ML19320A871

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Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law Responding to Aslab Questions on Battelle Rept.Findings Are Adopted by TMI-2/Peachbottom Intervenors & Ecology Action.Urges Suspension of Ols.Certificate of Svc Encl
ML19320A871
Person / Time
Site: Peach Bottom, Hope Creek, Sterling, 05000484, Crane  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/18/1980
From: Kepford C
Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power
To:
References
NUDOCS 8007080086
Download: ML19320A871 (12)


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EN IRONMENTAL COALITION ON NUCLEAR POWER Co Owesomes: Mr. George Boomume-R.D. et, Peach Bottom, Pe.17563 717 548-2836 Dr. Judith John,rud--433 Oriendo Avenue. Sts,s Cohees. Pa.16001 814-237M i

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'ISSION

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-t t THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARDS In the Matters of

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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY et al.

Docket Nos. 50-277 (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station,

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50-278 Units 2 and 3)

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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY et al.

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Docket No.-

50-320 (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,

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Unit No. 2)

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Docket Nos. 50-354 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS.CO.

(Hope Creek Generating Station, 3

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50-355 Units 1 and 2)

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NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY et al. * )

Docket No. STN 50-484 (Tyrone Energy Park, Unit 1)

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Docket No. STN 50-485 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION et al.

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(Sterling Power Project,

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RESPONSE TO APPEAL BOARD QUESTIONS ON BATTELLE REPORT, JUN 2 01980 > 75 PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND og SUBMITTED BY THE TMI-2/PEACHBOTTOM INTERVENORS g

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The period over which mill tailings wil1 remain a hazard is much longer than any human institution can be' relied upon'to endure (Miller testimony, p?ll).

It is not possible to predict quantitatively;the perfomance of tailings impoundments over the period that the tailings will remain a hazard (Miller testimony, p. 15).

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The Staff's program for reducing radon emissions from the mill tailings j

is at an. early and preliminary stage (tr. 180-183). The proposed Staff regulations, which constitute the most advanced generic rules to control radon emissions from l

the mill tailings piles which the Staff has issued to date, are vague and rather l

general (see Miller cross-examination generally, e'.g., tr. 194-196, 198-200, 242,254,257). These ambiguous proposed regulations would be unenforceable even 80070800tb 0509 s-50/l

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['.f if' issued in91nal fom. _ They all.ow the Staff virtually. unbridled discretion,.

to accept any proposed solutibn to the mill tailings disposal. problem as long 7

c f$. %. as the proposal seems reasonable 'to the Staff and would reduce short-term N

emissions of radon to the level ~of'two picacuries per square meter per second.

3.

The proposed Staff regulations do not require remedial work when~the calwlsted rate of radon releases exceeds two pico-curies per square meter per second (tr.168). The proposed Staff regulations do not require that mill tailings sites be identified by putting a sign up or a marker 6n them to indicate the toxic nature of the tailings piles, nor would fencing of the area of the piles be required (tr. N5). At present, there are no requirements that radon emissions from the mill tailings piles be measured periodically (tr.185). The proposed mgulations do not pmvent licensed mill tailings piles from eroding away with

,the passage of time (tr. 75-76). Nor do the regulations require placement of the mill tailings in pemanent, secure repositories to isolate radan emissions from the biosphere for the full period'of toxicity of the wastes, despite the fact that pemanent repositories may be available (tr. 114-115,288).

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T.he permanent costs associated with continued monitoring and any remedial work on the mill tailings piles which becomes necessary after the operator and

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, departed from the site will be paid by posterity (tr. 191-194).

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yowevef,. gstitutional controls capable of monitoring and maintaining the piles ccannot be a\\sumed to persist for the duration of the period of toxicity of. the 4 stail:inghaNe's, and may only survive as long as our present form of political 3

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certain amount of continuing, permanent institutional control will be necessary

--- 7'from-t ' moment the mill tailings are first created, to monitor and maintain the i'l tailings piles in a stabilized form. Rather than compel present users of

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n'uclear power. to locate a_ truly pemanent mpository. for these wastes or stop I.

using nuclear / power entinly,.the Staff has adopted. the expedient solution of -.

mfusing.to acknowledge:that a problem exists, while. unilaterally bequeathing to all future societies 'on earth a permanent legacy--that the mill tailings piles must either be monitored periodically and any problems which develop must be continually s

egrmeted', or people will]be living alongside a pemanent source.cf eenetic mutation and premature death for. as long.as there are people remaining-on. earth. m-

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Even if data were systematically accumulated and studied through monitoring

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the mill tailings piles for the next 100 years, it would not be possible to? "

predict 'whetih'er massive failures"l'eading to unacceptable releases' of. radon.' wilt

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result Uth thk passarje' of addho' rial 7 time'(th."2'95).'" W if"'Y k.hP ' ~ ~ "

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Staff witness Miller tried to present' the novel (and completely unsubstan-tiated) Staff position. that the mill tailings piles will not erode away with the

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.. passage of. time, except after an Unpred. ictable and unspecified. number of thousands

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193,277). His adherence to this position wave' red 'at times,fhowever.

of years (tr.

For example, efter insisting 6,t one point that no remedial work woul,d ever be required (1:r.193), he inadvertently a.cknowledged that there is "more t.ncertainty' o

as to whether future remedial work will become necessary at some sites (tr.194).

He also acknowledged 'that current Staff pol'ic'y (w' ic'h'all'egedly is mom 'sl.rin' gent h

than the pioposed regulations)~hoea not' evenfrequiS' mill operators {to place an initial layer of co'ver whicQ exceeds lhe thic'kness nechssary'to'achiev'e' a short-term emissions rate of'thu picocuries;per souam meter per dcond,'to

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provide a margin for error'. Rather,. the St'aff will walt until a pile is found to

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be exhaling rad'on in excess of)the allowabl'e two pic'o-curie rate, and then'will E '

"make the. operator turn amundfind put another foot of dirt on the pile, another two feet of dirt" (tr.188).

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Staff witness Miller concede'd that reclamation of the mill tajlings piles

.in the manner, which the Staff.a[dvocates faces, a substantial' hurdle [in.tihat it involves "probably the biggest quality assurance problem that anybody has ever faced" (tr. 310). Nevertheless.,the NRC does not itself inspect ongoing melama-tion efforts to determine whether the plans iipproved by the Staff are being This function hasi 'nstead beenNelegated to consultats (tr. 315-316).

i implemented.

Staff witness Miller agn:ed that 25, 50, or' 100 years from now the mill tailings piles might not be in'spected ve'ry carefully, for example, where a' pile initially was reported to have been 'coveied by 40 'or'5b" fee' oIcover (tr'.177).('

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Staff witness Miller,js qualified to testify on behalf of the Staff that the

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Staff believes in has a regulatory program to contml radon releases (see tr.158) l to do here is...to describe the programihat l

("I think what the Staff is seeking i

they have...).. However, Staf.f witness Miller is not a competent witness on the l

principal sub,iect that is at"iEsue in' this phceeding--whether the techniques which I

the Staff says it is applying are in fact adequate to ensure ' protection of the 3

i public health and. safety as required by law fStaff witness Miller is an engineer (tr. 2,98) whose fomal education ended when hI received a Master's degree in 1976

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Wh.. f(P'e} kins tr.i 393)h_.J.The, record,nowhere de.monstrates that Mr. Miller is' qualified

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g;*%./.:... pile.s, dur.ing the. comi, rig. decades a: centuries.. or mil.lennia. The record nowhere, m

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of future geologic and climatological trends and their efffects on the integrity of the temporary, quick-fix solutions which the Staff has advanced.

Consequently,

..a. _~.. he lacks, the requisite. expertise and is not competent to speak with authority about

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~ the duration or' ultimate' extent to'wh'ich radon emissions would be reduced if Staff

..m, policy as. to the pr.ocedures which mill operators should utilize were being

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Staff Witnesses. Gotchyjnd Magno discussed in prior testimony the then Staff position that all of.the protective layer of cover could erode away in 500 years.

They estimated the radon releases which would occur in this event,(or which would

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occur if no cover at all were ever placed on the piles. for that matter)(tr. 212).

The willingness of these witnesses,to concede that the. protective cover could erode away in the short-tem does not make their estimates of radon releases conservative (except in comparisont to the estimates of Staff Witness Miller). Far #

greater releases than Gotchy and Magno discussed will result as the piles them-selves, rather than just the protective cover, erode away.

Furthemore, no witness qualified to testify ori the subject appeared to substantiate their claim that the protective cover, if any, could endu~re for as long as 500 years. That Staff witness Miller now believes it is'necessary to mtreat from prior Staff admissions that the mill tailings piles cannot be' isolated from the elements in the long-tem, by postulating that the Staff suddenly has learned to reduce radon emissions for " thousands" of years, demonstrates that the Staff has decided to ignom the public health and safety by refusing to acknowledge that a problem exists.

10.

The reclamation. techniques which, Staff, witness Miller now says will mduce,

radon emissions from the. mill tailings for. thousands of years;are essentially the same reclamation, techniques whi.ch Staff witness Gotchy said in Perkins would work

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for 500, years. Gotchy and Miller also gavh contradictory testimony regarding the time oeriod for which credible predictions over the disposition of the mill tailings could be made. Gotchy stated that no credible predictions could be made beyond 1006 years, whereas Mille'r claims that credible predictio's c5 c~over a s. pan of

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The NRC Staff has repeatedly att'empted tIo conceal the magnitu'de' of the radon emissions problem (see, e.g., the TMI-2 Intervenors' June 12,1978'," Appeal Fmm'

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An Appeal Board Order On The Grounds of Fraud..and on Other Grounds, Docket No.;

S0-320). There is a serious lack.of comoliance by the Staff 'and"re'act'oF operato,rs with numerous legal requirements established to regulate the commercial nuclear industry.

Effective regulation has been thwa'rted in many cases, creating' major cua'ity assurance problems (see, e.g., tr. 310). With its present Staff and l

attitudes, the NRC is unable to assure protection of the public health and safety 1

(see Finding number 12 of the Pmsident's Comission's Report on Three Mile Island).

In view of these factors, the only conclusion as to future emission rates which it is reasonable for this Board to assume is that any release rates _ established,

and enforced by the NRC Staff as it is presently constituted can.and will. be violated with absolute impunity.

Nothing in the m cord demonstrates that the-..

current two pico-curie per squam meter per second standard is being achieved at I

any mill tajlings disposal site. More important, though, is that the record,

nowhere demonstrates that the existing, allowable release rates for radon will not be formally relaxed, if not abol'ished entirely, a:: soon as it becomes politically-expedient to do so. The Staff's preposterous assumotion that it's own intemal review procedures (even if subjected to;the NEPA process) will. suffice to guarantee that the public will not be exposed to dangerous levels of radon releases'in the coming decades, centuries, and millennia is without adequate foundation in the' i

mcord and completely untenable.

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1 There is no basis in the record for assurping that the mijl tailings piles 12.

will in fact be stabilized, monitored, and maintained to achieve the emissions rates described by'the Staff. No competent testimony was presented to support) 1;he Staff's speculative. assumption that radon releases can theoretically be:-

reduced fo-thousands of years by adoption of the Staff's proposals. But e. ven tif such. reductions theoretically are possible, all that matters is: What in fact.

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assumpi. ions about the effectiveness,,a.of its quality' assurance program, even if the

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Staff tightens up its proposed mgulations' tio make them enforceable, and affima-i tively begins to seeks public. input in its decisionmaking process, who will' f

ultimately.asstane the pemanent obligation of monitoring and m5intaining'these ;

mill ~ tailings sites? The record in this proceeding nowhere demonstrates that -

paople of the future will be.willing and able to assume this awesome responsjbility.

What if future people dig up the mill tailings sites or sink wells in them

((tr.i73. 89-90,117)?. What if the mill tail,ings sites are viewedias relics of a' r

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.1.h:m 1p'ast civilization and.become touri.st attractions for young families with small children? What if future societies will not be highly technologEal, and the rip-rap cover is removed to construct stone dwelling huts on the mill tailings piles (compam tr. 38-39)7,

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Even if one were to assume that the makeshift, unenforceable policies of the Staff would, if properly implemented, reduce radon emissions for " thousands" i

of years, this would reduce only a minute fraction of the total radon releases which result from milling uraniun ore to fuel commercial nuclear reactors. See Table 1 of the June 8,1978, prepamd testinony of Dr. Kepford subsitted on behalf of the Intervenors in the Perkins 1, 2, and 3 proceeding.

14. The last ~100,000 years ia*ve been a period'of'(1) major climatic changes with associated changes in erosion rates and processes; vegetation density and type, major extinctions of pleistocene fauna, and ths formation of large lakes in (2) major gl'acial modifications of the northern part of 4,

presently arid areas:

the continents and the westem moudtains of North Aherica; (3) major sea level

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fluctuations with accompanying river incision and deposition; and (4) continuing displacement of the earth's surface by faulting and isotactic adjustment to the addition and removal of ice loads. If the past is indeed a guide to the future, and there is no reason to believe that it is not, then long-tem emstonal i

stability cannot be assumed. Even where glacial activity and faulting are improbable, climatic change and the resulting change in river behavior, as well as change in the rates and mechanics of hill slope erosion, prevent secure storage of earth materials near' the earth's surface (tr. 271-273).

15. Uncontrolled, pemanent, high levels of radon emissions will result in many cases if major climatic changes occur in the areas in which the mill tailings piles am located, assuming that the mill tailings are covered up in the manner which the' Staff proposes,(tr. 210)....

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Unless future human beings happen to understand the toxic nature of uranium mill tailings, they will not recognize the need to perfom remedial work to -

compensate for the erosion which occurs at the piles with the passage of time (tr.456,459-462).

17'.

The codinission isEpresently involved in examining worst-case scena'rios in the

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hm case of high-level transuranic wastes because their lo'nij half life nece'ssitates the long-tem isolation of these wastes from the biosp,here (see tr.117).

Considering the long-tem period of toxicity of the mill tailings (tr.89-90,113-114,117), the Staff proposal of throwing a little dirt over the tailings and

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hoping the problem will go away is. irresponsible in the extreme.

During. the :?..:

Perkins proceeding, Staff. witness Gotchy was, asked why there should.be short--

... term treatment;.cf mill tailings.,.whose radon emissions;fwill. continu$,virtuallyr.

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fomver, while4the Cormission jstactively considering proposals intended to -

isolate high-level transuranic waistes for periods rangt'ng. fro ~m 100,0,00 to 500,000 2583-2584).., G tchy attributed this disparity to the fact that years (Perkins.tr.

9 high-level transuranic, wastes are easier io[ manage because they are not spread out in several million. cubic ya'rds 'of] dirt (Perkins tr. 2583-2584).' This disparity

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of treatment by the Commission is an arbitrary, capricious, and illegal one, is not designed to protect the heaith and safety of the public, 'and is! inconsistent d

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18.. The difficulties inherent,in monitoring and maintaining the mill tailings piles pemanently in a manner which protects them from the elements increases,

The, average om grade has been declining.

as the volume,of tailings.increasesz steadily, with, time (tr. 475).. This trend i,s important because radon emissions are directly proportional to the amount of'uranitsk in the sre which is being mined, and are essentially independent of:thilings volume. Witness Goldman in.itially stated

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that t.he relationship between, ore grade and oercentage uranium recovery;is linear (tr,475). There is, however'., no fundamental reason whi'it should be linear (tr. 475).

Goldman later agreed that other. curves representing a much larqer. increase of tailings

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volume with decreasin;g ore grades can be drawn through the existing data,:and may in fact more accurately reflect the underlying function which deter es the data (tr. 486-4[90). Upon still furt'her questionir.9, Goldnan admitted that the less conservative linear relationship which he initially advanced would apply only if

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new technology was applied throughout the industry to reduce tailings v'olu:nes i

(tr. 490-493).

19. The discussion by Dr. Goldman of Indian mounds.is irrelevant and has no pmbative value in,the present, proceeding.5,3The. mounds aboutjhich Dr. Goldman.

claimed to have knowledge,,were not constiucte'd in the regions'in which uranium,

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milling is presently taking place (tr. 445-446), and are. constructed of the kinds 1

of soils natural to the areas in which the mounds are located;(tr. 485). Many of 1

l the Indian mounds have been covered by varying kinds of vegetation for periods of over"a thousand years (tr. 445)d Unlike milItailings piles, Indian mounds were not constructed of sandstone which had been ground up by man-made machinery (tr. 484).

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Nor wem these Indian mounds ' constructed of ground-up sandstone which has been soaked 'in sulfu)ic acid, a' p' recess. which severely retards the growth' of vegetation 4

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  • tailings piles (tr. 484). The observed rats.- of erosion;in areas of uranium

., - - Q mill tallings.- gmatif' exceed the ' erosion > rates which can be -calcu'T&ted for Indian mounds (tr.:450.455)'. rThere is also no basis in the record far assuming that0

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4 6M....IE..mode'rn mari unde'rstandTthe: te'chn' ology 'usAd :to build 'the ' Indian mounds'[ENorido we have any idea h, w m;any' Indian mounds in 'the aggregate have disappeared due to ~'

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erosion, compared to the number which wers originally constructed (tr. 446-447).

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.u The recor.d.nowhere demonstr.ates that Dr. Goldman, witness for the Applicant, 20,.

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is". qualified on'the basis 'of fomal; tra,ining'.or subsequent experience to predict

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the long-term eff,ects of erosion and weathering on the mill tai. lings piles. during

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the coming de' ades, centuries,' or millennia. The record nowhem suggests that c

'Dr. Goldnan is q'ualified' to 't stify 'about the rat'es and dimetion of future geologic J

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and climatoligical trends and their effects on the integrity of the temporary, quick-fox solutions' which the" Staff has~a'dy'anced. ~ Consequentl'y,' he lacks' the -

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. requisite experti5e~ ~an'd"isndt ' competent To speak with authority abouYth'e ' duration

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or ultimate extent to'wh'ich"r'adon emissions would be reduced if Staff ' policy" as' to the procedures which mill ope'ra' ors should utilize were being i plemented{ ~ '--

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No evidence. was introduced concerning the actual depths o,f the m,ill tailings

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piles which are being produced, to fuel the reactors which are subject to thii proceeding._ No.ev'idance,was intrbduce'd[to suggest'that the Staff assumptions

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'conceming the depths of these piles are even remotely representative of the actual depthsofthepilesthemselve's. Th'e Staff deciifon to base.their calculations on

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an average of a small sample. of existing piles is also deficient in that it results in a substantial underestimation of.short-term radon releases, due to the shielding effect of p'iles which exceed 'certain depths. (see tr. 53-54)., Nor was any evidence supported by a competent witness introduced in defense of the Staff's assumption that the tailings plies would withstand the effects of weath'ering forces during, say, the next one hundred to five hundred years. About the only thing that was dete51Md on' thErecord abouF the a'ctual'd'epths of 'the mill tailing's piles is"

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!c that'no regulatidn's,'nof ehendhe Staff's' proposed ones, require that the piles-be'constructeif tYbh"othe$pths' which 'the S'taff' calculations assume ~ (tr. 166-167).

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Staff witness Mil'ler's criticism of Dr. Pohl's estimate of 330 Ci?AFR-yr (Mil'ler testimony, p. 28) is therefore not supportable by the record in this proceeding.

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22.

As in every othet.NRC licensing proceeding, the myth of Staf.f conservatism must be put to rest.., Miller all'ege' tha't.Magno's estimates were cons'ervative because d

Magno multiplied the total release rates which he. calculated by a factor of ten

'(Miller testimony, p.16). The Staff did not, however, attempt' to project scenarios to cover emsion over time (tr. 213). The Staff instead simply assumed a. perfect

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world in which failure is impossible,~and noted that the rel' ease rates calculated for this model would be saall.(by comparison with the maximum possible release rates of 1000 cyries per AFR'per year). Since multiplication of one small number by anothkr genIrally" pro' dudes"a'notheY 'small number, Magno multiplied his calculated emissions rate by ten so that the Staff could hide under an umbrella of alleged conse rvatism. The procedure used by $agno is arbitrary and capricious (tr. 212-213). There is:no basis in the. record for determining what the proper multiplier should be. What flagno's arb'itirary selection of ten as a multiplier is. designed to avoid is the fact'that the world, which we. live in abounds with failures, and 5

m is far from perfect.

23.

' The mcord does not!' support the conclusion that the predictions by the'. Staff and Applicant of future radon emissions from the nill tailings : piles are donser-vative. The undisputed testimgny.of Dr. Pohl that releases of 1000 curies per AFR per year can occur (tr. 57) demonstrates the extent to which Staff and ' Applicant,

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predictions are, based upon self-interest and wishfcl thinking; and do not reflect the concern for protecting the health and safety of the pitblic which the law requires.

The Appeal Board should adopt verbatim kn its Findings of Fact all of the 24.

statements made by Dr. Pohl in his prepared testimony.

25.

The matter concerning the impacts of the:Battelle report upon the disposition of alleged deficiency one reached in ALAB-562 should be held in abeyance until the final report is. available to the parties and this Board, to avoid the need for submitting cor:ments on an interim product (tr. 527).

26.

The Intervenors in this proceeding were prejudiced and'pmvented,from adequately preparing for the 1980 radon hearings by the failure of the Staff to serve any of its prepared testimony on Dr. 'epford within thef allotted time K

period (tr. 153}229-230).

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27.

The Intervenors were prejddicek in' twIk/nportant respects by the 'way~in which the Appeal Board conducted this proceeding. The Appeal, Board ' illegally attempted to moid the 1980 radon proceeding in a manner which)was incondistent with the requirement of objectivity and the legal obligation of protecting the health and safety of the public. The key witness in this proceeding 'was Staff witness Miller. Repeatedly,'.as soon as Staff' witness Miller's responses to cross-examination began to stray from the " party line" that the' Appeal Board was intent upon upholding, Dr. Kepford's ques'tioning oflNr. Miller wasjnterrupted so that the Appeal Board

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could divert attention towards testimony which it considered to be less damaging to th'e Staff's and Applicant's pos'ition.

In addition, the Appeal' Boar' constantly d

thmatened that it would truncate Dr. Xepford's cross-examination of Mr. Miller

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after2an aditrary time period, despite the gravity of the issues in this.

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Because.the.- Appeal,. Board had, scheduled the TMI-2 aircraft impact hearings

. -28.

for late February 1980, and.due to other scheduling conflicts arising from other NRC licensing pmceedings, the Intervenors requested during a telephone con-ference call that the Appeal Board postpone the 1980 radon hearings. The Inter-venors* involvement in these several ongoing NRC proceedings stems from the absymal failure of past and present NRC actions to protect the health and safety j

of the Central Pennsylvania public.. The public health dangers (potentially on the order of millions of premature deaths from cancer per AFR per reactor) posed by the permanent releases of radon which Staff policy would allow, the.

fraudulent concealment by the NRC Staff and TMI-2 Apolicant in the past of the magnitude of these dangers, and the literfly several years' time which this

' Board has allowed the Staff and Applicant to prepare testiimony for the 1980" l

radon proceedings highlight the cru,cial.importance of allowing the oublic's _

representatives adequate opportunity to prepare for the proceedings. The Board's refusil to grant even a modest extension of time to prepare for the hearings consti.

~

tuted an arbitrary and illegal ' denial of due process and equal protection, and was inconsistent with the fundamental obligation of this Board to conduct its proceedings in a manner which will ensure protection of the public health and I

safety.

29.

The applicable law has been explained on nunerous previous occassions in i

filings by the TMI-2 and Peachbottom Intervenors on this subject.

Da to the Staff's failure to abide by NEPA and protect the health and safety of the public, f

and for the other reasons stated in our prior filings, the Appeal Board must issue an order imediately suspending the operating licenses of all reactors subject to this proceeding in view of the prodigious, long-term releases of radon which are attributable to the nuclea,r fuel cycle...

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.g Ecology' Actiotr also adopts -the above proposed findings.

In addition, the TMI-2/ Peach Bottom Intervenors adopt they proposed findings of Ecology Action.

Resp.ecpily,

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t Chauncey Kepfo

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June 18, ~1980'.' ' -

Representative of the TMI-2/ Peach Bottom Intervenors i

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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I hereby certify that: copies of PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCt0'SIONS OF LAW e,

AND RESPONSE TO APPEAL BOARD QUESTIONS ON BATTSLE Kf'^RT, SUb51TTED BY THE

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TMI-2/ PEACH BOTTOM INTERVENORS have been servrd on the following by deposit in ey;;-

the U.S. Mail first class postage paid on thisiday.of June,1980:

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George T.2.Trowbridge, 1

Edward Lutos, Eso., Chairmaa

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Trowbridge U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consission 1Soo.M Street, N.W.

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Washingto$ D.C. 20036 Mr. Gustave A. Linenberger.

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709 Health and Welfare Building,

Office of.the Secretary Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 '

U.S. Nuclear Re ulatory

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20555 i-1 Alan S. Rosenthal/ Esq..' Chairman.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal f'anel Henry.72 ii4Gu'rrn U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission:y-Counsel foi NRC Ctaff Washington. D.C. 20555 l.'

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