ML17333B038
| ML17333B038 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 09/15/1997 |
| From: | FITZPATRICK E INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 50-315-97-09, 50-315-97-9, 50-316-97-09, 50-316-97-9, AEP:NRC:1260H, NUDOCS 9709230028 | |
| Download: ML17333B038 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000315/1997009
Text
CATEGORYlREGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)DOCKET0500031505000316NOTES:CCESSIONNBR:9709230028DOC.DATE:97/09/15NOTARIZED:YESFACIL:50-315DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM,50-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaMAUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONFITZPATRICK,E.IndianaMichiganPowerCo.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)SUBJECT:RespondstoNRC970815ltrreviolationsnotedininsprepts50-315/97-09a50-316/97-09on970505-23.Correctiveactions:calculationDC-D-1-SI-F101revisedarevisedsafetyreviewincorporatingcorrectMDAFWpumpstarttimeapproved.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE-TITLE:General(50Dkt)-InspRept/NoticeofViolationResponseINTERNAL:RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-3PDAEOD/SPD/RABDEDRONRR/DISP/PIPBNRR/DRPM/PECBNUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS2COPIESRECIPIENTLTTRENCLIDCODE/NAME11HICKMANiJ1AEODf&T~1+FILECEHTE~RQN1/DRC@HHFB1NRR/DRPM/PERB1OEDIR1RGN3FILE01COPIESLTTRENCL111111111111110REXTERNALLITCOBRYCEgJHNRCPDR11NOAC11NUDOCSFULLTEXT1111D0N0NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR18ENCL18
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indianaMichiganPowerCompany500CircleOriveBuchanan,Mi491071395INDIANAItrIICHIGANPWERSeptember15,1997AEP:NRC:1260H10'CFR2.201DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Gentlemen:DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2NRCINSPECTIONREPORTSNO.50-315/97009(DRP)AND50-316/97009(DRP)REPLYTONOTICEOFVIOLATIONThisletterisinresponsetoaletterfromG~E.Grant,datedAugust15,1997,thatforwardedanoticeoftwoviolationsofNRCrequirementstoCookNuclearPlant.Theviolationswereidentifiedduringtheoperationalsafetyteaminspection(OSTI)conductedbytheNRCfromMay5,1997,toMay23,1997.Theattachmentcontainsourresponsetotheseviolations.CommitmentsweremadebyCookNuclearPlantpersonneltotheNRCOSTI.Theinspectorsidentifiedconcernsrelatedtovalvedescriptionsonlabels,drawings,andinprocedures,andtheyhadconcernsrelatedtoourprogramforsealedvalves.Thecharacterizationanddetailofthesecommitmentsintheinspectionreportreflectsourintent.whenthecommitmentsweremade.Thesecondviolationrelatestotheissueofdesigncontrol.WhilereviewingtheOSTIreportandpreparingthisresponse,CookNuclearPlantunderwentanNRCarchitectengineering(AE)teaminspection.TheAEinspectionidentifieddesigncontrolissues,somethataresimilartothosecitedinthisviolation.Resolutionoftheoveralldesigncontrolissuewillrequireactionbeyondthatwhichiscommittedtohere.ThoseactionswillbedefinedinthecourseofaddressingtheAEteaminspectionissues.Thenuclearengineeringorganization,alongwithourentirenucleargenerationgroup,understandstheimportanceoferrorfreehumanperformanceandattentiontodetail,andtohavingadesignbasisthatisclear,understandable,andretrievable.WebelievethatafirststepwastakenonSeptember2,1997,whenstandardsfortechnicalinformationexchangeanduseinthenuclearengineering9'709'2300289709i5PDRADQCK050003%58PDRr.~~0,<iQ,,sllllllllilllliIIIJlllllllllllliillilfill
U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionPage2AEP:NRC:1260Horganizationwereformallyestablished.Theobjectiveoftheguidanceistoprovideassurancesthattechnicalinformationisaccurate,basedonsoundengineeringprinciples,properlyconveyed,andproperly,documented.Sincerely,E.E.FitzpatrickVicePresidentSWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBEDBEFORE-METHISI'5DAYOF~LV',1997NotaryPublicMyCommissionExpiresvlbAttachmentsJANWA%0NCAARYPQSC,BBNKNcoWn,eMYCOMMSSOMEXPtRESFEL10,1999c:A.A.BlindA.B.BeachMDEQ"DW&RPDNRCResidentInspectorJ.R.Padgett
ATTACHMENTTOAEP:NRC:1260HREPLYTONOTICEOFVIOLATION:NRCINSPECTIONREPORTNOS.50-315/97009(DRP)AND50-316/97009(DRP)
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260HPage1OnMay23,1997,theNRCcompletedanoperationalsafetyteaminspection(OSTI)ofCookNuclearPlantunits1and2reactorfacilities.TwoviolationsofNRCrequirementswereidentifiedduringthisinspection.Inaccordancewiththe60FR34381,'GeneralStatementofPolicyandProceduresforNRCEnforcementActions",datedJune30,1995,theviolationsandourresponsesareprovidedbelow.NRCViolationI"10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionV,'Instructions,Procedures,andDrawings,'equires,inpart,thatactivitiesaffectingqualitybeprescribedbyproceduresofatypeappropriatetothecircumstancesandbeaccomplishedinaccordancewiththeseprocedures.Contrarytotheabove,OnMay10,1997,theinspectorsidentifiedthatsafetyrelatedTemporaryModification(TM)1-95-1,whichdidnotrequireanoutageforrestoration,hadbeenassigneda(administrative)dateofAugust27,1996,buthadnotbeenmadeapermanentinstallationthroughadesignchangeorbeenremovedasofMay10,1997asrequiredbyPlantManagersProcedure(PMP)5040.MOD.OO1,'TemporaryModifications,'evision7.B.OnMay7,1997,theinspectorsidentifiedthatanactivityaffectingquality,thedeenergizationoftheDG2ABinverter,wascompletedwithoutplacing2-DGAB-INV-CB2and2-DGAB-INV-CB1tooff,contrarytosteps2.1.2and2.1.3ofprocedure02-OHP4021.032.008'AligningDG2ABSubsystemsForStandbyOperation,'evision4,Attachment7.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementI)."ResonsetoNRCViolationITheletterfromMr.Grant,andthenoticeofviola'on,statethatCookNuclearPlant'sstaffprovidedtheNRCwithsatisfactoryinformationregardingthereasonsfortheviolation,andthecorrectiveactionstakenandplannedtocorrectbothexamplesoftheviolationandpreventrecurrence.Thelettergoesontosaythat,unlessourcorrectiveactionsorourpositionarenotaccuratelyreflectedintheinspectionreport,wearenotrequiredtofurtherrespondtothisviolation.Wehavereviewedinspectionreportno.50-315/316)-97009anddeterminedthatitreflectsthecircumstancesoftheexamplesintheviolationascited,aswellasthecorrectiveactionstakenforeach.Notwithstanding,forconsistencyinunderstanding,thereisinformationinthediscussionsectionoftheinspectionreportthatwewishtoclarify.Severalconditionreports(CRs)arelistedashavingbeenreviewedinconjunctionwith'he2ABEDGvoltageregulatorwork.Inparticular,CR97-1452islistedwiththetitle"PartialClearanceAdditionDeterminedAsRootCauseforBlownFuseOn2ABEDGInverter."WewouldliketoclarifythatthefailuretodeenergizetheEDGinverterusingtheappropriateprocedureisnot
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AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260HPage2consideredtobetherootcausefortheinverterfuseblowingduringreenergization.Subsequentinvestigationhasdeterminedthatthefailuretofollow'thedeenergizationprocedurewasrecognizedbeforeactionsweretakentoreenergize.Priortousingtheproceduretoreenergizetheinverterandplaceitbackinservice,theinvertercircuitalignmentwascorrectedandtheintegrityofthefusewasverified.Thefusedidblowcoincidentwithperformanceoftheproceduretoreenergizetheinverter.NRCViolationZZ"10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionZZZ,requires,inpart,thatmdasuresbeestablishedtoassurethatthedesignbasisarecorrectlytranslatedintospecifications,drawings,procedures,andinstructions.Designcontrolmeasuresshallprovideforverifyingorcheckingtheadequacyofdesign.Contrarytotheabove,designcontrolmeasureswerenotadequatetoassurethatthedesignbasiswascorrectlytranslatedintodesignmodificationdocuments:b.OnMay7,1997,theinspectorsidentifiedthatcalculationDC-D-1-SZ-F101,'StressAnalysis&LoadGenerationforSystem1-SI-F101Per12-MM-590,'sedthewrongmomentarmandhadamissingreactionforceandmoment.OnMay13,1997,theinspectorsidentifiedthatincorrectandnon-conservativedesigninputwasusedforthemotor-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpstarttimeintheSafetyReviewMemorandumfortheSetpointValuesfortheTimeDelayPickupRelaysintheAFWFlowRetentionCircuits,datedJanuary15,1997,fordesignchangepackage12-DCP-0817,'ReviseAux.FeedwaterFlowRetentionCircuit.',OnMay13,1997,theinspectorsidentifiedthatacalculationfortheseismicdesignadequacyofminormodification12-MM-337wasnotperformed.Thedesignpackagefor12-MM-337indicatedthiscalculationexistedasDC-D-12-ES-116.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(Sur,v>lementI)."ResonsetoNRCViolationZZ1.AdmissionorDenialoftheViolationWeadmittoviolationZIascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.ReasonsfortheViolation,Theexamplescitedintheviolationrepresentissuesintheareaofdesigncontrol.ConcurrentwiththereviewoftheOSTIreportandpreparationofthisresponse,CookNuclearPlantunderwentanNRCarchitectengineering(AE)teaminspection.Thisinspectionidentifieddesigncontrolissues,somethataresimilartothosecitedintheviolation.Ztisrecognizedthatthethreeexamplescitedinthisnoticeofviolationmustbe
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AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260HPage3consideredalongwithanynewissuesidentifiedbytheAEteaminspection,relativetotheoverallissueofdesigncontrol.Thecircumstancesofeachissuecitedinthisnoticeofviolationarediscussedbelow.CalculationDC-D-1-SI-F101,"StressAnalysisandLoadGenerationforSystem1-SI-F101per12-MM-590",wasperformedinsupportofaddingapermanentventlinetothesafetyinjectionsystem(SIS)piping.Theinspector'sreviewofthedesignchangepackageidentifiederrorsmadebytheauthorsandoverlookedbythecalculationreviewers.Theerrorsarecharacterizedasinsufficientattentiontodetailonthepartoftheengineersperformingandreviewingthedesignchangepackage.Whencalculatingreactionforces,thelengthvalueofapipingspan,usedasamomentarminthecalculation,wastranscribedfromtheinputdatapresentationtotheactualalgebraicpresentationincorrectly,from37-5/8"to35-5/8".Thisdiscrepancycausedthemaximumreactionforceresulttobeincorrect,butinaconservativedirection.Inanothersectionofthepackage,valuesforreactionforceandmomentwereomittedfromasummaryformat.Thesediscrepanciesconsistedofnumberscorrectlyderivedinthebodyofthecalculationononepage,butomittedfromthesummaryonthefollowingpage.Thisproblemwasadministrativeinnature;noincorrectinformationwaspresentedorusedasaresult.Athirddiscrepancyrelatedtothisdesignchangepackagewasnotedinthebodyoftheinspectionreport,butnotspecifiedinthenoticeofviolation.Theinspectormadeanobservationthatincorrectdesigninformationwasstatedinthesafetyreviewdocumentation.Ourinvestigationconcludedtherewasnodiscrepancyinthesafetyreviewinputinformation.Thevaluesofdesigntemperatureandpressureusedbythesafetyreviewerwerecorrectforthespecificlocationwherethenewventvalvewastobeinstalled.TheengineerperformingthedesigncalculationconservativelyusedthehighestboundingdesigntemperatureandpressurefortheSISasawhole.Thisapproachisoftenadoptedwhentheinherentsafetymarginofadesignissuchthatthemorestringentdesignrequirementscanbeaccommodated.Thethoughtprocessinvolvedintakingthisapproachwasnotclearlydocumentedinthecalculationpackage.Designchange12-DCP-0817wasdevelopedtoaddatimedelayrelaytotheauxiliaryfeedwater(AFW)flowretentionactuationcircuittopreventspuriousactuationfrommomentaryoutletpressurespikes,especiallythosethatoccurwhentheAFWpumps
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AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260HPage4automaticallystart.Asafetyreviewwasperformedbythedesignengineeringorganizationfortheadditionofthetimedelaypick-uprelaytotheAFWsystemcircuits.Thenuclearsafetyandanalysissectionwasaskedtoperformanevaluationofthesetpointvalueforthetimedelayrelay.Thereviewperformedbythisgroupwasintendedtodemonstratethatthemagnitudeofthetimedelayintheflowretentioncircuitswouldnotadverselyimpactrelatedaccidentanalysisassumptionsorsafetymargins.Inordertocompletethisreview,theengineerneededtoknowhowquicklythemotordrivenAFWpumpswouldstart.An'incorrectvalueofthirtysecondswasused,basedonatelephoneconversationwiththeAFWsystemengineerattheplantsite.ThesystemengineercommunicatedthattheturbinedrivenAFW(TDAFW)pumpsstartandcomeuptospeedwithinthirtyseconds.SurveillancedataontheTDAFWpumpswasavailableonthesystemengineersdeskatthetime.Whatthesystemengineerintendedwasthatthirtysecondswouldboundthestarttimeonthemotordrivenpumps.Mostoften,inrelationtosafetyanalysisorT/Ssurveillance,theinformationofconcernisatimewhichboundsthepumpstart,time.However,thesafetyreviewerunderstoodthatthethirtysecondswouldcharacterizethestarttimeforthemotordrivenauxiliaryfeedwater(MDAFW)pumps.Basedonsurveillancemeasurements,thecorrectstarttimeforthemotordrivenpumpsisthreeseconds.Investigationintothereasonforthisincorrectinputtothesafetyreviewconcludedthatitwaspoorcommunicationsbetweentheinvolvedengineers,andanincompleteunderstandingonthepartofthesystemengineerastotheintendeduseoftheinformation.Oneengineerbelievedtheboundingstarttimewasneeded,whiletheotherwastryingtodeterminetheshorteststarttimeforthepumps.Minormodification12-MM-337wasperformedtoreplacetheemergencydieselgenerator(EDG)startingairsystemsafetyvalves.TheNRCinspectorindicatedthatthecalculationfortheseismicadequacyofthenewvalvetypewasnotperformed.ThedesignchangepackagereferencedcalculationDC-D-12-ES-116.Thisreferencedcalculationwasnotintendedtofollowthetypicalformatinwhatwasthenthecalculationprocedure.DC-D-12-ES-116wasarecord-keepingandretrievalfileforanumberofindividualreviewspreparedforthereplacementofnon-identicalvalves.Thefiledidcontainthefinalapprovalletterfromthestructuraldesignsectiondocumentingthatthevalvechangehadbeenreviewed.However,wewouldhaveexpectedtofindinformationinthisfilerelatedto
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260HPage5thedecisionmakingprocess,suchasisometricdata,weightdata,andsupportlocationinformation.Forunknownreasons,thisfiledidnotcontaintheinformationthatwouldhavebeenexpectedpertainingtothereviewofthevalvereplacementof12-MM-337.Theinformationcouldnotbefound.Itwasreconstructedandthenewreviewwasdocumentedappropriately.Thefilenowcontainstheappropriateinformationandreviewdocumentation(performedinMay1997)thatconfirmedtheconclusionoftheoriginaldesignapprovalletter.Whetherthefilewaslost,orthereviewneverdocumented,thisconditionischaracterizedasinsufficientattentiontodetail.Itresultedintheinabilitytoretrievedesigndataordesignbasisrelatedinformation.3.CorrectiveActionTakenandResultsAchievedb.cCalculationDC-D-1-SI-F101,forthesafetyinjectionsystemstressanalysis,wasrevisedandapprovedonJune2,1997,toaddresstheciteddiscrepancies.OnMay29,1997,arevisedsafetyreview,incorporatingthecorrectMDAFWpumpstarttimewasapprovedbytheplantnuclearsafetyreviewcommittee(PNSRC).Theconclusionsoftheoriginalsafetyreviewremainedunchanged.Awalkdownandreviewofthevalvesinstalledunder12-MM-337,fortheEDGstartingairsystem,wasperformedonMay13,1997,anddocumentedwiththerelatedconditionreport.Thisreviewconfirmedtheoriginalconclusionsoftheseismicqualificationreviewperformedin1992.ThereviewwasformallydocumentedonMay15,1997.CorrectiveActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolationsWeunderstandtheimportanceof"attentiontodetail",andtohavingadesignbasisthatisclear,understandable,andretrievable.EachofthethreecitedexamplesintheNRCinspectionreportrefertoalackof"attentiontodetail",oralackofclearcommunicationofdesigninformation.ThethreeexamplesofdesigncontrolproblemshighlightedinthisviolationwillbeconsideredagainasapartofthelargersetofissuesidentifiedbytheNRCAEteaminspectionofCookNuclearPlant.Resolutionoftheoveralldesigncontrolissuewillrequireactionbeyondthatwhichiscommitted'inthisresponse.ThoseactionswillbedefinedinthecourseofaddressingtheAEteaminspectionissues.Theviolationexamplesa.andc.havebeencharacterizedasinsufficientattentiontodetail.Whentheerrorswereidentifiedbytheinspector,discussionswereheldwiththeengineersinthedesignengineeringorganizationwhoareinvolvedinthedevelopmentand
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AttachmenttqAEP:NRC:1260HPage6documentationofthecalculations.Theyweremadeawareoftheinspectionfindingsandtheimportanceofattentiontodetail.ThiswasaccomplishedwhiletheOSTIwasstillinprogress.Trainingwillbeprovidedforpersonnelinthenuclearengineeringorganizationwhoperform,review,andapproveengineeringanddesigncalculations.Thesessionwillemphasizetheimportanceof"attentiontodetail"andgoodcalculationcontrolprocesses.ThistrainingwillbecompletedbyDecember31,1997.In1990,asaresultofdesignverificationconcernsraisedduringthesafetysystemfunctionalinspectionofouressentialservicewatersystem,qualityreviewteams(QRTs)wereestablishedtoperiodicallyreviewdesignoutputdocumentationfortechnicaladequacyandproceduralcompliance.Theseteamsweredisbandedin1996.ThediscrepanciesfoundundertheQRTprogramhadnoimpactontheconclusionsofthecalculations.Selectedcalculationsperformedduringthepastyear,August1996,toAugust1997,willbereviewed.Thereviewwilllookforcalculationerrors,inconsistencies,properdocumentationofassumptions,andprocedureadherence.Anyfindingswillbeaddressedanddocumentedunderthecorrectiveactionprogram.ThisassessmentwillbecompletedbyDecember1,1997.Theproblemcitedinexampleb.oftheviolation,incorrectdatainputtoasafetyreview,hasbeenidentifiedtobeacommunicationproblem.OnAugust26,1997,thenuclearsafetyandanalysissectionconductedatabletopsessionthatdiscussedtheneedforprecisionintheuseoftechnicalinformationinsafetyreviews.Itstressedthattheuseofwritteninputisthepreferredmethod,andthatifverbalcommunicationisneeded,itmustbefollowedupwithawrittendocument.ThesestandardsforinformationexchangeandusewereformallyestablishedbyproceduraldirectionissuedonSeptember2,1997.Thisdocumentprovidesrequirementsfornuclearengxneeringorganizationpersonnelwhenprovidingtechnicaldirection.Theobjectiveofthestandardistoprovideassurancesthattheinformationisaccurate,basedonsoundengineeringprinciples,properlyconveyed,andproperlydocumented.5.DateWhenFullComlianceWasAchievedRelativetotheindividualexamplescitedintheviolation,fullcompliancewasachieved:OnJune2,1997,whencalculationDC-D-1-SI-F101wasreviewedandapprovedforthesafetyinjectionsystemstressanalysis.OnMay29,1997,whentherevisedsafetyreviewfortheAFWflowretentiontimedelayrelaysetpointwasapprovedbythePNSRC.
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AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260HPage7OnMay15,1997,whenwalkdownandreviewoftheseismicqualificationoftheEDGstartingairsystemsafetyvalveswasdocumentedandverified.