ML17334B364
| ML17334B364 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 04/11/1990 |
| From: | ALEXICH M P INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG |
| To: | DAVIS A B NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| AEP:NRC:1125A, NUDOCS 9004200632 | |
| Download: ML17334B364 (38) | |
See also: IR 05000315/1989031
Text
\rIndiana'Achrga~PowerCompany~~080c'.663'Nl7lAMA
NTCHIGANPOWERAEP:NRC:1125A
DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2DocketNos.50-315and50-316LicenseNos.DPR-58andDPR-74NRCINSPECTION
NOS.50-315/89031
AND50-316/89031:
RESPONSETOVIOLATION
U.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,
D.C.20555Attn:A.B.Davi.sAprilll,1990DearMr.Davis:ThisletterisinresponsetoMr.H.J.Miller'sletterdatedMarch1,1990,whichforwarded
thereportonthespecialmaintenance
teaminspection
conducted
byMr.Z.Falevitsandothersofyourstaff.Thisinspection
wasconducted
fromDecember4through8,andDecember18through22,1989,onactivities
attheCookNuclearPlantassociated
withthesupportandimplementation
ofmaintenance
toensurethatplantstructures,
systemsandcomponents
reliablyperformondemand.TheNoticeofViolation
attachedtoMr.Miller'sletteridentified
sixweaknesses
andfourSeverityLevelIVviolations
relatingtoourmaintenance
program.Theweaknesses
areaddressed
inAttachment
1tothisletter.Theviolations
areaddressed
inAttachment
2tothisletter.A14-dayextension
forourresponsewasgrantedonMarch15,1990'hisdocumenthasbeenpreparedfollowing
Corporate
procedures
thatincorporate
areasonable
setofcontrolstoensureitsaccuracyandcompleteness
priortosignature
bytheundersigned.
Sincerely,
M.P.AlichVicePresident
ldpAttachments
~)g4QOCk&2
900411pggADQcKo>oog+~~~Ipp1/00
Mr.A.B.DavisAEP:NRC:1125A
cc:D.H.Williams,
Jr.A.A.Blind-BridgmanR.C.CallenG.CharnoffNRCResidentInspector
-BridgmanNFEMSectionChief
ATTACHMENT
1TOAEP:NRC:1125A
RESPONSETONRC-IDENTIFIED
WEAKNESSES
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page1NRC-Identified
Weakness(1)"Lackoforineffective
actiontocorrectnumerousselfidentified
maintenance
problemsidentified
inFebruary1988,manyofwhichwereidentified
bytheteamduringthisinspection."
ResponsetoWeakness(1)Corrective
ActionsTakenAsaresultofthe1988Maintenance
Self-Assessment
Report,AEPSCcontracted
IMPELLtoassistinidentifying
andformulating
appropriate
corrective
actionstoaddresstheself-identified
deficiencies.
Theresultsofthi,seffortareinadocumententitled,
D.C.CookPlantPMProramUradeStrateDocument,
datedNovember1988.Thisstudycontained
astrategyforAEPtoaccomplish
aplannedupgradeofthePreventive
Maintenance
(PM)ProgramattheCookNuclearPlant.Itidentified
reasonable
goalsandachievable
objectives
forthePMUpgradeProgrambasedonAEPSC/Cook
NuclearPlantphilosophy,
resources
andcapabilities.
Thespecificimplementation
tasksandstrategic
considerations
werepresented
forobtaining
thedesiredupgraderesults.Thiseffort'ot
onlyaddressed
improvements
inthePMProgramitself,butalsoexaminedrelatedorganization
andautomation
requirements
tosupporttheimprovedPMProgram.Basedontheresultsofthisstudy,numerouscorrective
actionswereinitiated
inJanuary1989.Thefirstwastheinitiation
ofareliability-centered
maintenance
(RCM)program.Thismajortaskhastwophases:analysisandimplementation.
AEPSChasbeenworkingcloselywithGeneralPhysicsontheanalysisportionthatwillformthefoundation
oftheRCMprogram.Thisworkincludes:
definingsystemboundaries
andfunctions
identifying
dominantfailuremodesdetermining
criti.cal
failuremodesandcriti.cal
components
identifying
applicable
andeffective
preventive
maintenance
taskstopreventfailurescompleting
analysisofselectedplantsystems
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page2Implementation
oftheRCMProgrambeganinAugust1989withthedevelopment
ofplantprocedures,
identification
ofsystemboundaries,
andestablishment
ofanRCMdatabase.
Thefirstsyst:emanalysiswascompleted
inFebruary1990onthefeedwater
system.Analysisof22additional
plantsystems/functional
areaswilltakeplaceoverthenextthreeyears.Anotheroutgrowth
oftheMaintenance
Self-Assessment
ReportandtheAEPSC/IMPELL
studywasthedevelopment
oftheSystemEngineerProgram.ThegoaloftheSystemEngineerProgramistoprovidetrainingtoenableindividuals
toprovidetheengineering
expertise
requiredforsafe,efficient
andreliableoperation
ofsystemsforwhichtheyareresponsible.
TheSystemEngineerdischarges
thisresponsibility
byperforming
assignedtasks,andmaintaining
cognizance
ofallworkassociated
withtheassignedsystem(s).
Inaddition,
AEPSCcontracted
TENERASystemsandSoftwaretoprovideacomputerized
maintenance
management
information
system.Thissystem,referredtoastheNuclearPlantMaintenance
Module(NPM)System,discussed
inmoredetailinourresponsetoweakness(3),willallowplantstafftoinitiate,
issue,prioritize
andtrackallmaintenance
workattheplant.Thissamesoftwareiscurrently
beingusedatPacificGasandElectric's
DiabloCanyon,andPublicServiceElectricandGas'sSalemandHopeCreekGenerating
Stations.
Inaddition,
itwasrecentlychosenbyElectricite
deFranceforuseinallfiftyofitsnuclearplants.Thesethreeprograms,
RCM,SystemEngineerandNPM,arejustpartoftheactionsthatarebeingtakentorespondtotheSelf-Assessment.
TheNovember1989reorganization
ofCookNuclearPlant'smanagement
isanotherimportant
elementintheupgradeofourmaintenance
program.Theintentoftheneworganization
istoplaceemphasisonmaintenance,
outages,andhuman'resources,
Otheractions,whichhaveorarebeingtakenareasfollows:oAnAEPandCookNuclearPlantpolicyonmaintenance
wasdeveloped
andapprovedinDecember1989byAEPseniormanagement.
Anadditional
plant-specific
maintenance
policyestablished
inaccordance
withINPOguidelines
isbeingdeveloped
toclarifymaintenance
philosophies
andresponsibilities
forallmaintenance
groups
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page3oCorporate
reviewshavebeenconducted,
whichhaveresultedinimprovements
beingmadetoshopareasusedbythemaintenance
groupsoStaffingstudiesarebeingperformed,
whichhavealreadyresultedinanincreaseinthenumberofengineers
andradiation
protection
technicians
onsite.oOtherprogramsofnotethataddressmaintenance
self-assessment
findingsincludethemaintenance
procedure
rewrite(SeeWeakness(6)),thelong-range
planandtheoutageguideline
development
plan.(2)BenefitsToBeDerivedFromCorrective
ActionsRCM,theSystemEngineerProgramandNPMwereinitiated
toaddressmanyoftheMaintenance
Self-Assessment's
identified
deficiencies.
Whenallofoureffortshavebeencompletely
implemented,
eachofthemajorfindingsoftheselfassessment
willhavebeenaddressed.
,Asaresultofthesecorrective
actions.weanticipate
havingastateoftheartmaintenance
programwhichwillresultinimprovedplantsafety,reliability
andaccountability.
(3)DateWhenBenefitsVillBeRealizedAspreviously
stated,westartedtheRCMPrograminAugust1989.However,weanticipate
thattheprogramwillnotbecompletely
implemented
forallthecriticalplantsystemsuntiltheendof1992.Aseachsystemisanalyzed,
benefitswillberealizedsothatwhenthisprogramiscompleted
wewillhaveafullyintegrated
preventive
maintenance
program.TheSystemEngineerProgram,likeRCM,isstillintheearlystagesofimplementation.
Adocumentwhichclearlydelineates
theresponsibilities
oftheengineers
iscurrently
inthefinalstagesofreviewandapproval.
AEPSC'sacquisition
ofTENERA'sNPMsystemwasapprovedinDecember1989.However,itwillnotbeinplaceandoperational
untilAugust1990,whendatawillbeentered.Vewillbeconducting
QAauditsorsurveillances
toaccessthestatusandeffectiveness
ofsomeofourcorrective
actionsastheydevelop.Inaddition,
theMaintenance
Improvement
Planwillreviewandresolve,asappropriate,
theMaintenance
Self-Assessment
items'heImprovement
Planincludesmilestones
andabuilt-inmechanism
thatrequiresregularre-evaluation.
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page4Whilewearealreadyrealizing
benefitsfromourefforts,wedonotanticipate
thefullbenefitforseveralyears.Inordertoeffectively
implement
programsasencompassing
andcomprehensive
asthese,significant
analysis,
planningandcoordination
areneeded.Asaresult,theirbenefitswillnotbefullyrealizeduntilmid1993.
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page5NRC-Identified
Weakness(2)"Anineffective
preventive
maintenance
programthatresulted,
forexample,infailuresof4KVcircuitbreakers"
ResponsetoWeaknessWeconcurthatthePreventive
Maintenance
Programcanbeimprovedand,aspreviously
discussed,
wearetakingstepstodoso.However,CookNuclearPlant'savailability
in1989isevidencethatthepresentpreventive
maintenance
programiseffective.
During1989,CookNuclearPlantgenerated
12millionnetMWHRS,themostsince1984.The69.3%availability
forUnit1in1989contributed
toanaverageavailability
of79.4%since1985'lthoughUnit2overallavailability
hasnotbeenashighduetosteamgenerator
tubedegradatidn,
its74.4%availability
in1989wasthehighestsince1983.OnDecember8,the111-dayrecordforthelongestrunwithbothunitsoperating
wasbroken.Thisrecordwasextendedto140dayswhenUnit2wasbroughtoff-lineforasurveillance
outageonJanuary6,1990.Unit1ended1989withitslongestrunof175daysandcontinued
operating
untilMarch17,1990(aCookNuclearPlantrecordrunof251days)whentheunitwasbroughtofflineforaplannedsurveillance
outage.Asdiscussed
inourresponsetoNRCviolation
(2)oftheinspection
report,the4KVcircuitbreakersfailurewasdetectedduringpreventive
maintenance
testing.Asaresult,appropriate
corrective
actionwas.subsequently
takenwhichresultedinimprovements
toour4KVbreakers.
Also,wenotifiedtheindustryoftheproblemviaaPart21report.
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page6NRC-Identified
Veakness(3)"Anextensive
backlogofnon-outage
corrective
maintenance
joborderspartlycausedbylackofintegrated
planningandscheduling
methodology."
ResponsetoWeakness"Maintaining
theCookNuclearPlantinvolvesthecompletion
ofapproximately
20,000JobOrdersannually.
Therelativepriorities
ofjobschangefrequently
duetoanumberoffactors,theprimaryreasonbeingplantconditions.
Managingtheinformation
contained
withinthebacklogofyet-to-be
completed
JobOrderscanbecriticaltoplantavailability
andreliability.
Theseeffortsarepresently
hamperedbythelogistics
ofpaperfilingsystemsandcomputertrackingsystemsthatlackneededflexibility
inhardwareandsoftware.
(1)Corrective
ActionsTakenTheCookNuclearPlantInformation
Management
System(IMS)plan,approvedfordevelopment
inFebruaryof1989identified
ninecomputersystemmodulesthat,whencompleted,
willformasingle,integrated
information
management
system.Thisautomated
information
systemwillbeusedbybothplantsiteandcorporate
personnel
tosupportplantoperation
andmaintenance.
Itwillprovideforthescheduling
andinitiation
ofmaintenance
tasksandsupporttheassignment
ofresponsibilities
andaccountabilities
forthesetasks.Specifically,
formaintenance,
theNuclearPlantMaintenance
Module(NPM)oftheCookNuclearPlant'sIMSplanwillallowplantstafftoinitiate,
issue,prioritize,
andtrackallmaintenance
workattheplant.TheNPMmoduleoftheIMSplanwillalsomaintainahistoryofmaintenance
work.Theprimaryobjectives
oftheNPMmodulearetoimproveplantavailability
andtooptimizetheuseofplantresources
withtheoverallgoalofreducingplantmaintenance.
TheNPMsystemisdesignedtoallowanyNPMusertoinitiateastructured
requestthattheuserbelievesshouldbereviewedand,ifwarranted,
actedupon.Thisactionrequestfeatureprovidesaprocessforscreening
thoseactionsrequiring
work,andwillserveasafocalpointforinitiating
andtrackingJobOrders.Plantpersonnel
willenterdataintotheNPMsystemdefiningthecomponent
thatneedsworkandbrieflydescribing
thatwork.Thesystemisdesignedtoeliminate
allpaperinthisprocessexcepttheactualJobOrderitself.
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page7ThereviewsthattakeplaceintheJobOrdersystemareperformed
on-line.Thison-linecapability
allowsforpendingJobOrderstobesortedinvariouswaysandthereviewing
individuals
have'mmediate
accesstothisinformation.
Oncereviewsareperformed
theactualJobOrderscanbeprintedfortheworktobeperformed.
OnceaJobOrderhasbeeninitiated,
startingfromtheveryfirstentryintothesystemandnotjustfromthetimeitgetsprinted,theJobOrderprocessing
systemcantrackthestatusoftheJobOrder.Thisisaccomplished
throughtheuseofstatuscodefields.Someofthecodesrepresent
situations
suchaswaitingformaterials,
orwaitingforapprovalofthereviews,orothertypesofconditions.
Thisfeatureisveryhelpfulforplanningandscheduling
themanyJobOrdersinthesystem.TheNPMsystemwillpermittheplantstafftoassignspecificJobOrders,attheactivitylevel,toascheduled
date,crewandsupervisor.
Uponcompletion'f
thecrewassignments
andconfirmation
ofpermitrequirements,
thesystemproducesasupervisory
assignment
reportandprintstheJobOrder.Thecompleted
workpackageincludestheJobOrder,equipment
descriptions,
partslist,andtestingformsalongwithotherneededdocuments.
OncetheworkrelatedtoaJobOrderhasbeencompleted
andtested,theJobOrderisreviewedandclosedout,on-line.TheNPMsystemmaintains
acompletehistoryofallcompleted
andclosed-out
JobOrders.ThisfeatureallowsforrapidaccesstoallhistoryonJobOrders.TheNPMsystempreventsaJobOrderfrombeingclosed-out
untilallreviewsandtestshavebeencompleted.
Znaddition,
theNPMsystemwillbearepository
forpreviousrepetitive
tasks.Thisfunctioneliminates
theneedforindividuals
torecreateJobOrdersthatarerepetitive
innature,TheNPMsystemwillautomatically
generatetheJobOrders,,according
totheappropriate
duedates,orasdirectedbyaplanner.TheNPMsystemwillalsoprovideforcontinuous
monitoring
ofsurveillance
testsandpreventive
maintenance
worktomeetregulatory
orplantrequirements.
Oncetherepetitive
orpreventive
maintenance
JobOrdersarecreated,theyareavailable
forreviewsandexecutions
inthesamemannerasanyoftheotherJobOrders.ThissystemwillalsobeusedtodevelopJobOrdersforplannedoutagessuchasrefueling
outages.
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page8(2)BenefitsToBeDerivedFromCorrective
ActionsThedataenteredintotheNPMsystem,andtheprocessing
thatthesystemdoeswiththisdata,willeliminate
themultiplemanualdataentrystepsofourpresentprocess.Eliminating
redundant
manualsystemsisofsignificance
itself.However,moreimportantly
aretheanticipated
improvements
inplantavailability
andlaborproductivity.
Alongwithimprovedabilitytoplanandscheduleworkcomesanincreased
amountoftimeavailable
formorecarefulconsideration
ofotheraspectsoftheworktobeperformed,
forexample,personnel
safety.Improvements
canbeexpectedandwillcertainly
bestrivedfor.TheNPMsystemwillalsoidentifyandcoordinate
maintenance
onrelatedequipment
andsystems,thusdecreasing
downtimeoncomponents
removedfromservice.Quickaccesstotheinformation
intheNPMdatabasesmakesthesupervisors
inboththeoperations
andmaintenance
areasmoreawareofJobOrderprogress.
Itisanticipated
thattheNPMsystemw'illhelpusrealizeourgoalofanon-outage
corrective
maintenance
joborderbacklognotinexcessof90days.(3)DateWhenBenefitsWillBeAchievedWecurrently
anticipate
havingthecomputerized
automated
maintenance
systeminplaceandoperational
byAugust1990.Atthattime,datavalidation
andloading,procedure
changesandtrainingofpersonnel
willbegin.
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page9NRC-Identified
Weakness(4)"Poormaterialcondition
especially
asevidenced
bythehighnumberofoil,steamandwaterleaks."ResponsetoWeakness(1)Corrective
ActionsTakenWhileitisAEPSC'spolicytokeepallofitsfacilities,
ingoodmaterialcondition,
werecognize
theneedforimprovement
inthisarea.Asaresult,themanagement
oftheCookNuclearPlanthaslaunchedaconcerted
efforttoimproveplantmaterialcondition.
Thisisevidenced
bytheallocation
offundstosupportthefollowing
physicalimprovements
thatarecurrently
takingplace:oAuxiliary
buildingpaintingoContaminated
equipment
storageareaexpansion
IoDecontamination
arearedesignoImprovedlightingoInstallation
of18personnel
wholebodycontamination
monitorsItisCookNuclearPlantpolicythatnoleakisconsidered
acceptable.
Consequently,
duringthe1988/1989
refueling
outageswerefurbished
about1,780valvesandpackedthemwithChesterton
packing.Abreakdown
ofthiseffortisasfollows:Unit1Unit2TotalAuxiliary
BuildingContainment
TurbineHallMiscellaneous
254130225211502807009255071250504Nevertheless,
asubstantial
numberofleaksstillexistintheauxiliary
building,
rangingfromsmalltracesofdriedboricacidtodripping.
Theseleakshavebeenenteredintoacomputerdatabase,havebeenchalkeddown,andjobordershavebeenwritten.Theleaksarecurrently
beingprioritized
andeffortswillbemadetorepairthemduringthenextrefueling
outage,ifnotbefore.
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page10Theplantmanagerhasreaffirmed
hiscommitment
togoodplantmaterialcondition
andpersonalaccountability
bysendingamemorandum
toeachemployee.
Thiscommitment
hasbeensupported
bycontinued
radiation
workerawareness
training,
andoperatortrainingonventinganddraining.
Inaddition,
decontamination
effortscontinue,
whichhavealreadyreducedthecontaminated
areafromapproximately
45,000feetin1986tothecurrent25,000feet(excluding
laydownareas).Ourgoalistoreducethesecontaminated
areasto20,000squarefeetin1990and10,000squarefeetpriortotheoutagein1991.(2)BenefitsToBeDerivedfromCorrective
ActionsTherearenumerousbenefitsgainedfromhavingtheplantingoodphysicalcondition,
themostimportant
ofthesebeingincreased
plantsafetyandreliability.
Arelatedbenefitisimprovedradiation
protection
andworkersafety.However,anotherimportant,
butlessquantifiable
benefitistheimprovement
toworkermorale.(3)DateWhenBenefitsWillBeRealizedWhilemaintaining
theplantingoodphysicalcondition
isanongoingprocess,weanticipate
majorimprovements
withinthenextyear.Therefueling
outagewillfacilitate
therefurbishment
ofvalises,aswellasotherrepairsandmodifications.
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page11NRC-Identified
Weakness(5)"Inadequate
trending,
rootcauseanalysisandactiontocorrect,forexample,numerousleakingsafetyreliefvalves."ResponsetoWeakness(1)Corrective
ActionsTakenThisweaknessisbeingaddressed
bythreeprograms:
theNPMsystemwhichisdiscussed
indetailinourresponsetoweaknesses
(1)and(3),theSystemEngineerProgram,discussed
inourresponsetoweakness(1),andtheRCMProgramdiscussed
inourresponsetoweakness(1).(2)BenefitsToBeDerivedfromCorrective
ActionsTheNPMsystemwillprovideforacompletecomponent
history.Thecomponent
historywillprovideachronological
listingofwork,modifications
orinspections
thathavebeenperformed
onaparticular
component.
Thisprocesscreatesanindexedhistorical
recordforcomponents
orfunctional
equipment
groupsandcatalogscompletion
dates,failurecodes,as-foundandas-leftconditions,
partsreplaced,
testresults,etc.TheSystemEngineers
areexpectedtoidentifyandtrendappropriate
systemparameters,
withthegoalofobtaining
pertinent
dataforsystemperformance
andreliability
monitoring.
Theparameters
trendedshallbeperiodically
reviewedandapprovedtoallowtimelypreventive
orcorrective
actionstobeimplemented.
Basedonthetrendeddata,theSystemEngineerisexpectedtorecognize
significant
system/component
degradation
orabnormaloperating
conditions
frombothahistorical
basis,aswellascurrentstatus.TheSystemEngineermayrequirethesupportoftechnical
expertstoanalyzespecificareasofconcernandwillworkcloselywithourCorporate
NuclearEngineering
Divisionengineers
inthisregard.TheSystemEngineers
areexpectedtoperformrootcauseanalysesonthesystemsassigned.
Consequently,
theSystemEngineers
willbetrainedinrootcauseanalysis.
Inaddition,
theSystemEngineerisexpectedto:Evaluatesystem/component
failureimpactonplantsafetyandunitpoweroperations
Prepareandperformspecialsystem/component
performance
tests.
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page12TheRCMProgramwt.llcontribute
toresolving
thisissuebyidentifying
dominantfailuremodesandcriticalcomponents.
(3)DateWhenBenefitsWillBeRealizedAspreviously
stated,weexpecttheNPMsystemtobeinplaceandoperational
inAugust1990.Atthattime,personnel
traininganddataloadingwillbegin.Severalsystemengineers
havebeenassignedatCookNuclearPlantandbenefitshavealreadybeenrealizedfromthisprogram.Aneffortiscurrently
beingmadetorecruitSystemEngineers.
However,weanticipate
itwilltakeatleastayearbeforetheprogramisfullystaffed.
Attachment
1toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page13NRC-Identified
Weakness(6)"Inseveralinstances
procedures
werenotfollowed,
werepoorordidnotexistespecially
inthebalanceofplantarea."ResponsetoWeakness(1)Corrective
ActionsTakenKeytothesafeandefficient
operation
ofanynuclearpowerplantisstrictadherence
toprocedures.
Assuch,employees
areshownduringtheNuclearGeneralEmployeeTraining(NGET)classes,avideotape
ofDavidWilliams,
Jr.,SeniorExecutive
V.P.,Engineering
andConstruction,
mandating
theadherence
toprocedures.
ItisAEPSC'slong-standing
policythatfailuretofollowprocedures
willresultindisciplinary
action.Inorderforthispolicytohaveanybenefit,well-written
andaccurateprocedures
mustbeinplace.Consequently,
AEPSCispurchasing
PRONETandtheservicesofconsultant
procedure
writerstoupgradeorwrite690maintenance
procedures
(268maintenance,
422I&C).Criticalbalanceofplantcomponents
willbeaddressed
astheyariseintheRCMprogram.TheMaintenance
Improvement
Planprovidesguidancethatclearlydefineswhatprocedure
compliance
is.Inaddition,
aprocedure
writer'/user's
guidewilladdressthecircumstances
forchangingaprocedure
toensureprocedural
compliance.
(2)BenefitsToBeDerivedfromCorrective
ActionsPRONETisastateoftheartcomputersystemthatintegrates
writer'sguidelines,
wordprocessing,
graphicsanddatabasefunctions
intoacentralized
procedure
management
system.Development,
commitment,
scheduling
andreporting
functions
willbecontrolled
bythismenu-driven
network.Thisintegrated
approachwillresultinaprogramthatreducesdevelopment
timeandprovidesefficient
long-term
procedure
maintenance
andcommitment/reference
tracking.
(3)DateWhenBenefitsWillBeRealizedAlthoughaconsultant
willtrainplantstaffontheuseofPRONET,thebulkoftheprocedure
upgradeworkwillbeperformed
byconsultant
personnel.
Byusingcontractworkerswewillnotimpacttheplantstaff.Iftheexistingstaffwereused,itisanticipated
thattheeffortwouldtakefourtofiveyears.Thisisconsidered
tobeanunacceptable
timeframeforthiswork.Byusingcontractworkers,wewillobtainprofessionally
preparedprocedures
inareasonable
timeframe.Theeffortisscheduled
tobecompleted
byDecember1991.
ATTACHMENT
2TOAEP:NRC:1125A
RESPONSETONRC-IDENTIFIED
VIOLATIONS
Attachment
2toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page1NRCViolation
1"10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
V,asimplemented
bySection1.7.5oftheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantOperational
QualityAssurance
Programrequiresthatactivities
relatedtoqualitybeprescribed
bydocumented
instructions,
procedures,
anddrawings,
thatthoseactivities
beaccomplished
inaccordance
withthoseinstructions,
procedures
anddrawings,
andthatinstructions,
procedures
ordrawingsincludeappropriate
quantitative
orqualitative
acceptance
criteriafordetermining
thatimportant
activt,ties
havebeensatisfactorily
accomplished.
a~Procedure
PMI-2290,
"JobOrders,"Revision8,requiredinSections4.4.8and4.4.8.3thatuponcompletion
ofthephysicalwork,thejobordertagsberemovedanddiscarded.
Contrarytotheabo~e,tags15119,029643,B012209,B016950,B016832,andB017240werenotremovedalthoughthejoborderswerecancelled
orcompleted.
Asaresult,statusofequipment
condi.tion
remainedindeterminate
(315/89031-01A;
316/89031-01A)
~b.RequestForChange12-2180requiredinstallation
of200%overloadmotorprotection
andthatthethermaloverloadbesetatthelowtripcurrentrating.Contrarytotheabove,onDecember19,1989,theinspectors
observedthatthethermaloverloadheaterassociated
withresidualheatremovalloopisolation
motor-operated
valveICM-111wassetatthehightripcurrentrating.Numerousadditional
thermaloverloads
inthedieselgenerator
motorcontrolcenterwerealsoobservedtobethewrongsizeorsetatthewrongcurrentrating,whichwillresultinpremature
removalofoperating
voltagefromthemotors(315/89031-01B;
316/89031-01B)
~c~Procedure
PMI-2030,
"Document
Control,"
Revision10,failedtoincluderequirements
fortheMasterDrawingIndexestobereviewedbyintendedusersforthelatestasbuiltdrawingslocatedintheplantmasterfile.Consequently,
drawingsissuedbythedocumentcontrolcenterforfieldverifications
werenotthelatestasbuiltdrawingsorrevisions
(315/89031-01C;
316/89031/01C).
The"PumpOperator's
Data"manualandthevendormanualfor'heAuxiliary
(AFV)pumprequiredthatthepumppackingbeadjustedwhilethepumpisoperating.
Contrarytotheabove,thisrequirement
wasnotincorporated
intotheAFVmaintenance
procdures
[sic).Althoughnoproblemswerenoted,inadequate
attention
tothisrequirement
couldresultinrotorseizure,scoredshaftsleeves,orburnedpacking(315/89031-01D;
316/89031-01D).
Attachment
2toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page2Procedure
12THP6030IMP.014"Protective
RelayCalibration",
Revision8,Step8.1.2-2specified
thatblackelectrical
tapebeusedwhencleaningthediskanddragmagnetmechanism
onTimeOvercurrent
(IAC)relays.Contrarytotheabove,onDecember5,1989,atechnician
wasobservedusinganunusedcalibration
stickertocleanthe2ABEDGTimeOvercurrent
testrelay.Asaresult,cleanliness
ofthecontactswasquestionable
(315/89031-01E;
316/89031-01E).
f.Procedure
PMI-2010"PlantManagerandDepartment
HeadInstructions,
Procedures
andIndex,"Revision17,PolicyStatement
3.1,Section3requiredthat"doubleasterisked"
procedures
forplantactivities
be"in-hand"
whenimplementing
theprocedure.
Contrarytotheabove,onDecember6,1989,theinspector
observedanoperatorrackin"2A"TrainReactorTripBypassBreakerwithouthaving"inhand"doubleasterisked
procedure
~12-OHP4021.082.018
"RackingInandOutReactorTrip,ReactorTripBypassandMGSetOutputBreakers,"
Revision2.Eventhoughnoadverseaffectswerenoted,inthepastundersimilarcircumstances,
areactortripoccurred(315/89031-01F;
316/89031-01F).
Procedure
PMI-2010,
"PlantManagerandDepartment
HeadInstructions,
Procedures
andIndex,"Revision17,requiresinSection3.14.1thatalleffective
instructions
andprocedures
bereviewednolessfrequentthanonceeverytwoyears.Contrarytotheabove,maintenance
procedure
MHI2070,MHI7090,PMI4050,12THP6030IMP~071,and12THPIMP.062werenotreviewedinthelasttwoyears.Asaresult,theprocedures
werenotupdatedtoreflectfeedbackandchangestopreventive
maintenance
activities
(315/89031-01G;
316/89031-1G)."
ResponsetoViolation
laPlantprocedure
PMI-2290requiresthattagsplacedatornearequipment
needingrepairberemovedwhentheitemisrepairedoriftheJobOrderiscancelled.
Asnotedinthetext,sixJobOrdertagswerefoundintheplantforworkthathadbeencancelled
orcompleted
whichconstitutes
failuretofollowprocedure.
Theconclusion
madeinInspection
Report89031wasthatequipment
statuswas"indeterminate."
WhilethepresenceofJobOrdertagswascontrarytotherequirements
ofPMI-2290,
thestatusofequipment/components
involvedwouldnotbeaffected.
Theinformation
placedonatagidentifies
topersonnel
1)thataJobOrderhasbeenwrittenforrepairwithnumbernoted,2)thenatureofrepairs/adjustments
requiredasdetermined
bythepersoninitiating
theJobOrderand3)helpslocatethespecificcomponent.
Byitself,aJobOrdertaghasnoimpactonsystemorequipment
operability,
does
Attachment
2toAEP:NRC.:1125A
Page3notindicatethatequipment
hasbeentaggedout,anddoesnotdirectanyotheractivityinvolving
theequipment.
Othersystemssuchastheclearance
permitsystemlogsandthedeficiency
logsindicatetheequipment
status.(1)Corrective
ActionTakenandResultsAchievedJobOrdertagsidentified
duringtheinspection
weresubsequently
removedtoachievecompliance
withapplicable
sectionsofPMI-2290.
(2)Corrective
ActionTakenToAvoidFurtherViolation
ThePlantManagerwilli.ssueamemoonprocedural
compliance
toensurethatallpersonnel
arefullyawareofthemeaningofcompliance,
consequences
offailureandwhatactionstotake~whenaprocedure
cannotbefollowedaswritten.TheMaintenance
Improvement
Planincludesissuanceofadepartment
policyonprocedure
compliance.
Includedwillbeguidanceonthemonitoring
oftheeffectiveness
ofprocedure
compliance.
Alsoaprocedure
writer'/user's
guidewilladdressthecircumstances
forchangingaprocedure
toensureprocedural
compliance.
(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedThefinaldraftofthepolicywillbeissuedonJuly15,1990.Guidanceontheeffectiveness
monitoring
willbeissuedonAugust15,1990.ThePlantManager's
memowillbeissuedonMay1,1990.ResponsetoViolation
lbTheNoticeofViolation
identified
thatthermaloverloads
intheplanthadbeeninstalled
atanincorrect
tripcurrentrating.Asaresultoftheinspection,
plantpersonnel
investigated
theproblemandaddressed
itinProblemReport90-81.(1)Corrective
ActionTakenandResultsAchievedTheimproperpositioning
and/ormis-sizing
oftheoverloadheatersresultedfromerrorsmadeduringinitialinstallations.
Twentyoverloads
wereinspected
andevaluated
byplantandAEPSCengineers.
Elevenwerefoundtob'ecorrect.Onewasfoundonabreakerforaresistive
heaterwhereoverloadprotection
wasnotconsidered
criticalasmoldedcasecircuitbreakersprotection
wasprovided.
Onfourbreakers(including
ICM-111)theas-foundheatersizeagreedwiththecalculated,
butarrowpositiondidnotagree.Fullloadampswasatthedividingpointforselecting
upordownposi.tion.
Slightchangesinmotorprotection
resultedbutdidnotaffecttheoperability
ofload.FourfeedersonBOPwerefoundtobemis-sized.
Ofthosefour
Attachment
2toAEP:NRC:1125A
-Page4onewasmis-sized
toadegreethatreplacement
wasneededtoensureadequateprotection.
Ofthethreeotheroverloadheaters,thoughimproperly
set,wouldhaveprovidedthermaloverloadprotection
forequipment.
JobOrderstocorrectthesesettingsbyOctober30,1990,havebeenwritten.(2)Corrective
ActionTakenToAvoidFurtherViolation
Inthecourseoftheplant'sinvestigation
itwasdetermined
thatthemis-sizing
and/ormispositioning
ofthethermaloverloads
hadoccurredduringinitialinstallation
in1977and1978.Lackingvendorinformation,
calculations
weremostlikelydeveloped
byplantpersonnel
forpositions/sizes
whichinsomeofthecases,provedincorrect.
Thedesignchangeprocesshasevolvedsincethattimetoalevelthatreasonably
ensuresthatrepetition
ofasimilarcondition
willnotoccur.Specifically,
generalprocedures
nowrequirethatdesigncalculations
beverifiedanddocumented
byqualified
personnel.
(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedBasedontheengineering
evaluation
completed
January15,'990,thedeficiencies
inthethermaloverloadheatersettingswouldnothaveaffectedtheoperability
oftheICM-111breaker.Otherdeficiencies
didnotdegradethethermaloverloadprotection
oftheequipment
breakers.
Currentprocedures/practices
shouldpreventrecurrence
ofthisproblem.ResponsetoViolation
lcInthecourseoftheinspection
itwasfoundthataplantinstruction
utilizedfordocumentcontrol(drawings)
contained
noprovision
mandating
thattheuseroftheindexverifythatitwasthemostrecentupdate.Weconcurwiththeinspector's
conclusion
thataninstruction
tousersoftheMasterDrawingIndextoensurethatitreferences
up-to-date
as-builtdrawingsshouldbeincludedinprocedures.
(1)Corrective
ActionTakenandResultsAchievedAsaresultoftheinspection,
PMI-2030,
"Document
Control,"
wasrevisedtoinstructaMasterDataIndexusertoensurethatitreflectsthelatestas-builtdrawingslocatedintheplant'smasterfile.(2)Corrective
ActionTakenToAvoidFurtherViolation
Revision11toPMI-2030isbeingroutedforapprovalfromplantmanagement.
Therevisionaddresses
theinspector's
concernnotedintheNoticeofViolation.
IAttachment
2toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page5(3)DateWhenFullComlieneeWillBeAchievedTherevisedversionofPMI-2030willbeeffective
byMay1,1990.ResponsetoViolation
ldProcedural
revisiontoincorporate
adirection
torunapumpinordertoproperlyadjustpackingisnotviewedasnecessary.
Personnel
performing
packingadjustments
meettherequirements
ofANSIStandardN18-1(4.5.3).Consistent
withthatstandard,
maintenance
personnel
receiveformaltraininginsubjectsassociated
withtheirposition.
Includedintheplant'strainingisacourseonpumpsthatdirectlyreferences
thecorrectmethodology
foradjusting
thepackingonpumps.Thisteachesmaintenance
personnel
thatadjustments
willonlybemadetopackingwhenthepumpisoperating.
AsrequiredbyANSIStandardN18-7,Section4.1(2),plantprocedures
aredeveloped
withtheobjective
ofproviding
adequateinformation
topersonnel
involvedinagiventaskconsidering
theskilltheyareprovidedthroughthetrainingprogram.(1)Corrective
ActionTakenandResultsAchievedThosepersonswhowouldbeinvolvedinpumppackingworkarehiredandtrainedconsistent
withANSIN18-1.(2)Corrective
ActionTakentoAvoidFurtherViolation
Thehiringpractices
andtrainingprogramshaveprovenadequatetopreventproblemsduetopumppacking(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedNoviolation
occurredaspractices
areinaccordance
withN18-1andpersonnel
arefullyqualified.
ResponsetoViolation
leWhiletheintentofStep8.1.2-2ofmaintenance
procedure
12THP6030.IMP.014
wastoensurethattechnicians
performing
cleaningwouldutilizetapeorsimilaradhesive-backed
material.
Blackelectrical
tape,wasspecified
becauseitisacommonlyavailable
item.However,useofacalibration
stickerdid-constitute
aviolation
oftheprocedure
aswritten.(1)Corrective
ActionTakenandResultsAchievedMaintenance
supervision
reviewedtheneteffectofutilizing
thestickerinthecourseofcleaninganddetermined
thatsatisfactory
resultswereobtained.
Nore-cleaning
wasdeemed
Attachment
2toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page6necessary.
12THP6030.IMP.014
hadbeenrevisedviaachangesheetinitiated
April2,1990,toremovereference
toblackelectrical
tape.(2)Corrective
ActionTakenToAvoidFurtherViolation
ThePlantManagerwillissueamemoonprocedural
compliance
toensurethatallpersonnel
arefullyawareofthemeaningofcompliance,
consequences
offailureandwhatactionstotakewhenaprocedure
cannotbefollowedaswritten.TheMaintenance
Improvement
Planincludesissuanceofadepartment
policyonprocedure
compliance.
Includedwillbeguidanceonthemonitoring
oftheeffectiveness
ofprocedure
compliance.
Alsoaprocedure
writer'/user's
guidewilladdressthecircumstances
forchangingaprocedure
toensureprocedural
compliance.
(3)DateWhenFullComlieneeWillBeAchievedThefinaldraftofthepolicywillbeissuedonJuly15,1990.Guidanceontheeffectiveness
monitoring
willbeissuedonAugust15,1990.ThePlantManager's
memowillbeissuedonMay1,1990.ResponsetoViolation
lf(1)Corrective
ActionTakenandResultsAchievedTheAuxiliary
Equipment
Operator(AEO)involvedinthiseventhadreceivedtrainingontheoperation
ofreactortripbreakersandtheexistence
oftheprocedure
priortothisevent.TheAEO,however,overlooked
thereactortripbreakerprocedure
wasrequiredtobe"inhand"wheneverperforming
rackingoperations.
Althoughtherackingevolution
wasdoneinaccordance
withthe.procedure
requirements,
thiseventwasaviolation
becausetherequirement
tohavetheprocedure
"inhand"wasnotsatisfied.
Amemorandum
wasissuedtoOperations
personnel
onJanuary19,1990,toremindthemofthe"inhand"requirement
forthereactortripbreakerprocedure.
(2)Corrective
ActionToBeTakenToAvoidFurtherViolation
Theroutinesurveillance
procedures
forreactortripbreakertestingwererevisedonDecember13,1989,toreference
therequirement
forhavingthereactortripbreakerrackingprocedure
"inhand"fortherackingevolutions.
Thestartupsurveillance
procedures,
whichrequirerackingofthereactortripbreakers,
willberevisedbyJune4,1990,toreference
therequirement
forhavingthereactortripbreakerprocedure
"inhand."
Attachment
2toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page7Duringtheconcluded,
procedures
Therefore,
pasttwoyears,QAaudits/surveillances
haveexceptfora"fewisolatedcases,"doubleasterisked
haveinfactbeen"inhand"whenrequired.
nogenericprogrammatic
problemexists.(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliance
wasachievedonDecember6,1989,whenthe'involved
AEOwasreinstructed
ofthe"inhand"procedural
requirement.
ResponsetoViolation
lgFiveprocedures/instructions
werecitedintheNoticeofViolation
asnothavingbeenreviewedwithinthetwo-yearlimitestablished
inplantprocedure
PMI-2010.
However,ineachcasethedocuments
hadbeenreviewedanddocumentation
tothateffectwasonfile.Uponrequestoneoftheinspectors
wasprovidedwithbiannualreviewdocuments
forIMP.071andIMP.062.Theinstruction
doesnotrequireanapprovedrevisionwithintwo.years,onlyareviewpriortosuchrevision.
Thisinformation
maynothavebeenadequately
communicated.
(1)Corrective
ActionTakenandResultsAchievedFurtherreviewoftheNoticeofViolation
bytheplantidentified
thatprocedures/instructions
notedhadreceivedreviewasrequiredbyPMI-2010,
Rev.17.(2)Corrective
ActionTakentoAvoidFurtherViolation
Trackingandreviewofprocedures
ispresently
adequate.
(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedNoviolation
occurred.
Attachment
2toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page8NRCViolation
2"10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
VIII,asimplemented
bySection1.7.8oftheDonaldCDCookOperational
QualityAssurance
Programrequiredthatmeasuresbeestablished
fortheidentification
ofmaterials,
partsandcomponents
suchasbypartnumber,serialnumber,orotherappropriate
meansontheitemorrecordstraceable
totheitemthroughout
fabrication,
installation
anduseoftheitem.""Contrary
totheabove,identification
ofmaterials
andcomponents
fortraceability
wasnotaccomplished
forcableextension
portionsandaluminumsplicingsleevesforconnections
toseveralsafety-related
motorcontrolcentersinstalled
undertheRequestForChange1482modification
(315/89031-02;
316/89031-02)."
ResponsetoViolation
transition
pieces(sleeves)
tosplicecoppertoaluminumcablesinvariousmotorcontrolcenters.PerRFCinstructions,
thetransition
piecesweretobeinstalled
inaccordance
withEngineering
DesignSpecification
(EDS)607andEDS608'heinstallation
tookplacebetweenJuneof1979andSeptember
of1981whenthefinalsummarywasissued.Asearchofthecompleted
RFCpackage(including
installation
joborders)andofthemicrofilm
ofthecompleted
joborderpackagesrevealednodocumentation
oftheparts(sleeves)
usedfortheinstallation.
Individuals
whowereinvolvedwiththeMaintenance
Department
atthattimestatedthatpersonnel
wouldhaveinstalled
thetransition
piecespertheEDSasstatedintheRFC.Inadequate
documentation
ofmaterialinstalled
byaJobOrderduringthedesignchangeprocesswastherootcauseofthisviolation.
Additionally,
therewereinadequate
reviewofthecompleted
jobordersandthedesignchangepackageuponcompletion.
(1)Corrective
ActionTakenandResultsAchievedTheinstallation
tookplaceapproximately
10yearsagoandwasperformed
inaccordance
withEDS608,whichwasreferenced
intheRFCpackage.Actualapplication
forthepasttenyearshasfunctionally
demonstrated
theadequacyofsubjectmaterials'
Attachment
2toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page9(2)Corrective
ActionTakenToAvoidFurtherViolation
Currentprocurement/dedication
practices
ensureproperdocumentation
isdeveloped
todemonstrate
controloverthesuitability
ofmaterial,
partsandcomponents.
(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedCurrentprocedures/practice's
shouldpreventrecurrence
ofthisproblemandensurefuturecompliance.
Attachment
2toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page10NRCViolation
3"10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
XI,asimplemented
bySection1.7.11oftheDonaldC.CookOperational
QualityAssurance
Programrequiredthatatestprogrambeestablished
toassuretestingtodemonstrate
thatsystemsandcomponents
willperformsatisfactorily
inserviceinaccordance
withtestprocedures
whichincorporate
requirements
andacceptance
limitscontained
inapplicable
designdocuments,
andthatadequatetestinstrumentation
wasavailable
andused.""Contrary
totheabove,testinstruments
werenotsensitive
oraccurateenoughtoverifythecalibration
oftheundervoltage
relaysthatactuatetheEmergency
DieselGenerators.
Procedure
2THP6030IMP.250,"4kVDieselStart,4kVESSBusUndervoltage
RelayCalibration,"
Revision7,Section3.0,requiredtheuseofaWestinghouse
typePA-161ACanolog[sic]voltmeter
oritsequivalent
withequalorbetteraccuracyandadequaterangetomeasurethedesiredparameters.
However,thevoltmeter
hadatolerance
of+1.5voltsthatwasnotsufficiently
accuratetomeasurethedesiredparameter
of90.3to91.8voltsspecified
inTechnical
Specification
3.3.2.Inaddition,
thevoltmeter
indicated
tothenearestwholevoltanddidnothavedivisionmarkingsbetweenthenumbers.Technicians
hadtointerpolate
resultsandrecordvaluestothenearesttenthofavoltwhilethevoltmeter's
dialindicator
wasmovingintheincreasing
ordecreasing
direction.
Furthermore,
thetechnicians
usedhandsignalstocommunicate
themomenttheundervoltagerelayoperated.
Basedontheinaccuracy
andinsensitivity
ofthevoltmeter,
andpoortestingtechnique,
resultsoftheundervoltage
testwerenotconclusive
(315/89031-03;
316/89031-03)."
ResponsetoViolation
3Themeterusedwasfirstspecified
intheoriginalprocedure
developed
beforeinitialplantstart-up.
Thespecificreasonsforusingthismetercouldnotbedetermined.
However,itisbelievedthatthiswasthelimitoftheavailable
technology
atthattime.Theonlyothermeteravailable
wasabasicdigitaltype,whichcouldnotbeusedduetotheinherently
slowresponseandupdatetime,causingagreateruncertainty
ofspecificsetpointvaluethantheanalogmeter.
Attachment
2toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page11(1)Corrective
ActionsandResultsAchievedZ&CnowusestheFlukeModel45digitalmeterduringtestingofthe4KVdieselstartand4KVESSbusundervoltage
relays.Recentdevelopments
indigitalmeterswhichincludefasterresponsetimesandupdatetimesandminimum/maximum
modifierfeatureshasmadetheiruseacceptable.
Thedigitalmetercurrently
beingusedhasanaccuracyof+0.3percent.Theprevioustestmethodprovidedacceptable
results,basedontheas-foundvaluesonthefirstuseofthedigitalmetersbeinginspecification
bycomparable
percentages.'2)
Corrective
ActionsTakenToAvoidFurtherViolation
Thecalibration
procedures
whichcurrently
allowuseofeitheranalogordigitalmeterswillbechangedtospecifytheuseoftheFlukeModel45digitalmeter,oritsequivalent,
toensureconsistent
useofadigitalmeter.(3)DateWhenFullComlieneeWillBeAchievedTheprocedure
changeswillbecompleted
beforeApril30,1990.
~~
Attachment
2toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page12NRC.Violation
4"10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
XVI,asimplemented
inSection1.7.16oftheDonaldC.CookOperational
QualityAssurance
Programrequiredthatmeasuresbeestablished
toassurethatconditions
adversetoqualitywerepromptlyidentified
andcorrected.
Inthecaseofsignificant
conditions
adversetoquality,themeasuresshallassurethatthecauseofthecondition
wasdetermined
andcorrective
actiontakentoprecluderepetition.
"Contrary
totheabove:ThePlantAssessment
GroupCommittee's
reviewinMarch1989forProblemReport89-245,concerned
withtheFebruary1989failureoftwosafety-related
4kVbreakersT-11D6andT-1104tocloseondemandduringtestsduetolubrication
hardening,
failedtospecifycorrective
actiontopreventrecurrence.
Furthermore,
noactionwastakentoinspectother4kVbreakersforcommonmodefailure.Consequently,
inMarchandAprilof1989sevenadditional
safetyrelatedandbalanceofplantbreakersfailedtocloseduringtesting,whichwasalsocausedbyhardening
ofthelubricant
onthebreakerlinkage(315/89031-04A;
316/89031-04A).
b.Corrective
actionwasneitherpromptnoradequatetocorrectmaintenance
related'roblems
identified
bythelicenseeinFebruary1988.InDecember1989,36ofthese71selfidentified
findingsandrecommendations
werereopened.
Duringthisinspection
manyofthesameproblemswereidentified
thatreflectasignificant
weaknessinthecorrective
actionsystem(315/89031-04B;
316/89031-04B)."
ResponsetoViolation
4aBasedonreviewofProblemReport89-245,whichwasaddressed
intheNoticeofViolation
itisourpositionthatnoactualviolation
occurred.
TheFebruary27,1989,condition
wasidentified
duringscheduled
'preventive
maintenance
workandresultedintheproblemreport.Thatdiscovery,
coupledwithasimilarcondition
alsofoundduringpreventive
maintenance,
resultedinaPart21report.ThePart21investigation
revealedthatvendor-specified
information
contained
noinstruction
forperiodiclubrication
ofthebreakers.
Similarbreakersusedintheplanthad,untilthattime,passedtestrequirements'he
plant'sactionswhichweretakenpromptly,
includedrevisionoftheprocedure
basedonnewinputfromthemanufacturer,
initiation
ofJobOrderstoinspectallothersimilarbreakersinstalled
inbothunits,andestablishment
ofscheduled
inspections
toidentifypossiblerepetition
ofthe
C.I1
Attachment
2toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page13condition
inthefuture.TheNoticeofViolation
incorrectly
concluded
thatnoactionwastakentoinspectadditional
breakersordevelopcorrective
action.Twosubsequent
problemreportswereinitiated
asaresultofdeficiencies
foundintheinspections
andtestscoveredbyourexpandedactionforProblemReport89-245andtheassociated
Part21review.Thosereportswereinitiated
todocumentthesimilarconditions
onthenotedbreakers.
WithintwomonthsoftheMarch1,1989,Part21reporttotheNRC,theplanthadcompleted
theinspections,
cleanedandrelubricated
thebreakersinbothunitsasrecommended
bytherevisedvendorinformation,
anddocumented
eachcasewhenasimilarcondition
wasfound.(1)Corrective
ActionTakenandResultsAchievedTheresultofProblemReport89-245,whichwasreviewedbythePlantAssessment
GrouponMarch17,1989,wastoinspect,cleanandlubricate
similarbreakersinbothunitsanddocumenttheresults.(2)Corrective
ActionTakentoAvoidFurtherViolation
Procedure
changesandinspections
werescheduled
asaresultofaddressing
theproblemreportedinProblemReport89-245onsimilarbreakers.
Theseactionsgenerated
additional
JobOrdersandcondition
reportswhichwerereferenced
intheinspection
report.(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedNoviolation
occurred.
ResponsetoViolation
4bAsdiscussed
inourresponsetoWeakness(1),AEPhastakennumerouscorrective
actionstoaddresstheproblemsidentified
bytheMaintenance
Self-Assessment.
Theseactionsinclude:othedevelopment
ofaRCMProgramotheacquisition
oftheNuclearPlantMaintenance
(NPM)Moduleothedevelopment
ofaSystemEngineerProgramotheacquisition
ofNUS'sPRONETandtheservt.ces
ofNUS'sprocedure
writers.
Attachment
2toAEP:NRC:1125A
Page14Inordertoeffectively
implement
programsasencompassing
andcomprehensive
asthese,significant
analysis,
planningandcoordination
areneeded.Assuch,itwilltakeseveralyearstocompletely
implement
someofthecorrective
actionswehaveinitiated.
(1)Corrective
ActionsandResultsAchievedMaintenance-related
problemsidentified
intheMaintenance
Self-Assessment
willbereviewedandresolvedasappropriate,
withimplementation
oftheMaintenance
Improvement
Plan.(2)Corrective
ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolation
TheImprovement
Planincludesmilestones
andabuilt-inmechanism
thatrequiresregularre-evaluation
oftheplanandmonitoring
ofitseffectiveness
toensurethatitisproviding
thedesiredresultsandthatthereiscontinuing
improvement
inallmaintenance-related
areas'3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedResolution
anddocumentation
oftheidentified
itemswillbecompleted
byJune1,1991.