ML17334B364

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Responds to NRC 900301 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-315/89-31 & 50-316/89-31.Corrective Actions:Reliability Centered Maint Program Initiated
ML17334B364
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 04/11/1990
From: ALEXICH M P
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To: DAVIS A B
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
AEP:NRC:1125A, NUDOCS 9004200632
Download: ML17334B364 (38)


See also: IR 05000315/1989031

Text

\rIndiana'Achrga~PowerCompany~~080c'.663'Nl7lAMANTCHIGANPOWERAEP:NRC:1125ADonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2DocketNos.50-315and50-316LicenseNos.DPR-58andDPR-74NRCINSPECTIONNOS.50-315/89031AND50-316/89031:RESPONSETOVIOLATIONU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Attn:A.B.Davi.sAprilll,1990DearMr.Davis:ThisletterisinresponsetoMr.H.J.Miller'sletterdatedMarch1,1990,whichforwardedthereportonthespecialmaintenanceteaminspectionconductedbyMr.Z.Falevitsandothersofyourstaff.ThisinspectionwasconductedfromDecember4through8,andDecember18through22,1989,onactivitiesattheCookNuclearPlantassociatedwiththesupportandimplementationofmaintenancetoensurethatplantstructures,systemsandcomponentsreliablyperformondemand.TheNoticeofViolationattachedtoMr.Miller'sletteridentifiedsixweaknessesandfourSeverityLevelIVviolationsrelatingtoourmaintenanceprogram.TheweaknessesareaddressedinAttachment1tothisletter.TheviolationsareaddressedinAttachment2tothisletter.A14-dayextensionforourresponsewasgrantedonMarch15,1990'hisdocumenthasbeenpreparedfollowingCorporateproceduresthatincorporateareasonablesetofcontrolstoensureitsaccuracyandcompletenesspriortosignaturebytheundersigned.Sincerely,M.P.AlichVicePresidentldpAttachments~)g4QOCk&2900411pggADQcKo>oog+~~~Ipp1/00

Mr.A.B.DavisAEP:NRC:1125Acc:D.H.Williams,Jr.A.A.Blind-BridgmanR.C.CallenG.CharnoffNRCResidentInspector-BridgmanNFEMSectionChief

ATTACHMENT1TOAEP:NRC:1125ARESPONSETONRC-IDENTIFIEDWEAKNESSES

Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1125APage1NRC-IdentifiedWeakness(1)"LackoforineffectiveactiontocorrectnumerousselfidentifiedmaintenanceproblemsidentifiedinFebruary1988,manyofwhichwereidentifiedbytheteamduringthisinspection."ResponsetoWeakness(1)CorrectiveActionsTakenAsaresultofthe1988MaintenanceSelf-AssessmentReport,AEPSCcontractedIMPELLtoassistinidentifyingandformulatingappropriatecorrectiveactionstoaddresstheself-identifieddeficiencies.Theresultsofthi,seffortareinadocumententitled,D.C.CookPlantPMProramUradeStrateDocument,datedNovember1988.ThisstudycontainedastrategyforAEPtoaccomplishaplannedupgradeofthePreventiveMaintenance(PM)ProgramattheCookNuclearPlant.ItidentifiedreasonablegoalsandachievableobjectivesforthePMUpgradeProgrambasedonAEPSC/CookNuclearPlantphilosophy,resourcesandcapabilities.Thespecificimplementationtasksandstrategicconsiderationswerepresentedforobtainingthedesiredupgraderesults.Thiseffort'otonlyaddressedimprovementsinthePMProgramitself,butalsoexaminedrelatedorganizationandautomationrequirementstosupporttheimprovedPMProgram.Basedontheresultsofthisstudy,numerouscorrectiveactionswereinitiatedinJanuary1989.Thefirstwastheinitiationofareliability-centeredmaintenance(RCM)program.Thismajortaskhastwophases:analysisandimplementation.AEPSChasbeenworkingcloselywithGeneralPhysicsontheanalysisportionthatwillformthefoundationoftheRCMprogram.Thisworkincludes:definingsystemboundariesandfunctionsidentifyingdominantfailuremodesdeterminingcriti.calfailuremodesandcriti.calcomponentsidentifyingapplicableandeffectivepreventivemaintenancetaskstopreventfailurescompletinganalysisofselectedplantsystems

Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1125APage2ImplementationoftheRCMProgrambeganinAugust1989withthedevelopmentofplantprocedures,identificationofsystemboundaries,andestablishmentofanRCMdatabase.Thefirstsyst:emanalysiswascompletedinFebruary1990onthefeedwatersystem.Analysisof22additionalplantsystems/functionalareaswilltakeplaceoverthenextthreeyears.AnotheroutgrowthoftheMaintenanceSelf-AssessmentReportandtheAEPSC/IMPELLstudywasthedevelopmentoftheSystemEngineerProgram.ThegoaloftheSystemEngineerProgramistoprovidetrainingtoenableindividualstoprovidetheengineeringexpertiserequiredforsafe,efficientandreliableoperationofsystemsforwhichtheyareresponsible.TheSystemEngineerdischargesthisresponsibilitybyperformingassignedtasks,andmaintainingcognizanceofallworkassociatedwiththeassignedsystem(s).Inaddition,AEPSCcontractedTENERASystemsandSoftwaretoprovideacomputerizedmaintenancemanagementinformationsystem.Thissystem,referredtoastheNuclearPlantMaintenanceModule(NPM)System,discussedinmoredetailinourresponsetoweakness(3),willallowplantstafftoinitiate,issue,prioritizeandtrackallmaintenanceworkattheplant.ThissamesoftwareiscurrentlybeingusedatPacificGasandElectric'sDiabloCanyon,andPublicServiceElectricandGas'sSalemandHopeCreekGeneratingStations.Inaddition,itwasrecentlychosenbyElectricitedeFranceforuseinallfiftyofitsnuclearplants.Thesethreeprograms,RCM,SystemEngineerandNPM,arejustpartoftheactionsthatarebeingtakentorespondtotheSelf-Assessment.TheNovember1989reorganizationofCookNuclearPlant'smanagementisanotherimportantelementintheupgradeofourmaintenanceprogram.Theintentoftheneworganizationistoplaceemphasisonmaintenance,outages,andhuman'resources,Otheractions,whichhaveorarebeingtakenareasfollows:oAnAEPandCookNuclearPlantpolicyonmaintenancewasdevelopedandapprovedinDecember1989byAEPseniormanagement.Anadditionalplant-specificmaintenancepolicyestablishedinaccordancewithINPOguidelinesisbeingdevelopedtoclarifymaintenancephilosophiesandresponsibilitiesforallmaintenancegroups

Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1125APage3oCorporatereviewshavebeenconducted,whichhaveresultedinimprovementsbeingmadetoshopareasusedbythemaintenancegroupsoStaffingstudiesarebeingperformed,whichhavealreadyresultedinanincreaseinthenumberofengineersandradiationprotectiontechniciansonsite.oOtherprogramsofnotethataddressmaintenanceself-assessmentfindingsincludethemaintenanceprocedurerewrite(SeeWeakness(6)),thelong-rangeplanandtheoutageguidelinedevelopmentplan.(2)BenefitsToBeDerivedFromCorrectiveActionsRCM,theSystemEngineerProgramandNPMwereinitiatedtoaddressmanyoftheMaintenanceSelf-Assessment'sidentifieddeficiencies.Whenallofoureffortshavebeencompletelyimplemented,eachofthemajorfindingsoftheselfassessmentwillhavebeenaddressed.,Asaresultofthesecorrectiveactions.weanticipatehavingastateoftheartmaintenanceprogramwhichwillresultinimprovedplantsafety,reliabilityandaccountability.(3)DateWhenBenefitsVillBeRealizedAspreviouslystated,westartedtheRCMPrograminAugust1989.However,weanticipatethattheprogramwillnotbecompletelyimplementedforallthecriticalplantsystemsuntiltheendof1992.Aseachsystemisanalyzed,benefitswillberealizedsothatwhenthisprogramiscompletedwewillhaveafullyintegratedpreventivemaintenanceprogram.TheSystemEngineerProgram,likeRCM,isstillintheearlystagesofimplementation.Adocumentwhichclearlydelineatestheresponsibilitiesoftheengineersiscurrentlyinthefinalstagesofreviewandapproval.AEPSC'sacquisitionofTENERA'sNPMsystemwasapprovedinDecember1989.However,itwillnotbeinplaceandoperationaluntilAugust1990,whendatawillbeentered.VewillbeconductingQAauditsorsurveillancestoaccessthestatusandeffectivenessofsomeofourcorrectiveactionsastheydevelop.Inaddition,theMaintenanceImprovementPlanwillreviewandresolve,asappropriate,theMaintenanceSelf-Assessmentitems'heImprovementPlanincludesmilestonesandabuilt-inmechanismthatrequiresregularre-evaluation.

Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1125APage4Whilewearealreadyrealizingbenefitsfromourefforts,wedonotanticipatethefullbenefitforseveralyears.Inordertoeffectivelyimplementprogramsasencompassingandcomprehensiveasthese,significantanalysis,planningandcoordinationareneeded.Asaresult,theirbenefitswillnotbefullyrealizeduntilmid1993.

Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1125APage5NRC-IdentifiedWeakness(2)"Anineffectivepreventivemaintenanceprogramthatresulted,forexample,infailuresof4KVcircuitbreakers"ResponsetoWeaknessWeconcurthatthePreventiveMaintenanceProgramcanbeimprovedand,aspreviouslydiscussed,wearetakingstepstodoso.However,CookNuclearPlant'savailabilityin1989isevidencethatthepresentpreventivemaintenanceprogramiseffective.During1989,CookNuclearPlantgenerated12millionnetMWHRS,themostsince1984.The69.3%availabilityforUnit1in1989contributedtoanaverageavailabilityof79.4%since1985'lthoughUnit2overallavailabilityhasnotbeenashighduetosteamgeneratortubedegradatidn,its74.4%availabilityin1989wasthehighestsince1983.OnDecember8,the111-dayrecordforthelongestrunwithbothunitsoperatingwasbroken.Thisrecordwasextendedto140dayswhenUnit2wasbroughtoff-lineforasurveillanceoutageonJanuary6,1990.Unit1ended1989withitslongestrunof175daysandcontinuedoperatinguntilMarch17,1990(aCookNuclearPlantrecordrunof251days)whentheunitwasbroughtofflineforaplannedsurveillanceoutage.AsdiscussedinourresponsetoNRCviolation(2)oftheinspectionreport,the4KVcircuitbreakersfailurewasdetectedduringpreventivemaintenancetesting.Asaresult,appropriatecorrectiveactionwas.subsequentlytakenwhichresultedinimprovementstoour4KVbreakers.Also,wenotifiedtheindustryoftheproblemviaaPart21report.

Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1125APage6NRC-IdentifiedVeakness(3)"Anextensivebacklogofnon-outagecorrectivemaintenancejoborderspartlycausedbylackofintegratedplanningandschedulingmethodology."ResponsetoWeakness"MaintainingtheCookNuclearPlantinvolvesthecompletionofapproximately20,000JobOrdersannually.Therelativeprioritiesofjobschangefrequentlyduetoanumberoffactors,theprimaryreasonbeingplantconditions.Managingtheinformationcontainedwithinthebacklogofyet-to-becompletedJobOrderscanbecriticaltoplantavailabilityandreliability.Theseeffortsarepresentlyhamperedbythelogisticsofpaperfilingsystemsandcomputertrackingsystemsthatlackneededflexibilityinhardwareandsoftware.(1)CorrectiveActionsTakenTheCookNuclearPlantInformationManagementSystem(IMS)plan,approvedfordevelopmentinFebruaryof1989identifiedninecomputersystemmodulesthat,whencompleted,willformasingle,integratedinformationmanagementsystem.Thisautomatedinformationsystemwillbeusedbybothplantsiteandcorporatepersonneltosupportplantoperationandmaintenance.Itwillprovidefortheschedulingandinitiationofmaintenancetasksandsupporttheassignmentofresponsibilitiesandaccountabilitiesforthesetasks.Specifically,formaintenance,theNuclearPlantMaintenanceModule(NPM)oftheCookNuclearPlant'sIMSplanwillallowplantstafftoinitiate,issue,prioritize,andtrackallmaintenanceworkattheplant.TheNPMmoduleoftheIMSplanwillalsomaintainahistoryofmaintenancework.TheprimaryobjectivesoftheNPMmodulearetoimproveplantavailabilityandtooptimizetheuseofplantresourceswiththeoverallgoalofreducingplantmaintenance.TheNPMsystemisdesignedtoallowanyNPMusertoinitiateastructuredrequestthattheuserbelievesshouldbereviewedand,ifwarranted,actedupon.Thisactionrequestfeatureprovidesaprocessforscreeningthoseactionsrequiringwork,andwillserveasafocalpointforinitiatingandtrackingJobOrders.PlantpersonnelwillenterdataintotheNPMsystemdefiningthecomponentthatneedsworkandbrieflydescribingthatwork.ThesystemisdesignedtoeliminateallpaperinthisprocessexcepttheactualJobOrderitself.

Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1125APage7ThereviewsthattakeplaceintheJobOrdersystemareperformedon-line.Thison-linecapabilityallowsforpendingJobOrderstobesortedinvariouswaysandthereviewingindividualshave'mmediateaccesstothisinformation.OncereviewsareperformedtheactualJobOrderscanbeprintedfortheworktobeperformed.OnceaJobOrderhasbeeninitiated,startingfromtheveryfirstentryintothesystemandnotjustfromthetimeitgetsprinted,theJobOrderprocessingsystemcantrackthestatusoftheJobOrder.Thisisaccomplishedthroughtheuseofstatuscodefields.Someofthecodesrepresentsituationssuchaswaitingformaterials,orwaitingforapprovalofthereviews,orothertypesofconditions.ThisfeatureisveryhelpfulforplanningandschedulingthemanyJobOrdersinthesystem.TheNPMsystemwillpermittheplantstafftoassignspecificJobOrders,attheactivitylevel,toascheduleddate,crewandsupervisor.Uponcompletion'fthecrewassignmentsandconfirmationofpermitrequirements,thesystemproducesasupervisoryassignmentreportandprintstheJobOrder.ThecompletedworkpackageincludestheJobOrder,equipmentdescriptions,partslist,andtestingformsalongwithotherneededdocuments.OncetheworkrelatedtoaJobOrderhasbeencompletedandtested,theJobOrderisreviewedandclosedout,on-line.TheNPMsystemmaintainsacompletehistoryofallcompletedandclosed-outJobOrders.ThisfeatureallowsforrapidaccesstoallhistoryonJobOrders.TheNPMsystempreventsaJobOrderfrombeingclosed-outuntilallreviewsandtestshavebeencompleted.Znaddition,theNPMsystemwillbearepositoryforpreviousrepetitivetasks.ThisfunctioneliminatestheneedforindividualstorecreateJobOrdersthatarerepetitiveinnature,TheNPMsystemwillautomaticallygeneratetheJobOrders,,accordingtotheappropriateduedates,orasdirectedbyaplanner.TheNPMsystemwillalsoprovideforcontinuousmonitoringofsurveillancetestsandpreventivemaintenanceworktomeetregulatoryorplantrequirements.OncetherepetitiveorpreventivemaintenanceJobOrdersarecreated,theyareavailableforreviewsandexecutionsinthesamemannerasanyoftheotherJobOrders.ThissystemwillalsobeusedtodevelopJobOrdersforplannedoutagessuchasrefuelingoutages.

Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1125APage8(2)BenefitsToBeDerivedFromCorrectiveActionsThedataenteredintotheNPMsystem,andtheprocessingthatthesystemdoeswiththisdata,willeliminatethemultiplemanualdataentrystepsofourpresentprocess.Eliminatingredundantmanualsystemsisofsignificanceitself.However,moreimportantlyaretheanticipatedimprovementsinplantavailabilityandlaborproductivity.Alongwithimprovedabilitytoplanandscheduleworkcomesanincreasedamountoftimeavailableformorecarefulconsiderationofotheraspectsoftheworktobeperformed,forexample,personnelsafety.Improvementscanbeexpectedandwillcertainlybestrivedfor.TheNPMsystemwillalsoidentifyandcoordinatemaintenanceonrelatedequipmentandsystems,thusdecreasingdowntimeoncomponentsremovedfromservice.QuickaccesstotheinformationintheNPMdatabasesmakesthesupervisorsinboththeoperationsandmaintenanceareasmoreawareofJobOrderprogress.ItisanticipatedthattheNPMsystemw'illhelpusrealizeourgoalofanon-outagecorrectivemaintenancejoborderbacklognotinexcessof90days.(3)DateWhenBenefitsWillBeAchievedWecurrentlyanticipatehavingthecomputerizedautomatedmaintenancesysteminplaceandoperationalbyAugust1990.Atthattime,datavalidationandloading,procedurechangesandtrainingofpersonnelwillbegin.

Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1125APage9NRC-IdentifiedWeakness(4)"Poormaterialconditionespeciallyasevidencedbythehighnumberofoil,steamandwaterleaks."ResponsetoWeakness(1)CorrectiveActionsTakenWhileitisAEPSC'spolicytokeepallofitsfacilities,ingoodmaterialcondition,werecognizetheneedforimprovementinthisarea.Asaresult,themanagementoftheCookNuclearPlanthaslaunchedaconcertedefforttoimproveplantmaterialcondition.Thisisevidencedbytheallocationoffundstosupportthefollowingphysicalimprovementsthatarecurrentlytakingplace:oAuxiliarybuildingpaintingoContaminatedequipmentstorageareaexpansionIoDecontaminationarearedesignoImprovedlightingoInstallationof18personnelwholebodycontaminationmonitorsItisCookNuclearPlantpolicythatnoleakisconsideredacceptable.Consequently,duringthe1988/1989refuelingoutageswerefurbishedabout1,780valvesandpackedthemwithChestertonpacking.Abreakdownofthiseffortisasfollows:Unit1Unit2TotalAuxiliaryBuildingContainmentTurbineHallMiscellaneous254130225211502807009255071250504Nevertheless,asubstantialnumberofleaksstillexistintheauxiliarybuilding,rangingfromsmalltracesofdriedboricacidtodripping.Theseleakshavebeenenteredintoacomputerdatabase,havebeenchalkeddown,andjobordershavebeenwritten.Theleaksarecurrentlybeingprioritizedandeffortswillbemadetorepairthemduringthenextrefuelingoutage,ifnotbefore.

Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1125APage10Theplantmanagerhasreaffirmedhiscommitmenttogoodplantmaterialconditionandpersonalaccountabilitybysendingamemorandumtoeachemployee.Thiscommitmenthasbeensupportedbycontinuedradiationworkerawarenesstraining,andoperatortrainingonventinganddraining.Inaddition,decontaminationeffortscontinue,whichhavealreadyreducedthecontaminatedareafromapproximately45,000feetin1986tothecurrent25,000feet(excludinglaydownareas).Ourgoalistoreducethesecontaminatedareasto20,000squarefeetin1990and10,000squarefeetpriortotheoutagein1991.(2)BenefitsToBeDerivedfromCorrectiveActionsTherearenumerousbenefitsgainedfromhavingtheplantingoodphysicalcondition,themostimportantofthesebeingincreasedplantsafetyandreliability.Arelatedbenefitisimprovedradiationprotectionandworkersafety.However,anotherimportant,butlessquantifiablebenefitistheimprovementtoworkermorale.(3)DateWhenBenefitsWillBeRealizedWhilemaintainingtheplantingoodphysicalconditionisanongoingprocess,weanticipatemajorimprovementswithinthenextyear.Therefuelingoutagewillfacilitatetherefurbishmentofvalises,aswellasotherrepairsandmodifications.

Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1125APage11NRC-IdentifiedWeakness(5)"Inadequatetrending,rootcauseanalysisandactiontocorrect,forexample,numerousleakingsafetyreliefvalves."ResponsetoWeakness(1)CorrectiveActionsTakenThisweaknessisbeingaddressedbythreeprograms:theNPMsystemwhichisdiscussedindetailinourresponsetoweaknesses(1)and(3),theSystemEngineerProgram,discussedinourresponsetoweakness(1),andtheRCMProgramdiscussedinourresponsetoweakness(1).(2)BenefitsToBeDerivedfromCorrectiveActionsTheNPMsystemwillprovideforacompletecomponenthistory.Thecomponenthistorywillprovideachronologicallistingofwork,modificationsorinspectionsthathavebeenperformedonaparticularcomponent.Thisprocesscreatesanindexedhistoricalrecordforcomponentsorfunctionalequipmentgroupsandcatalogscompletiondates,failurecodes,as-foundandas-leftconditions,partsreplaced,testresults,etc.TheSystemEngineersareexpectedtoidentifyandtrendappropriatesystemparameters,withthegoalofobtainingpertinentdataforsystemperformanceandreliabilitymonitoring.Theparameterstrendedshallbeperiodicallyreviewedandapprovedtoallowtimelypreventiveorcorrectiveactionstobeimplemented.Basedonthetrendeddata,theSystemEngineerisexpectedtorecognizesignificantsystem/componentdegradationorabnormaloperatingconditionsfrombothahistoricalbasis,aswellascurrentstatus.TheSystemEngineermayrequirethesupportoftechnicalexpertstoanalyzespecificareasofconcernandwillworkcloselywithourCorporateNuclearEngineeringDivisionengineersinthisregard.TheSystemEngineersareexpectedtoperformrootcauseanalysesonthesystemsassigned.Consequently,theSystemEngineerswillbetrainedinrootcauseanalysis.Inaddition,theSystemEngineerisexpectedto:Evaluatesystem/componentfailureimpactonplantsafetyandunitpoweroperationsPrepareandperformspecialsystem/componentperformancetests.

Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1125APage12TheRCMProgramwt.llcontributetoresolvingthisissuebyidentifyingdominantfailuremodesandcriticalcomponents.(3)DateWhenBenefitsWillBeRealizedAspreviouslystated,weexpecttheNPMsystemtobeinplaceandoperationalinAugust1990.Atthattime,personneltraininganddataloadingwillbegin.SeveralsystemengineershavebeenassignedatCookNuclearPlantandbenefitshavealreadybeenrealizedfromthisprogram.AneffortiscurrentlybeingmadetorecruitSystemEngineers.However,weanticipateitwilltakeatleastayearbeforetheprogramisfullystaffed.

Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1125APage13NRC-IdentifiedWeakness(6)"Inseveralinstancesprocedureswerenotfollowed,werepoorordidnotexistespeciallyinthebalanceofplantarea."ResponsetoWeakness(1)CorrectiveActionsTakenKeytothesafeandefficientoperationofanynuclearpowerplantisstrictadherencetoprocedures.Assuch,employeesareshownduringtheNuclearGeneralEmployeeTraining(NGET)classes,avideotapeofDavidWilliams,Jr.,SeniorExecutiveV.P.,EngineeringandConstruction,mandatingtheadherencetoprocedures.ItisAEPSC'slong-standingpolicythatfailuretofollowprocedureswillresultindisciplinaryaction.Inorderforthispolicytohaveanybenefit,well-writtenandaccurateproceduresmustbeinplace.Consequently,AEPSCispurchasingPRONETandtheservicesofconsultantprocedurewriterstoupgradeorwrite690maintenanceprocedures(268maintenance,422I&C).CriticalbalanceofplantcomponentswillbeaddressedastheyariseintheRCMprogram.TheMaintenanceImprovementPlanprovidesguidancethatclearlydefineswhatprocedurecomplianceis.Inaddition,aprocedurewriter'/user'sguidewilladdressthecircumstancesforchangingaproceduretoensureproceduralcompliance.(2)BenefitsToBeDerivedfromCorrectiveActionsPRONETisastateoftheartcomputersystemthatintegrateswriter'sguidelines,wordprocessing,graphicsanddatabasefunctionsintoacentralizedproceduremanagementsystem.Development,commitment,schedulingandreportingfunctionswillbecontrolledbythismenu-drivennetwork.Thisintegratedapproachwillresultinaprogramthatreducesdevelopmenttimeandprovidesefficientlong-termproceduremaintenanceandcommitment/referencetracking.(3)DateWhenBenefitsWillBeRealizedAlthoughaconsultantwilltrainplantstaffontheuseofPRONET,thebulkoftheprocedureupgradeworkwillbeperformedbyconsultantpersonnel.Byusingcontractworkerswewillnotimpacttheplantstaff.Iftheexistingstaffwereused,itisanticipatedthattheeffortwouldtakefourtofiveyears.Thisisconsideredtobeanunacceptabletimeframeforthiswork.Byusingcontractworkers,wewillobtainprofessionallypreparedproceduresinareasonabletimeframe.TheeffortisscheduledtobecompletedbyDecember1991.

ATTACHMENT2TOAEP:NRC:1125ARESPONSETONRC-IDENTIFIEDVIOLATIONS

Attachment2toAEP:NRC:1125APage1NRCViolation1"10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionV,asimplementedbySection1.7.5oftheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantOperationalQualityAssuranceProgramrequiresthatactivitiesrelatedtoqualitybeprescribedbydocumentedinstructions,procedures,anddrawings,thatthoseactivitiesbeaccomplishedinaccordancewiththoseinstructions,proceduresanddrawings,andthatinstructions,proceduresordrawingsincludeappropriatequantitativeorqualitativeacceptancecriteriafordeterminingthatimportantactivt,tieshavebeensatisfactorilyaccomplished.a~ProcedurePMI-2290,"JobOrders,"Revision8,requiredinSections4.4.8and4.4.8.3thatuponcompletionofthephysicalwork,thejobordertagsberemovedanddiscarded.Contrarytotheabo~e,tags15119,029643,B012209,B016950,B016832,andB017240werenotremovedalthoughthejoborderswerecancelledorcompleted.Asaresult,statusofequipmentcondi.tionremainedindeterminate(315/89031-01A;316/89031-01A)~b.RequestForChange12-2180requiredinstallationof200%overloadmotorprotectionandthatthethermaloverloadbesetatthelowtripcurrentrating.Contrarytotheabove,onDecember19,1989,theinspectorsobservedthatthethermaloverloadheaterassociatedwithresidualheatremovalloopisolationmotor-operatedvalveICM-111wassetatthehightripcurrentrating.Numerousadditionalthermaloverloadsinthedieselgeneratormotorcontrolcenterwerealsoobservedtobethewrongsizeorsetatthewrongcurrentrating,whichwillresultinprematureremovalofoperatingvoltagefromthemotors(315/89031-01B;316/89031-01B)~c~ProcedurePMI-2030,"DocumentControl,"Revision10,failedtoincluderequirementsfortheMasterDrawingIndexestobereviewedbyintendedusersforthelatestasbuiltdrawingslocatedintheplantmasterfile.Consequently,drawingsissuedbythedocumentcontrolcenterforfieldverificationswerenotthelatestasbuiltdrawingsorrevisions(315/89031-01C;316/89031/01C).The"PumpOperator'sData"manualandthevendormanualfor'heAuxiliaryFeedwater(AFV)pumprequiredthatthepumppackingbeadjustedwhilethepumpisoperating.Contrarytotheabove,thisrequirementwasnotincorporatedintotheAFVmaintenanceprocdures[sic).Althoughnoproblemswerenoted,inadequateattentiontothisrequirementcouldresultinrotorseizure,scoredshaftsleeves,orburnedpacking(315/89031-01D;316/89031-01D).

Attachment2toAEP:NRC:1125APage2Procedure12THP6030IMP.014"ProtectiveRelayCalibration",Revision8,Step8.1.2-2specifiedthatblackelectricaltapebeusedwhencleaningthediskanddragmagnetmechanismonTimeOvercurrent(IAC)relays.Contrarytotheabove,onDecember5,1989,atechnicianwasobservedusinganunusedcalibrationstickertocleanthe2ABEDGTimeOvercurrenttestrelay.Asaresult,cleanlinessofthecontactswasquestionable(315/89031-01E;316/89031-01E).f.ProcedurePMI-2010"PlantManagerandDepartmentHeadInstructions,ProceduresandIndex,"Revision17,PolicyStatement3.1,Section3requiredthat"doubleasterisked"proceduresforplantactivitiesbe"in-hand"whenimplementingtheprocedure.Contrarytotheabove,onDecember6,1989,theinspectorobservedanoperatorrackin"2A"TrainReactorTripBypassBreakerwithouthaving"inhand"doubleasteriskedprocedure~12-OHP4021.082.018"RackingInandOutReactorTrip,ReactorTripBypassandMGSetOutputBreakers,"Revision2.Eventhoughnoadverseaffectswerenoted,inthepastundersimilarcircumstances,areactortripoccurred(315/89031-01F;316/89031-01F).ProcedurePMI-2010,"PlantManagerandDepartmentHeadInstructions,ProceduresandIndex,"Revision17,requiresinSection3.14.1thatalleffectiveinstructionsandproceduresbereviewednolessfrequentthanonceeverytwoyears.Contrarytotheabove,maintenanceprocedureMHI2070,MHI7090,PMI4050,12THP6030IMP~071,and12THPIMP.062werenotreviewedinthelasttwoyears.Asaresult,theprocedureswerenotupdatedtoreflectfeedbackandchangestopreventivemaintenanceactivities(315/89031-01G;316/89031-1G)."ResponsetoViolationlaPlantprocedurePMI-2290requiresthattagsplacedatornearequipmentneedingrepairberemovedwhentheitemisrepairedoriftheJobOrderiscancelled.Asnotedinthetext,sixJobOrdertagswerefoundintheplantforworkthathadbeencancelledorcompletedwhichconstitutesfailuretofollowprocedure.TheconclusionmadeinInspectionReport89031wasthatequipmentstatuswas"indeterminate."WhilethepresenceofJobOrdertagswascontrarytotherequirementsofPMI-2290,thestatusofequipment/componentsinvolvedwouldnotbeaffected.Theinformationplacedonatagidentifiestopersonnel1)thataJobOrderhasbeenwrittenforrepairwithnumbernoted,2)thenatureofrepairs/adjustmentsrequiredasdeterminedbythepersoninitiatingtheJobOrderand3)helpslocatethespecificcomponent.Byitself,aJobOrdertaghasnoimpactonsystemorequipmentoperability,does

Attachment2toAEP:NRC.:1125APage3notindicatethatequipmenthasbeentaggedout,anddoesnotdirectanyotheractivityinvolvingtheequipment.Othersystemssuchastheclearancepermitsystemlogsandthedeficiencylogsindicatetheequipmentstatus.(1)CorrectiveActionTakenandResultsAchievedJobOrdertagsidentifiedduringtheinspectionweresubsequentlyremovedtoachievecompliancewithapplicablesectionsofPMI-2290.(2)CorrectiveActionTakenToAvoidFurtherViolationThePlantManagerwilli.ssueamemoonproceduralcompliancetoensurethatallpersonnelarefullyawareofthemeaningofcompliance,consequencesoffailureandwhatactionstotake~whenaprocedurecannotbefollowedaswritten.TheMaintenanceImprovementPlanincludesissuanceofadepartmentpolicyonprocedurecompliance.Includedwillbeguidanceonthemonitoringoftheeffectivenessofprocedurecompliance.Alsoaprocedurewriter'/user'sguidewilladdressthecircumstancesforchangingaproceduretoensureproceduralcompliance.(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedThefinaldraftofthepolicywillbeissuedonJuly15,1990.GuidanceontheeffectivenessmonitoringwillbeissuedonAugust15,1990.ThePlantManager'smemowillbeissuedonMay1,1990.ResponsetoViolationlbTheNoticeofViolationidentifiedthatthermaloverloadsintheplanthadbeeninstalledatanincorrecttripcurrentrating.Asaresultoftheinspection,plantpersonnelinvestigatedtheproblemandaddresseditinProblemReport90-81.(1)CorrectiveActionTakenandResultsAchievedTheimproperpositioningand/ormis-sizingoftheoverloadheatersresultedfromerrorsmadeduringinitialinstallations.TwentyoverloadswereinspectedandevaluatedbyplantandAEPSCengineers.Elevenwerefoundtob'ecorrect.Onewasfoundonabreakerforaresistiveheaterwhereoverloadprotectionwasnotconsideredcriticalasmoldedcasecircuitbreakersprotectionwasprovided.Onfourbreakers(includingICM-111)theas-foundheatersizeagreedwiththecalculated,butarrowpositiondidnotagree.Fullloadampswasatthedividingpointforselectingupordownposi.tion.Slightchangesinmotorprotectionresultedbutdidnotaffecttheoperabilityofload.FourfeedersonBOPwerefoundtobemis-sized.Ofthosefour

Attachment2toAEP:NRC:1125A-Page4onewasmis-sizedtoadegreethatreplacementwasneededtoensureadequateprotection.Ofthethreeotheroverloadheaters,thoughimproperlyset,wouldhaveprovidedthermaloverloadprotectionforequipment.JobOrderstocorrectthesesettingsbyOctober30,1990,havebeenwritten.(2)CorrectiveActionTakenToAvoidFurtherViolationInthecourseoftheplant'sinvestigationitwasdeterminedthatthemis-sizingand/ormispositioningofthethermaloverloadshadoccurredduringinitialinstallationin1977and1978.Lackingvendorinformation,calculationsweremostlikelydevelopedbyplantpersonnelforpositions/sizeswhichinsomeofthecases,provedincorrect.Thedesignchangeprocesshasevolvedsincethattimetoalevelthatreasonablyensuresthatrepetitionofasimilarconditionwillnotoccur.Specifically,generalproceduresnowrequirethatdesigncalculationsbeverifiedanddocumentedbyqualifiedpersonnel.(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedBasedontheengineeringevaluationcompletedJanuary15,'990,thedeficienciesinthethermaloverloadheatersettingswouldnothaveaffectedtheoperabilityoftheICM-111breaker.Otherdeficienciesdidnotdegradethethermaloverloadprotectionoftheequipmentbreakers.Currentprocedures/practicesshouldpreventrecurrenceofthisproblem.ResponsetoViolationlcInthecourseoftheinspectionitwasfoundthataplantinstructionutilizedfordocumentcontrol(drawings)containednoprovisionmandatingthattheuseroftheindexverifythatitwasthemostrecentupdate.Weconcurwiththeinspector'sconclusionthataninstructiontousersoftheMasterDrawingIndextoensurethatitreferencesup-to-dateas-builtdrawingsshouldbeincludedinprocedures.(1)CorrectiveActionTakenandResultsAchievedAsaresultoftheinspection,PMI-2030,"DocumentControl,"wasrevisedtoinstructaMasterDataIndexusertoensurethatitreflectsthelatestas-builtdrawingslocatedintheplant'smasterfile.(2)CorrectiveActionTakenToAvoidFurtherViolationRevision11toPMI-2030isbeingroutedforapprovalfromplantmanagement.Therevisionaddressestheinspector'sconcernnotedintheNoticeofViolation.

IAttachment2toAEP:NRC:1125APage5(3)DateWhenFullComlieneeWillBeAchievedTherevisedversionofPMI-2030willbeeffectivebyMay1,1990.ResponsetoViolationldProceduralrevisiontoincorporateadirectiontorunapumpinordertoproperlyadjustpackingisnotviewedasnecessary.PersonnelperformingpackingadjustmentsmeettherequirementsofANSIStandardN18-1(4.5.3).Consistentwiththatstandard,maintenancepersonnelreceiveformaltraininginsubjectsassociatedwiththeirposition.Includedintheplant'strainingisacourseonpumpsthatdirectlyreferencesthecorrectmethodologyforadjustingthepackingonpumps.Thisteachesmaintenancepersonnelthatadjustmentswillonlybemadetopackingwhenthepumpisoperating.AsrequiredbyANSIStandardN18-7,Section4.1(2),plantproceduresaredevelopedwiththeobjectiveofprovidingadequateinformationtopersonnelinvolvedinagiventaskconsideringtheskilltheyareprovidedthroughthetrainingprogram.(1)CorrectiveActionTakenandResultsAchievedThosepersonswhowouldbeinvolvedinpumppackingworkarehiredandtrainedconsistentwithANSIN18-1.(2)CorrectiveActionTakentoAvoidFurtherViolationThehiringpracticesandtrainingprogramshaveprovenadequatetopreventproblemsduetopumppacking(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedNoviolationoccurredaspracticesareinaccordancewithN18-1andpersonnelarefullyqualified.ResponsetoViolationleWhiletheintentofStep8.1.2-2ofmaintenanceprocedure12THP6030.IMP.014wastoensurethattechniciansperformingcleaningwouldutilizetapeorsimilaradhesive-backedmaterial.Blackelectricaltape,wasspecifiedbecauseitisacommonlyavailableitem.However,useofacalibrationstickerdid-constituteaviolationoftheprocedureaswritten.(1)CorrectiveActionTakenandResultsAchievedMaintenancesupervisionreviewedtheneteffectofutilizingthestickerinthecourseofcleaninganddeterminedthatsatisfactoryresultswereobtained.Nore-cleaningwasdeemed

Attachment2toAEP:NRC:1125APage6necessary.12THP6030.IMP.014hadbeenrevisedviaachangesheetinitiatedApril2,1990,toremovereferencetoblackelectricaltape.(2)CorrectiveActionTakenToAvoidFurtherViolationThePlantManagerwillissueamemoonproceduralcompliancetoensurethatallpersonnelarefullyawareofthemeaningofcompliance,consequencesoffailureandwhatactionstotakewhenaprocedurecannotbefollowedaswritten.TheMaintenanceImprovementPlanincludesissuanceofadepartmentpolicyonprocedurecompliance.Includedwillbeguidanceonthemonitoringoftheeffectivenessofprocedurecompliance.Alsoaprocedurewriter'/user'sguidewilladdressthecircumstancesforchangingaproceduretoensureproceduralcompliance.(3)DateWhenFullComlieneeWillBeAchievedThefinaldraftofthepolicywillbeissuedonJuly15,1990.GuidanceontheeffectivenessmonitoringwillbeissuedonAugust15,1990.ThePlantManager'smemowillbeissuedonMay1,1990.ResponsetoViolationlf(1)CorrectiveActionTakenandResultsAchievedTheAuxiliaryEquipmentOperator(AEO)involvedinthiseventhadreceivedtrainingontheoperationofreactortripbreakersandtheexistenceoftheprocedurepriortothisevent.TheAEO,however,overlookedthereactortripbreakerprocedurewasrequiredtobe"inhand"wheneverperformingrackingoperations.Althoughtherackingevolutionwasdoneinaccordancewiththe.procedurerequirements,thiseventwasaviolationbecausetherequirementtohavetheprocedure"inhand"wasnotsatisfied.AmemorandumwasissuedtoOperationspersonnelonJanuary19,1990,toremindthemofthe"inhand"requirementforthereactortripbreakerprocedure.(2)CorrectiveActionToBeTakenToAvoidFurtherViolationTheroutinesurveillanceproceduresforreactortripbreakertestingwererevisedonDecember13,1989,toreferencetherequirementforhavingthereactortripbreakerrackingprocedure"inhand"fortherackingevolutions.Thestartupsurveillanceprocedures,whichrequirerackingofthereactortripbreakers,willberevisedbyJune4,1990,toreferencetherequirementforhavingthereactortripbreakerprocedure"inhand."

Attachment2toAEP:NRC:1125APage7Duringtheconcluded,proceduresTherefore,pasttwoyears,QAaudits/surveillanceshaveexceptfora"fewisolatedcases,"doubleasteriskedhaveinfactbeen"inhand"whenrequired.nogenericprogrammaticproblemexists.(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliancewasachievedonDecember6,1989,whenthe'involvedAEOwasreinstructedofthe"inhand"proceduralrequirement.ResponsetoViolationlgFiveprocedures/instructionswerecitedintheNoticeofViolationasnothavingbeenreviewedwithinthetwo-yearlimitestablishedinplantprocedurePMI-2010.However,ineachcasethedocumentshadbeenreviewedanddocumentationtothateffectwasonfile.UponrequestoneoftheinspectorswasprovidedwithbiannualreviewdocumentsforIMP.071andIMP.062.Theinstructiondoesnotrequireanapprovedrevisionwithintwo.years,onlyareviewpriortosuchrevision.Thisinformationmaynothavebeenadequatelycommunicated.(1)CorrectiveActionTakenandResultsAchievedFurtherreviewoftheNoticeofViolationbytheplantidentifiedthatprocedures/instructionsnotedhadreceivedreviewasrequiredbyPMI-2010,Rev.17.(2)CorrectiveActionTakentoAvoidFurtherViolationTrackingandreviewofproceduresispresentlyadequate.(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedNoviolationoccurred.

Attachment2toAEP:NRC:1125APage8NRCViolation2"10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionVIII,asimplementedbySection1.7.8oftheDonaldCDCookOperationalQualityAssuranceProgramrequiredthatmeasuresbeestablishedfortheidentificationofmaterials,partsandcomponentssuchasbypartnumber,serialnumber,orotherappropriatemeansontheitemorrecordstraceabletotheitemthroughoutfabrication,installationanduseoftheitem.""Contrarytotheabove,identificationofmaterialsandcomponentsfortraceabilitywasnotaccomplishedforcableextensionportionsandaluminumsplicingsleevesforconnectionstoseveralsafety-relatedmotorcontrolcentersinstalledundertheRequestForChange1482modification(315/89031-02;316/89031-02)."ResponsetoViolation2RFC-1482installedtransitionpieces(sleeves)tosplicecoppertoaluminumcablesinvariousmotorcontrolcenters.PerRFCinstructions,thetransitionpiecesweretobeinstalledinaccordancewithEngineeringDesignSpecification(EDS)607andEDS608'heinstallationtookplacebetweenJuneof1979andSeptemberof1981whenthefinalsummarywasissued.AsearchofthecompletedRFCpackage(includinginstallationjoborders)andofthemicrofilmofthecompletedjoborderpackagesrevealednodocumentationoftheparts(sleeves)usedfortheinstallation.IndividualswhowereinvolvedwiththeMaintenanceDepartmentatthattimestatedthatpersonnelwouldhaveinstalledthetransitionpiecespertheEDSasstatedintheRFC.InadequatedocumentationofmaterialinstalledbyaJobOrderduringthedesignchangeprocesswastherootcauseofthisviolation.Additionally,therewereinadequatereviewofthecompletedjobordersandthedesignchangepackageuponcompletion.(1)CorrectiveActionTakenandResultsAchievedTheinstallationtookplaceapproximately10yearsagoandwasperformedinaccordancewithEDS608,whichwasreferencedintheRFCpackage.Actualapplicationforthepasttenyearshasfunctionallydemonstratedtheadequacyofsubjectmaterials'

Attachment2toAEP:NRC:1125APage9(2)CorrectiveActionTakenToAvoidFurtherViolationCurrentprocurement/dedicationpracticesensureproperdocumentationisdevelopedtodemonstratecontroloverthesuitabilityofmaterial,partsandcomponents.(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedCurrentprocedures/practice'sshouldpreventrecurrenceofthisproblemandensurefuturecompliance.

Attachment2toAEP:NRC:1125APage10NRCViolation3"10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionXI,asimplementedbySection1.7.11oftheDonaldC.CookOperationalQualityAssuranceProgramrequiredthatatestprogrambeestablishedtoassuretestingtodemonstratethatsystemsandcomponentswillperformsatisfactorilyinserviceinaccordancewithtestprocedureswhichincorporaterequirementsandacceptancelimitscontainedinapplicabledesigndocuments,andthatadequatetestinstrumentationwasavailableandused.""Contrarytotheabove,testinstrumentswerenotsensitiveoraccurateenoughtoverifythecalibrationoftheundervoltagerelaysthatactuatetheEmergencyDieselGenerators.Procedure2THP6030IMP.250,"4kVDieselStart,4kVESSBusUndervoltageRelayCalibration,"Revision7,Section3.0,requiredtheuseofaWestinghousetypePA-161ACanolog[sic]voltmeteroritsequivalentwithequalorbetteraccuracyandadequaterangetomeasurethedesiredparameters.However,thevoltmeterhadatoleranceof+1.5voltsthatwasnotsufficientlyaccuratetomeasurethedesiredparameterof90.3to91.8voltsspecifiedinTechnicalSpecification3.3.2.Inaddition,thevoltmeterindicatedtothenearestwholevoltanddidnothavedivisionmarkingsbetweenthenumbers.Technicianshadtointerpolateresultsandrecordvaluestothenearesttenthofavoltwhilethevoltmeter'sdialindicatorwasmovingintheincreasingordecreasingdirection.Furthermore,thetechniciansusedhandsignalstocommunicatethemomenttheundervoltagerelayoperated.Basedontheinaccuracyandinsensitivityofthevoltmeter,andpoortestingtechnique,resultsoftheundervoltagetestwerenotconclusive(315/89031-03;316/89031-03)."ResponsetoViolation3Themeterusedwasfirstspecifiedintheoriginalproceduredevelopedbeforeinitialplantstart-up.Thespecificreasonsforusingthismetercouldnotbedetermined.However,itisbelievedthatthiswasthelimitoftheavailabletechnologyatthattime.Theonlyothermeteravailablewasabasicdigitaltype,whichcouldnotbeusedduetotheinherentlyslowresponseandupdatetime,causingagreateruncertaintyofspecificsetpointvaluethantheanalogmeter.

Attachment2toAEP:NRC:1125APage11(1)CorrectiveActionsandResultsAchievedZ&CnowusestheFlukeModel45digitalmeterduringtestingofthe4KVdieselstartand4KVESSbusundervoltagerelays.Recentdevelopmentsindigitalmeterswhichincludefasterresponsetimesandupdatetimesandminimum/maximummodifierfeatureshasmadetheiruseacceptable.Thedigitalmetercurrentlybeingusedhasanaccuracyof+0.3percent.Theprevioustestmethodprovidedacceptableresults,basedontheas-foundvaluesonthefirstuseofthedigitalmetersbeinginspecificationbycomparablepercentages.'2)CorrectiveActionsTakenToAvoidFurtherViolationThecalibrationprocedureswhichcurrentlyallowuseofeitheranalogordigitalmeterswillbechangedtospecifytheuseoftheFlukeModel45digitalmeter,oritsequivalent,toensureconsistentuseofadigitalmeter.(3)DateWhenFullComlieneeWillBeAchievedTheprocedurechangeswillbecompletedbeforeApril30,1990.

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Attachment2toAEP:NRC:1125APage12NRC.Violation4"10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionXVI,asimplementedinSection1.7.16oftheDonaldC.CookOperationalQualityAssuranceProgramrequiredthatmeasuresbeestablishedtoassurethatconditionsadversetoqualitywerepromptlyidentifiedandcorrected.Inthecaseofsignificantconditionsadversetoquality,themeasuresshallassurethatthecauseoftheconditionwasdeterminedandcorrectiveactiontakentoprecluderepetition."Contrarytotheabove:ThePlantAssessmentGroupCommittee'sreviewinMarch1989forProblemReport89-245,concernedwiththeFebruary1989failureoftwosafety-related4kVbreakersT-11D6andT-1104tocloseondemandduringtestsduetolubricationhardening,failedtospecifycorrectiveactiontopreventrecurrence.Furthermore,noactionwastakentoinspectother4kVbreakersforcommonmodefailure.Consequently,inMarchandAprilof1989sevenadditionalsafetyrelatedandbalanceofplantbreakersfailedtocloseduringtesting,whichwasalsocausedbyhardeningofthelubricantonthebreakerlinkage(315/89031-04A;316/89031-04A).b.Correctiveactionwasneitherpromptnoradequatetocorrectmaintenancerelated'roblemsidentifiedbythelicenseeinFebruary1988.InDecember1989,36ofthese71selfidentifiedfindingsandrecommendationswerereopened.Duringthisinspectionmanyofthesameproblemswereidentifiedthatreflectasignificantweaknessinthecorrectiveactionsystem(315/89031-04B;316/89031-04B)."ResponsetoViolation4aBasedonreviewofProblemReport89-245,whichwasaddressedintheNoticeofViolationitisourpositionthatnoactualviolationoccurred.TheFebruary27,1989,conditionwasidentifiedduringscheduled'preventivemaintenanceworkandresultedintheproblemreport.Thatdiscovery,coupledwithasimilarconditionalsofoundduringpreventivemaintenance,resultedinaPart21report.ThePart21investigationrevealedthatvendor-specifiedinformationcontainednoinstructionforperiodiclubricationofthebreakers.Similarbreakersusedintheplanthad,untilthattime,passedtestrequirements'heplant'sactionswhichweretakenpromptly,includedrevisionoftheprocedurebasedonnewinputfromthemanufacturer,initiationofJobOrderstoinspectallothersimilarbreakersinstalledinbothunits,andestablishmentofscheduledinspectionstoidentifypossiblerepetitionofthe

C.I1

Attachment2toAEP:NRC:1125APage13conditioninthefuture.TheNoticeofViolationincorrectlyconcludedthatnoactionwastakentoinspectadditionalbreakersordevelopcorrectiveaction.TwosubsequentproblemreportswereinitiatedasaresultofdeficienciesfoundintheinspectionsandtestscoveredbyourexpandedactionforProblemReport89-245andtheassociatedPart21review.Thosereportswereinitiatedtodocumentthesimilarconditionsonthenotedbreakers.WithintwomonthsoftheMarch1,1989,Part21reporttotheNRC,theplanthadcompletedtheinspections,cleanedandrelubricatedthebreakersinbothunitsasrecommendedbytherevisedvendorinformation,anddocumentedeachcasewhenasimilarconditionwasfound.(1)CorrectiveActionTakenandResultsAchievedTheresultofProblemReport89-245,whichwasreviewedbythePlantAssessmentGrouponMarch17,1989,wastoinspect,cleanandlubricatesimilarbreakersinbothunitsanddocumenttheresults.(2)CorrectiveActionTakentoAvoidFurtherViolationProcedurechangesandinspectionswerescheduledasaresultofaddressingtheproblemreportedinProblemReport89-245onsimilarbreakers.TheseactionsgeneratedadditionalJobOrdersandconditionreportswhichwerereferencedintheinspectionreport.(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedNoviolationoccurred.ResponsetoViolation4bAsdiscussedinourresponsetoWeakness(1),AEPhastakennumerouscorrectiveactionstoaddresstheproblemsidentifiedbytheMaintenanceSelf-Assessment.Theseactionsinclude:othedevelopmentofaRCMProgramotheacquisitionoftheNuclearPlantMaintenance(NPM)ModuleothedevelopmentofaSystemEngineerProgramotheacquisitionofNUS'sPRONETandtheservt.cesofNUS'sprocedurewriters.

Attachment2toAEP:NRC:1125APage14Inordertoeffectivelyimplementprogramsasencompassingandcomprehensiveasthese,significantanalysis,planningandcoordinationareneeded.Assuch,itwilltakeseveralyearstocompletelyimplementsomeofthecorrectiveactionswehaveinitiated.(1)CorrectiveActionsandResultsAchievedMaintenance-relatedproblemsidentifiedintheMaintenanceSelf-Assessmentwillbereviewedandresolvedasappropriate,withimplementationoftheMaintenanceImprovementPlan.(2)CorrectiveActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolationTheImprovementPlanincludesmilestonesandabuilt-inmechanismthatrequiresregularre-evaluationoftheplanandmonitoringofitseffectivenesstoensurethatitisprovidingthedesiredresultsandthatthereiscontinuingimprovementinallmaintenance-relatedareas'3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedResolutionanddocumentationoftheidentifieditemswillbecompletedbyJune1,1991.