Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Unit 2 Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 requires each PCIV be operable in Mode 1. With one PCIV inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated by use of at least one closed and de -activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured. Contrary to the above, on November 6, 2016 at 21:51 operators tagged valve 2E41F111, a PCIV, open with the breaker off. Subsequently, a licensed operator performing a main control room board walk down noted the PCIV was inoperable and, on November 8 at 0151, operators closed and de -activated an automatic valve in the line to rest ore compliance. Inspectors screened the finding in accordance with IMC 609 Appendix A The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at -Power. The finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) because the questions in Appendix A E xhibit 3 for reactor containment were answered no. This issue was documented in the licensees corrective action program as CR 10295889. (Section 4OA3.2) |
| Site: | Hatch  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000321/2017001 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2017 (2017Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | No Cornerstone |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Collins D Hardage D Retterer J Panfel R Carrion R Kellner S Sandal W Pursley A Patz |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |
Finding - Hatch - IR 05000321/2017001 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hatch) @ 2017Q1
Self-Identified List (Hatch)
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