5thedecisionmakingprocess,suchasisometric
data,weightdata,andsupportlocationinformation.
Forunknownreasons,thisfiledidnotcontaintheinformation
thatwouldhavebeenexpectedpertaining
tothereviewofthevalvereplacement
of12-MM-337.
Theinformation
couldnotbefound.Itwasreconstructed
andthenewreviewwasdocumented
appropriately.
Thefilenowcontainstheappropriate
information
andreviewdocumentation
(performed
inMay1997)thatconfirmed
theconclusion
oftheoriginaldesignapprovalletter.Whetherthefilewaslost,orthereviewneverdocumented,
thiscondition
ischaracterized
asinsufficient
attention
todetail.Itresultedintheinability
toretrievedesigndataordesignbasisrelatedinformation.
3.Corrective
ActionTakenandResultsAchievedb.cCalculation
DC-D-1-SI-F101,
forthesafetyinjection
systemstressanalysis,
wasrevisedandapprovedonJune2,1997,toaddresstheciteddiscrepancies.
OnMay29,1997,arevisedsafetyreview,incorporating
thecorrectMDAFWpumpstarttimewasapprovedbytheplantnuclearsafetyreviewcommittee
(PNSRC).Theconclusions
oftheoriginalsafetyreviewremainedunchanged.
Awalkdownandreviewofthevalvesinstalled
under12-MM-337,fortheEDGstartingairsystem,wasperformed
onMay13,1997,anddocumented
withtherelatedcondition
report.Thisreviewconfirmed
theoriginalconclusions
oftheseismicqualification
reviewperformed
in1992.Thereviewwasformallydocumented
onMay15,1997.Corrective
ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations
Weunderstand
theimportance
of"attention
todetail",andtohavingadesignbasisthatisclear,understandable,
andretrievable.
EachofthethreecitedexamplesintheNRCinspection
reportrefertoalackof"attention
todetail",oralackofclearcommunication
ofdesigninformation.
Thethreeexamplesofdesigncontrolproblemshighlighted
inthisviolation
willbeconsidered
againasapartofthelargersetofissuesidentified
bytheNRCAEteaminspection
ofCookNuclearPlant.Resolution
oftheoveralldesigncontrolissuewillrequireactionbeyondthatwhichiscommitted
'inthisresponse.
Thoseactionswillbedefinedinthecourseofaddressing
theAEteaminspection
issues.Theviolation
examplesa.andc.havebeencharacterized
asinsufficient
attention
todetail.Whentheerrorswereidentified
bytheinspector,
discussions
wereheldwiththeengineers
inthedesignengineering
organization
whoareinvolvedinthedevelopment
and
0
Attachment
tqAEP:NRC:1260H
Page6documentation
ofthecalculations.
Theyweremadeawareoftheinspection
findingsandtheimportance
ofattention
todetail.Thiswasaccomplished
whiletheOSTIwasstillinprogress.
Trainingwillbeprovidedforpersonnel
inthenuclearengineering
organization
whoperform,review,andapproveengineering
anddesigncalculations.
Thesessionwillemphasize
theimportance
of"attention
todetail"andgoodcalculation
controlprocesses.
Thistrainingwillbecompleted
byDecember31,1997.In1990,asaresultofdesignverification
concernsraisedduringthesafetysystemfunctional
inspection
ofouressential
servicewatersystem,qualityreviewteams(QRTs)wereestablished
toperiodically
reviewdesignoutputdocumentation
fortechnical
adequacyandprocedural
compliance.
Theseteamsweredisbanded
in1996.Thediscrepancies
foundundertheQRTprogramhadnoimpactontheconclusions
ofthecalculations.
Selectedcalculations
performed
duringthepastyear,August1996,toAugust1997,willbereviewed.
Thereviewwilllookforcalculation
errors,inconsistencies,
properdocumentation
ofassumptions,
andprocedure
adherence.
Anyfindingswillbeaddressed
anddocumented
underthecorrective
actionprogram.Thisassessment
willbecompleted
byDecember1,1997.Theproblemcitedinexampleb.oftheviolation,
incorrect
datainputtoasafetyreview,hasbeenidentified
tobeacommunication
problem.OnAugust26,1997,thenuclearsafetyandanalysissectionconducted
atabletopsessionthatdiscussed
theneedforprecision
intheuseoftechnical
information
insafetyreviews.Itstressedthattheuseofwritteninputisthepreferred
method,andthatifverbalcommunication
isneeded,itmustbefollowedupwithawrittendocument.
Thesestandards
forinformation
exchangeandusewereformallyestablished
byprocedural
direction
issuedonSeptember
2,1997.Thisdocumentprovidesrequirements
fornuclearengxneering
organization
personnel
whenproviding
technical
direction.
Theobjective
ofthestandardistoprovideassurances
thattheinformation
isaccurate,
basedonsoundengineering
principles,
properlyconveyed,
andproperlydocumented.
5.DateWhenFullComlianceWasAchievedRelativetotheindividual
examplescitedintheviolation,
fullcompliance
wasachieved:
OnJune2,1997,whencalculation
DC-D-1-SI-F101
wasreviewedandapprovedforthesafetyinjection
systemstressanalysis.
OnMay29,1997,whentherevisedsafetyreviewfortheAFWflowretention
timedelayrelaysetpointwasapprovedbythePNSRC.
I1
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1260H
Page7OnMay15,1997,whenwalkdownandreviewoftheseismicqualification
oftheEDGstartingairsystemsafetyvalveswasdocumented
andverified.