ML17250B199
| ML17250B199 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1990 |
| From: | MECREDY R C ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | MARTIN T T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9006200487 | |
| Download: ML17250B199 (37) | |
See also: IR 05000244/1989081
Text
xREGULATOYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTZOYSTEM(RIDE)x~xACCESSIONNBR:9006200487DOC.DATE:90/06/08NOTARIZED:NO;CFACIL:50-244RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,RochesterGAUTH.NAME~~~~AUTHORAFFILIATIONCREDY,R,C.RochesterGas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONMARTINET.T.Region1,OfcoftheDirectorSUBJECT:RespondstoNRC900509ltrreviolationsnotedinInspRept50-244/89-81.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IEOZDCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR1ENCL3SIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-InspRept/NoticeofViolationResponseNOTES:LicenseExpdateinaccordancewith10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).DOCKET0500024405000244cRECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD1-3PDRGN1ERNAL:LPDRNSICINTERNAL:AEODAEOD/TPADNRRMORISSEAU,DNRR/DLPQ/LPEB10NRR/DREP/PEPB9DNRR/DST/DIR8E2NUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS2FILE01COPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEJOHNSONFAAEOD/DEIIBDEDRONRRSHANKMAN,SNRR/DOEADIR11NRR/DRIS/DIRNRR/PMAS/ILRB12OE~IREG~02NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111<11~~+NG:P3fo)579+/NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASCONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESKROOMPl-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEED!ADD,TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR22ENCL22
AE;f,Nfe~~~5OAA55455ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATION~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER,N.Y.14849-PPPIJune8,1990TEEER<04CAREACODE75555462700Mr.ThomasT.MartinRegionalAdministratorRegionIU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission475AllendaleRoadKingofPrussia,PA19406Subject:ResponsetoInspectionReport50-244/89-81SafetySystemFunctionalInspect'ion--RHRSystemR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantNRCDocket50-244DearMr.Martin:Thisletterprovidestheinitial30-dayresponsetotheSafetySystemFunctionalInspection(SSFI)oftheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)SystemattheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,conducted,betweenNovember6andDecember8,1989.TheNRCletterofMay09,1990fromMarvinW.Hodges(NRC)toRobertC.Mecredy(RG&E)transmittedthereportforthatinspection.ThisletterprovidestheRG&Eresponses,pursuantto10CFR2.201,tothetwoviolationsissuedinconjunctionwiththeSSFIreport.Inaddition,weareprovidingscheduleinformationconcerningtheunresolvedissues,includingthepostulatedfloodingoftheRHRroom,identifiedintheinspectionreport.Additionalinformationwillbeprovidedinthe120-dayresponsetotheSSFIreport.Thenuclearindustryisgoingthroughmajorupgradeeffortsinvolvingconfigurationmanagementanddesignbasisdocuments.RG&Eisnotaloneinrecognizingthebenefitsoftheseimprovementsandhasbeenproceedingwiththeseefforts.OnMarch6,1990RG&EmadeaformalpresentationtoNRCRegionIstaffandonMarch27,1990madeapresentationtoNRRregardingourconfigurationmanagementprogram.Wehavecompletedthreepilotsystemdesignbasisdocumentsandarereviewingthemtodeterminetheoptimalspecificationfortheoveralldesignbasisdocumentprogramfortheremainingplantsystems.Inaddition,RG&Ehasdevelopedaseparateprogramtoprovidefurtherassurancethatalldesignbasisinformationand,commitmentswhichmayhavebeenrelieduponbytheNRCarecaptured.TheobjectiveoftheNRCSSFIoftheRHRsystemswastoassessthecapabilityofthatsystemtoperformitsdesignbasisfunctions.Aspartofthatinspection,theSSFIteamassessedtheoveralldesigncontrolprogramandotherworkprocessesusedbyRG&E.ThereviewoftheseprogrammaticaspectswasfarbroaderthantheRHRsystem.Specialemphasiswasplacedupontheengineeringprocessesandtheirinterfaceswithotheractivities.900b200487900b08PDRADOCK050002448PNUggIJt~fP(
2TheprimaryresultoftheSSFIwasthatnosituationswereidentifiedthatwouldprohibittheRHRsystemfromperformingitsintendedfunctionsundernormalanddesignbasisaccidentconditions.AswouldbeexpectedfromanSSFIofanynuclearpowerplant,andinparticularoneoftheearlySEPplants,theSSFIidentified.areaswhereimprove-mentiswarranted.TwoSeverityLevelIVviolationswerecited.,andtenspecificunresolveditemsweredocumented.TheNRCletterofMay09,1990requiresthattheviolationsbeaddressed,pursuantto10CFR2.201,within30days.TheletteralsorequeststhatRG&Eprovideitsevaluationofthespecificunresolveditemsandplannedactions,within120days.Inaddition,theNRCletterrequeststhatRG&Ealsoprovidescheduleinformationregardingtheactionstoaddresstheunresolveditems,within30days.Theschedulesrequestedareexclusiveofunresolveditem89-81-11,EngineeringAssurance,forwhicharesponsewasrequestedin120days.kResponsestotwoviolationsidentifiedar'eprovidedasEnclosuresA&Btothisletter.Thefirstviolationinvolved.notmaintaininganup-to-dateloadprofileforthebatteries.Theactualcapabilityofthebatterieswasnotanissue,onlytheadequacyofthetesting.RG&EhadalreadyreachedastateoffullcomplianceonthismatterwhentheSSFIreportwasreceived.>>Thesecondviolationcitedhadtwoparts.Thefirstpartinvolveshavingnotalreadydevelopedaperiodictestingprogramforthemoldedcasecircuitbreakers.Thesecondpartinvolvesnothavinganexplicitacceptancecriterioninthetestprocedureforthesetpointsofthedcundervoltagealarmrelays.Althoughagenerallyacceptedperiodictestmethodformoldedcasecircuitbreakersisnotavailableintheindustrytoday,wechoosenottotakeissuewiththisviolation.Theindustryiscurrentlyexaminingtheneedforand/orrequirementsformoldedcasecircuitbreakertesting.RG&Ewillimplement,when.available,thosetestingmethodsandrequirementsendorsedbytheindustry.Withregardtotheacceptancecriterionfortheundervoltagerelaysetpoints,wehadalreadyreachedastateoffullcomplianceonthismatterwhentheSSFIreportwasreceived.Inaddition,onourowninitiative,wehaveexpandedthisconcerntoincludetheacundervoltagerelaysforthesafetybuses.Inadditiontotheseviolations,NRCalsoidentifiedtenunresolveditems.TheidentificationoftheseitemsiscontainedinEnclosureC.Severaloftheseunresolveditemshavealreadybeencompletedandseveralmoreareinprocess.DuringtheRG&EreviewoftheSSFIreport,managementrecognizedthatmanyoftheunresolveditemswereexamplesofbroader,underlying,programmaticconcerns.Manyoftheseconcernsfocusedonengineeringfunctionsand,controls'.BecauseRG&EunderstandstheimportanceofresolvingtheprogrammaticandmanagementissuesaswellasthespecificitemscitedbytheNRC,wearedevelopingasystematicapproachtoaddressbothtypesofconcerns.Thisapproachisatwo-part,paralleleffort.Thefirstpartfocusesonthemanagementprocessesinadisciplinedmanner,whilethesecond.partfocusesontheresolutionofthespecificunresolveditems.
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Tobeginthereviewofthebroaderconcerns,wehavere-reviewedtheSSFIreportandthecitedissues,andhavecategorizedthemintogeneraltopicalareas.Forexample,unresolveditem89-81-05involvesnothavingamechanismtoassurethatdesigncalculationsaremain-tainedup-to-date.Weseethisspecificitemasbeingpartofamoregeneralareacalleddesigncontrol.EnclosureDisapreliminarycategorizationoftheunresolveditemsintothegeneraltopicalareas.Inaddition,RG&Eisinitiatingamoredetailedreviewoftheworkprocessesandtheircontrolsforeachofthegeneralareaswhichcontainsignificantidentified,weaknesses.Thisreviewwillencompassidentifyingthecauseoftheviolations,aswellastheunresolvedissues,identifiedbytheSSFIreport.EnclosureEcontainstheschedularinformationasrequestedbythestaff.Wehaveseparatedthisscheduleinformationintotwocatego-ries:resolutioncompletedandscheduledforresolution.RG&Ehasresolveditems89-81-04,06,07A,and10asidentifiedinEnclosureC.Inparticular,RG&EhaspromptlyresolvedtheissueregardingfloodingoftheRHRpumproom.TheUFSARhasbeenupdated,andtheEOPsandtrainingdocumentshavebeenrevised.Adetailedaccountofthoseactionstakentoresolvetheitemsidentifiedabovearecon-tainedinEnclosureE.RG&Ebelievesthattheapproachoutlinedinthisletterassuresproperandcompleteresolutionofthespecificissuesidentifiedaswellasthemoreprogrammaticissuesdiscussed.Verytrulyyours,RobertC.MeceyDivisionManagerNuclearProductionGAHN108Enclosuresxc:U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission(original)DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555AllenR.Johnson(MailStop14D1)ProjectDirectorateI-3Washington,D.C.20555GinnaNRCSeniorResidentInspector
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ENCLOSUREAResponsetoNoticeofViolation50-244/89-81Violation1
.InsectionReort44/88-81VIOLATION1:STATEMENTOFVIOLATION-10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionIII,requiresinpartthatmeasuresbeestablishedtoensurethatapplicableregulatoryrequirementsanddesignbasesaretranslatedintospecificationsandprocedures.Thesemeasuresshallprovideforverifyingtheadequacyofdesignbyperformanceofdesignreviews.GinnaStationQualityAssuranceManual,SectionNo.11,"TestCon-trol,"requiresthatengineeringestablishdesigntestrequirementsandthattestingbeperformedinaccordancewithapprovedprocedureswhichincorporatetherequirementsandacceptancecriteriacontainedinapplicableTechnicalSpecificationsandregulatoryrequirements.Contrarytotheabove,onNovember15,1989,thedesignreviewsforEngineeringWorkRequest(EWR)3891wereinadequateinthattheEWRdidnotestablishthebatteryload,requirementstherebyresultinginabatteryload.profileusedduringtheservicetest.notreflectingthedesignbasisloadrequirements.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVViolation(Supplement1).ACCEPTANCEOFVIOLATION:RG&EagreesthatitdidnotupdatethebatteryloadprofileaspartofEWR3891.DISCUSSION:ThepurposeofEWR3891wastoreplacethebatteriesbecausetheywerenearingtheendoftheirservicelifeand,whilereplacingthem,toincreasethecapacitymargin.EWR3891didnotincludeanupdat-ingofthebatterytestprofilebecauseithadbeendeterminedthatnolargeloadshadbeenadded.tothebatterysincetheoriginalloadprofilehadbeendeveloped.ThebatteryloadprofilewasbasedupontheoriginalWestinghousedesigndata.Thatinformationwasconsistentwithindustrypracticeatthetimeitwasdeveloped.Analyticaltechniqueswerenotassophisticatedasthoseinusetoday.Ratherthanexplicitlyquanti-fyingsuchfactorsasmomentaryloadsand.theloadstartingcurrents,itwasgeneralpracticetoprovideadditionalbatterysizingbaseduponexperienceandengineeringjudgement.Today'sstandards(suchasIEEEstandard485)suggestamorerefined,morepreciselyquanti-fiedanalysis.Theactualbatterycapacitywassufficienttoprovideitssafetyfunctions.Thebatteryhasbeenshowntohaveadequatecapacityasconfirmedbyaphysicaltest.AlthoughthereisnorequirementfortheGinnaNuclearPowerPlanttoincorporateallnewly-developedindustrystandards,webelieveitprudenttousethecurrentindustrystandardsfordevelopingrevisedbatteryloadprofiles,andhavedoneso.A-1
CORRECTIVESTEPSTApreliminaryanalysis,performedduringtheinspection,demonstratedthatthebatterysizeisadequate.Therevisedbatterysizecalculationhad,beenfinalizedsubsequenttotheNRCinspectionandpriortothereceiptoftheinspectionreport,whichconfirmsthatthebatterysizeisnotaconcern.Animprovedbatteryloadprofilehasbeendevelopedwhichincorpo-ratescalculationalimprovementscontainedincurrentindustrystandardIEEE485-1983.Theupgradedbatteryloadprofile(DesignAnalysisEWR3341"SizingofVitalBatteries",datedMarch12,1990)hasbeentransmittedbyEngineeringtotheplantstaff,andthebatterytestingprocedures'PT-10.2andPT-10.3,BatteryServiceTests)havebeenrevised.Thebatteriesweretestedduringtherecentoutageusingtherevisedprocedures.Theresultsdemonstratedtheadequacyofthebatterycapacity.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOBETAKENTOPREVEBVPREClJRRENCE:TheapplicabilityofthisviolationhasbeenbroadenedbyRG&Etoassurethatnotonlytheimportantdcelectricalloadsareanalyzedandtested,butalsothattheimportantacelectricalloadswhichmayimpacttheoperationoftheplantemergencydieselgeneratorsareidentifiedandtracked.Wehaveimplementedanelectricalload'rowthprogramasdescribedunderunresolveditem89-81-05.DATEWHENFULLCOMPLIANCEWILLBEACHIEVED:Engineeringestablishedupdatedbatteryloadrequirements.Thebatterytestprocedureshavebeenrevisedandthebatterieshavebeentestedusingthenewprocedure.TheseactionswerecompletedpriortothereceiptoftheNRCinspectionreport.RG&Eisinfullcompli-ance.A-2
ENCLOSUREBResponsetoNoticeofViolation50-244/89-81Violation2
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~RG&E/GinnaInsectiReort50-244/89-81VION2:STATEMENTOFVIOLATION:R.E.GinnaTechnicalSpecificationsSection6.8.1requiresthatwrittenproceduresbeestablishedand.implemented.foractivitiessuchassurveillanceandtestingactivitiesofsafety-relatedequipment.GinnaStationQualityAssuranceManual,SectionII,"TestControl,"establishestherequirementsforestablishingandimplementingtestprogramstodemonstratethatsafety-relatedsystemsandcomponentswillperformsatisfactorily.Furthermore,thissectionrequiresthattestingshallbeperformedinaccordancewithwrittenprocedureswhichincorporateacceptancecriteria.Contrarytotheabove,onDecember9,1989,Class1E480Vacmoldedcasecircuitbreakershavenotbeensubjectedtoscheduledperiodictesting.Furthermore,thereisnoestablishedacceptancecriteriafortestingthedcundervoltagerelayal'armsinProcedurePT-11,"60-CellBatteryBanks'AB'hisisaSeverityLevelIVViolation(Supplement1).ACCEPTANCEOFVIOLATION:RG&Eagreesthattheperiodictestingprogramofsafety-relatedequipmentattheGinna.NuclearPowerPlantdoesnotcurrentlyincludemoldedcasecircuitbreakers.RG&EalsoagreesthattheGinnaperiodictestprocedurePT-11"60-CellBatteryBanks'AB'"didnotspecifyanacceptancecriterionforthesetpointofthedcundervoltagerelayalarms.Thisviolationhastwopartswhichareaddressedseparatelybelow:Part1:MoldedCaseCircuitBreakerTestingDISCUSSION:Moldedcasecircuitbreakersaredesignedfornuclearandnon-nuclearapplications.Thistypecircuitbreakerissealed.anddoesnotincludedesignfeaturestotestallthecapabilitiesofthebreakerbeyondfunctionaltests.RG&Erealizestheimportanceofassuringproperoperationofthesebreakers.RG&Ehasnotbeenlaxinitsattentiontotheimportanceoftestingmoldedcasecircuitbreakers.Thisproblemwasself-identifiedbyRG&EandwasincorporatedintotheRCMprogram.Onourowninitiative,wedevelopedandimplementedreceipt-inspectiontestingforallnewmoldedcasecircuitbreakersatGinna.Wehavealsoperformedtestingonmolded,casecircuitbreakersinanefforttodeterminetheircharacteristics.Threeyearsago,RG&Eperformedspecialtestingofallofitsexist-ingmagneticonly,moldedcasecircuitbreakersatGinnaStationonaspecialone-timebasis.Successfuloperationhasindicatednoknowndegradation.B-1
WhilethefunctioniO~ofmoldedcasecircuithkersisimportanttosafetyandwhilethereisanNRCrequirementforatestprogramtoassurethatsafety-relatedstructures,systemsand.componentswillperformsatisfactorily,thereisnospecificrequirementtotestperiodicallyeverypieceofequipment.Asstated.inAppendixB,CriterionXI,"Thetestprogramshallinclude,asappropriate,operationaltests...ofstructures,systemsandcomponents."Theterm"asappropriate"isapplicableandincludestheavailabilityofappropriatetestmethods.Moldedcasecircuitbreakersarenotdesignedforinsitutestingandwouldrequiredeterminationandreterminationtoperformthetesting.Thevendorsofthisequipmenthavealsonotmaderecommendationsforperiodictesting.Becauseofgenericapplicability,periodictestingformoldedcasecircuitbreakershasbeenanindustry-wideissueandnogenerallyacceptedtestmethodhasbeendevelopedatthistime.ThenuclearindustryhasrespondedtotheNRCthroughNUMARCconcern-ingmoldedcasecircuitbreakertestingandRG&Eispursuingthisinconjunctionwiththiseffort.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKEN:RG&Eiscontinuingtoworktowarddevelopingappropriatetestmethodsformoldedcasecircuitbreakers,aspartoftheReliabilityCenteredMaintenance(RCM)program.TheGinnaNuclearPowerPlantisoneofthetwo"pilotplants"inthenationfortheEPRIsponsoredRCMprogram.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOBETAKENTOPR1DGQFZRECURRENCE-Theindustryiscurrentlyexaminingtheneedfor,andbenefitsof,moldedcasecircuitbreakertesting.RG&EwillcontinuetoworkcloselywiththeindustryandEPRItodetermineappropriatetestmethodsand.requirements.DATEWHENFULLCOMPLIANCEWILLBEACHIEVED:AlthoughRG&Edoesnotconsiderthisacompliancematter,RG&Ewillimplement,whenavailable,thosetestingmethodsandrequirementsendorsedbytheindustry.Part2:UndervoltageRelayAlarmAcceptanceCriteriaCORRECTIVESTEPSTAKEN:TheperiodictestprocedurePT-11"60-CellBatteryBanks'AB'"hasbeenrevisedtoexplicitlydefinetheacceptanceband/criterionforthedcundervoltagealarmrelays.Thedcrelayshavesubsequentlybeencalibratedandtested.Therelayshavebeenverifiedtoperformwithinthespecifiedacceptancecriterion.B-2
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.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENTOPREVIXTREE:TheapplicabilityofthisviolationhasbeenbroadenedbyRG&Etoassurethatnot.onlythetestproceduresfordcundervoltagealarmrelayshaveexplicitacceptancecriteria,butalsothatthetestproceduresfortheacundervoltagerelaysforthesafeguardsbuseshaveexplicitacceptancecriteria.Thetestprocedure,PT-11forthedcundervoltagealarmrelayshasbeenrevisedandPT-9.1forthe480Vacsafeguardsbusesisbeingrevisedtoprovideexplicitacceptancecriterion.DATEWHENFULLCOMPLIANCEWILLBEACHIEVED:Thetestprocedureforthedcundervoltagealarmrelayshasbeenrevisedtoprovideanexplicitacceptanceband/criterion.ThisactionwascompletedpriortothereceiptoftheNRCinspectionreport.RG&Eisinfullcompliance.B-3
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ENCLOSURECIdentificationofSpecificUnresolvedItemsNote:ThestatementsofissueshavebeendirectlyextractedfromtheSSFIreport.Inafewinstancestheissueshavebeencondensedandparaphrased.
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.89-81-01ServicerSingleFailureSusceptlityPotentiallossofcoolingwater[flow]tobothemergencydieselgeneratorsduringorfollowingaseismicevent.Thecoolingwaterforthewaterjacketheatexchangerandlubeoilheatexchangerdischargesthroughacommonnon-safetynon-seismic10-inchdischargepipe.Thecoolingwaterdischargepipewouldhavetofail[orhasbeenpostulatedbytheNRCSSFIteamtofail]soastoprevent[block/pinchoff]theflowoftheservicewater.89-81-02ResolutionofSafetyConcernsThelicenseewasunabletoprovidetheteamwithadocumentedorverifiableprocessavailableatRG&EthataddresseshowsafetyconcernsraisedoutsidethenormalengineeringprocessarebroughttotheattentionoftheNuclearSafetyandLicensingstaffandresolved.89-81-03RHRPumpNPSHAconsultantindependentlyevaluatedtheavailableNPSHduringpost-accidentrecirculationmodefromthecontainmentsumpand,aprelimi-naryresultindicatesthattheremaybesomemodesofoperationoftheRHRpumpsunderwhichadequateNPSHisnotavailable.Licenseeisevaluatingthevalidityofthesemodesandtheprobabilityofoccurrence.Licenseeisalsoevaluatingthepossibilitythattheconsultant'sanalyticalmodelwastooconservative.89-81-04Class1EBatteryTestingFailuretotestthebatterieswithaloadprofilewhichtrulyrepre-sentedtheloaddemandonthebatteryisconsideredaviolationof10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionIII.89-81-05ElectricalLoadGrowthControlProgramRG&Edoesnothaveamechanismtoassurethatplantcalculationsaffectedbymodificationsareupdatedtoensurethattheyaremain-tainedup-to-dateandaccurate.Thedesignprocessprovidesguidancetoengineerstoreviewthesystemcapacityandotherattributes,buttheguidanceaddressesonlyspecificmodificationsastheyareperformed.Thereisnoformalloadtrackingsystemtoensurethatsystemcapacityisreviewedfortheintegratedeffectofseveralmodificationsinsteadofjustone.Thelicenseestatedthatanon-lineprogramtocaptureelectricalloadgrowthandupdateaffectedcalculationswouldbedeveloped.89-81-06MoldedCaseCircuitBreakersand,UndervoltageRelayAlarmsFailuretoperiodicallytestthemoldedcasecircuitbreakersandnotestablishinganacceptancecriteriafortheundervoltagerelayalarmsareaviolationoffacilityTechnicalSpecifications6.8.1,whichrequirestestingofsafety-related.componentsinaccordancewithestablishedprocedures.
.89-81-07ACalibrateofControlRoomInstrumeThecontrolroomdcvoltmetersarenotcalibratedonaperiodicbasistoensurereliablesystemvoltageindicationtooperators.89-81-07BControlRoomP&IDsPipingandInstrumentDiagram(P&ID)updatesandDesignChangeRequests(DCRs)postedinthecontrolroomwerereviewedbytheteam.ItwasnotedthattheRHRsystemP&ID(33013-1247)didnotreflectthecurrentvalvepositionconfigurationfortheRHRsystem.Also,theexistingDCRsoutstandingagainstthisdrawingcouldnotbeused.toderivethecorrectvalvepositionsinthatDCRs1247-4,and1247-5hadnotbeenapprovedbyRG&EEngineeringanddidnotreflectthecurrentpositionofvalve822B.ProcessingofDCRsdoesnotalwaysoccurinatimelymannersuchthatthecontrolroomP&IDscanbeimmediatelyupdated.Plantoperationsorganizationmakespermanentchangestosystemvalvepositions,thereisnotanimmediatemarkuporannotationmadeontheeffecteddraw-ings.TheteamnotedthatpermanentchangestovalvepositionsinsystemoperatingproceduresareoccurringwithoutthepriorconcurrenceofRG&Eengineering.UFSAR,sections5.4.5.3.5and5.4.5.2,referstotworemotelyoperat-edvalveswhichcanbeutilizedtoisolateanRHRloopfromoutsidethepumproom.ThesystemwalkdownandtheupgradedP&IDsindicatethatthereisnolongeranymethodavailabletoisolateanRHRloopremotely(i.e.,viareachrods).AlthoughthisinformationhasbeenremovedfromtheRHRP&ID,thereisnoidentifiedpunchlistitemtodeletethisinformationfromtheUFSAR.Theteamnotedthatuncontrolledtrainingmaterial(LessonTexts)havenotbeenupdatedtoreflectsystemchangesaccomplishedduringthelastoutage.Thereisnostationrequirementtomaintainthistrainingmaterialcurrent.Theinspectionteamconsidersthatmakingthistypeofinformationavailabletocontrolroomoperatorsinsuchanuncontrolledmannerrepresentsanotableprogramweakness.Thelackoftimelyoperatinginformationupdatesforcontrolroomuseisconsideredanunresolved.item.89-81-08EquipmentEnvironmentalQualificationEvaluationTheNRCquestioned.thebasisfortheassumptionthatRHRpumpsealfailurewilloccurafter24hours.TheNRCrequestsRG&Etosub-stantiatethemethodofdetectinganyleakintheRHRpumproomifthepumpsealweretofailbeforethestated24hourperiod.C-2
Thesafetyreliefvalvetestprocedurescontaingeneralandminimalinstructionsforperformingthereliefsetpointtest.Standardtestpracticesarenotalwaysperformed.ordocumented.Aswritten,thetestprocedurerequiresonlyonesuccessfulsetpointtest.Datafromreliefvalvetestinghasbeenrecordedinaccuratelyand.inconsistent-lyinsomecases.TheNRCconcludedthatRG&Eshouldformalizetestproceduresinstructionsanddatarecordingrequirements.Duringtheon-goingprocedureupgradeeffort,RG&Eshouldassurethatvalvetestproceduresincorporateallnew(1986)ASMECodeSectionXI,IWV-3512,andANSI/ASMEOM-1-1981requirementsforsafetyreliefvalves.Inparticular,morethanonesuccessful"poptest"atthedesignatedliftpressureshouldbeperformedandtheresultscomp-letelyandaccuratelydocumented.Valvesetpointandleaktestingshouldalsobeperformedwiththeallowablespecificationlistedintheprocedure.Valvetestresultsanddatashouldaccuratelyreflect'heresultsofalltestactivities.RG&Eshouldalsoconsiderthebenefitsofaddingotherperiodicvalvetestssuchastheas-foundreliefliftsetpoint,valveaccumulation,and.valvecapacity.89-81-10TranslationofFSARRequirementsintoOperatingProceduresTheGinnaUFSARcontains"operational"informationanddatawhichtheinspectorsdeterminedtobeinvalidand,withoutasupportingdesignbasis.,Specifically,Section5.4.5.3.5statesthatintheeventofa50gpmRHRpumpsealleakandlossofbothpumproomsumppumps,operatorshave4hourstoisolatetheleakbeforetheRHRpumpmotorsbecomeflooded.Theteamdeterminedthata50gpmleakintothepumproom,withtwofailedsumpmotors;cannotbesustainedintheRHRpumproomforfourhoursbeforefloodingthepumpmotors.Itwassuggested.thatthefourhourallowancewasoriginallyintendedjusttoindicatearoughsystemmarginforcopingwithgrossleakageinthepumppit.Theteamwasunabletofindanyconsiderationofthisinanyoftheavailabledesigndocumentsassociated,withtheRHRsystem.Italsocouldnotbefoundinanyofthesystemoperatingoremergencyprocedures.Thealarmresponseprocedureforthehighsumplevelalarmrequirescontrolroomoperatorstodispatchanauxiliaryoperatortoinvestigatepossiblepumproomflooding,howeverthereisnoreferencetomaximumtimelimittoisolatealeakingRHRtrainifnecessary.Theteamreviewedtheinstrumentationdevicesavailabletocontrol,roomoperatorswhichwouldindicateRHRleakageinthepumproom.Theonlyknownindicationwouldbefromahighlevelsumpalarm.However,thesumpalarminstrumentisnotqualifiedforserviceinaharshenvironment.Operatingprocedures,emergencyprocedures,andoperator.trainingmaterialdonotreflectthelimitingdesignbasisofthesystem.Theapparentlyunsupported4hourfloodinglimitisconsideredanun-resolveditempendingverificationofthevaluebythelicenseeorcorrectionoftheUFSAR.C-3
O89-81-11Engineer'ssuranceThedesigncontrolmeasuresasimplemented/practicedbythelicensee'sengineeringdepartmentwereweak,anddidnotfavorablycomparetogoodengineeringassurancepracticesgenerallyacceptedintheindustry.Therewaslackofconsistencyintheimplementationofapprovedengineeringproceduresamongthevariousdepartmentsandengineeringmanagementdidnotappeartobecognizantofthisincon-sistency.Therewasalackofformaldesigninterfacecontrol,lackofcontroloverexternalcommunicationwithdesignconsultants,andalackofcontroloverdesigndocuments/modificationpackagesduringthedevelopmentandimplementationphase.C-4
ENCLOSURE.DPreliminaryCategorizationofIssuesNote:ThecategoriescontainedinEnclosureDwereselectedtopicsin10CFR50AppendixBandothersources.Tobeginthereviewofthebroaderconcerns,wehavereviewedtheSSFIreportandthecitedissues,andhavecategorizedthemintogeneraltopicalareas.Forexample,unresolveditem89-81-05involvesnothavingamechanismtoassurethatdesigncalculationsaremaintainedup-to-date.Weseethisspecificitemasbeingpartofamoregeneralareacalleddesigncontrol.EnclosureDisapreliminarycategorizationoftheunre-solveditemsintothegeneraltopicalareas..Itiscurrentlyplannedtocategorizealltheconcernsidentifiedintheinspectionreport.
DESIGNCONTROLGeneralControlofDesignInputsControlofDesignProcessSSFIURI89-81-05:SSFIURI89-81-08:ElectricalLoadGrowthCon-trolProgramEquipmentEnvironmentalQual-ificationEvaluationControlofDesignOutputsSSFIURI89-81-07B:ControlRoomP&IDsControlofDesignInterfacesand.CoordinationControlofDesignChangesDesignReviews/EngineeringAssuranceSSFIURI89-81-05:ElectricalLoadGrowthControlProgramSSFIURI89-81-11:EngineeringAssuranceSpecificDesignConcernsSSFIURI89-81-01:ServiceWaterSingleFailureSusceptibilitySSFIURI89-81-03:RHRPumpNPSHPROCEDURESSSFIURI89-81-09:SafetyReliefValveTestingDOCUMENTCONTROLSSFIURI89-81-07B:ControlRoomP&IDs
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ORGANIZATIONAL.ACESSSFIURI89-81-02:ResolutionofSafetyConcernsSSFIURI89-81-07B:ControlRoomP&IDsSSFIURI89-81"10:TranslationofFSARRequire-mentsintoOperatingProce-duresHANDLINGOFSAFETYCONCERNSSSFIURI89-81-02:ResolutionofSafetyConcernsSURVEILLANCETESTINGMAINTENANCESSFIURI89-81-07A:CalibrationofControlRoomInstrumentsSSFIURI89-81-09:SafetyReliefValveTestingD-2
ENCLOSUREEResolutionofSpecificIssuesNote:Wehaveseparated.thescheduleinformationcontainedinthisenclo-sureintotwocategories:resolutioncompleted,andscheduleforresolution.ListedfirstarethoseitemsforwhichRG&Ehascomplet-edresolution.ThosemeasurestakenbyRG&Eareidentified.Someoftheunresolveditemslistedcannotbeadequatelyresolved,withoutaddressingthebroadermoreprogrammaticissuessuchasdesigncontrolandengineeringassuranceandrequiremoretimetoresolvethanthespecificitems.TheschedulesprovidedforsomeitemsmaychangeasRG&Efurtheridentifiestheunderlyingconcerns.Anupdatedschedulewillbeprovidedinthe120dayresponse.
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~ResolutionComlete~89-81-04Class1EBatteryTestingThisitemwasresolvedpriortoreceiptoftheSSFIreport.seeEnclosureAforactionstakenforresolution.Please89-81-06UndervoltageRelayAlarmsandMoldedCaseCircuitBreakersPleaseseeEnclosureBforactionstakenforresolution.89-81-07ACalibrationofContxolRoomInstrumentsThisitemwasresolvedpriortoreceiptoftheSSFIreport.Theactionstakentoresolvethisissueinclude:1)Calibrationofallcontrolroomdcbusvoltmetersduringtherecentrefuelingoutage(thevoltmeterswerefoundtobewithinthespecifiedacceptancecriteria).2)AlldcbusvoltmetersarenowcalibratedperCalibrationProce-,dureCP-514onanannualbasis.3)AllemergencydieselgeneratorandvarioussecondarysystempowermetercalibrationshavebeenaddedtotheCP-500seriesprocedures,andthemeterswerecalibratedduringthe1990refuelingoutage.89-81-10TranslationoftheFSARRequirementsintoOperationalProceduresThisitemwasresolvedpromptly.Theactionstakentoresolvethisissueinclude:1)Performanceofareanalysis,duringtheSSFIinspection,whichdeterminedthatoperatorshavetwohourstorespond.(DesignAnalysis,10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluation,NSL-0000-015,Rev.0,datedDecember8,1989,ResidualHeatRemovalLeakageProvi-sions.)T2)UpdateofUFSARsections5.4.5.3.5,5.4.5.2and6.3.3.8,submit-tedaspartoftheUFSARupdateonDecember16,1989.3)RevisionofTrainingSystemDescriptionRGE-25duringtheinspection.4)RevisionofEOPspriortoreceiptoftheinspectionreport.(ProcedureE-1,LossofReactororSecondaryCoolant,Step18wasaddedandES-1.3,TransfertoColdLegRecirculation,anotebeforeStep9wasadded.)
.ScheduleforResolu.n89-81-01ServiceWaterSingleFailureSusceptibilityAsnotedintheinspectionreport,thefailureofthe10inchdis-chargelineinamannerwhichwouldstopservicewaterflowtothedieselgeneratorsisalowprobabilityevent.Thiseventisalsobeyondthedesignandlicensingbasisoftheplant.Nevertheless,RG&EplanstofurtherevaluatethepotentialriskofthisscenarioduringthePRA/IPEeffort.OurIPEiscurrentlyscheduledtobesubmittedinthethirdquarterof1991.89-81-02ResolutionofSafetyConcernsAninterimprocessforhandlingsafetyconcernsisunder-developmentandwillbediscussedinour120dayresponse.89-81-03RHRPumpNPSHDocumentationoftheanalysisfindingsisscheduledtobecompletedbyDecember31,1990.Inaddition,RG&EplanstoconsiderthismatterinthePRA/IPE.89-81-05ElectricalLoadGrowthProgramRG&Ehasimplementedaninterimprocessforallmodificationstoperformthefollowingactions:Currentsystemloadingsforthedcbatterieshavebeenestab-lishedinDesignAnalysis,EWR3341,SizingofVitalBatteries,andforthedieselgeneratorloadsinDesignAnalysis,EWR4136,DieselGeneratorLoading.2)AnElectricalEngineeringDesignGuide,ElectricalInterfaceChecklistEDG-15D,Rev.0,isbeingimplementedonallmodifica-tionswhichrequiresidentificationofloadchangestothedcbatteriesandthedieselgeneratoracloads.3)AprocesscontrolledbyElectricalDesignGuide,DesignVerifi-cationModelEDG-15B,Rev.0,hasbeenestablishedwithintheElectricalEngineeringDesignVerificationGroupwhichupdatestheloadingdatafortheimpactedpowersupplyanddeterminestheremainingcapacitymarginforacanddcloads.WearetakingactionstointegratethisprocessintotheappropriateEngineering(QE)procedures.Weanticipatecompletionoftheseactionsbythedateofour120dayresponse.-89-81-07BControlRoomP&IDsRG&Ehasconsideredtheexamplesidentifiedbythestaffwhichresultedinthestaff'sconclusionthatinformationupdatesforcontrolroomusearenotimplementedinatimelymanner.RG&Ehasresolvedseveraloftheexamplesidentified.Theseinclude:E-2
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.1)RG&EhasimpleilhtedimprovedcontrolsinDrawingChangeRequest(DCR)process.RG&EhasassignedZ"StationEngineerwithresponsibilityfortrackingandprocessingallDCRs.~~2)TheUFSARhasbeenreviewedtoassurethattheappropriateinformationwithregardtotheisolationoftheRHRpumpsealiscorrect.3)RGGEhasrevisedthelessontexttoreflecttherevisedRHR'pumpsealleakagetimelimitationoftwohours.Aninterimprocessforenhancingtheupdateprocessforcontrolroominformationiscurrentlyunderreviewandwillbediscussed,inthe120dayresponse.89-81-08EquipmentEnvironmentalQualificationEvaluationThepassivefailure'ofaRHRpumpsealisassumedtooccurat24hours,consistentwithSRP15.6.5.Theconsequencesofthisassumedpassivefailure,concurrentwiththeassumeddesignbasisLOCA,wasevaluated,bytheNRCduringthereviewofSEPTopicXV-19andfoundtobeacceptable.Nevertheless,RGGEplanstofurtherevaluatethisscenarioduringthePRA/IPEeffortwithitsattendantrequirementtoperformaninternalfloodinganalysis.OurIPEiscurrentlysched-uledtobesubmittedinthethirdquarterof1991.Theresultsofthisevaluationwilldetermineiftheupgradeofthesumplevelswitchestoasafety-relatedstatusisrecommended.89-81-09SafetyReliefValveTestingand,DocumentationRGGEhascommit/edtoincorporateASMECodeSectionZI-IWV-3512(1986)andimplementANSI/ASMEOM-1-1987aspartoftheISTProgramUpgrade.Procedurechangestoincorporatetheserequirementswerecompleted.priortoreceiptoftheSSFIreport.RGfiEwillhavecompleted.alltestingsunderthesenewrequirementsbyDecember31,1994.E-3
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