NRC-2015-0142, Comment (2) of Erica Gray on Biweekly Notice: Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations
| ML15201A579 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 02/14/2013 |
| From: | Gray E - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | Division of Administrative Services |
| SECY RAS | |
| References | |
| 80FR32624 00002, NRC-2015-0142 | |
| Download: ML15201A579 (2) | |
Text
7/1612015 7/162015NRC-2015-0142-DRAFT-0002.html As of: 7/16/15 2:52 PM Rpeeived, Tiilv 09 901S PUBLIC SUBMISSION Status: PendingPost Tracking No. ljz-8jwO-3y5g Comments Due: July 09, 2015 Submission Type: Web Docket: NRC-2015-0142 Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations Comment On: NRC-2015-0142-0001 Biweekly Notice: Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations
'-'i Document: NRC-2015-0142-DRAFT-0002
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Comment on FR Doc # 2015-13815 Submitter Information Name: Erica Gray Address:
-01 406 Glendale Dr.
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Henrico, VA, 23229
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Email: veggielady@yahoo.com D
General Comment Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339, North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Louisa County, Virginia Brief description of amendment: The license amendments approve changes to the Technical N
Specification (TS) TS 3.1.7, Rod Position Indication, to provide an additional monitoring option Sfor an inoperable control rod position indicator. Specifically, the proposed changes would allow monitoring of control rod drive mechanism stationary gripper coil voltage every eight hours as an alternative to using the movable in core detectors every eight hours to verify control rod position.
The NRC always states there are many layers of protection, yet the NRC seem to be allowing for 1\\
more and more compromises.
Reliability and accuracy of the information for the control rod position is very important to the reactor safety as well as the design of the core protection system.
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The position indicator is classified as a Class lE component because the rod position signal of the position indicator is used in the safety related systems. Therefore it will be separated from the control systems to the kextent that a failure of any single control system component of a channel and will have sufficient independence, redundancy, and file:///C:/Users/CAG/Downloads/NRC-2015-0142-DRAFT-0002.htmI 1/2
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,testability to perform its safety functions assuming a single failure.
How long has the equipment been inoperable?
This document is dated:February 14, 2013 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT NO.2, ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR TEMPORARY CHANGE TO ALLOW TWO INOPERABLE DEMAND POSITION INDICATORS PER CONTROL BANK (TAC NO. ME8656)
Dear Mr. Heacock:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 251 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-7 for the North Anna Power Station, Unit NO.2.
The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated May 11,2012.
The amendment revises the TS 3.1.7, "Rod Position Indication" to allow two demand position indicators in one or more banks to be inoperable for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. This change is proposed as a temporary change to the TS for the current operating cycle and is proposed as a footnote to the current TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Section 3.1.7, Condition D http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML 303/ML13032A154.pdf May 1, 2015 http://www.nuepros.com/content/nrc-accepts-north-annas-altemate-control-rod-position-monitoring-ts-change It was less than a year ago that during refueling, 2 broken fuel rods were discovered. Perhaps this is related.
DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT At 0900 on September 15, 2014, with Unit 2 defueled, debris that had the potential to be fuel fragments was located on the core plate (EIIS System - AC) directly below the B 1 1 core location. Ten pieces of material, approximately 1/8" in diameter, were found. The material was near the edge of the outer flow hole and partially under the gap between the baffle plate and the core plate. Fuel assembly, (EIIS System -AC) 4Z9 was located at the B 131 location during Cycle 23. Video inspection of fuel assembly 4Z9 identified that the top springs of two fuel pins were dislodged.
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1432/ML14325A692.pdf Dominion should have to fix inoperable equipment, not be given more amendments!
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