GO2-83-436, Interim Deficiency Rept 216 Re RHR Relief Valve Vents. Initially Reported on 821022.Relief Valves Will Be Removed, Containment Leakage Path Will Be Eliminated & Steam Condensing Mode Will Be Deactivated.Next Rept by 830817
| ML17277A612 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 05/18/1983 |
| From: | Carlisle C WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| To: | Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17277A611 | List: |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, GO2-83-436, NUDOCS 8306270353 | |
| Download: ML17277A612 (8) | |
Text
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gO Interna1 Oistribution HRC Distribution
~Na)l Ora Attached ZiI E: COPY Docket ilo. 50-397 Mr, J.
B. Martin May 18, 1983 Regional Administr ator U.S.
Nuc 1 ear Regul atory Commi s si on Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596
Subject:
NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.
POTENTIALLY REPORTABLE CONDITIONS 8216, RHR RELIEF VALVE VENTS; 8223, STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM (SLCS);
AHD 8232, LPCS AHD RHR SUPPORT PIH RECEPTACLES
References:
a) Telecon dated October 22,
- 1982, R.T.
Johnson to John E 1 in b) Telecon dated January 27,
- 1983, L.C. Floyd to R.
Dodds (QA2-83-029) c) Telecon dated January 21,
- 1983, L.C. Floyd to John Elin (QA2-83-023)
In accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e),
your office was informed by telephone, of the above subject conditions.
Attachments A and 8 provide the Project's interim reports on Conditions
//216, RHR Relief Valve Vents and 8223, Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS).
Attachment C provides our final report for Condition //232, LPCS and RHR Support Pin Receptacles.
He will continue to provide your office with quarterly updates on Conditions 216 and 223.
If you have any questions or desire further information regarding these
- subjects, please contact Roger Johnson, llHP-2 Project QA Manager, (509) 377-2501, extension 2712.
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S. Carlisle Program Director, MHP-2 Attachments:
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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.
2 DOCKET NO. 50-397 LICENSE NO.
CPPR-93 10CFR50.55(e)
CONDITION II216 RHR RELIEF VALVE VENTS lRTERIM REPORT Descri tion of Deficiency There are 4
RHR relief valves which have a 2" vent hole on the valve body.
The valves are RHR-V-55A, RHR-V-95A, RHR-V-558, and RHR-V-958.
These valves are situated such that the failure of a single motor operated
- valve, RCIC-V-113, would allow an open leakage path from the wetwell (primary containment) directly to the reactor building (secondary containment'
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The attached sketch illustrates the situation
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Containment penetration X-116 is an open path into the wetwell's gaseous volume.
In the steam con-densing
- mode, RHR-V-55A (or 8) and RHR-V-95A (or 8) protect the RHR heat exchanger from over-pressurization.
In order to accommodate condensation in the line between these valves and containment, a vacuum breaker has been installed that consists of penetration X-116, RCIC-V-113, RHR-V-102, RHR-V-101A (or 8),
RHR-V-103A (or 8),
and RHR-V-179A (or 8).
All of these valves are.normally open.
Upon a containment isolation signal, the only valve to close would be RCIC-V-113.
If it failed to close, and a
LOCA had occur red, the wetwell would pressurize, and the wetwell atmos-phere would vent down this path.
Details of the RHR relief valve show that a flow path exists which would allow the wetwell atmosphere to vent directly to secondary containment.
Safety Im 1 icati on m
Earns an]
Roe has estimated the gaseous release from these four paths at 5,2 x 10 scfm during the first 450 seconds after a
LOCA and at a rate of 4.9 x 10 scfm thereafter.
This can be compared to the allowable re'lease rate for primary containment of approximately 1.7 scfm.
Corrective Action After a review of possible corrective actions, including incorporation of a bellows seal, the Project has decided to remove the relief valves, elimi-nate the containment leakage
- path, and deactivate the steam condensing mode of the RHR system.
Supply System and Burns and Roe Engineering are prepar-ing the necessary Project Engineering Directives and FSAR changes to imple-ment the corrective action.
We will continue to provide your office with quarterly updates on this subject.
The next report will be submitted by August 17, 1983.
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