NRC Generic Letter 1980-97
| ML031350466 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/14/1980 |
| From: | Grier B H NRC Region 1 |
| To: | |
| References | |
| BL-80-023 GL-80-097, NUDOCS 8012040066 | |
| Download: ML031350466 (5) | |
UNITED STATES VNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION I631 PARK AVENUEt97.; /o KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 1906November 14, 1980Docket Nos. 50-0350-247 ,Consolidated Edison Company ofNew York, Inc. -ATTN: Mr. Peter Zarakas c o 2Vice President4 Irving PlaceNew York, New York 10003Gentlemen:The enclosed IE Bulletin 80-23, "Failures of Solenoid Valves Manufactured byValcor Engineering Corporation" is forwarded to you for action. No writtenresponse is required.In order to assist the NRC in evaluating the value/impact of each Bulletin onlicensees, it would be helpful if you would provide an estimate of the manpowerexpended in conduct of the review and preparation of the report(s) required bythe Bulletin. Please estimate separately the manpower associated with correctiveactions following identification of problems through the Bulletin.If you desire additional information regarding this matter; please contactthis office.Sincerely,o H. GrierDirectorEnclosures:1. IE Bulletin No.80-232. List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins
CONTACT
- D. L. Caphton(215-337-5266)cc w/encls:L. 0. Brooks, Project Manager, IP NuclearW. Monti, Manager -Nuclear Power Generation DepartmentM. Shatkouski, Plant ManagerJ. M. Makepeace, Director, Technical EngineeringW. D. Hamlin, Assistant to Resident ManagerJ. D. Block, Esquire, Executive Vice President -AdministrationJoyce P. Davis, EsquireBrent L. Brandenburg, Assistant General Counsel8012040 'OGC ,c)
SSINS No.: 6820Accession No.:8008220257IEB 80-23UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENTWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555November 14, 1980IE Bulletin No. 80-23:FAILURES OF SOLENOID VALVES MANUFACTURED BY VALCORENGINEERING CORPORATIONIntroduction:Valcor Engineering Corporation (Valcor) has submitted 10 CFR Part 21 Reportsaddressing failures of Valcor solenoid valves used at nuclear power facilities.These failures have occurred at nuclear facilities owned by Duke Power Companyand Omaha Public Power District, and are purportedly limited to solenoidvalves having part numbers (P/N's) V70900-21-1 and V70900-21-3.The information presented in this bulletin is intended to shed light on thedefective solenoid valves so that appropriate actions can be taken to circum-vent the degradation of any safety-related system using such solenoid valves.DISCUSSION:The specific Valcor solenoid valves addressed herein were purportedly designedas Class IE components. However, in light of the reported failures, it appearsthat neither the design nor the qualification tests were adequate for Class IEservice. Valcor has attributed the failures to a latent defect in the magnetwire. Valcor believes that this defect manifests itself when the solenoidvalves are continuously energized at elevated temperatures by an incompata-bility between the magnet wire's polyvinyl varnish coating and the wire'spolyimide insulation which causes a dielectric breakdown leading to turn-to-turn shorts within the coil.Valcor states that the above incompatability is limited to solenoid valveshaving P/N's V70900-21-1 and V70900-21-3, and that all customers affected bythe aforementioned defect have been notified. A listing of Valcor customersso notified and valves purchased follows.tCUSTOMFRP-0- NO.VALVE P/NOTYAnchor-DarlingAnchor-DarlingCesare Bonetti (Italy)Duke Power CompanyDuke (Mill Power)Duke Power CompanyRalph HillerMill PowerOmaha Public Power Dist.Stone and WebsterCopes VulcanP-827N6631535/79E95188-11C-97733E97822-11HA-187-0E52462-7343472LOOO #43911,553V70900-21-1,-3V70900-21-1V70900-21-3V70900-21-3V70900-21-1,-3V70900-21-3V70900-21-3V70900-21-1,-3V70900-21-3V70900-21-3V70900-21-1246101003357014201984TAL 610
IEB 80-23November 14, 1980Pages 2 of 3Valcor's corrective actions include making arrangements for replacing existingcoils with a newly designed coil using a 997 silicone varnish coating insteadof the polyvinyl varnish. Sample coils of the new design are scheduled toundergo qualification tests. We do not know the particulars of these tests,but Valcor has scheduled the first phase of these tests for completion byNovember 15, 1980, and has identified the second phase as an on-going agingtest.Fort Calhoun has replaced twelve of its original solenoid valves with Valcortype V70900-21-3 valves, ten of which are located inside containment and twooutside. This substitution was made because the original solenoid valves didnot meet the requirements of IE Bulletin No. 79-01. However, subsequent tothe replacement, Fort Calhoun has experienced five failures of these Valcorsolenoid valves. Each failure involved a solenoid valve located inside contain-ment and designed for operation in the normally energized mode. These twofactors (i.e., continuously energized mode of operation and a somewhat elevatedtemperature inside containment) tend to support Valcor's contention regardingthe failure mechanism.ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY HOLDER OF OPERATING LICENSES:1. Determine whether Valcor solenoid valves having P/N's V70900-21-1 or -3are used to perform any safety-related function at your facility.If so, identify the safety-related systems using these solenoidvalves, the total number of such solenoid valves used, and evaluateacceptability of continued operation with potentially defective solenoidvalves. A report of the results of the evaluation of continued operationshall be submitted within ten (10) days of the date of this bulletin andshould include factors such as (a) operator's ability to promptly identifya failing or failed solenoid valve, (b) effect of solenoid valve failureson safety-related systems and subsequent operator actions required, and(c) possible degradation of the power supply serving a failed solenoidvalve and the effects on other components served by said power supply.If no such solenoid valves are used, you need only submit a negativedeclaration to this effect within thirty (30) days of the date of thisbulletin and you need not respond to the remaining items.2. Licensees of operating plants using the aforementioned solenoid valves insafety-related applications shall periodically test the coils forpotential turn-to-turn shorts in a manner that will not violate any LCOor cause any undesirable transient. The tests should account for coilresistance chfnges due to temperature effects attributed to the environ-ment and to I R losses in the coil to provide accurate indications ofchanges in resistance due to turn-to-turn shorts.These tests are to be initiated within ten (10) days of the date of thisbulletin. The following schedule is recommended until the units arereplaced with qualified units:(a) Daily for solenoid valves operated in a normally energized mode;(b) Weekly for solenoid valves operated in a normally deenergized mode.
IEB 80-23November 14, 1980Pages 3 of 3Whenever the tests indicate that ten percent or more of the coil turnshave been shorted, said solenoid valve, or its coil, shall be replacedwith a new unit.3. Licensees of operating plants shall submit a report within forty-five(45) days of the date of this bulletin describing their longer termcorrective action plan and the date by whidh the corrective actionswill be implemented. As a minimum, the longer term corrective measuresshould include the replacement of the coils with fully qualified coils.New solenoid valve assemblies (i.e., a repaired unit with a replacementcoil or a completely new unit) shall be demonstrated to be qualified forits safety-related application per the applicable requirements ofIEEE 323-1974, IEEE 344-1975, IEEE 382-1972 and IE Bulletin No. 79-O1Band supplements thereto.ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCTION PERMITS:1. Determine whether Valcor solenoid valves having P/N's V70900-21-1 or -3are to be used to perform safety-related functions at your facility.If so, a report addressing this matter shall be submitted by the earlierof the two following dates: (a) within ninety (90) days of the dateof this bulletin; (b) two weeks prior to the date by which you expectto receive an operating License.The above report should indicate your plans to replace said valvesprior to commencing operation, if this is the case. Otherwise, if youpropose to commence operation prior to replacing said valves, the reportshould indicate the safety-related systems where such valves are to be used,and should include an evaluation of the acceptability of operating withpotentially defective valves. This evaluation should address factorssuch as your proposed test plan, operator's ability to promptly identifya failing or failed valve, effect of solenoid valve failure on safety-relatedsystems and subsequent operator actions required, and the preventivemeasures you plan to implement to circumvent the effects of failuresof these valves.If no such valves are to be used in your facility, submit a negativedeclaration to this effect within forty-five (45) days of the date ofthis bulletin but prior to the date by which you expect to receive anoperating license.The above requested reports shall be submitted to the director of theappropriate NRC region within time stipulated for each item in the thisbulletin. A copy of each report shall be forwarded to the Director, Divisionof Resident and Regional Reactor Inspection, Office of Inspection and Enforcement,United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555.Approved by GAO, B180225(R0072); clearance expires November 30, 1980. Approvalwas given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
IE Bulletin No. 80-23November 14, 1980Enclosure 2RECENTLY ISSUEDIE BULLETINSBulletinNo.SubjectAutomation Industries,Model 200-520-008 Sealed-Source ConnectorsDate Issued9/12/80Issued ToAll holders of aradiography license80-2280-21Valve Yokes Supplied byMalcolm Foundry Company,11/6/80Inc.All holders of apower reactorOL or CPRevision 1to 79-26Revision 1to 80-19Boron Loss fromBWR Control BladesFailures of Mercury-Wetted Matrix Relays inReactor ProtectiveSystems of OperatingNuclear Power PlantsDesigned by CombustionEngineering8/29/808/15/80All holdersof a BWR powerreactor OLAll holders of apower reactorOL or CP80-2080-1980-18Failures of WestinghouseType W-2 Spring Return toNeutral Control SwitchesFailures of Mercury-Wetted Matrix Relays inReactor Protective Systemsof Operating Nuclear PowerPlants Designed by CombustionEngineeringMaintenance of AdequateMinimum Flow ThruCentrifugal Charging PumpsFollowing Secondary Side HighEnergy Line Rupture7/31/807/31/807/24/80All holders of apower reactor OLor CPAll holders of apower reactor OLor CPAll holders of aPWR power reactorOL or CPSupplement 3to 80-17Supplement 2to 80-17Supplement 1to 80-17Failure of Control Rodsto Insert During aScram at a BWRFailure of Control Rodsto Insert During a Scramat a BWRFailure of Control Rodsto Insert During a Scramat a BWR8/22/807/22/807/18/80All holders of aBWR power reactorOL or CPAll holders of aBWR power reactor OLAll holders of a BWRpower reactorOL or CP