ML17334A523

Facility Conceptual Design Description for Technical Support Ctr & Emergency Operations Facility.

ML17334A523
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	09/15/1982
From:	INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
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ML17334A522	List: ML17334A521 ML17334A523
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NUDOCS 8404030229
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INDIANA&MICHIGANEXZCTRICCCMPMYCONALDC.QXKNKXZRRPLANTKETHETSZBGCAGSUPPORTCENTERMDTHEKF.ATTAGBKÃTK)AEP:NRC:0533ARevised:September15,1982andincorporatedasAttachment2toAEP:NRC:0531E'hangesareindicatedbyabarintheright-handmargin.'IhisdccunntcontainsiafornationpxcpxietazytoWestinctmuseElect~Co~zationandAn~canElec"~PowerSezv'ceCozpozaticn;itissuhnittedinconfidenceardistoheusedsole+forNwpurposeforwhichitIsfuz2LLshed~dccQm'.?ItandsuchinfozIGaticnLsnottohezepzoduced,tzananitted,disclosedorusedat2~vtseinwholeorinpar"8404030229820929PDRADOCK050003l5FPDR gESTtr<grOUSEPROPRIETARYCLASS2'his.documentcontainsmaterialthatisproprietarytotheMestinghouseElectric'orporation.Theproprietaryinformationhasbeenmarkedbymeansofbrackets.ThebasisformarkingthematerialproprietaryisidentifiedbymarginalnotesreferringtbthestandardsinSection8oftheaffidavitofR.A.Miesemannofrecord"IntheMatterofAcceptanceCriteriaforEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemsforLightMaterCooledNuclearPowerReactors(OocketNo.RH-50-1)"attranscriptpages3706through3710(February24,1972).Ouetotheproprietarynatureofthematerialcontainedinthisreport:which.wasobtainedatconsiderabIeMestinghouseexpenseandtherelease-ofwhichwouldseriouslyaffectourcompetitiveposition,werequestthisinformationtobewithheldfrompublicdisclosureinaccordancewiththeRulesofPractice,10CFR2.790,andthattheinformationpre-sentedthereinbesafeguardedinaccordancewith10CFR2.903.Mebelievethat-withholdingthisinformationwillnotadverselyaffectthepublic.interest.Thisinformationisforyourinternal-useonlyandshouldnotbereleasedtopersonsororganizationsoutsidetheOirec.orateofRegula-tionandtheACRSwithoutpriorapprovalofWestinghouseElectricCorporation.Shoulditbecomenecessarytoreleasethisinformationto.suchpersonsaspartofthereviewprocedure,pleasecontactMesting-houseElectricCorporationandtheywillmakethenecessaryarrangementsrequiredtoprotecttheirproprietaryinterests.4RRlA Section1.1.11.1.21.1.31.1.41.2TitleZntzxductionSystemFul~ions'ZechnicalSupportCenterSafetyParm~xsDisplaySystemNuclearDataLinkBypass6ZnoperableStatusZr~tion.SystemEb~rtBasis~cCAEP-1AEP-1AEP1AEP-2AEP-2AEP-32.2.12.22.32.3.12.3;22.3.3~DataAcquisitionaDisplaySystemCat@uterSystemSystemEhtaDisplaySystemCnsiteTechnicalSupportCenterContxolHocmBtarger~CpezatingFacilities3.3e13.23.3CnsiteTechnicalsupportCenterDesianBasisZnputDetexminatianOTSCCcexatorZntexaceAEP-9AEP-9AEP-10AEP-1144.14.24.3SafetyPazaratexsDisplaySystemPurposeZnputDetemunationMan-<~hixmZntexfaceAEP-30AEP-30AEP-30AEP-335.5715.25.3Bypass&Jr~ableStatusZndicationSystemPurposeManW~>eZntexfaceAEP-47AEP-47AEP47AEP-476.

SectionTitle7.7.17.1.17.1.2TSC~SupplySystems~totheTSCCatguter~UPSSystemCons~RaofPm'upplyAEP-56AEP-56AEP-56AEP-567.2PamrtotheTSCComplexAEP-578.8.18.1.18.1.28.1.38.1.48.1.58.28.2.18.2.28.2.38.3TaskFunctionsPerfoznadbyEnLLvidualsintheTSC.TechnicalSupportYanageaant~ztEmergencyFunctionsPexfozmedintheTSC/ECPforeachErargencyClass.ChusualEventAlertSiteandGenialBmzgehcyFunctionsofIndividualsReportingtotheECF.AEP-58AEP-58AEP-58AEP-58AEP58AEP-59AEP-59AEP59AEP-59AEP-60AEP-61AEP-629.9.19.29.3TSCRecordandDataAvailabil'tyAEP-63ControlledPlantSpecificBeferer~i<wterialAEP-63Chca~lledEnfozma~andTec.'nicalAEP-64Referer~Ywtexial.OtherMta,Records,arZZnfonraticn~5 1.ZBZEGDKZICH11SYST124FCKTECNS:TheD.C.CookPlantTechnical~xtCenterDataSystemisbeingdevelopedanddesignedusingtheguidelinesofNUB'696topzovidetheplantcpexatingandtechnical~xtpezsannelwithtMpm~ntplantinformationtofacilitatetheend~nayresponsetoanaccident.'IbisSystem,whichutilizesthe-Westinc~seP2500TSCCan@uterSystans,canalsobeusedduxingnozmalplantagezaticnforatherfhrctianssuchas-plantpezfonmxaanalysis,pezsonnelDmin~etc.systemcansistsaf~similarcaagutezizeddataacquisition,pzccessinganddisplaysystems,ereforeachD.C.CookUnit.The=fournavarfunctionspzavidedbythisccmputersystemare:1.1.1TZGKXCALSGPPORCCENTER(TSC):Theccngutersystemwillreceive,stoze,prccessanddisplayoncolor~tmanix~and/orcnhard-copyteaninalstherealtimedataacquixedfxcmvaxiousplantsyst~.Pre-tripandpost-~dataarealsocollectedardcanbepzocessedanddisplayedbythecancuter.Thissystemwillfacilitatetheassessnantafttmplant'sconditionbyp1antoperatingardtechnicalsmpoxtcexsonrml.ThedatadisplaysafthTe&nical~xtCmzterfur~ionwillpzenridesuficientinfozmationtodeterrnirw:

'~-Plantsteadystatecgamting-canditians.priortaNmunittrip-TransientconditionspxcducingNminitiatingeventandsystem1x8zaviorduz~the~eaftheaccident.-Pxesentconditionsaftheplant.TheTSCdatadzsp1aysystanmayheusedfor.-Reviewingtheaccidentsecnzence..-Detezznizuz@apprcpxiatemitigatingactions.-Evaluatingthee'xtmztafanydamage.-Detezznizzizgplantstatusduringrecoverycgexaticm.functionwillhedesc~RindetailsinSection3.011.2~M~FETYSTATICDISPLAY(PSSD):ThisPSSDsystenwasdesignedinaccordancewiththeguidelinesfortheSafetyPaxamteDisp1aySystem(SOS)ofNGREG0696.ThisPSSDsystem,~displaysthesafetystatusafNmplantinafaxmatthat.canheeasilyxeax~edhy+~contxolroamoperators,willhelptheoperatorstodetectanyahnoznnalccnditianina~lytnanmr.Pdditiar~lfeaturesafthisPSSDsystemwillhe1ptheoperatorsandtechnicalsupportpersonneltochtaiz>detailedinformationan&~safetysystemsafNmplant.DetaileddescriptionsafthissystanareplaidedinSecticn4.113NXZZARDATALINK(NDL)TheTSCcartcutersystemhasahuilt-inaff-sitedatatxazmnissiancapahili.tywhichcanheusedforizztexfacingwithafutureNuclearDataLink(NDL)Sub-Systm.l1AZP2 1.1.4am'rmeZWBrZSTATtaINDICATESwam(BISI):TheBISXsystemprovidestheoperatorsandtechnicalsupportpersonnelwithaclearindicatianaf.theavailabilityoCNuplantsafetysystems(ESFSystems).Detaileddescrq~nsofthissystemazeprovidedinSection5.1.2REPCBTBASIS:Thisreportis~ontheproprietaryWestingbmxseKRPHegort9725"WestinghouseTechnicalSupportCamlex,"whichwassubmittedtotheHRC.'-AppropriatemxiifiaatianswexettedetoreflectthespecificdesignofD.C.CcakM.ts1aeR2.

2.THEDOZEACQUISITZCH&DISPELSYSTEM2.1GSECOMP~SYSTEM:F~2.1showsthecangutersystemhaxdwaxeforeachCcokUnit.Multiple16-bithighspeedminicomputerandttenaxydevicesareusedtoprocessplantdata,generatedisplaysandpexfoxmotherman~chineinterfacefunctions.Thesystemisconfiguredinafault~tolerantchsign.Zfacantxalprocessingunit(CPU)ora~rtionofaamxyfails,thesystemwillautomaticallyreconf'uxeitselftoperformitschsignatedfunctions.2.2ZNPOZSYSTEMFigure2.2showsNnschematicdiagramfortheTSCcomputerSystem.InputsignalsfrcmthecontxolxccmardotherplantlocationsaretakentothexemoteInput/Output(I/O)cabinets.SignalisolationisprovidedintheI/OcabinetssothatnofailureontheoutputsideoftheI/Ocabinetswillaffecttheinputsignals.InadditiontoJ~seisolators,allsignalsconungfromthesafetysystaraaretakenaftertheexistingamlifiedisolatorsonthesesyst~.'Iheinputsignals,aftergoing+~ghtheisolators,willbeconvertstobina~informationonthei~cardsandthenaxerultiplexedtothecomputer.EachanalogsignalchannelhasitscwnAnalog/DigitalConver~,thusprovidingahighdegreeofreliabilityfortheinputsystem.

C,PpssCIJ4ApSL&4se*(,'ss.4as,tA1-.Ssr2.3DATADZSPIAYSYSTEMIssI2.3.1TechnicalrtCenterRxxnEachD.C.CbokUnithasadedicatedcorrrrrandconsolelocatedin'theOnsiteTechnicalSupportCenter.EachcormendconsoleisecguppedwithtwocolorCRCdisplaysandavideohardcopier(whichcanbeusedtoobtainahardcopyoftt~screenimage).OneCRTisdedicatedtothePSSDfunctionandthesecondCRPisageneralpurposedisplay.Threesatellitestations,eachwithacolorCRPdisplay,arealsoprovided.'IhesatellitestationscanbeconnectedtoeitherCcokUnit1orUnit2TSCCcaguterSystem.AsharedvideohardccpierisprovidedforthethreesatelliteCps.Thesatellitestationsarearrangedsothatvisualaccessfromtheccrmrandstationcanbehmaintainedwhilestillprovidingsufficientxccmtominimizenoiseanddistrutanoe.ForprintinglengttFreports,alineprinterisprovided.2.3.2ControlRnn.TworedundantPSSDdisplayCRTsandtworedundantBISZCpsareprovidedinea&controlroom.AvideohardcopierisalsoprovidedtocbtainhadccpyoutputfrcmtheCRTscreenimage.hss2.3.3EEOoeratinFacilities(EOP):AcolorCRTterminal,whichcanbeconnectedtoeitherCcokunitTSCccmputer,isprovidedintheEmergencyQgemtirgFacilities.'QmremoteCRTcanbeusedtodisplayallofthedisplaysavailableonAEP-5

~~thePSSD,TSCandBZSZfunctionsexceptforthetopleveliconicdisplayafthePSSDfunctian.Thisiconicdisplaywasdesignedforearlyxeaxpu.tionafaneventbytiecontxolnxxncpamtorsandtherefoxeisnotincludedinN~EOF.

~pr@ele'<<e~qt~Ie~gaggef>>e~yCtASIIS5SIOI5Ilet!.I.I,IIISLSIIIII@~AOeeeeoeesI00eA'IOIIAef~Ae<<OSAeccotteltS~eeetlACA<<III~FjIZOPCH(sharedbyl+lIIt~IIII~OSOSI4AACCIIIIII~III~etSAtAIIQOOOlltLA~CtllIOettlAr<<e<<Ol04elc<<(CSEr'v0OfPlAectleI5IOOISCIIOttA<<SIOO~ye000r0letcArCI<<IASSAtAASIOOIIIIIII~IIItII3S2$200HDL',5III5lIIIII5COIISOOLLA5IIr'IIeAIIIIIItIIIII'0&%<<h&W<<CCrSISIStfSOIAOCAIIIII~e'SOAAOteOIaftete~eeeeAOOSAfaosaAAeeeeOAAOCefJr40~IeeQAAO'IIOI0Ccthl1teSOswlArwlArCIA~CCR~oveArCIAOCOII0Ih<<heO4Ah%AIOIIOI~IAIIO'%>>4telA~I<<II<<el~~e0lh<<e~fe<<ehe0~IheOhe0\SetttI555CIIIIIL'OLIltfretflICIIIII0~tIlI~IfIIIIIIIIIItFigurc2.1.Tt.'chnicalSUpportComplexSYstcmConfiguration

<<SensorSignalsnon-'safetySaetysyst.syst.,sianalssianalsisolators<<I<<.~~ControlBoardIndicationIIIIGISXDisplaysIPSSDDisplaysICONTROLROO14rL'PSSDDisplaysPlantProcessComputerIsolatorX/0CaninerainAIIIlILtors~-</OCa@inc.lTrainBIIIIIteIIBISIDisplaysIrIITscDisplaysITECsiSUPPOFTCENTERTSCCO><PUTTERSYSE.'lsite8oundaryE'igue2.2:TSCComputerSystemSchematic.TSCBXSIPSSD(non-iconic)NUCLEARDATALIDKAEP-8 3ONSITETE'CHNICALSUPPORTCENTER3.1DESIGNBASIS:Tt~QnsiteTechnicalSupportCenter(OTSC)savesasthefocalpointforpost-accidentrecoverymanageaant.Assuch,itmusthavethechili~toaccess,displayandtransmitpertinentplantstatusinformationindependentofactionsinthecontxolzccm.Technica1SupportCenterSu~ionoftheTSCCanpxterSystanwasj1.PexmnnelintheOTSCmathaveaccesstotherealtimeinformationdefinix~thejumentstatusofcritica1plantsystansandfunctions.2.TfuTSCfur~immthavethecapabilitytostorehistorical~ventandpost-eventdatainordertoenab1eadiagncsisandevaluationaftheventtodeteaninet!mextentafanypossibleplantsystemdana<a.3.TheTSCQzmticnnusthavethecapabilitytoacornsanddisplayplantgararetezsirdependentofactionsinthcontxolroom.4.TheinterfaceoftbeTSCsystemequipmentwithexisitingplantprotectionsystem,controlroanor~~func~5.Pazanatarstot?mextentpossibleshouldbefran<wsana~ethatisusedforcontrolrocmirZicationstoensuredatacons~cy~6.TlmTSCsystannusthavethecapabilityofinterfacingwithcamrnnicationequizztantfortheoffmitetzansaussicnofpertinent.plantdata.

'.'Iheusersmastbeabletocr~teormodifydisplaystonaet;tomneedsasconditionsmaydictate.Inordertodefinetheinformationwhichnust:heavailableintheOTSC,agenericstudyafcriticalplantsystemsandkeysafety8uwtions(asListedinTable3.1)wasconductedbyWestinghouse.Thisstudyresultedina.ListafpazanaterstobemonitoredbythecarputerfortheTechnicalSupportCenterSuction.ThisWest~ouseparaaaterlistwasreviewedandmade~PlantspecificbyAEP.Table3.2ListsthepmnaipalparanatmsandTable3.3liststhebasisforinputselection.Bedtm3ancyanddiversityafprocessir~tionsareutilizedtosatisfyconcernsassociatedwithunavailablesignalsduetosensorfailure.Sana.refixmaentafthinputparanatersListmayhemadeafterthesuhnittaLof'hisconceptualdesignreportAEP-10 MESHN6HOUSKNOPRHYARYCIJ5523.3OTSCOPERATORINTERFACETheabilityoftheOTSCtobeaneffectiveMo]fnpost-accfdentrecoverymanagementisafunctionoftheinputsprovidedandtheabf1ftytopresentinformationinameaningfulandorganizedmanner.Asstatedpreviously,theman-machineinterfacefsthroughtheuseoffnteractfv'e~aphiccolorCRTdisplays.TheinterfaceAnctionsfntheOTSCconsistofdisplaysandconsolefunctions..ThedisplaytypesavailableforOTSCpersonneluseconsistofgraphi'candalphanumericdisplayswhicharebothpreformattedanduserconstruc-tible.Examplesofthetypesofdfsp1aysavaf1ableareshownfnFigures3li32and3-3Figure3.l.fsanexamp]eofapreformattedsystemstatusdisplay,g~theringimportantsystemandloopparametersontoasfnglepageofdisplay.Figure3.2showsmoredetailedinformationonindividualparameterssuchasinformationonsensorstatus,current~value,andhighandlowlimits..Figure3.3isanexampleofagraphictrenddisplayshowingatimehistoryofre]atedparameters.Highlight--ingtechniquesforind~catingparametersvrconditionsof)nterestutil-.4zebothcolorandachraaatfcmeans.ByprovidingacombinationofbothpreformattedanduserconstructibledisplaystheOTSCpersonnelareprovidedwithprearrangedquicklyacces-sfblesyseminformationandtheflexibilitytopermitthetailoringofinformationprmentationtomeetspecificneedsasconditions.dictate.Thespecificcontentofpreformatteddisplayswillbedeterminedbymalyzingposaccidentdatarequirementsintermsofeventevaluation,thesafetysitusoftheplant,andlong-termrecoveryplanning.Ois-playswillalso.bedesignedtoreflee.plantspecificdesigndetails.8~Oisplayaccessisprovidedbothbydedicatedfunctionalconsolepush-buttonsandstandardkeyboardentries.Ocdicatedkeysprovideaccesstothemostfrequentlyuseddisplaysorfunctions.Forotherfunctionsaccesscanbeeitherdirectbyenteringshortcodesorbyutilizing~ninstructionfunc.iontodeterminetheidentificationcodeforadisplayifitisunknown.~51A27 0

1gESTI~IGHOUSEPROPRIETARYCLASS2~Othertypesofinformationisavailablethroughtheconsolekeyboard..Theseconsistoffunctionssuchaspointrevie~,logs,post-triphistor-1caldatareview,andoffsitedatatransmission.Thepaintreviewfunctionsenabletheconsoleoperator,to'reviewplantsensorinformation.Thetypesofreviewfunctionsavailableare:Valuesofindividualpoints.~2.Pointsremovedfromscan.3.Pointsremovedfranlimitchecking.4Pointsfailedunderqualitycheckingroutines.$.Pointswhose'canfrequencieshavebeenchangedfmnthenormalscanfrequencies.Therearelog<unctionsavailabletotheOTSCpersonnelwhichcanbedisplayedonCRTswithperiodicupdatesoroutputontoahardcopydevicesuchasalineprinter.Thesefunctionscanbepreprograrmedandautomaticallyinitiatedorspecifiedandinitiatedhyconsoleoperatorinput.I~Thepost-tripreviewfunctionprovidesthecapabilitytoreviewhistor-yicaldatatoaidinaneventevaluation.Thisfunctioncontinuouslystoresinmemoryanupdatedtableofpreassignedsensorvaluesfora,predefinedperiod.Upontheoccurrenceofadisturbance{e.g.,planttrip)thesystemcontinuestostoredataforadefinedtimeperiod.Afterthisperiod,theentire,datarecordcanbereviewedbytheOTSCpersonnelonCRTsand/oroutputtohardcopydevicesforpermanentrecordstoragepurposes.CAC11'=8AEP-12 Ip-.,iNGHOJSEPROPRIETARYCLASSZ,TheoffsitedatatransmissionfunctionenablesQTSCpersonnelto'trans-.mitplantdatatooffsite',ocationsviaownersuppliedcomnunicationssystems.TheOTSCoperatorcaninitiatetransmissionofdataeitherona"one-shot"orperiodic"asis.Thetransmitteddatacanbearrangedhntofoureditedversionsforthespecificneedsofseparateoffsite:.ccnmunicationsreceiverssuchastheNRC.\2-9 iIII"545YZGHGHOUSEPROPRlEFARYCLASS2TABLE3.1,4-CRITICALP'LANTSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS.ReactivityControl,VrimarySystemInventory5555rI5hgc;355.55CoreHeatRemovalCapabilitiesAvailabilityandCapacityofHeatSinks5~,ContainmentIntegrity-'PrimarySystemPressureandTemperatureAvailabilityandCapacityofAlternateRaterSourcesAvailabilityandOperabilityofCriticalSupportSystems-RadioactivityControl454~I'5h'55*-2-10AEP14

,Table3.2TSCPaxarratmrsListVariablesMin.NoafSignalsbetlegtarp-RCScoldlegtarp-BCSpressuxe-BeactorwaterLevel-KSlxxcnconcentxation-PressurizerwaterLevel-SteamgeneratorLevelWidexangeNanna'ancp-SteamLinepressure~ntainFientpxesssuxe0-700degF0-700degF0-3000psig0-100%0-5000pcm0-10000-10000-1000O-a4OOpsig-5-+36psig~denotestoracptanklevel2-2oxicacidtanklevel-Auxfeedwarmflac'eedwaterflow~gh~injectionf1cw589'-599'lev.599'-614'lev.0-10000-1000o-aoo~0-250KLbs/hr0-5000K1bs/hr0-200cpmAEP-15

~"4Table3.2TSCParanatersListVaziablesMin.NoofSignals444'4e-Lowheadinjectionflew416~Neutronflux-Contmlrodposition53-Prirrarysystemrelief&.4anentcoolingwaterflow2~agormntccolingwatertemp.2-Contaimnenttargerature80-5500gptn0-2500degF0-10000gptn32-200degF0-30%0-100degF0-120%pramPallinorrotClosed-notclosed,4-Sec.syst.reliefvalves4-P2Rrelief~pressure1-PZRrelief~3c1m'.1-BCSdegreofsubcoolingN/A-Accunulatorlevel-Accunaxlatorpressure-AcaxaQatorisolationvalves4-Auxbuildingsumplevel-BHRsystemflowClosed-notclosedClosed-notclosed0-100psigO-10OS50-350degF200sub-5super0'-10080-700psigClosed-r~clcsed0-flccdlevel0-7000apn Table3.2TSCPaxarretarsListVariablesMin.NoofSicnmls~heat,ex.outlettemp.~ricacidchaupir@flaw-KSlet-dawnflaw-BCSnake-upflaw~xgvBDtilatichdcntKer-Statusafstandby~-Kighradioactivityliquidtanklevel-Badiaactivegasdecaytkpress4-BeactorCoolantPunpsstatus4-PZRneaterbankstatus<<WtmrolcxyMinddizectionAtm.deltatemp.-Badiation2Car~antareaxadia~11ContainmztairauriculateQCitVentradiogasChitVentiodine0-400degF0-10pe0-200gpn0-200cdclosed-natclosedEmxgizedornot0-10080-150psig0-1200anps0-200anps0-360deg0-100miles/hr0-50PegF.1-10E4mR/hr10-10E6~~10-10E6axn1O-1OE6~10-10E6cdAEP-17 Table3.2TSCPazanetersListVariablesMin.No.ofSils-Radiation(continued)Steamgen.blowdownCondenserairejectorCoolingwaterEastCcolingwaterWestServicewaterEastServicewaterWestWasteZiquidoff-gasWastegasdecayControlrccmareaSpentfuelareaClarLzgpproomarea10-10E6cpn.1-10E4mR/hr.10-10E6cpn10-10E6cpn10-10E6cpn10-10E6cpn10-10E6cpn10-10E6cpn.1-10E4mR/hr.1-10E4mR/hr.1-10E4mR/hrNcrta1

DegreeofsubcoolingwillheindependentlycalculatedbytheTSCccnauter.Note2:Weradiationsignalslistedabovearesignalsfromthe'Iexistirgradiationdetectors.AEPisintheprocessofirmlementinganewRadiationRonitorSystematCookUnits1and2,andwillprovideaseparateRadiationDataDisplaySystemfortheTSCandEOF.AEP-18 hJrh'A~Ahw~hh~r~A8hhr4~PARAHETERtYES1'INAllOUSEPltOPAlEfAQ'LASS2TABLE23I'SCINSTRUHENTBASISINITIALEVENTDIAGNOSIS+uBASIS.(b,c)ContainmentPressureSteamlinePress.ure-Determineifbreakisinsideoroutsideofcontairunent-Determineifhiqhenergysecondaryl)neruptureoccurred-Honitorcontainmentconditions-Haintainanadequatereactorheatsink-Honitorsecondarysidepressureto:.-verifyoperationofpressurecontrolsteamdumpsystem-monitorRCScooldownrateNarrowRangeSteamGeneratorWaterLevelWideRangeSteamGeneratorWaterLevelBoricAcidTankLevelCondensateStorageTankLevelRefuelingWaterStorageTankLeveI-Determineifmalfunctionofsecondarysidesystemhasoccurred-None-None-None-None-Honitorheatsink-Haintainsteamgeneratorwaterlevel-Determineifheatsinkisbeingmaintained-VerifyRCSborationsystemfunctionsforadequatereactivitycontrol-Haintainadequatewatersupplyforauxiliaryfeedwaterpumps-Verifyadequatesupplyofemergencycorecoolingwater-VerifyECCSandcontainmentspraysystemarefunctioning>Certain.indicationsonthistableareusedassecondarydiagnosesastheoperatorproceedsthroughPost-IncidentRecovery,525lhYIF~SIlNMl""'EI'"ONIFJARY'LASS2h

PARAHETERWideRangeThandTc-None'PfYiTIHGNONEPAOPAIHANVMS2IAOLE2-3(Continued3TSCINSTRUHENTOASISINITIALEVENTDIAGNOSIS*IIOASIS(b,c)I-Haintainadequatereactorheatsink-HaintaintheproperrelationshipbetweenRCSpressureandtemperature-verifyvesselNDTTcriteria-maintainprimaryinventorysubcooled-maintainsafeshutdowncon-dition-maintainRHRconsiderationsforcooldown-monitorRCSheatupandcooldownratePressurizerHaterLevel-None-Confirmifplantisinasafeshutdowncondition-DetermineabilitytocontrolRCSpressure-HonitorRCSinventory-Haintainpressurizerwaterlevel*CertainindicationsonthistableareusedassecondarydiagnosesastheoperatorproceedsthroughPost-IncidentRecovery.5251AQf'Slla<n<IQI<t~~no~nI~4n<<n~"c<<2 0ICSTIHGIIOUSEIAOPRIDARYCIASS2TABLE2-3(Continued)TSCINSTRUMENTOASISPARAMETERSystemWideRangePressure-NoneINITIALEVENTDIAGNOSIS*BASIS(b,c)-Determineifplantisinasafe,shutdowncondition-MaintaintheproperrelationshipbetweenRCSoressureapdtempera-ture-verifyvesselNDTTcriteria-maintainprimaryinventorysubcooled(particularlywithlossofol'fsitepower)-maintainl?NRconsiderationsforcooldownContainmentBuildingWaterLevel-')eterminewhetherh'ighenergy'linerupture>asoccurredinsideoroutsidecontainment-DetermineNPSllforrecirculationmodecooling-Determinewhichequipmentincon-tainmentissubmergedCondenserAirEjectorRadiationSteamGeneratorBlowdownRadiationContaienentRadiation-Determineifsteamgeneratortubeleak.hasoccurred-Determineifsteamgeneratortubeleakhasoccurred-Determineifhighenergylinebreakorfuelmishandlingaccident-Monitorradioactivityreleasepathtoenvironment-Monitorradioactivityreleasepathtoenvironment-Monitorradioactivityreleasepathtoenvironment-Determineaccessibilitytocon-tainmentbuilding*CertainindicationsonthistableareusedassecondarydiagnosesastheoperatorproceedsthroughPost-IncldpntRecnvery.525lAlVBTlHG!lOUSE.",".A."."I:.'.r;CrPSSP MSIIHCIIOIISEPIIOPIIIHAWCLASS2TABI.E2-3(Continued)TSCIHSTRIINENTBASISPARAHETERIHITIALEVENTDIAGHOSIS*(b,c)-Determineifsignificantfueldamagehasoccurredpl&IhJh)AuxiliaryFeedwaterFlowIlightleadSafetyInjectionFlowLowlleadSafetyInjectionFlowAreaRadiationHonltoringinAuxiliaryBuildingandControlRoom-Hone-Hone-Hone-'etermineifsourceofaccidentisoutside',contaIrunentbuilding-Honitorenvironmentalconditionsaroundequipmentincontainment-Determineifsufficientflowexiststomaintainheatsink-DeterminethatECCSisdeliyer-ingflow-Honitorabilitytokeepcorecovered-DeterminethatECCSisdeliver-ingflow-Honitorabilitytokeepcorecovered-Infersprayoperation-Honitoraccessibilitytoplantzones/equipment-Honitorradioactivityreleasepathtoenvironment-Honitoreffectivenessofcleanupholdupsystems-Honitorintegrityof.long-termcoolingsystemI*Certain.indicationsonthistableareusedassecondarydiagnosesastheoperatorproceedsthroughPost-IncidentRecovery.5251AWESTIHOIIOUSEPIIOPAIETARYCLASS2 PARAMETERgf.'ftttQIIOUSEIAOPNITARYCLASSgTABLE2-3(Continued)TSBIRSTRBMBRTBASISINITIALEVENTDIAG1IOSIS+BASIS(b,c)[IAI-Honitorhabitabilityofthecontrolroom7CoreExitThermocouplesNeutronI'lux-None-None-Determineifcoreisbeingcooled-Monitorabilityofreactivitycontrolsystemstokeepthecoresubcritical-DetermineifplantisinasafeshutdownconditionIIDegreeofSuLcoolingofPrimaryCoolantPrimarySystemSafetyandReliefValvePositionPressurizerReliefTankPressure,Temperature,andLevelContainmentIsolattonValvePosition-None-None-None-None-Haintainadequatereactorheatsink-Haintainsafeshutdowncondi-tionsI-Haintainprimarysysteminventory-Monitorradioactivityreleasepathsintothecontainment-Monitorcapacitytorelieveprimarycoolantpressure-Monitorradioactivityreleasepathsintothecontainment-Monitorradioactivityreleasepathstotheenvironment-MonitorstatusofcontainmentisolationI*CertaintndtcattcnsonthistableareusedassecondarydiagnosesastheoperatorproceedsthroughPost-IncidentRecovery.5251A5fSIINGIIOIISEPl'OPIllETNYClASS2 PARAHETERSecondarySafety,Reliefs,andAtmosphericDumpValves-Hone0WESTINGIIOUSEPROPRIETARYCUSS2TA""E~.3(Continued)TSCINSTRUHENTBASISINITIALEVENTDIAGNOSIS*(b,c))-HonitorsecondarysystemintegrityBASIS-Honitor.radioactivityreleasepathstotheenvironmentAccumulatorTankLevelAccumulatorIsolationValvePositionRllRSystemFitsRllRIleatExchangerOutletTemperatureComponentCoolingMaterFlwandTemperature-None-None-None-None-None-Honitorprimarysysteminventory-Determinewhethertheaccumulatortankshavein5ectedintotheRCS-Determinesystemoperation-Hopitorprimarysysteminventory-Honitorcoreheatremovalcapabilities-Honitorcoreheatremovalcapabilities-Honitorsystemoperationofacriticalsupportsystem*CertainindicationsonthistableareusedassecondarydiagnosesastheoperatorproceedsthroughPost-IncidentRecovery.551ASESTINGIIOUSEPROMJETAB'LASS2

PARAHfTERWESIINGIIOIISEPROPRIETARYCQSSgTABLE33(Continued3TSCIHSTRUHfHTOASISINITIALfVftITDIAGtlOSIS*BASIS(b,c)BoricAcidChargingFlowLetdownflowWaterLevelinClosedSpacesAroundSafetyfquipmcnt)nAuxiliaryBuildingEmergencyVentilationDamperPositionltighLevelRadioactiveLiquid,TankLevel-tlone-None-ttone-Hone-tlone-Honitorprimarysysteminventory-Determineboronconcentrationforreactivitycontrol-HonitorabilitytocontrolRCSpressureorpri~~rysysteminve,,or-HonitorabilitytocontrolRCSpressure-Honitorcoreheatremovalcapability-Determineboronconcentrationforreactivitycontrol-Honitorenvironmentalconditionsaroundrequiredsafetyequipmentoutsideofcontainment-Ensureproperventilationtovitalareasunderpost-accidentconditions-Honitorcapacitytocontainandstoreradioactiveliquids'CertainindicationsonthistableRecovery.5251AIareusedassecondarydiagnosesastheoperatorproceedsthroughPost-Incidentgfg]NIIOIISEP.".".0"IQ'ARYClh.S2~~

PARAMETERRadioactiveGaslloldupTankPressure'tatusofAllElectricPowerSuppliesandSystemsEffluentRadioactivityNobleGases,Radiohalogens,andParticulatesPlantandEnvironsRadioactivity(PermanentandPortableInstruments)SamplingSystemMeteorology(windspeedanddirectiontemperatureproflie,andprecipitation)-tlone-None-None-tlone-NoneVlf."TltlGllOUSEPROPAIETAAYCLASS2TABLE2-3(Continued)TSCINSTRUMENTBASISINITIALEVENTDIAGNOSIS*BASIS(b,c)-Honitorcapacitytocontainandstareradiaactivegases-Ensureadequateelectricpowertasafetyandsuppartsystems-Honitorradioactivityreleasepathstotheenviranment-Monitorreleaseofradioactivematerialsnotcoveredbyeffluentmonitors-OetermineRCSchemistryforreactivitycontrolandextentoffuelcladdamage-Monitorradioactiveeffluenttransportationforemergencyplanning,doseassessments,andsourceestimatesContainmentAtmospheretemperature-NoneandttydrogenConcentration-Monitorcontainmentintegrity-Honitorenvironmentalconditiansaroundequipmentincontainment*CertainindicationsonthistableareusedassecondarydiagnosesastheoperatorproceedsthroughPost-IncidentRecovery.5251AVIESTlrlcttOUSEPROP;;tETNWCLASS2

iNgiiNGHOUSiPROPRIEMRYCLASS2SystemsStatus-ReactorCoolantSystemLoop1Loop2Loop3Loop4Taverage('F)OverpowerDTPoPWR)Overtemp.DT(%PWR)Coldlegtemp.(narrowrange)('F)Hotlegtemp.(narrowrange))'F)Reactorcoolantflow(%)Reac'.orcoolantpressure-WR(PSlG)Pressurizerpressure(PSlA)Pressurizervaportemp.(')Pressurizerliquidtemp.('F)Pressurizerrelieftankpr.ssure(PSlG)Pressurizerrelieftanklevel('h)Pressurizerrelieftanktemp.('F)Pressurizersafetyrelieftemp.('F)595.2595,2110.0110.0110.0110.0559.8559.8624.0624.01000'G~02250.02250.02250.0563.8565.21.577.6110.3120.0595.2110,0110.0559.8624.0100.02250.0595.2110.0110.0559.8624.01GO.O2250.0Figure3.1'SystemStatusDisplayatQnsiteTechnicalSupportCenter(Example)AZP-27 yIggHGHOUSEPROPRIETARYCUSSZParameterSummaryPointQescriptionYaiue..RangeUnitsStatusTO400RCSLoop1HotLegT593.40:700.OEGFNormalPO480RCSPressure2234.1OOOOLO421StmGen2NarrowRangeLevel39.10:100PO549SteamlinePressureLO103RWSiLevelLO114BoricAcidTankLevel893.00:1100100.00;10098.80:100LO119CondensateStorageTankLevel58.40:100LO947ContainmentBldg.'VaterLevel3.30:160.TO406RCSLoop1ColdLegT54720:700OEGF.NormalPSlGNormalPCLowPSlGNormalPCNormalPCNormalPCNormalPCHighFigure3.2:Parameter!n'ormationOisplayatOnsiteTechnicalSupportCenter(Example)AEP-28 16108-2WEST)HGHQUSE?ROPRlETARYCLASS2RCSCOLDLEGTElNP(oF)100700RCSHOTLEGTEMP(4R'100100PRZRLEYEL(~o)402500PRZRPRESSURE(PSlG)190002468101214161820T)ME(SECONDS)Rgure3.3GraphicDisplayatOnsiteTechnicalSupportCanter(Example)AEP-29

/<<'.s'wxA'aa<<~P4airw<<<<<<.,'/<<./<<-.ms<<w~-/t:.'/ga.~<<aasm/~as,a/~wt'<<<<4iv~wm/weaww'<<c4~V/Ella(GHOIJSKPROFRIEfARYCLASS2'.0PLAI'lTSAFETYSTATUSDISPLAY4.SPURPOSEThefunctianofthePlantSafetyStatusDisplay(PSSD)istopresentasuccinctaccountoftheoverallplantsafetystatustothecontrolroomoperator(orsupervisor).Theentiredatabaseshouldbeavailabletotheoperatorarrangedinaformatthatwillenhancehisresponsetoeventsandthediagnosesofthecauseoftheevent.BecausethePSSDservesasani~aortantinterfacebetweentheplantprocessandtheoperator,theinformationpresentationshouldbedefinedintermsofparametersandlogicsupportiveofdefinedoperating.proceduresfordealingwithabnormalevents.4.2INPUTDETERMINATIONInurdartudeterminethe".squiredcperatinna1madesfnrthePSSDgenemustfirstconsider'hevarioustypesoftransientswhichmayoccur.Areviewafpostulatedplanttransients(events)indicatedthattheycanbedividedintotwobasiccategories:(b,c,e)1.Slawtransienatswnichdanotresultinimnediateprotectionsystemsactuationandforwhichthecontrolroomoperatorhasanopportunitytoreacttopossiblyterminatetheeventbeforesafetysystemsarerequiredtofunction.Z.Fasttransientswhichresultinalmostimmediatereactortripandposs'.blysafeguardsacuationandforwhichthecontrolroomoperator'sresporsseistoreacttoensurethatappropriatesafetymeasureshavebeentakenandtodiagnosetheevent(.BecausecfthefactthatLdi-;-erectparametersandsignalrangesaraassociatedwiththetwopotentialeventtypegsthePSSOincorparatesLtwocperatingmades.The',ir'tmade(TERMIRATEMODE)isitivewhi1e:hge(b,c,e)!b,c,e)4-15435AAEP-30 IIIESTll'lGHGUSEPRQPRlEl'nRYCL(SS2At(b,c.e)LpIantis1nanormaloperatingcond1tionandthesecondmode(MITIGATEMDOE)isactivefollowingareactortrgp,Theparametersavailablefor'3(b.c-)Leachmodewerechosentomaximizetheusefulamountof1nformat1ontobe(btc.e)displayedtotheoperateTheroleforwhichthe:pSSDprovidesLsupportforeachoftheoperatingmode/a1sasfoll'ows:t(bce)lcEMIMATEMODE1.Monitortheplantprocessforabnormalitiesindicativeofslowtransientsthatdonotresultinimediatereactortripsandforwhichthecontrolroomoperatormighttakecorrectiveorprotectiveaction.2.Monitortheintegrity-ofthevariousboundariestoradioactiverelease.MITIf)ATEKOOE1.Monitorthesafetystatu"oftheastrippedcondition.2.Monitorforconditionswhichmightleadtoabreachofanyofthelevelsofdefenseagainstradioactiverelease.3.Monitortheconditionofthebarrierstoradioactiverelease.Foranyevent,thesafetystatusoftheplantcanbeevaluatedintermsofsixbasicsafetyconcms.Theseconcernscanbestatedasfollows;1.SaturationofReactorCoolant2.ReactiviyExcursion3.LossofPrimaryCoolantInventorya.LossofPressureandTemperatureContre/142AEP-31 LB.RadioactiveRelease(VESTNGHQUSEPRQPRlETARyCLASS2(b,c,e)5.ContainmentEnvironmengtByaddressingLacysafetyconcerns,theconsequencesofabnormaleventscanbelimitedormitigatgd,(b,c,e)tTheteysafetyconcernscanberelatedtospecificabnormaloccur-rences..Tables4-Iand4-2indicatekeysafetygoalsforsometypicalpostulatedeventsintermsofthePSSDoperatingmode.Itmustbenotedthattheseeventsaretypicalanditisconceivableformultipleeventstooccurinundefinablesequences.Forthesereasons,thePSSDmustbedesignedonthebasisofkeysafetyconcernsratherthanspecificscenario/a/IndefiningtheinputsforthePSSQ,ttuorequirementshavetobeme+~tiasfo11ows:.(b,c,e)-(b,c,e)Ll.Theinputsselectedmustrepresentaminimumsatsufficientformonitoringallpossibleeventsincludingthosewhichmightnothavebeenanticipated.(b,c,e)2.Theselectionofinputsmustaddressconditionswithpotentiallyerroneoussignals,conflictingindications,andparametersoutofrange(I.e.,redundancyanddiversity)gInresponsetotheLfirstrequirement,thefunctionofthePSSOhasbeenconsideredintwoways.Theprimaryfunctionistomonitortheplantprocssintermsofsatisfyingthekeysafetyconcerns.Asstatedabove,byguaranteeingthattheseconcernsareaddressed,theconditionsofunanticipatedeventsoreventsequencscanbesatisfied.ThesecondfunctionofthePSSDistosupportthemonitoringfunctionoftheplantforpostulatedeventsandtoprovideaman-machineinterfacedesignthatsupportsa.definedevaluationprocessandproceduresforrespondingtoabnormalevents(b,c,e)"43"84-3AEP-32

'NEST!!1B!HOUSEPROPRIETARYCLA$$2fnordertosatisfytheLsecondconsiderationofevaluatingerroneoussignalsandtheneedforredundancyand"diversity,thePSSOmustperform-operationsuponmulti-sensorinputstoevaluateerroneoussignalsandbeabletoprovidetheoperatorwithadiversemethodofindicatingtheplantprocess.TheinputstothePSSOarechosenuponthebasisoftheirdirectrelevancetothekeysafetyconcerns.Tables4-3and4-4listsomespecificinputsrelatedtokeysafetyconcernsforseveralevents4.3MAN-i%CHINEINTERFACE(a,b,c)(a,c)ThePSSOsystemwill-processthedefinedinputdatasetofplantparam<<,stereatftwosecondinterval/sandgeneratedisplaysforredundantPSSDdedicatedCRTslocatedinthecontrolroom.QAdedicatedCRTwillalsobelocatedintheOnsiteTechnicalSupportCentaurInordertoachieveaneffectiveman-machineinterface,thedisplaysystemmustbedesignedtoprovidealogicalandhumanengineereddis-playstructureandselectionprocessinamannerwhichsupportsdefinedrolesinwhichtheoperatorisexpectedtoperformduringanabnormaloccurrence.(b,c)TheroleofthecontrolroomoperatorinLdatectingandreacting".oanabnormaloccurrenceisexpectedtofollowtherourbasicactivitieQsdepictedinFigure4-1.Thedisplaysystemstructureshouldbe.definedsuchthatitLsupportsanidentifiablegoalforeachofthegeneralactivitiesshowninthefigureThe.segoalgsaredefinedasfollows:IActivity:DetectionGoal:Thecontrolroomoperatorshouldbeinastateofreadinesstomakearapiddetectionofincipientthreatsoractualeventswhichmayaffectplantsafety.Theresponseoftheoperatorwouldbebaseduponhisknowledgeofexpectedplantperformanceandhisskillincontrollingtheplantprocess!.

Nay."4Jvsaa's'w4aActivity:ReactionV'-"SIflGHGUSEPROPS!EERYCLASS2(b,c)Goal:Thecontrolroomoperatormustimmediatelyreacttothedetectionofanevent.Hisirstobjectiveistoassurethatappropriatesafetysystemresponseshavebeentakenandthatkeysafetyconcernsarebeingaddressedbyobservingcriticalplantparameters.Activity:DiagnosisGoal:Followingthecontrolroomoperator'sinmediatereactionitisthennecessarytodiagnosethecause{s)oftheeventanddetermineifanydamagetothevariousbarrierstoradioactivereleasehasoccurred.Theoperationalmodeatthistimewouldbebasedontheoperator'sknowledgesupportedbyreferencetovariousabnormalandemergencyoperatingprocedures.:0Activity:Terminate/MitigateGoal:Atthelaterstagesoftheeventthecontrolroomopera-torwillneedtoimplementtherulesorstrategiesthathavebeenidentifiedasaresultofthediagnosisactiv-ity.Theoperator'sgoalistoverifythatcorrectiveactionsarasatisfyingthekeysafetyconcern/aThedisplaystructureshovtninFigure4-s/supportsthespecifiedcontrolroomoperatoractivitiesandgoals.Thedisplaysarestructuredintothreelevelsofinformationrangingfromgeneralplantsystensumaryinformationwithabroadfieldofat.ention,secondlytoalevelofinformationwithanarrowerfieldofattentionandmoredefinitiveinformationonsubsystemsandfunctions,andfinallytoalevelofinformationcontainingirdividualsensorvaluesandstatuQs(a,c,f)r,34gAEP-34

'hil'G~JSCPQ,laTAR(CLASSQLeveI1wouldcontaininformationintheformofacontinuousgraphicdisplayforeachofthetwooperatingmodesofthePSSO.InformationcontainedinthedisplaywouldsupportthedetectionactivityIAmajorproblemassociatedwiththeman-machineinterfaceisthe/requirementthattheplantoperatorsampleandprocessa'largenumberofplantparametersandperformwhataretermedmulti-parameterdecisionprocesses.AnadvancedconceptingraphicCRTdisplaydesignedtoaidtheoperator,,isemployedforLevel1informationinthePSSTFigure4-3isanillustrationofthedisplay.IEachrayinthefigurerepre-sentsthescaleforaprocessparameter.Whenthenormaloperatingvaluesfortheparametersareplottedonthescalesandlinesaredrawnconnectingthepoints,ageometricpatternisdeveloped.Positivedeviationsfromthenormalvaluesresultinpointsfurtherawayfromthecente~ofthefigurewhilenegativedeviationsresultinpointsclosertothecenterofthefigure.Whentheactualvaluesofparametersaredifferentfromthenormalorreferencevalues,theresultisageometricpatterndifferentfromtheoriginalpatter/aFigures4-4and4-5arepreliminaryversionsof[Level1displaysforeachofthePSSDoperationaImode/afortwosampleevents:PrimarytoSecondaryCoolantSystemLeakandPrimaryCoolantSystanLeaktoContainment.Theparameterschosenforthedisplayswerechosento/permitanevaluationoftheteysafetyconcern/a/ThisadvancedgraphicdispIayprovidestwodistinctadvantaoesoverconventionalcontrolrocmindicators:aconcise,systemsleveloriented,integrationofparametersandsecondly,agraphicdisplayformat.Thedetectionofanabnormalconditionisenhancedastheoperatortaskisnowbaseduponthediscriminationoftwogeometricfigures.NuIti-parameterdecisionsandeventevaluationisfacili-tatedbytheintegratednatureofthedisplayandthefactthatonlydifferencesinparametersarehighlightedbythedisplay.Theoperatorupondetectingabnormalitiesisthenabletosekmorespecificinforma-tionatotherinformationlevelstosupportthereaction,diagnosis,andterminate/mitigateactivitiegs5435A4-6AEP-35

)';-ST!,'su,",OUSEPROPrltTAnYCLASS2The'inforaationatfLeve12isanexpansionofeachofthekeysafetyconcernsandsystems.blaredetailedinformationisprovidedonthestatusoftheprocess.Forexample,the'valuesofpressuresandwaterlevelsinindividualsteamgeneratorscouldbeprovidedatthislevel.Inaddition,trenddisplaysfortheprevious5minutesofoperationofLevel1primarydisplayparametersareprov',ded.Diversityinprocessindicationsatthislevelwillbeemployedtoenabletheoperatortoverifyconclusions.AtLevel3,thedataisdetailedfurthertoprovideinformationonthestatusofindividualsensors,multiplemeasurementpoints,anddataanomalies.Thesensorvaluesareannotatedtoinclude'suchthingsasdata-out-of-rangeandprocesslimits.Informationonsuspectdataqua11tyiscarriedintoupperdisp1ayleve1@(a,c,f)543""A4~7AZP-36

• ee'ejÃESTlHQHOUSEP!OPRfET'qYCt~SSZTASLE4-1(b,c,e)PLANTSAFETYSTATUS..OISPLAY>>SAFETYGOALS-TERMINATEMOOETRANSIENTSReactorControlSystemsMalfunctioneee4e.'*C'~1C--+iAStoprodmotionMaintaincorethermalandnuclearparameterswithinlimitsReactorCoolantSystemMakeupControlPreventcorethermalandnuclearparametersfromexceedinglimitse'Maintain-pressurizerpressureandlevelInadvertentOepressurization(Slow)TerminatedepressurizationRestoresystanpressureReactorCoolantSystemLeakLimitradioactivereleaseegMaintainpressurizerpressureandlevel'e0543514-8AEP-37 V/EST1HGHOUSEPRCPRluARYCLASS2TABLE4-2ReactorTripPLANTSAFETYSTATUSOISPLAY-SAFETYGOALS-MITIGATEMOOETRANSIENTS(b,c,e)Maintainheatsinkviasteamgenerators-,.MaintainsubcoolingbycontrollingsteampressureMaintainpressurizerlevelStationBlackoutProvidesecondaryheatsinkMaintainsubcoolingMaintainpressurizerlevelEmergencyEorationPreventreturntocriticalityOperationwithNaturalCirculationProvideheatsinkControlsubcoo1ingMaintainpressurizerlevelSpuriousSafetyInjectionOeterminesafetyinjectionisnotrequiredandterminateactionLossofReactorCoolantVerifyandestablishshorttermcorecoolingMaintainlongtermshutdownandcooling5435A4-9AEP-38 V<ESTtfsGHOUSEPOPHIET:RYCLASS2TABLE4-2.(Continued)PLANTSAFETYSTATUSDISPLAY-SAFETY'OALS-MITIGATEMODETRANSIENTS',Lossof'econdaryCoolantEstablishstabilizedreactorcoolantsystemandsteamgeneratorconditionsMinimizeenergyreleasePreventliftingof.pressurizersafetyvalvesIsolate,auxiliaryfeedtoaffectedsteam.generatorBoratetomaintainreactorshutdownmarginSteamGeneratorTubeRuptureMinimizeradioactivematerialreleaseEstablishfeedwatertounaffectedsteamgeneratorsandisolate.faultedunitMaintainresidualheatremovalcapability-*-MaintainRCS'ubcoolingPreventover-floodingoffaultysteamgeneratorVVC'43GA4-10AEP-39QVC'C IYBOllCHG"SEFROPRtci~7l'LASS2TABLE4-3PLANTSAFETYSTATUSOISPLAYTERMINATEMOOEPARAMETERS(b,c,e)VariableTransientReactorControlSystemMalfunctionReactorCoolantReactor'akeupCoolantControlSystemInadvertentSystemMalfunctionOepressurizationLeakavgrefRodpositionOeltaTStartuprateCountratePzr.pressur0ChargingflowPzr.levelComp.coolH20radContainmentradAirejectrad.Blowdownrad.Cont.humidityCont.temperaturesCont.oressurePrz.dischargepipingtempsPRTpressurePRTlevelPRTtempsRCPsealtempera-tureRCPsealflowRCPseallevelYCTflowXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.XXXXXXXXXjJimp4-11.AEP-40

Y~wRCHOVSEPRCPRIETACCLASS7PLANTSAPPYSTATUSOISPLAY"IlTTGATEWOEPARAvETERSVWableTrans1cntReactorTripStationBlackoutGnergencyBar'ationOperationwith'laturalClrculatlonlossofCeolantAccidentLossafSecondaryCoolantSteamGeneratorTubeRuature.ReactartripbreakerStartuprateReutranfluxRodpos1tfonTurbinetHpBlackoutsignalTavg(thermacoup1es)Radbottom3nd.PrimarypressureStcamflexFeedflowPressurfterlevelCarethcrmacouplesCont.radarat<anAfrQectarrad$at5anSlowdownradiationCont.pressurePri.M.R.tanp.StcampressureCant.sumplevelCant.temperature-Cant.huahdltyChargingflawS.G.levelB.A.tankleveiAux.fmdflawSa'lawRMSTlevelCSTlevelXXXXI~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"XXXXXXXXa-lZ.)cSBAAEP-41 16708-1ygggtfGHOUSEPROPRtH'ARYCLOS2(a,c)CONDITIONSNORMAL?DETECTIONIMPLEMENTRESPONSEIDENTIFYRESPONSEYESSAPETYLIMITSVIOLATEDREACTIONNODIAGNOSEPROBLEMDIAGNOSISTAKECORRECTIV'EACTIONTERMINATE/MITIGATEFigure4-1.OperatorResponseMadelAEP-42 1664310WESTINGHOUSEPROPRIETARY,CLASS2Qrepftie,OlsplayTpC'yXLEVEL1OISPLAYLoop,TSATTAVQTHTCPR.PressSTIjf/FOFlowPSteamRCP'sPressureReliefVlv.SafetyVlv.SprayHeatersPER.TCSReactorCoolantInventoryPrzrLevelCte.LeatownW.R.TH.TC.CoreTC'sTSAT.Etc.,LEVEL2OISP'LAYSSensors,ComparisonsofRedurufantIVleasurernentErrorCtteeksLEVEL3OISPLAYSjInputsFigure4-2.DisplayStructureofPlantStatusDisplayAEP-43

WESTlHGHOUSEPROPRlETARYCLASS2PressurizerPressure(Value)psiPrimaryTavg(Value)FStartupRate(Value)Oec/MinPressurizerLevel(Value)4k/////////ContainmentHumid(Value)o/oTemp(Value)'FChargingFlow(Value)GPMSteamGenLevel(Value)IoRadiationContmtBlwdnAirEjectFig"~4-3.S~pieDisplay-plantSafetySttusDl~tayAEp-44

NESTINGHOUSEPROPRIETARYCLASS2-~k4PressurizerPressure(Value)psiPrimaryTavg(Value)'FStartupRate(Value)Dec/MinPressurizerLevel(Value)%IIIIIIIContainmentHumid(Value)'6'emp(Value)'FChargingFlow(Value)GPMSteamGenLevel(Value)%RadiationContmtBtwdnAirEjectFigure44.SamplePlantSafetyStatusDisplay-TerminateMode-PrimarytoSecondaryCoolantSys;emLeak(SGTubelak)AEP-45 WESTINGHOUSEPROPRIETARYCLASS2RCSW.R.Pressure(Value)psiRCSW.R.Temp(Value)oF(Value)'FTsatStartupRate(Value)Dec/Min(a,c,f)4~'\PressurizerLevel(Value)%IIIIIIIrr~r\\\IIIIIIIContainmentPressure(Value)psiR.V.Level(Value)%SteamGenLevel(Value)%RadiationContmtBiddnAirEjectFigure4-KSamplePlantSafetyStatusDisplay-MitigateMode-PrimaryCoolantSystemLeaktoContainmentmx-46

'EVESTlNQHOOSEPROPRIETARYCLASS25.0.BYPASSEDANOINOPERA8LESTATUSINDICATIONFOR.PLANTSAFETYSYSTEMS5.1PURPOSEThepurposeoftheBypassedandInoperableStatusIndication(BISI)systemistoprovidethecontrolroomoperatorwithacontinuoussystemslevelindicationofabypassedorinoperableconditionforthesystemscomprisingtheengineeredsafetyfeatures.Thesystemconsidersthe,actualstatusofindividualcomponentsincludingsystemslevelbypassesandcontrolroomoperatorenteredinputsforcomponentsremovedfromservice.5~2INPUTOETERNINATIONBypassedandinoperablestatusindicationisprovidedforthesystemscomprisingtheengineeredsafetyfeaturesandtheircriticalsupoortsystems.ThesesystemsareidentifiedinTableS.l.Thistablealsoidentifiesthetypesofcomponentsforwhichmonitoringisrequired,theapproximatenumberofeachtypeofcomponent,andthetypeofstatus.informationneeded.Thislistisgenericinnatureandwillberevisedtomeetindividualplantspecificdesigns.Ietheevaluationofsysteminputs,thecomponentsineachsystanare.consideredinthelightofbeinginaproperstatetoperformorsupoorttheoperationofasafetyfunction.ThesystemslevelbypassfunctionsthatmustalsobeconsideredarelistedinTable:5.2.Inadditiontoautomaticallymonitoredinputs,thesystemalsoconsiderstheeffectofcomponentorsys.emoutofserviceinputsmanuallyenteredbythecontrolroomoperator.5.3MAN-MACHINEINTERFACETheinterfacebetweentheoperatorandthissystemisprovidedbyredun-dantCRTdisplaysandkeyboardconsoleslocatedinthecontrolroom.PersonnellocatedintheOnsiteTechnicalSupportCenterwillalsobeAEP-47

~Ve'FSTlhGHOUSEPRO?RlH'hI1YCLASS2abletoaccessthesameinformation.The6IGluti1izesastructureddisplayhierarchyfortheoperator'.'nterface.ThedisplayhierarchyisshowninFigure3.1.Theprimarydisplay,anexampleofwhichisshowninFigure3.2pcon-tainsthefollowinginformationforeachofthesystemscomprisingtheengineeredsafetyfeatures:LSypassedorinope~ablestatu"indicationforeachaffectedsubsystemoneitherasystemsleveland/ortrainlevelbasis.Z.identificationofwhethertheconditionisduetotheinoperablestatusofacomponentorauxiliarysupportsuchascoolingwater,powersupply,tc.OtherlevelsofdisplayssuchasshowninFigure.3.3providesupportinginformationonindividualcomponentswithineachsubsystemandsupportsystem.Lnnadditionaldisplayprovidesa".abulationofallcontrolroomoperatorenteredinputsrorinoperablecomponentsforwhichautomaticmonitoringcannotbeaccommodatedorforwhichmonitoringdoesnotcurrentlyexistwheneverthestatusofasystembecomesinoperableorbypassed,theontrolroanoperatorwillbealertedbyanaudiblealarmandtheprimarydisplaywillindicateviavideohighlighting(e.g.,flashing,colorchange,reversevideo,etc.)theaffectedsystenandsubsys.em.Theoperatorcanthenaccesssupportingdisplaystcdeterminethecauseofthebypassedorinoperablecondition.Theontrolroomoperatormustacknowledgetheabnormalconditioninordertosilencetheaudiblealarm.Reinstatementofnormalsystenfunctionwi11alsogenerateadifferentaudiblesignal.TwoadditionalcapabilitiesoftheSISIarethetimingandtestfunc-tionssAEP48

WESTltsGHQUSEPI'.OPHl~iARYCL".SSg/Thetimingi'unctionenab'lesthecontrolromaperatortasetupacount-downtimingfunctionforasystemwhichisbypassedorinoperable.Anaudiblealarmwouldbegeneratedattheexpirationoftheoperatorspecifiedtimelimit.-Thisfeat'urewouldaidthecontrolroomoperatorincomplyingwithTechnicalSpecificationtimelimitsforsystemsunavailableforservice.(a,cThetestfunctionenablesthecontrolroomoperatortotesttheefectonsystemslevelstatusofachangeincomponent,statuspriortochang-ingthecomponent'sstatus.Inresponsetothecontrolroomoperatorenteredinput,simulatingtheaffectofchangingacomponent'sorsys-tem'sstatus,thesystemdeterminestneresultanteffectonsystemoperabilityandindicatestheresulttothecentralracmoperator3~3AEP-49

• ITABLES.l-~BYPASSEDAt10ItsOPRABLSTATUSItsOICATIOt1COMPOttEHTINPUTS~t$y,'I~'ao"a('.c)~SstemEmergencycorecooling.AuxiliaryfeedwaterComoonentsYalves=Pumps~.Process(level,pressure)Valves.Pumps.ProcessStatusOpen/ShutOperableHigh/L'o~,etc.Open/Shut.OperableNigh/Low,etc.0Containmentspray'ontainmentiso1ationValvesPumpsProcessValvesOpen/ShutOperable=High/Low,etcOpen/ShutAuxiliarypowersystemBreakers'eneratorsVoltagesOpen/Closed/OutOperab.leHigh/Low'ContainmentventilationYalvesMotorsOpen/ShutOperableContainmenthydrogenrecombinersValvesMotorsOpen/ShuOperableComponentcoo1ingValvesPumpsOpen/ShutOperableServicewaterYalvesPumpsOpen/ShutOperable3~AEP-50~.'~~o~~~~4~

AWESTINGHOUSEPROPRjETARYCL4SS2TABLE5.2YrqBYPASSEDANDINOPERABLESTATUS,INOICATION-SYSTEMLEVELBYPASSFUNCTIONSSafetyinjectionLowpressurizerpressureLowsteamlinepressureManualreset~s44SteamlincisolationSteamdumpinterlockSteamgeneratorblowdownisolation3-5AEP-515251A

IESTINGHOUSF.PROPRIETARYCLASS2OperatorInputsSystemsLevelStatuscCCSHlHeadSlAccumulatorsEtc.PrfrnaryQteplaySafetylntecuonContinentSpraylOtnerslPump1ReadyPump2OutValvetOpenStthsysternContponentLevelQtapksyContainmentSpraySucpotComoonentCoolingESPPowerEtc.SupportSystornlComponentLovelPisplayFigure5.1DisplayStructure-8ypasseCandinoperableStatusindicationAEP-52 IESTINGHpUSEpRppRIETARYCLASS28YPASSEDANDINOPERABLESTATUSDISPLAYSYSTEMSEmergencyCoreCooling-HighHeadSIIntermediateHeadSlLowHeadSIAccumulatorsAuxiliaryFeedwatrContainmentIsolationContainmentSprayContaiomentVentilationSafeguardsPowerSourceOperableOperableOperableOperableOperableOperableInoperable-TrainAComponentOperableOperableFigure.5.2PrimaryDisofay-BypauedandinoperableStatusindicationAZP53 WESTINGHOUSEPROPRlETARYCLAS)gTrainACONTAINMENTSPPAyTrain8TrainCVLY101PumpASuetYLV111NAOHSupplyPumpAOpenOpenOperableVLY102PumpAOutletClosedVLY103HeadrAOutletVLV121RecircAClosedClosedRefuelingWaterStorageTankVLV201Pump8SuetVLV211NAOHSupplyPump8VLV202Pump8OutletVLV203Headr8OutletVLV221Recirc8OpenOpenOperableOpenClosedClosedVLV301PumpCSuetVLV311NAOHSupplyPumpCVLV302PumpCOutletVLV303HeadrCOutletVLY321RecircCOpenOpenOperableOpenClosedClosedLS1COLevelLS101LevelLS102LeveiLS103LevelNormalNormalNormalNormalNAOHSprayAdditiveLS200LevelNormalLS201LevelNormalLS202LevelNormalTS200TempNormalTS201TempNormalTS202TempNormalFigure5.3SecondaryDisplay-BypassedandInoperableSt-tusInformationAEP-54 6TSCZNSTRUiiENTATZONAsdescribedinSection2,mostoftheinputsignalsttieTSCcomputeraretakenfromtheexistinginstrumentswhichalsoprovidesignalsfortheControlRoomindicators.Thisapproachwillprovideconsistentdatainboththecontrolroom,OnsiteTechnicalSupportCenterandtheEOF.TheinputsignalstotheTSCcomputerthereforehavethesamehighquality,accuracyandreliabilityasthecontrolroomsignal.ZnputstotheTSCcomputerprovidetransformerisolationforallanaloginputsignalsandalldigitalinputsignalsareopticallyisolated.Znaddition,allsignalsfromtheReactorProtectionChannelsaretakenaftertheexistingsafetygradeisolators.TheinterfacingoftheTSCComputertotheexistingplantinstrumentationwasdesignedsoasnottoresultinanydegradationofthecontrolroom,protectionsystem,controlsorotherplantfunctions.Anydegre'dationthatisqnotedduringcheckoutandintegratedsystemstestingwillbecorrected.AEP-55 7..TSCKWERSUPPLYSYSTEPS7.1POWERYOTHETSCCCMPUPERSYSTl24:1bg~y(UPS).ThisUPSsystemwillprovidetheTSCc~ezsarBpexiphexalegal@~<withahighquality,transientfxepowersource.7.1.1THEUPSSYSTEM:Figuxe7.1showsaone-linediagram(schematic)fortheUPSsystem.-Thesystemconsistsofxedundar&battezychairs,.battezy,staticinvextexs,andstatictxansferswitches.~ruxmalconditions,thebattezychargerconvertsACtoCCandsuppliesittotheimaxter.'Ihebattexychargeralsokemsthebattezyat,fiQlcharge.Theinvexter.convertstheCCtoACinordertosupplythe7.1.2COHSHQ~SCFPCNERSUPPLYINTERRUPTIGH:thexeisapowerxeduction(dipordegradation)orloss(failure)oftheACpcwersouxce,theUPSbattezy?eccnest".wpr'unarysourceofD"to&aumexter,ratherthan51mbattezychargerwhichhaslostitsnormals~ofACpowersupply.Tt~hFforapexicdof30minutes.Thisallowsasufficienttineintervalinwhichadiesel.genexator(badmpACsource)canbemadeavailabletoprovidepowertotheinverter.Intheunli3celyeventoflossorAEP-56 TSCPOWERSUPPLYSYSTEM(CONCEPTUALOESIGN)IEMERGENCYSOURCENORMALSOURCEBACK-UP'OURCEINOEPENOENT600VOLTBUSINOEPENOENT600VOLTBUSINOEPENOENT600VOLTBUSO'C.C.BREAKER225AM.C.C.BREAKER225AM.C,C.BREAKER225AAUTOMATICTRANSFERSWITCH260A600'5KVA120~700A~MPIBATTERYCHARGERI(ALTERNATE}700AMPBATTERYCHARGERBATTERY927A40KVAINVERTER40KVAINVERTERSTATICSNITCHSTATICSWITCHFIGURE7.IUNITWITSCCOMPUTER8P'ERIPHERALSUNITW2TSCCOMPUTER8PERIPHERALSAEP-56o

unavailabilityafboththerurmalandbadcupACsources,thestaticswi~willbeusedfortransfer,ifnecessary,totheenaxcpncyACsource~7;2PONERTOTHETSCCDMPLZX:Standardbalan-plant(BOP)sourceswillprovidetheTSCwithpowerforlightingandcowmniencereceptacles.Foradditionalprotection,,thelightizqfixturesareprovidedwithbatterypactumforcontinuedoperationintheeventoflossaftheEOPpamrsupply.ThePRCequitantwillbesuppliedfrcmanEssentialServicesSystembusQCsource).AEP-57 Section8.0OriginalpagesAEP-58throughAEP-62havebeendeletedfromthissubmittal.ThedescriptiveinformationthatwascontainedthereincanbefoundintheOCCNPEmergencyPlan.L?afIC5~CAEP-58

Section9.0OriginalpagesAEP-63throughAEP-65havebeendeletedfromthissubmittal.Listingsofplantrecords,plantspecificreferencematerial,generaltechnicalreferencematerial,plantproceduresandreportsthatareavailabletopersonnelworkingintheTSCareprovidedingeneralcompanyinternaldocumentswhichpertaintothesubjectmatter.AEP-63 Attachment1toAEP:NRC:0916IREASONSAND10CFR50.92ANALYSESFORCHANGESTOTHEDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNIT2TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS IIIj,r/II1rr+ktr'flgIPJfenrr~Ab::.,i.jf",",1;i,'j,-';:;,,;e'It4I).r.,g~Artl11I4~'1ICjIIpI)1.,jII'I1'I11IJI,4iI,Irt'>>jar'lrrjh/trIIl AEP:NRC:0916IAttachment1Page1of18TheTechnicalSpecification(T/S)changesincludedinthisletterare,ingeneral,thosenecessarytosupportthesafetyanalysesperformedbyExxonNuclearCompany(ENC)fortheUnit2Cycle6reload.Inadditiontothesechanges,however,wehaveincludedadditionalchangeswhichareintendedtomaketheT/Ssclearer,easiertouse,ormoreconsistentwiththeStandardTechnicalSpecifications(STSs)forWestinghousePressurizedWaterReactors,NUREG-0452,Rev.4(orDraftRev.5,whereapplicable).AsummaryofthechangeshasbeenincludedasAttachment10tothisletter.Itincludesabriefdescriptionofeachchange,aswellasthereasonforthechange,and,whereapplicable,referencestothesafetyanalysesthechangeisbasedon.Thisattachmentincludesanoverviewofthechanges,aswellasour10CFR50.92justificationsfornosignificanthazardsconsideration.Pleasenotethatthechangeswillbereferredtobytheirnumbers,whicharegiveninthe"DescriptionofChange"columninAttachment10.Wehavegroupedthechangesinto12separatetypesforeaseofdiscussion.Thesechangesarediscussedbelow.1.EditorialChangesThefirstgroupofchangestobediscussedconsistsofthosethatarepurelyeditorialinnature.Thesechangesarenumbered1,2,5,6,12,20/21'4'5'6'5'0~60~62~69'4'1~83~84'8'"90'3J94'7/98'nd105inAttachment10.ThesechangesareproposedtoenhancethereadabilityoftheT/Ss,toachieveconsistencybetweentheUnit1and2T/Ss,ortoachieveconsistencywiththeSTSs,asdescribedinAttachment10.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendmentwillinvolveanosignificanthazardsconsiderationiftheproposedamendmentdoesnot:'(2)(3)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated,orinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Criterion1Thesechanges,beingeditorialinnatureandintendedtoimprovethereadabilityoftheT/Ss,willnotreduceinanywayrequirementsorcommitmentsintheexistingT/Ss.Thus,noincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofapreviouslyevaluatedaccidentwouldbeexpected.Criterion2Thesepurelyeditorialchangeswillnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyevaluated,becauseallaccidentanalysesandnucleardesignbasesremainunchanged.

AEP:NRC:0916IAttachment1Page2of18Criterion3Theproposedamendmentwillnotinvolveasignificantreductioninmarginofsafety,because,asdiscussedabove,allaccidentanalysesandnucleardesignbasesremainunchanged.Lastly,wenotethattheCommissionhasprovidedguidanceconcerningthedeterminationofsignificanthazardsbyprovidingcertainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendmentsconsiderednotlikelytoinvolvesignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefirstoftheseexamplesreferstochanges.thatarepurelyadministrativeinnature:forexample,changestoachieveconsistencythroughouttheT/Ss,correctionofanerror,orachangeinnomenclature.ThisgroupofproposedchangesisintendedtoachieveconsistencybetweentheUnit1and2T/Ss,toachievegreaterconsistencywiththeSTSformat,ortoimprovetheoverallreadabilityoftheT/Sdocument.Asthesechangesarepurelyeditorialanddonotimpactsafetyinanyway,webelievetheFederalRegisterexamplecitedisapplicableandthatthechangesinvolvenosignificanthazardsconsideration.2.Removalof3-LooTechnicalSecificationsAsecondcategoryofchangesinvolvesremovalofTechnicalSpecificationprovisionsfor3reactorcoolantloopoperationinOperationalModes1and2.Thesearechangesnumbered3,7,16,29,30,31,46,56,59,61,67,91,99,and100inAttachment10.Thiscategoryincludesallchangesinvolvingremovalof3-loopprovisionsexceptforthoseassociatedwithFunctionalUnitl.e.(DifferentialPressureBetweenSteamLines-High)onEngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESF)ActuationInstrumentationTable3.3-3.Three-loopchangesassociatedwiththisESFsignalarediscussedinCategory5ofthisAttachment.LicenseCondition2.C.3(j)forUnit2prohibitsoperationwithlessthan4pumpsatpowerlevelsabovetheP-7permissive(approximately11%ofratedthermalpower).Asamatterofpractice,wehaveextendedthisrestrictiontocoverallofModes1and2.AsT/Sscovering3-loopoperationinModes1and2arethereforenotnecessary,weproposetoremovethemtostreamlinethedocument.IncludedinthisgroupofchangesisthedeletionofT/S3/4.4.1.4.Althoughthisspecificationcontainsprovisionsforlessthan4-loopoperationinmodesotherthan1and2,therequirementsforothermodeswhichremainapplicableareaddressedidenticallyinotherT/Ss,asspecifiedbelow:ActionStatement(BelowP-7)WhereAddressedabcT/S3'.1.1T/Ss3.4.1.2and3.4.1.3Notneeded,since3-loopoperationinModes1and2willbeprohibited.

AEP:NRC:0916IAttachment1Page3of18Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendmentwillinvolveanosignificanthazardsconsiderationiftheproposedamendmentdoesnot:(2)(3)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated,orinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Criterion1Thisgroupofchangeswillextendthelicenseconditionprohibiting3-loopoperationabovetheP-7permissivetoincludeallofModes1and2.Thus,thechangeswouldbeexpected,asaminimum,toreducetheprobability,orconsequencesofapreviouslyevaluatedaccident.Criterion2Sincethesechangesplaceadditionalrestrictionsonplantoperation,theywouldnotbeexpectedtocreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated.Criterion3Since3-loopoperationinallofModes1and2willbeprohibited,additionalmargintoDNBunderaccidentconditionsshouldresult.Thus,marginofsafetyshouldbeincreasedratherthandecreased.Lastly,wenotethattheCommissionhasprovidedguidanceconcerningthedeterminationofsignificanthazardsbyprovidingcertainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendmentsconsiderednotlikelytoinvolvesignificanthazardsconsideration.Thesecondoftheseexamplesreferstochangesthatimposeadditionallimitations,restrictions,orcontrolsnotpresentlyincludedintheT/Ss.Sinceprohibitionof3-loopoperationinModes1and2constitutesarestrictionwhichthecurrentT/Ssdonothave,webelievethisexampleisapplicableandthatthechangesinvolvenosignificanthazardsconsideration.3.AdditionalRestrictionsBecauseofSafetyAnalysesAthirdgroupofchangesinvolvesinclusionofproposednewrequirementsintheT/Ss.ThenewrequirementsareproposedtomaketheT/SsconsistentwiththesafetyanalysesperformedbyENCinsupportoftheCycle6reload,ortoachieveconsistencywiththeSTS.Thesechangesarenumbered9,22,51,52,55,63,64,70,72,73,80,82,86,92,and102inAttachment10.Theapplicablereferencestothesafetyanalysesareincludedtherealso.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendmentwillinvolveanosignificanthazardsconsiderationiftheproposedamendmentdoesnot:(1)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated, AEP:NRC:0916IAttachment1Page4of18(2)createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated,or(3)involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Criterion1ThesechangesconstituteadditionalrestrictionsontheplantintermsofT/Smodeapplicability,surveillancerequirements,orActionStatementrequirements.Sincenoneofthesechangesreduceinanywayprevioussafetyrequirements,theywouldnotbeexpectedtoresultinanincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Criterion2Thesechangeswillplaceadditionalrestrictionsonplantoperationandwillincrease,ratherthanreduce,requirementsforsafety.Therefore,theyshouldnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated.Criterion3Thesechangesaddadditionalsafetyrequirements,andinnowayreduceanyexistingrequirements.Thus,noreductioninmarginofsafetywilloccurbecauseofthesechanges.Lastly,wenotethattheCommissionhasprovidedguidanceconcerningthedeterminationofsignificanthazardsbyprovidingcertainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendmentsconsiderednotlikelytoinvolvesignificanthazardsconsideration.Thesecondoftheseexamplesreferstochangesthatimposeadditionallimitations,restrictions,orcontrolsnotpresentlyincludedintheT/Ss.ThesechangesimposeadditionalrestrictionsontheplantforconsistencywiththeCycle6safetyanalysesortheSTSs.Thus,webelievethatthisexampleisapplicableandthatthechangesinvolvenosignificanthazardsconsideration.4.RefuelingWaterStorageTankChanesAfourthgroupofchangesinvolvesT/Ss3.1.1.3,3.1.2.3,3.1.2.5,3.4.1.2,3.4.1.3,and3.9.8.1specificallyastheyapplytoboratedwateradditionorpositivereactivityadditionfromtheRefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST).Thesearechangesnumbered25,26,27,87,89,and104inAttachment10.T/S3.1.1.3requiresreactorcoolantflowofatleast3000gpmduringdilutionoftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)boronconcentrationinanymode.T/Ss3.4.1.2and3.4.1.3requireatleastonecoolantlooptobeinoperationduringborondilutioninModes3,4,and5.T/S3.9.8.1requires3000gpmofcoolantflowviatheResidualHeatRemovalSystemduringborondilutioninMode6.T/Ss3.1.2.3and3.1.2.5prohibitpositivereactivityadditioninModes5and6withchargingpumpsorboricacidtransferpumpsinoperable,respectively.BecauseofconcernswithliteralT/Scompliance,questionshavearisenastotheapplicabilityofthesespecificationsduringthetimeswhenweaddwatertotheRCSfromanoperableRWST,specificallywhentheboronconcentrationoftheRWSTislowerthantheRCS.

AEP:NRC:0916IAttachment1Page5of18TheRWSTminimumboronconcentrationsstatedintheT/Sswereestablishedtoensurethatadequateshutdownmarginismaintained,andareconsistentwithnumbersassumedbyENCintheirCycle6reloadanalyses.Becauseofthis,itisourbeliefthattheborondilutionrestrictionsoftheT/SslistedabovewerenotmeanttobeapplicableduringwateradditionfromtheRWST,providedtheboronconcentrationintheRWSTexceedstheminimumrequirementsstatedintheT/Ss.Wehavedocumentedthisinterpretationinthepast(seeourletterAEP:NRC:0975A,datedFebruary28,1986);thischangeissubmittedonlytoformalizethisinterpretation.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendmentwillinvolveanosignificanthazardsconsiderationiftheproposedamendmentdoesnot:(2)(3)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated;createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated,orinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Criterion1OurreviewhasdeterminedthattheT/SRWSTminimumboronconcentrationsaresufficienttoensurethatadequateshutdownmarginismaintainedthroughouttheentirecorelife.Additionally,theRWSTboronconcentrationsareconsistentwiththoseassumedintheLOCAanalysesperformedbyENC.Thus,weconcludethatthesechangeswillnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Criterion2Theproposedamendmentwillnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyevaluated.IthasbeendeterminedthattheRWSTboronconcentrationissufficienttoensureadequateshutdownmarginfromallexpectedoperatingconditions.TheconsequencesofaddingwaterfromanoperableRWSTwhichisatalowerboronconcentrationthantheRCSisthereforebounded,andnonewordifferentkindofaccidentfromthosepreviouslyevaluatedwouldbeexpected.Criterion3Becausethesechangeslessenoperatingrestrictions,itcanbeexpectedthatareductioninsafetymarginmayoccur.However,becausetheRWSTminimumboronconcentrationsaresufficienttoprovideadequateshutdownmarginfromallexpectedoperatingconditions,thisreductioninsafetymarginwouldbeinsignificant.Lastly,wenotethattheCommissionhasprovidedguidanceconcerningthedeterminationofsignificanthazardsbyprovidingcertainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendmentsconsiderednotlikelytoinvolvesignificanthazardsconsideration.Thesixthoftheseexamplesreferstochangeswhichmayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident,butwherethe,resultsare AEP:NRC:09161Attachment1Page6of18clearlywithinlimitsestablishedasacceptable.Asdiscussedabove,thesechangesrelaxrequirementsrelatedtoborondilutionorpositivereactivityaddition,butareclearlyboundedbyourshutdownmarginanalyses.Thus,weconcludethattheexamplecitedisapplicableandthatthechangesinvolvenosignificanthazardsconsiderations.5.ChangestotheDifferentialPressureBetweenSteamLines-HighESFActuationSignalThefifthgroupofproposedchangesinvolveFunctionalUnitl.e(DifferentialPressureBetweenSteamLines-High)undertheEngineeringSafetyFeature(ESF)ActuationSystemInstrumentationTable3.3-3.Thesechangesarenumbered67,68,and71inAttachment10.Specifically,weareproposingtochangethefootnotedesignatorfortheChannelstoTripcolumnofthe3-loopsectiontoaquadruplepoundsign,andtoaddacorrespondingnewfootnotetotheTable3.3-3notationsonT/Spage3/43-21.Additionally,weproposetorevisethefunctionalunittoprohibit3-loopoperationinModes1and2,consistentwithCategory2ofthisattachment.TheDifferentialPressureBetweenSteamLines-HighactuationdiffersfromotherESFactuationsignalsinthatasignalfromoneloopiscomparedtosignalsintheotherloops.Thecurrentfootnoteassociatedwiththissignalforthe3-loopcasestates:"ThechannelsassociatedwiththeprotectivefunctionsderivedfromtheoutofserviceReactorCoolantLoopshallbeplacedinthetrippedmode."Thiscouldbeconstruedtomeanthatallchannelsintheoutofserviceloopshouldbetripped.ThisinturnwouldresultinanESFactuation.Itisourbeliefthatthefootnoteasappliedtothisfunctionalunitmeanstotripthebistableswhichindicatelowactiveloopsteampressurerelativetotheidleloop.ThisactionreducestheESFactuationlogicfortheactiveloopdifferentialpressuresfrom2outof3to1outof2,andthuspermits3-loopoperationinMode3since2channelspersteamlinearenecessaryforatrip.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendmentwillinvolveanosignificanthazardsconsiderationiftheproposedamendmentdoesnot:(2)(3)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated,orinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theprohibitionof3-loopoperationinModes1and2isconsistentwiththechangesincludedinCategory2ofthisattachment.The10CFR50.92analysisisthusidenticalandwillnotberepeatedhere.The10CFR50.92analysesincludedinthiscategoryarethereforeonlythoseinvolvedinrewritingtheDifferentialPressureBetweenSteamLines-HighfootnoteinT/STable3.3-3.Criterion1Thechangesincludedinthisgroupareeditorialinnature,intendedonlytoclarifytheESFActuationSystemInstrumentationTable(3.3-3)asit AEP:NRC:0916IAttachment1Page7of18appliestotheDifferentialPressureBetweenSteamLines-Highactuationsignal.Thus,nosignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofapreviouslyevaluatedaccidentshouldoccur.Criterion2Theproposedamendmentwillnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyevaluatedbecausethesechanges,beingeditorialinnature,willnotimpactexistingsafetyanalysesorthenucleardesignbases.Criterion3Theproposedamendmentwillnotinvolveasignificantreductioninmarginofsafetybecause,asdiscussedabove,allaccident.analysesandnucleardesignbasesremainunchangedasaresultoftheseproposedT/Schanges.Lastly,wenotethattheCommissionhasprovidedguidanceconcerningthedeterminationofsignificanthazardsbyprovidingcertainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendmentsconsiderednotlikelytoinvolvesignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefirstoftheseexamplesreferstochangesthatarepurelyadministrativeinnature:forexample,changestoachieveconsistencythroughouttheT/Ss,correctionofanerror,orachangeinnomenclature.ThisgroupofproposedchangesisintendedonlytoclarifytheT/Ss,toavoidthepossibilitythattheymaybemisread.Asthesechangesareeditorialanddonotimpactsafetyinanyway,webelievethattheFederalRegisterexamplecitedisapplicableandthatthechangesinvolvenosignificanthazardsconsideration.6.ChangestothePower-0cratedReliefValve(PORV)Secification,3/4.11.4ThesixthgroupofproposedchangesinvolvearedraftofT/S3/4.11.4,concerningthePressurizerPower-OperatedReliefValves(PORVs).Thesechangesarenumber95inAttachment10.Specifically,weareproposingtochangeT/S3/4.11.4torequirethatatleast2PORVsbeavailableinModes1,2,and3.Forpurposesofthisspecification,"available"meansthatthePORVisoperablewithitssolenoiddeenergizedandthattheblockvalveisoperableandenergized.ThisdiffersfromthepresentT/S,whichallowsall3PORVstobeinoperable,providedtheirassociatedblockvalvesareclosed.TheproposedchangesareintendedtoensurethatPORVreliefcapabilityisavailabletoassistinRCSdepressurizationfollowingasteamgeneratortuberupturewithoutoffsitepower,andtorespondtocommentsmadebymembersofyourstaffatameetingheldwithusinBethesda,MDonDecember13,1984.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendmentwillinvolveanosignificanthazardsconsiderationiftheproposedamendmentdoesnot:(2)(3)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,createthepossibilityofnewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated,orinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.

AEP:NRC:0916IAttachment1Page8of18Criterion1ThisgroupofchangesconstitutesadditionalrestrictionsplacedonPORV(andassociatedblockvalve)operabilityrequirements.SincenorestrictionsassociatedwiththePORVsarereducedinanywaybythisgroupofchanges,weconcludethatthesechangeswillnotincreasetheprobabilityorconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Criterion2Sincethesechangesplaceadditionalrestrictions'onplantoperationandinnowayreducepresentsafetyrestrictions,theywouldnotbeexpectedtocreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated.Criterion3ThesechangesaddadditionalrestrictionsonthePORVs,designedprimarilytoensurethatPORVreliefvalvecapabilityisavailabletoassistinRCSdepressurizationfollowingasteamgeneratortuberupture.Thus,thesechangeswouldbeexpectedtoincrease,ratherthandecrease,safetymargins.Lastly,wenotethattheCommissionhasprovidedguidanceconcerningthedeterminationofsignificanthazardsbyprovidingcertainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendmentsconsiderednotlikelytoinvolvesignificanthazardsconsideration.Thesecondoftheseexamplesreferstochangesthatimposeadditionallimitations,restrictions,orcontrolsnotpresentlyincludedintheT/Ss.SincethisgroupofchangeswillrequirePORVstobeoperableinModes1through3(wherepreviouslynooperabilityrequirementexisted),theyclearlyconstituteadditionalrestrictions.Thus,weconcludethattheexamplecitedisapplicableandthatnosignificanthazardsareinvolved.7.AdditionofT/S4.0.4ExemtionsTheseventhgroupofproposedchangesarethosewhichaddT/S4.0.4exemptionstoexistingT/Ss.Thesechangesarenumbered44,65,66,and103inAttachment10.Forthefirstofthesechanges,aT/S4.0.4exemptionhasbeenproposedfortheflowmeasurementperformedaftereachrefuelingandforallflowsurveillancesfortheDNBT/S,4.2.5.1(seenumbers44inAttachment10).(TheflowspecificationhasbeenmovedfromtheFspecification(3/4.2.3)totheDNBspecification(3/4.2.5.1)forconsistencywithUnit1specifications.)ThisexemptionisrequiredHbecauseflowismeasuredusingsecondarycalorimetricandprimarytemperaturemeasurements,whichcanonlybeperformedatornearfullpower.Theflowinstrumentationiscalibratedbasedonthismeasurement.ExemptionshavealsobeenprovidedforseveralNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS)calibrations(seenumbers65and66inAttachment10)inT/STable4.3-1.Ofthese,thoseproposedforsourcerangeandintermediaterangedetectorcalibrationsappearinSTS,Rev.4.STS,Rev.4alsoprovidesthisexemptionfortheincoredetector,excorepowerrange

AEP:NRC:09161Attachment1Page9of18detectorcross-calibrationperformedafterrefueling.Ourproposalextendsthisexemptiontothequarterlyincoredetector,excorepowerrangedetectorcross-calibrationinordertoaddressthesituationwhereanunscheduledoutageofsignificantdurationcausesthesurveillanceintervalforthiscalibrationtolapse.Thisexemptionisproposedforthedailypowerrange,neutronfluxheatbalancebecauseitisrequiredtobeperformedabove15%ratedthermalpowerbyT/S.Itisalsoproposedforthemonthlyincore-excoreaxialoffsetcomparisonforthesamereason.Theseexemptionsareneededtoaddressunscheduledoutagesforwhichthesurveillanceintervalhaslapsed.AnexemptionfromT/S4.0.4forthesourcerangechannelfunctionaltestisproposed.Thisexemptionaddressesthesituationthatresultsfromareactortripaftercontinuouspoweroperationofmorethan1.25times31days.Thissurveillancecannotbeperformedatpowerwithoutdamagingthesourcerangedetectors.ExemptionsfromT/S4.0.4areproposedforthesingle-loopandtwo-looploss-of-flowtripcalibrationsofT/STable4.3-1.Thesearerequiredbecausethesecalibrationsarebasedontheprimaryflowmeasurementtakenatornearfullpowerwhichwasdiscussedaboveinrelationtoflowinstrumentation.Thesechangesarenumbered65and66inAttachment10.ExemptionsfromT/S4.0.4areproposedforthef(D,I)penaltiesassociatedwiththeOverpower5TandOvertemperatureb,Ttrips.Theseexemptionsarerequiredbecausethef(5I)moduleiscalibratedtodataobtainedfromtheincoredetector,excorepowerrangedetectorcross-calibration.AsisimpliedbytheexemptionofthiscalibrationfromT/S4.0.4onarefuelingfrequency,whichisalreadyavailableinSTS,Rev.4,thiscalibrationmustbeperformedatpower,intheapplicablemode.Thecalibrationisperformedatpowersothatanappreciablesignalcanbeobtainedontheincoredetectorsandtheexcoredetectors.Thesechangesarenumbered65and66inAttachment10.Lastly,anexemptionfromT/S4.0.4isproposedforSurveillance4.7.1.5(seenumber103inAttachment10.)ThisexemptionisrequiredbecauseT/S3.7.1.5,SteamGeneratorStopValves,isapplicabletoMode3,andSurveillance4.7.1.5,whichmeasuresstopvalveclosuretime,mustbeperformedinMode3.Inordertodemonstratetherequiredclosuretimeforthesteamgeneratorstopvalves,steampressuremustbeinthenormaloperatingrangecorrespondingtoprimarytemperatureabovetheP-12setpoint.Therefore,secondarypressureforthistestmustbeaboveapproximately800psigforwhichsaturationtemperatureiswellabovethe350FMode3boundary.AnexemptionisalsoproposedforBeginningofCycletoenterMode2forphysicstestingprovidedthesteamgeneratorstopvalvesareclosed.Thisprovisionallowscontinuationofthestartupprogramwithsteamgeneratorsisolatedintheeventthatsecondarysideworkisnotcomplete.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendmentwillinvolveanosignificanthazardsconsiderationiftheproposedamendmentdoesnot:(1)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated, AEP:NRC:0916IAttachment1Page10of18(2)createthepossibilityofnewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated,or(3)involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Criterion1ThechangesinthissectionarenecessarytomaketheT/Ssaccuratelyreflectlimitationsassociatedwithsurveillanceswhichmustbeperformedintheapplicablemode.Additionally,thechangesareneededtoaddressthefactthatunscheduledoutagescananddooccur,andwhentheydosurveillancescanexpirewithnowaytocorrectthesituationuntiltheunitreturnstopower.WherepossiblewehavefollowedtheguidancegivenbytheSTSs,expandingitasnecessarytoaddressthesituationsjustdescribed.AsthesechangesareconsistentwiththeguidanceprovidedbytheSTSs,webelievethatanyincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyanalyzed,oranyreductioninmarginsofsafety,wouldbeinsignificant.Criterion2Sincethesechangesrequireneitherphysicalchangestotheplantnorchangestothesafetyanalyses,itisconcludedthattheywillnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyevaluated.Criterion3PleaseseeourdiscussiononCriterion1,above.Lastly,wenotethattheCommissionhasprovidedguidanceconcerningthedeterminationofsignificant,hazardsbyprovidingcertainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendmentsconsiderednotlikelytoinvolvesignificanthazardsconsideration.Example6referstochangeswhichmayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobabilityorconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzed,accident,butwheretheresultsofthechangeareclearlywithinacceptablelimits.ItisourbeliefthatthesechangesarenecessarytoreflectlimitationsinherentinsurveillancetestingmethodsemployedbytheCookPlant,andthechangesreflectfurtherclarificationoftheintentoftheoriginalT/SasisindicatedbythetypeofT/SintheseareasthatispermittedbylaterrevisionsoftheSTS.Inlightofthis,webelievethereasonsforthisgroupofchangestobeconsistentwithExample6.8.ChangestoExistingT/SValuesTheeighthgroupofproposedchangesinvolvevaluesofparameterspresentlyincludedintheT/SsthatarebeingrevisedtoreflecttheassumptionsusedinthevarioussafetyanalysesperformedinsupportoftheUnit2Cycle6reload.Thesechangesarenumbered4,8,10,11,13,14'5,17,18,19,23,28,34,40,42,47,48,49,54,76,78,79,and101inAttachment10.Thatattachmentalsoincludesreferencestothespecificsectionsoftheaccidentanalysesonwhichthechangesarebased.

AEP:NRC:0916IAttachment1Page11of18Twotypesofchangesincludedinthisgroupneedfurtherexplanation.The~firstarechangestoallowancestopermitoperationwithRdFRTDs.Theseareincludedinthechangesnumbered8,10,14,19,42,47,48,76,and78inAttachment10.DuringtheUnit2Cycle6refuelingoutage,wewillbereplacingallofourexistingRosemountRTDswithRTDsmanufacturedbytheRdFCorporation.BecausetheuncertaintiesassociatedwiththesenewRTDsaredifferentfromthoseassociatedwiththeolderRosemountRTDs,itisnecessarytorevisesomeT/Svaluesaccordingly.WeusedthereviseduncertaintiestoobtainTechnicalSpecificationsetpointsfromtheanalysisvaluescalculatedbyExxonNuclearCompany.Certainsetpointswereaffectedbybothachangeinanalysisvalueandtherevisedallowances.Foryourconvenience,wehaveincludedtheWestinghouseElectricCorporationsafetyevaluationfortheRdFRTDinstallation(WCAP-11080)asAttachment3tothisletter.Thesecondgroupofchangesneedingclarificationarechangesinvolvedwiththef(5I)penaltywhichisappliedtotheOvertemperature5TandOverpower5Treactortripsetpoints.(Thesearechangesnumbered15and18inAttachment10.)Thereisonlyonef(~I)module,whichservesbothofthesetrips.Thismoduleplacesapenaltyonthesetripfunctionsintheeventofanaxialimbalanceinneutronfluxbetweenthetopandbottomhalvesofthecore.Thef(~I)penaltywasnotrequiredasaninputtotheOverpowerLTtripforpreviousUnit2cycles,andthusf(LI)ispresentlysetequaltozeroinT/STable2.2-1.ThenewanalysesperformedbyENCapplythef(5I)penaltytobothOverpowerand2Overtemperature5T.TheENCanalysesresultedindifferentf(5I)functionsforthesetwotrips.However,becausetheysharethesamef(~I)module,asinglef(5I)functionthatconservativelyboundsthesetwofunctionswaschosenfortheproposedT/Ss.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendmentwillinvolveanosignificanthazardsconsiderationiftheproposedamendmentdoesnot:(1)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccident.previouslyevaluated,(2)createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated,or'(3)involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangesincludedinthisgrouparenecessarytosupportsafetyanalysesperformedbyENCandWestinghouseElectricCorporation(asreferencedbyAttachment10)insupportoftheCycle6reload.TheseanalyseshavenotyetbeenacceptedbytheCommission.Ourconclusionofnosignificanthazardsconsiderations,whichissupportedbelow,isthereforecontingentuponCommissionacceptance.Criterion1ThesafetyanalysesperformedforCycle6addressedallpreviouslyanalyzedaccidents.Theanalyses,whicharereferencedinAttachment10,demonstratedthatnosig'nificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofapreviouslyevaluatedaccidentisexpectedtooccur.

AEP:NRC:0916IAttachment1Page12of18Criterion2ThesafetyanalysesperformedforCycle6addressedallapplicableaccidentsfoundintheStandardReviewPlanforrelevancytoCook.ManyofthoseaddressedhadnotpreviouslybeenevaluatedforD.C.CookUnit2.Therefore,weconcludethat,tothebestofourknowledge,thisgroupofchangeswillnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyanalyzed.Criterion3ThesafetyanalysesperformedforCycle6(asreferencedbyAttachment10)havedemonstratedthatacceptablemarginsofsafetyaremaintainedforallaccidentswhichwereaddressed.Lastly,wenotethattheCommissionhasprovidedguidanceconcerningthedeterminationofsignificanthazardsbyprovidingcertainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendmentsconsiderednotlikelytoinvolvesignificanthazardsconsideration.Thesecondoftheseexamplesreferstochangesresultingfromanuclearreactorcorereloading,ifnofuelassembliessignificantlydifferentfromthosefoundpreviouslyacceptabletotheNRCforapreviouscoreatthefacilityinquestionareinvolved.ThesechangesaresimilartothisexampleinthattheCycle6reloadisverysimilartopreviousreloadsintermsofenrichment,powerdistribution,andfueltype.Althoughminorchangeshaveoccurred(e.g.,Fwasincreasedfrom2.04to2.10),thechangeswereanalyzedandfoundn8ttosignificantlyimpactapplicablemarginstosafety.Thus,weconcludethattheexamplecitedisrelevantandthatnosignificanthazardsconsiderationisinvolved.N9.SearationofFlowRateandFTheninthgroupofchangersinvolverevisionstoT/S3/4.2.3,NuclearEnthalpyHotChannelFactor(F).Thesechangesarenumbered41,42,43,48inAttachment10.InthepresentT/Ss,RCSflowrateandFmaybehH"tradedoff"againstoneanother(i.e.,alowermeasuredRCSflowrateisacceptableprovidedFisalsoacceptablylower).IntheproposedTgS3/4.2.3,wehaveeliminatedtheabilitytotradeoffflowforF.FishHnowdefinedinT/S3.2.3onlyasafunctionofratedthermalpower.RSflowrateinMode1hasbeenmovedtoproposedT/S3/4.2.5.1,whichcontainstheMode1DNBparameters.AlthoughtheActionStatementsandsurveillancerequirementshavebeenrevisedtoreflectthisseparation,norequirementappropriateforeitherofthetwohasbeendeletedormadelesssevere.NofluxmappingisrequigedintheDNBAction'tatement,becausefluxmappingisusedtomeasureF<,notflow.Theproposedchangesincludedin)hisgroupareonlythosechangesinvolvedinseparatingflowrateandFintheT/S.ChangestoexistingfHT/SvaluesforflowareincludedinCategory8ofthisattachment.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendmentwillinvolveanosignificanthazardsconsiderationiftheproposedamendmentdoesnot:(1)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated, AEP:NRC:0916IAttachment1Page13of18(2)createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated,or(3)involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Criterion1Thisgroupofproposedchangesinnowayremovesorreducesanysafetyrequirements,nordoesitrequirephysicalchangestotheplant.Thus,itisnotexpectedtoinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofapreviouslyevaluatedaccident.Criterion2Theseproposedchangeswillnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccident,fromanypreviouslyanalyzed,because,beingprimarilyeditorialinnature,theyimpactneithertheaccidentanalysesnorthenucleardesignbases.Criterion3Theproposedchangeswillnotinvolveasignificantreductioninmarginofsafety,because,asdiscussedabove,allaccidentanalysesandnucleardesignbasesremainunchanged.Sincethesechangesactuallyrepresentadditionalrestgictions(inthatwewillnolongerbeabletotradeoffRCSflowrateforF)itcouldbeanticipatedthatanincrease,ratherthandecrease,inthemargintoDNBunderaccidentconditionsmightactuallyAHresult.Lastly,wenotethattheCommissionhasprovidedguidanceconcerningthedeterminationofsignificanthazardsbyprovidingcertainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendmentsconsiderednotlikelytoinvolvesignificanthazardsconsideration.ThefirstexamplereferstopurelyadministrativechangestotheT/S:forexample,changestoachieveconsistencythroughouttheT/Ss,correctionofanerror,orachangeinnomenclature.ThesechangesaresimilartothisexampleinthatRCSflowrateandFarebeingseparatedwithnoreductioninrequirements,primarilytomakeKeUnit2T/SsmoresimilartothoseforUnit1.ThesecondexamplepublishedintheFederalRegisterreferstochangesthatconstituteadditionallimitations,restriction's,orcontrolsnotpresentlyincludedintheT/Ss:forexample,morestringentsurveillancerequirements.ThesechangesaresimilartothisexampleigthatwewillbeprohibitingourselvesfromtradingoffRCSflowrateforF<Forthereasonsprovidedabove,weconcludethattheexamplescitedarexelevantandthatthisgroupofproposedchangesinvolvesnosignificanthazardsconsideration.10.ChanestotheP-12InterlockDescritionThetenthgroupofproposedchangesinvolvestheP-12InterlockdescriptionincludedinT/STable3.3-3.Thesechangesarenumbered75and77inAttachment10.TheP-12InterlockreceivesinputfromtheTlow-lowbistables.Thesebistablesarecalibratedtotripwhentheave0temperaturedecreasesto541FasspecifiedinT/STable3.3-4.

AEP:NRC:0916IAttachment1Page14of18With2outof4bistablestripped,P-12permitsthemanualblockoftheLowSteamLinePressureSafetyInjection,causessteamlineisolationunderconditionsofhighsteamflow,andremovesthearmingsignaltocondensersteamdump.With3of4Tchannelsabovetheresetpoint,whichisgreaterthan541F,themanual.blockofLowSteamlinePressure0aveSafe'tyInjectionisdefeatedorpreventedandthecondensersteamdumpisenabled.ThepresentT/SdescriptionoftheP-12Interlockisconfusinginthatitneglectsthetripandresetpoints,andinsteaddescribesP-12intermsofconditionsabove544Fandbelow540F.Ifthisdescriptionisread00literally,itcouldbeinferredthatP-12isestablishedwhenTis0oavegreaterthanorequalto544FandwhenTislessthan540F.aveAdditionally,themanualblockofsafetyxn3ectionactuationwouldnotbe00permitteduntilbelow540F,wheninfactthesetpointis541F.WeproposetorewriteP-12intermsofthe541Fsetpoint,whichissimilarto0themethodologyutilizedinRev.4oftheSTS,inordertobetterreflectthefunctioningofthisinterlock.Inadditiontothechangesdescribedabove,wehaverevisedtheP-12functiondescription.Thecurrent,descriptionstatesthattheSafetyInjectionassociatedwithP-12occursonhighsteamlineflowandlowsteamlinepressure.TheD.C.CookUnit2ESFdesignprovidesaSafetyInjectiononLowSteamLinepressurewhichdoesnotrequireacoincidentsignalfromP-12LowLowT.ThisparticularSafetyInjectionmaybeblockediftheP-12LowLowf.'ignalispresent.HighsteamlineflowaveavecoincidentwithP-12LowLowTdoesnotprovideaSafetyInjection;itavedoeshowevercauseasteamlinexsolation.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendmentwillinvolveanosignificanthazardsconsiderationiftheproposedamendmentdoesnot:(2)(3)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated,orinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Criterion1Thesechanges,beingeditorialinnatureandintendedonlytomoreaccuratelydescribethefunctioningoftheP-12interlock,willnot,reduceinanywayrequirementsorcommitmentswhicharepresentlyincludedintheT/Ss.Thus,noincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofapreviouslyevaluatedaccidentwouldbeexpected.Criterion2Thesechanges,beingpurelyeditorial,willnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyevaluatedbecauseallaccidentanalysesandnucleardesignbasesremainunchanged.

AEP:NRC:09161Attachment1Page15of18Criterion3Theproposedamendmentwillnotinvolveasignificantreductioninmarginofsafety,because,asdiscussedabove,allaccidentanalysesandnucleardesignbasesremainunchanged.Lastly,wenotethattheCommissionhasprovidedguidanceconcerningthedeterminationofsignificanthazardsbyprovidingcertainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendmentsconsiderednot,likelytoinvolvesignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefirstoftheseexamplesreferstochangeswhicharepurelyadministrativeinnature:forexample,achangetoachieveconsistencythroughouttheT/Ss,correctionofanerror,orachangeinnomenclature.Thisgroupofproposedchangesissimilartothisexampleinthatthechangesarepurelyeditorial,intendedtomaketheT/SsmoreaccuratelyreflectthefunctioningoftheP-12interlock.Nophysicalchangestotheplantoritsprocedureswillbenecessarybecauseofthesechanges.Thus,weconcludethattheexamplecitedisapplicableandthatthisgroupofchangesinvolvenosignificanthazardsconsideration.11.SimlificationstoPowerDistributionandAPDMST/SThepurposeoftheeleventhgroupofproposedchangesistodeletereferencetotheAxialPowerDistributionMonitoringSystem(APDMS)fromtheT/SsandtosimplifythePowerDistributionLimitsT/Ss.Thesechangesarenumbered32,33,37,38,39,53,and85inAttachment10.TheAPDMSisanoptioncurrentlyprovidedintheT/Ss.ItisrequiredtobeoperablebyT/S3.3.3.7whenitisbeingusedformonitoringaxialpowerdistribution.PoweroperationispermittedabovetheAllowablePowerLevel(APL)andbelowRatedThermalPowerprovidedadditionalsurveillanceisperformedusingtheAPDMSinaccordancewithT/S4.2.6.1.Inpractice,however,theAPDMScanbesomewhatmorelimitingthanAPL.Moreimportantly,experiencehasshownthatAPDMScausesextensivewearandtearontheMovableIncoreDetectorSystem,whichtheAPDMSusesfordataacquisition.Thiseffectresultsinseriousmaintenanceproblemsonasystemwhichcontainspartswhicharehighlyradioactive.Forthese'easons,itwasdecidednottooperatewithAPDMS.Therefore,weareproposingtodeleteT/S3/4.3.3.7,andtoreviseT/Ss3/4.2.2(F(Z))and3/4.2.6(AxialPowerDistribution)toremovematerialrelatedtoAPDMS.Inconjunctionwiththeabove,wehaverewrittenT/S3/4.2.6.TheproposedT/ScontainsthelimitsandsurveillancesrequiredtoestablishandmaintainAPL,andhasalsobeenrenamedaccordingly.MostofthesurveillancerequirementsofT/S4.2.2havebeenmovedtoT/S4.2.6inordertofurthersimplifytheseT/Ss.Itshouldbenotedthatthe2%penaltyappliedtoF(Z)forincreasingFbyT/S4.2.2.2.ehasbeenincorporatedintothedefinitionofAPLin%heproposedT/S3.2.6.NoQrequirementsorlimitscurrentlyinT/Ss3/4.2.2or3/4.2.6,otherthanthoserelatedtoAPDMSandthosediscussedinthenextparagraph,havebeenremovedorreducedinourproposedrevisions.Inadditiontothechangesdescribedabove,T/S3.2.2hasalsobeenrevisedtoeliminatetheneedtoplacethereactorinHotStandbytoperformtheOverpowerhTtripsetpointreductionwhenthissetpointis AEP:NRC:0916XAttachment1Page16of18requiredtobereducedbyActionStatementa.Ourreviewofthisrequirementhasdeterminedthatthereductioncanbeperformedwhilethereactorisatpower.Thechangeinsetpointcanbeaccomplishedonechannelatatimewithbistablesontheaffectedchannelinthetrippedconfiguration;therefore,thereisnoneedtoimposeatransientonthereactorsystems,whichisinherentinchangingfromNodes1to3.ThischangeisconsistentwithguidanceprovidedinDraftRev.5oftheSTS.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendmentwillinvolveanosignificanthazardsconsiderationiftheproposedamendmentdoesnot:(2)(3)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated,orinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Criterion1Thechangesincludedinthisgroup(withtheexceptionoftheOverpowersTtripsetpointreduction)shouldnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThesechangesareadministrativeinnatureanddonotdeleteanyrequirementsotherthanthoseassociatedwithAPDMS.Asdescribedearlier,APDMSisanoptionandisnotrequiredbyT/Ss.FortheOverpower5Ttripsetpointreduction,thechangeisconsistentwithguidanceprovidedbytheCommissionthroughtheissuanceofDraftRev.5totheSTSs.Althoughthechangesmayincreasetheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccident,theresultsshouldbenoworsethanthosepreviouslyacceptedbytheCommissionthroughtheirissuanceofDraftRev.5totheSTSs.Criterion2ThechangesotherthantheOverpowerLTtripsetpointreductionareadministrativeinnature.Theydonotintroduceanynewmodesofplantoperation,nordotheyrequirephysicalchangestotheplant.ThechangesassociatedwiththeOverpower5TtripsetpointareconsistentwithguidanceprovidedbytheCommissionthroughtheissuanceofDraftRev.5oftheSTSsandarepresumedtobeacceptableonthatbasis.Thus,weconcludethatthechangeswillnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated.Criterion3Thechangesincludedinthisgroup(otherthantheOverpower~Ttripsetpointreduction)shouldnotinvolveasignificantreductioninsafetymargins,sincetheyarepurelyadministrativeandinnowayreducepreviousrequirementsforsafety.ChangesassociatedwiththeOverpower~Ttripsetpointreductionmayinvolvereductionsinsafetymargins,buttheresultsofthechangeareclearlywithinlimitsfoundacceptabletotheCommissionthroughtheirissuanceofDraftRev.5oftheSTSs.

AEP:NRC:0916I'ttachment1Page17of18Lastly,wenotethattheCommissionhasprovidedguidanceconcerningthedeterminationofsignificanthazardsbyprovidingcertainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendmentsconsiderednotlikelytoinvolvesignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefirstoftheseexamplesreferstochangeswhicharepurelyadministrativeinnature:forexample,toachieveconsistencythroughouttheT/Ss,tocorrectanerror,ortomakeachangeinnomenclature.Thechangesinthisgroup(otherthantheOverpower6Ttripsetpointreduction)arepurelyadministrativeinnature.Theyareintended'toimproveT/SreadabilitybyeliminatingtheAPDMSoptionnotcurrentlyexercised,andbyrearrangingtheT/Sstomakethemeasiertouse.Noreductionsinsafetyrequirementswilloccurasaresultofthesechanges.AsfortheOverpower6Ttripsetpointreduction,thischangeissimilartoExample6publishedintheFederalRegister.Thisexamplereferstochangeswhichmayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobabilityorconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccidentormayreduceinsomewayasafetymargin,butwheretheresultsofthechangeareclearlywithinallacceptablecriteria.TheeliminationoftherequirementtoplacethereactorinHotStandbytoperformthereductiondoesconstitutearelaxationofapr'eviousrequirement,buttheresultsofthechangehavebeenfoundacceptablebytheCommissionthroughtheirissuanceofDraftRev.5totheSTSs.Basedontheabove,weconcludethattheexamplescitedareapplicableandthatthechangesinvolvenosignificanthazardsconsideration.12.ChangesforConsistencWithSTSThetwelfthgroupofproposedchangesconsistofthosethatarerequested'omakeourT/SsmoreconsistentwithRev.4oftheSTS.Thesearethechangesnumbered57,58,and96inAttachment10,whichalsoincludesadescriptionofthechanges.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendmentwillinvolveanosignificanthazardsconsiderationiftheproposedamendmentdoesnot:(2)(3)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccident,previouslyevaluated,createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated,orinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Criterion1AsthesechangesingeneralrepresentrelaxationofcurrentT/Srequirements,theymayinvolveanincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyanalyzed.Theresultsofthechanges,however,havebeenreviewedandfoundacceptablebytheCommissionthroughtheirissuanceofRev.4totheSTSs.Thus,weconcludethatanyincreaseinprobabilityorconsequenceswouldnotbesignificant.

14 AEP:NRC:0916IAttachment1Page18of18Criterion2AsthesechangeswillinvolvenophysicalplantchangesandnoT/Schanges.whicharenotconsistentwithRev.4oftheSTSs,weconcludethattheyshouldnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccident.fromanypreviouslyevaluated.Criterion3BecausethesechangesrepresentrelaxationofpresentT/Srequirements,theycouldpotentiallyinvolveareductioninsafetymargin.However,thesechangesareallconsistentwiththosefoundacceptablebytheCommissioninRev.4oftheSTSs.Thus,weconcludethatanyreductioninmarginsofsafetyareinsignificant.Lastly,wenotethattheCommissionhasprovidedguidanceconcerningthedeterminationofsignificant,hazardsbyprovidingcertainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendmentsconsiderednotlikelytoinvolvesignificanthazardsconsideration.Thesixthexamplereferstochangeswhichmayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobabilityorconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccidentormayreduceinsomewayasafetymargin,butwheretheresultsofthechangeareclearlywithinallacceptablecriteria.ThechangesincludedinthisgroupareconsistentwithRev.4oftheSTSs.Althoughtheymayreducesafetyrequirements,theresultsofthischangehavebeenevaluatedandfoundacceptablebytheCommission.Basedontheabove,weconcludethattheexamplecitedisapplicableandthatthechangeinvolvesnosignificanthazardsconsideration.ChanestotheBasesInadditiontothechangestotheT/Ssdescribedabove,wehavealsoproposedchangestotheBasessectiontoreflectbothchangesinthesafetyanalysesandchangesintheT/Ss.DescriptionsofthesechangeshavebeenincludedinAttachment10.ConclusionInconclusion,webelievethattheproposedchangesdonotinvolvesignificanthazardsconsiderationbecauseoperationofD.C.CookUnit2inaccordancewiththesechangeswouldnot:(1)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyanalyzed,(2)createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccident.fromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,or(3)involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Thisconclusionisbasedonourevaluationofthechanges,whichhasdeterminedthatallproposedchangeswhicharenotadministrativeinnature,consistentwiththeSTS,orconsistentwiththedesignbasisoftheplantareclearlytraceabletotheCycle6safetyanalyses,asreferencedbyAttachment10.AssumingCommissionacceptanceoftheseanalyses,itisourbeliefthattheysuccessfullydemonstratethatapplicablesafetylimitsandmarginstosafetywillbemaintained.

h