05000275/FIN-2008003-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Emergency Diesel Generator Snubber Valve Receipt Inspection |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV, Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or Components, after Pacific Gas and Electric failed to perform an adequate receipt inspection to identify defective emergency diesel generator fuel injector snubber valves. On March 13, 2008, Entergy Nuclear Operations issued Part 21, Report 2008-004-00, Potential Defect in Fairbanks Morse Emergency Diesel Generator Snubber Valve Material and Heat Treatment, after observing repetitive diesel generator snubber valve failures. Pacific Gas and Electric evaluated the Part 21 report and concluded that the current receipt inspection was adequate to identify defective snubber valves. However, the inspectors identified that the receipt inspection Procedure RPE M-7297, DEG Fuel Injection Pump Snubber Valve, did not include verification that the snubber valve material had been properly heat treated as described in the 10 CFR Part 21 notification. The inspectors concluded that the potential existed for defective snubber valves to be installed on station emergency diesel generators. The licensee took corrective actions to inspect the installed snubber valves, revise the receipt inspection, and enter the condition into the corrective action program as Action Request A0729807. The subsequent inspection did not identify any defective snubber valves installed in the plant or in the warehouse stock. The finding is greater than minor because if left uncorrected, less than adequate receipt inspections would become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors concluded this finding is of very low safety significance because it did not represent a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than the Technical Specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, associated with the operating experience component because Pacific Gas and Electric Company failed to adequately evaluate a Part 21 notification P.2(a) |
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
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| Report | IR 05000275/2008003 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2008 (2008Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Brown M Peck P Elkmann J Melfi J Nadel V Gaddy |
| CCA | P.5, Operating Experience |
| INPO aspect | CL.1 |
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Finding - Diablo Canyon - IR 05000275/2008003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Diablo Canyon) @ 2008Q2
Self-Identified List (Diablo Canyon)
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