ML20003G949
| ML20003G949 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 04/27/1981 |
| From: | Fisher G, Murphy G, Singleton C HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8105040277 | |
| Download: ML20003G949 (92) | |
Text
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s.
Al 1 W UNITED STATES OF AMERICA g 8l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of:
5 5
. HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER 5
Docket Nos. 50-4980L COMPANY, g M.
5 50-4990L 5
(South Texas Project, 5
Units 1 & 2) 5
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l TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, E g.
OF MR. GERALD R. MURPHY MR. GERALD L. FISHER MR. CHARLES M. SINGLETON MR. JOSEPH F. ARTUSO l
MR. RALPH R. HERNANDEZ i
MR. DAVID G. LONG ON SEVERAL ACTIVITIES COMPRISED WITHIN OR RELATED I
TO THE STP CONCRETE WORK, INCLUDING INTERVENORS' I
CONTEN'fIONS RELATING TO THE FOREGOING ACTIVITIES
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of:
5 5
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER 5
Docket Nos. 50-4980L i
5 50-4990L 5
(South Texas Project, 5
Units 1 & 2) 5 5
APPLICANTS' TESTIMONY ON SEVERAL ACTIVITIES COMPRISED WITHIN OR RELATED TO THE STP CONCRETE WORK, INCLUDING INTERVENORS' CONTENTIONS RELATING TO THE FOREGOING ACTIVITES The following is testimony presented on behalf of Houston Lighting & Power Company, et al. (Applicants) on several activities comprised within or related to the-South Texas Project (STP) concrete work, including containment I
shell placement, Cadwelding*, installation of waterproofing membranes and rebar erection.
The testimony covers the l
following portions of Contention 1 of the intervenors which l
I relate to the foregoing activities:
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f "Cadweld" is a Registered Trademark of Erico' Products, Inc.
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2.*.
5 Contention 1 There is no reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by the operating license for the South Texas Nuclear Project can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public in that:
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(2)
There has been field construction error and as a result, extensive voids exist in the concrete wall enclosing the containment building,-
in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Sections IX and X.
(3)
In violation of Quality Assurance and Quality control requirements applicable to the South Texas Nuclear Project with regard to document control (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Sections VI and XVII), a field document relating to cadweld inspections has been lost.
I (4)
There are membrane seals in the containment i
structure which are damaged, indicating a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Sections X, XV and I
XVI.
)
3 (5)
There are steel reinforcement bars which are missing from the concrete around the, equipment I
doors in the containment and such bars are missing from the containment structure as well, indicating violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Sections g
X, XV and XVI.
5 1
I' (6)
There are cadwelds which have been I
integrated into parts of the plant structure which 3
are not capable of being verified with regard to
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complianc,e with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, in
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violation of Sections IX and X of Appendix V.
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3 g
As a result of the foregoing, the Commission cannot make the findings required by 10 CFR 5550.57(a)(1) and 3
(2) necessary for issuance of an operating license for 3
the South Texas Nuclear Project.
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a The panel of witnesses presenting this testimony consists of Mr. Gerald R. Murphy, Mr. Gerald L. Fisher, Mr. Charles M.
P
[
Singleton, Mr. Joseph F. Artuso, Mr. Ralph R. Hernandez and i
Mr. David G. Long.
I The testimony consists of the following segments:
I
{
(1)
Messrs. Murphy, Fisher, Singleton and Artuso with i
respect to Contention 1(2) (alleged voids in the concrete i
i i
wall enclosing the reactor containment building (RCB)),
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Contention 1(3) and 1(6) (alleged lost documentation relating to Cadweld inspection and alleged Cadwelds not capable of I
being verified), Contention 1(4) (alleged damaged membrane 1
5 seals in the RCB structure), and Contention 1(5) (alleged i
7 missing reinforcing steel bars in the RCB);
3 3
(2)
Mr. Hernandez with respect to the activities of 3
L HL&P Engineering as they relate to the foregoing contentions; 2
""d 3
(3)
Mr. Long with respect to the activities of HL&P
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6 Quality Assurance (QA) as they relate to the foregoing conten-7 8.
tions.
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T. Hudson:8:D 3
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L TESTIMONY OF GERALD R. MURPHY, JOSEPH F. ARTUSO, CHARLES M. SINGLETON AND GERALD L. FISHER ON THE STP CONCRETE ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING INTERVENOR CONTENTIONS 1(2), 1(3) & 1(6), 1(4) AND 1(5).
Q. 1 Please state your names.
A. 1 Gerald R. Murphy, Joseph F. Artuso, Charles M.
Singleton and Gerald L. Fisher.
Q. 2 Please state your current employment, qualifications and experience.
A. 2 (GRM)(JFA):
Those matters are set forth in our testimony in this proceeding on the concrete verification program.
(CMS):
I am Brown & Root, Inc.'s (B&R's) Civil Discipline I
i Quality Control (QC) Superintendent for STP, and am directly 1
-)
responsible for all QC inspection activities in the areas of
)
e, concrete.
I report to the QC Manager for STP.
L Prior to joining Brown & Root, I completed a four year y
apprenticeship program in structural steel design at a large s
I shipbuilding company in Virginia.
I spent 3-1/2 years in 1
3 various positions in QA/QE with Litton Industries in Pasacagoula,
)
i
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I joined B&R in 1973, and worked for over one L
2 year as a QC specialist in B&R's fossil program and for two 3
4 years as a Civil Inspector in the Industrial Civil Division at 5
Waynesboro, Virginia.
In 1976, I moved to STP and, after 6
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9 0
1. _ _ _
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successful completion of B&R's training and certification program, became a Level II QC Civil Inspector for STP.
I bcame Civil Discipline QC Superintendent at STP in March 1979.
(GLF):
I am the Discipline Project Engineer for the Civil Structural Group on STP for B&R.
I am a graduate engineer from the University of Missouri i
at Rolla (1960).
I am a registered professional engineer in i
the states of Missouri, North Carolina and Texas.
I,have 6
twenty years of experience as a structural engineer in the i
power industry, including five years with Burns & McDonnell f
Engineering Co. as a Structural Design Engineer on fossil power e
i plants; four years with Gibbs, Hill, Durham & Richardson, Inc.
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as a Structural Project Engineer on nuclear and fossil power 1
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plants; and almost twelve years with B&R in various supervisory
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L positions within the power division civil / structural engineering
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department.
Q. 3 What is the purpose of your testimony?
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A. 3 (GRM, CMS, GLF, JFA):
Our testimony will address 7
various aspects of, he concrete program at STP with special 3
t 3
i i
,1 emphasis on the areas related.to Contentions 1(2), 1(3) & 1(6),
L 2
1(4) and 1(5).
Our testimony will demonstrate that the matters 3
involved in these contentions do not raise significant safety 4
5 concerns.
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Contention 1(2)
Q. 4 Mr. Murphy and Mr. Artuso, what is the purpose of your testimony regarding Contention 1(2)?
A. 4 (GRM, JFA):
The purpose of our testimony is to l
address contention 1(2) and, specifically, to describe the process through which voids in the RCB shell walls of Units 1 and 2 at STP were identified and repaired, and the steps taken by HL&P and B&R to ensure that significant voids do not occur in the future.
Ou-testimony will show that no significant voids exist now in the containment shell walls, and none are likely to result from subsequent shell wall placements.
Q. 5 Mr. Murphy, what are the basic standards and require-ments applicable to concreting activities for the STP contain-ment shell placements?
A. 5 (GRM):
The primary technical standard is ASME/ACI-359, American Society of Mechanical Engineering (ASME) Code,Section III, Division 2,
" Proposed Code for Concrete Reactor Vessels and Containments," including Addenda 1 through 6, issued for trial use and comment in 1973.
The following Regulatory Guides are applicable, to the extent stated in the FSAR and PSAR, to the STP concrete or concreting activities:
R. G. 1.10 (Cadwelding), R.G. 1.15 (Testing of Reinforcing Steel), R. G. 1.18 (Structural Acceptance Test for Concrete Containments), R. G. 1.55 (Concrete Placement in Category I Structures), R. G. 1.94 (QA Requirements), and R. G.
1.103 (Post-Tensioned Systems).
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5 Industry standards developed by the American Society for Testing 6
7 Materials (ASTM) and the American Concrete Institute (ACI) are S
applicable as required by the above documents and Project 9
0 specifications.
In addition to the above, the Quality Assurance g
2 (QA) Criteria contained in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, are 3
f 4
applicable.
5 6
Q. 6 were the STP RCB concrete shells placed in acco: dance j
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with these standards and requirements as then applicable?
9 A.
6 (GRM):
Yes, except in a relatively small number of 0
f instances in which deviations from these standards.and require-3 ments occurred, in which cases the deviations were evaluated 4
5 and approved by Design Engineering and properly documented.
6 7
Q. 7 what are the major steps involved in placing the STP 8
9 RCB shell walls?
O i
1 A. 7 (GRM):
Concrete is placed in approximately 10 foot 2
high lifts circumferential1y around the containment shell, 3
except for the concrete at construction openings ("blockouts"),
6 around large penetrations and the placements at the spring line 7
8 and the dome, where, lift heights are less than 10 feet. There 9
0 are approximately 33 placements in the containment shell.
1 2
The sequence of operations in the placement of one of the 3
4 10 foot lifts is typically:
5 Installation of 3/8" liner with attendant vertical 6
7 and horizontal stiffeners and penetrations.
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5 Inspection of liner, stiffeners and penetrations.
6 Initial preparation of construction joint.
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Installation of reinforcing steel and post-tensioning 0
ducts.
1 Setting of the external " jump" forms (the 3/8" liner 2
3 4
serves as the internal form and permanent form).
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Inspection of the above installations.
7 Final Pour Card sign off.
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Placement of concrete in accordance with the placement 0
1 plan.
2 Forn removal, inspection and curing operations.
3 4
5 Concrete is placed by Construction personnel under the 6
7 survaillance of QC personnel. to assure that all steps in the 8
9 placement procedure are followed.
O Q. 8 What procedures govern the placement of concrete in 2
the RCB shell walls?
3 4
A.' 8 (GRM):
Prior to July 1980, there were two main 5
6 construction procedures applicable to concrete placements:
7 3
Concrete Construction Procedure (CCP) 3 on Prepour Activities 9
0 and CCP-4 on Concrete Placement and Finishing.
These two 1
procedures, and four others also relating to concrete placements, 2
3 were absorbed in July 1980 into the new Quality Construction 4
5 Procedure CCP-25.
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5 Q. 9 Did CCP-25 modify the procedures applicable to 6
7 placement of concrete in RCB shells?
8 A. 9 (GRM):
Yes.
CCP-25 made the following procedural 9
requirements applicable to all RCB shell placements:
(1) 2 Preparation of a written placement plan for each placement; (2) 3 4
Holding a pre-placement meeting to review the placement plan 5
6 and discuss, among other things, any problem areas or special 7
g features of the placement; (3) Holding a post-placement meeting 9
within the next working day after the placement to discuss any 0
f deviation from the placement as planned or any problem which 3
may have been identified by any person familiar with the place-4 5
ment.
6 7
Q. 10 Are there special considerations involved in placing S
9 concrete in the containment shells?
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A. 10 (GEM):
Yes.
There are areas in the containment 2
shell next to the liner which contain high densities of reinforc-3 ing steel.
As a result of the congestion of reinforcing steel 6
and liner stiffeners in these areas, there is a possibility
.7 l8 that concrete will not flow uniformly into them resulting in
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" voids".
,1
,2 Q. 11 Have voids been detected in the STP containment i3 shell walls?
4 A. 11 (GRM):
Yes.
Voids were found in the. containment 6
f7 shell walls of Unit 1 in October 1978 and, upon further investi-i8 I9 gation, in those of Unit 2.
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Q. 12 How and where were these voids first detected?
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A. 12 (GRM):
The Unit 1 voids were first detected in a l
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.9 Lift 15 placement, behind the polar crane brackets.
They were 0
discovered by B&R personnel during the normal course of construc-2 tion work.
.3 4
Q. 13 What action was taken once the existence of voids 5
6 in a Lift 15 placement was revealed?
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A. 13 (GRM):
B&R personnel under my direction embarked 9
n an investigation to determine the location and extent of all 0
f voids in the L'ft 15 placement. The investigation consisted of 3
visually examining the external surface and tapping the liner 4
5 with a hammer; any area where tapping produced a hollow sound 6
7 was regarded as potentially containing voids and the hollow 8
9 sounding area was mapped.on a grid system.
The presence or 0
1 absence of voids in these suspect areas was then determined by 2
drilling test holes through the liner plate. Drilling test 3
4 holes was also required in the thickened areas of the liner, 5
6 where tapping would have given msbiguous results.
-7 8
Where voids were identified, they were examined using an 9
0 Olympus fiberscope to determine their extent, characteristics i
1 2
and relationship to the liner stiffening elements.
The fiber-3 i'
4 scope recorded the voids photographically so that the conditions 5
of the voids could be analyzed and patterns of void formation 7
determined.
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5 Q. 14 what conclusions were drawn as a result of this 6
7 investigation?
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A. 14 (GRM):
The investigation revealed that voids 0
ccurred in areas beneath shell penetrations, and/or beneath 1
2 the 8" channel and plat'e stiffeners, where high concentrations 4
of reinforcing steel were located.
The existence of voids in 3
6 the areas was generally evidenced by a hollow sound upon tapping.
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Many hollow sounding areas, however, contained no voids, the 9
f hollow sound being caused by a' narrow (0.001 to 0.002 inches 0
1 wide) gap behind the liner plate due to thermal movement of the 2
3 plate as a result of weldments to the plate, ambient tempera-4 5
ture changes or concrete shrinkage and settlement.
6, 7
Q. 15 Was anything done to identify the causes of void 8
9 formation in the Lift 15 placement?
O 1
A. 15 (GRM):
Yes.
The investigation to locate the voids 2
was followed by a concerted effort, which again I headed, to 3
identify the circumstances which contributed to void formation 6
on the Lift 15 placement, by reviewing in detail the " pour 7
8 package" (the packqge of documents pertain'.ng to the placement) 9 0
and conducting interviews with the personnel involved in the 1
2 placement.
3 4
Q. 16 Did you reach any conclusion as to the factors that 5
contributed to void formation in the Lift 15 placement?
6
'I A. 16 (GRM):
Yes.
The main factor was the complex 18 9
structural arrangement in that area of the containment, around 0
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L 2
3 4
5 the polar crane rail brackets, where the existence of additional 6
7 reinforcing steel and horizontal liner stiffeners or bracket 8
anchorages interfered'with concrete flow.
Other factors that 9
0 contibuted to void formation were access / visibility limitations,,
2 insufficient vibration, and equipment malfunction and associated 3
4 delays which adversely affected the uniformity of the concrete.
5 6
Q. 17 How and where were the voids in other areas detected?
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g A.
17 (GRM):
While the Lift 15 voids were being investi-9 gated and repair procedures developed, information was obtained 0
f from site personnel which led to a concern that voids might 3
exist in Lift 8 of the RCB Unit 1 shell walls.
It was determined 4
5 through the same process of visual inspections, sounding and 6
7 drilling that voids alsa existed in Lift 8.
When the existence J
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of voids in Lift 8 was determined, a program was established to 0
identify all significant voids in the RCB shell walls for both 1
2 Units 1 and 2.
4 1
18 What procedure was followed to search for potential 5
6 voids in the RCB shell placements other than Lifts 8 and 15?
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A. 18 (GRM):, Based on the experience acquired in the 9
0 investigations in Lifts 8 and 15, the areas where voids were 1
2 suspected were beneath shell wall penetrations and beneath the 3j 8" channel tad plate stiffeners, where high concentrations of
'5 reinforcing steel existed.
Potential void locations in these
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'7 areas were identified by the same process of tapping and drill-i8 i9 ang utilized in Lifts 8 and 15.
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I Q. 19 Were additional voids identified as a result of the i
r investigations?
I A. 19 (GRM):
Yes.
A total of 89 void areas in Unit 1
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(in Lifts 1 through 17) and 16 void areas in Unit 2 (in Lifts 1 g
I through 6) were identified.
Thesa void areas represented a 3
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volume of approximately 0.1% of the total volume of concrete 2
5 placed in the shells and 0.8% of the investigated areas.
The 1
I size and shape of each void area varied; the smallest was
)
approximately the size of a man's fist, and the largest consisted 3
L f small interconnected voids extending approximately 48 feet 2
3 above the equipment hatch, with the deepest of the interconnected 4
5 voids being about 17 inches.
3 7
Q. 20 Are you confident that the investigation identified 8
9 all significant voids existing in the RCB shell wall placements 0
and, if so, what is the basis for your confidence?
1 i
2 A. 20 (GRM):
Yes, I am.
As explained above, voids were 3
found only in areas of high rebar congestion beneath penetrations 6
and beneath the 8" channel and plate stiffeners.
We examined 7
8 those areas careful,ly in every placement ard identified all 1
9 0
significant voids existing in them.
Moreover, we examined 1
2 other areas in the placements where there was no physical 3
interference to the placing of concrete.
Where hollow sounds 4
5 resulted, holes were drilled into the liner.
Over 400 such 6
holes were drilled and, as anticipated, solid concrete was 9
0 1
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5 found in each instance, the hollow sound being caused by liner 6
7 separation.
To test the validity of the sounding technique and 8
as a further confirmation of the localized nature of the voids, 9
d 0
over 160 holes were drilled into solid-sounding areas.
In all 1
2 cases solid concrete was found.
3 4
It is important to point out that all the exploratory 9
6 holes drilled into the liner in Lift 15 (a total of 726 test 7
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g holes) were made deep enough to reach the center of the place-9 ment or the location of reinforcing steel.
In every case in 0
1 which a void was found, it was adjacent to the liner and er. tended 2
3 scme distance inwards, usually a few inches. There were no 4
5 instances of " internal voids," that is, voids located in the 6
7 center of the placement and not extending to the liner or 8
9 formed surface.
This result, together with the placing tech-0 niques used (depositing concrete in the middle of the placement y
2 and moving it outward towards the form and liner surfaces) 4 confirms that no internal voids exist in the STP RCB shell 5
6 walls.
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Q. 21 Was action taken to repair the voids identified by
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the investigation?
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A. 21 (GRM):
Yes.
Simultaneously with the investigation (3
of Lift 15, an extensive program to develop, qualify and test a g
repair procedure was conducted. Once all voids in Lift 15 had 7
been identified, they were repaired using the qualified repair 8
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5 procedure.
Essentially the same repair procedure was followed i
7 on the voids subsequently identified in other placements.
3 3
Q. 22 Please describe the procedure used to repair the f
voids identified by the investigation.
2 A. 22 (GRM)
The first thing that was done was to assemble 3
4 a team of construction workers, foremen and field construction 5
5 engineera to perform the repairs. This team was trained by an t
7 i
outside consultant and by design engineers on the repair proce-9 dure.
Once training was completed, the team went on to perform 3
the repairs.
The repair procedure consisted of the following 3
steps:
4 5
1.
couplings were installed (welded) into the previously 5
7 drilled inspection holes.
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2.
The voids were thoroughly washed using a combination 0
1 air-water jet.
2 3.
Void interconnections were found by filling the voids 3
with water at controlled pressures and noting the water flow 6
paths between the couplings.
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4.
Interconnections were marked on the face of the liner
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and the optimum location was selected for repairing intercon-1 2
nected voids.
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5.
Ports for the injection of " grout" (cement-like repair 5
material) were established at these optimum locations.
6 6.
Grout was injected under pressure into each port until 9
each void area was completely filled.
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Q. 23 Was the repair procedure successful?
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A. 23 (GRM):
Yes.
All the voids were completely filled 8
with grout that hardened to a strength equal to or greater than 9
.0 that of concrete.
The method of grouting and the quality of
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the grout ensured that the containment walls after grouting had
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.4 at least the same strength they would have had if the voids had
.5
.6 not occurred.
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,g Q. 24 As a result of the investigation and repair program, is it your opinion that the containment shell walls as repaired 1[2 meet all applicable safety requirements?
3 A. 24 (GRM):
Yes.
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.5 Q. 25 What is the basis for your opinion?
.6
.7 A. 25 (GRM):
The effectiveness of the repairs was verified
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- g by drilling exploratory holes in repaired art.as in LJit 15, and
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,y by successfully performing a very conservative load test on one 2
of the repaired polar crane brackets. The scheduled full scale 3
'4 polar crane test required by plant specifications was conducted 5
I 6
a few months later and confirmed that all brackets met the 7
8 design requirements.
These tests verified that the shell 9
.o walls, as repaired, meet their design capacity.
Also, during 1
2 the process of void repair in Unit 2, there was an incident 3
where excessive water pressure was applied in a void, resulting 4
5 in bulging of the liner and separation of a section of concrete.
- 7 Removal of the bulged portion of the liner plate exposed approxi-28 9
mately 150-200 sq. ft. of concrete immediately behind the 0
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I liner.
The voids that became exposed in that area were found i
to be exactly where predicted, and the grout injection ports e
that had been previously placed through the liner were ideally I
located to inject grout for complete filling of ;he holes, so I
that even the small (less than 1 sq. ft. ) areas of void would I
L be filled.
The remainder of the exposed concrete surface i
showed evidence of excellent consolidation, as did the concrete t
I that had to be removed to complete the repair.
This experience
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provided further validation of the void investigation and
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repair procedure utilized in both units, and again. confirmed I
the absence of any voids in the interior portion of the shell.
1 5
Q. 26 What is your opinion regarding the existence of 3
7 voids in the containment shell walls as repaired?
3
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A. 26 (GRM):
In my opinion, no significant voids exist J
in the containment shell walls at STP and none are anticipated L
2 to result from future shell wall placements.
3 Q. 27 What is the' basis for your opinion?
I A. 27 (GRM):
Approximately 80% of the Unit 1 and 2 RCB
-7 3
shell walls have be,en investigated for possible voids.
Due to 7
3 the careful investigation of the two containment shells and the L
2 subsequent repair procedures, the major voids have bc:n located 3
and repaired, specifically those voids which could have poten-4 tially reduced the structural capability of the shell.
With 7
respect to future placements, there is always the possibility 8
3 i
0 1 1
.I that some minor voids will occur no matter how ma.ny precautions are taken.
However, actions have been taken by HL&P and B&R to I
reduce the possibility of future void occurrence.
These actions, I
together with the experience gained in the void investigation i
and repair program, make it very unlikely that significant i
I voids will occur in future RCB shell placements.
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Q. 28 What actions have been taken to reduce the possi-t i
bility of void occurrence in future RCB shell placements?
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A. 28 (GRM):
The main preventive actions have been to
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provide better visibility and access to congested areas and to I
strengthen the construction and QC procedures. Visibility and i
I access have been improved by relocating the construction joint i
T so that the ru stiffeners are now located near the top of the
)
placement making it easier to vibrate and inspect the concrete
)
r, during placement.
In addition, the horizontal shear ties Z
(which are reinforcing steel bars which connect the inner and y
outer grids of main reinforcing steels) have been repositioned I
in order to provide better access to the vibrator operators and 1
3 inspectors.
Also,, provisions have been made to use a fine
)
)
. aggregate concrete (grout) mix instead of normal concrete mix L
I beneath penetrations and in congested areas.
I The procedural changes incorporated into CCP-25 provide g
I for more controlled planning and execution of the placements, 3
I so that potential equipment or concrete consolidation problems 3
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can be anticipated and dealt with in advance of the pour, and S
7 any unusual conditions occurring during glicement can be identi-i 3
fled and corrected.
Post-placement meetings will provide y
3 identification and resolution of any problems experienced g
I during the placement in a timely manner and suggestions for 3
I improvements on future pours.
3 5
Q. 29 To what extent will the structural integrity of the I
y containment shell be tested prior to operation?
9 A. 29 (GRM):
The post-tensioning of the containment
)
L prior to plant operation would cause observable structural 2
3 failure in localized areas if there were any significant voids.
4 5
In addition, the containment shell will be pressure tested at 5
7 65 psi (1.15 tices the containment design pressure)..This 3
9 pressure test would reveal any significant voids.behind the 3
L liner plate.
2 3
Q. 30 Mr. Artuso, is the presence of vuids in concrete placements an unusual phenomenod in large coterete construction 6
projects such as nuclear power plants?
7 8
A. 30 (JFA):,No. Voids in concrete are a common occur-9 0
rence in large construction projects.
In fact, the containment 1
2 structures of many, if not all, nuclear power plants are likely 3
4 to have some insignificant voids behind the liner.
The same is 5
true in other installations such as large fossil or hydroelec-6 tric power generation plants.
l 7
8 9
i 0
I l 1
a !..
2 3
4 5
Q. 31 Where are voids in containment structures most S
7 likely to be found?
8 A. 31 (JFA):
Voids are most likely to occur in highly 9
0 congested rebar areas and in the vicinity of blockouts.
2 Q. 32 Have you performed an evaluation of the void problem 3
4 at STP and of the inspection and repair program for the contain-5 6
ment shell walls?
7 g
A. 32 (JFA):
Yes.
Mr. Thomas J. Reading and I were J
9 members of a consultant Panel that worked together with the 0
1 members of a Special Task Force organized by HL&P and B&R to 3
respond to the concrete portion of the NRC's Order to Show 4
5 Cause of April 30, 1980.
As part of our activities with the 6
7 Special Task Force, Mr. Reading and I reviewed the void investi-8 9
gation and repair grogram instituted by B&R and made an indepen-0 y
dent evaluation of the program.
2 Q. 32 What were your conclusions as to the extent of the 4
problem?
5 6
A. 33 (JFA):
Considering the complexity of construction 7
-8 and the current sta,te of the art in concrete placement, the 9
O voids found at STP were not unique.
Some of the nuclear power 1
2 plants with which I am familiar had void problems similar to 3
those encountered at STP, underwent repairs analogous to those 4
5 conducted at STP, and successfully identified and repaired all 7
significant voids.
8 9
0 1
~
\\
t' 2
3 4
l 5
Q. 34 How were the void problems at those plants discovered?
l 6
7 A. 34 (JFA):
In most cases, the voids were apparent by 1
8 9
visual inspection during the placement process or once the 0
forms were removed.
On the other hand, at least in one instance y
2 the voids were located behind the liner knuckle and were dis-3 4
covered when the liner had to be punctured for another reason.
5 6
Q. 35 Is it customary in the nuclear power plant construc-7 g
tion industry to test concrete structures for voids after 9
0 placement?
7 A. 35 (JFA):
No.
The usual practice in the. industry is
~
3 to rely on visual examination during placement and after form 4
5 removal to ascertain the absence of voids.
6 7
Q. 36 would it be the usual practice in the industry to 8
9 test for voids absent visual indication of their existence?
O 1
A. 36 (JFA):
No. Usually,- tests for voids are only 2
conducted if visual inspection reveals that some voids do 3
4 exist.
On the other hand, once the presence of voids in an 5
6 area is identified, the appropriate practice is to test adjacent 7
8 or similar areas. This was the procedure followed at STP.
9 0
Q. 37 What were your conclusions regarding the inspection 1
2 and repair program at STP?
3 4
A. 37 (JFA):
As stated in my report dated August 13, 5
1980 to B&R, the investigation and repairs made to date on 6
concrete placed in the containment shells assures that there is 9
0 1
~
e.
L 2
3 4
5 good quality concrete near the inner and outer portions of the 6
7 shell.
The drilling and grouting in these areas should have 8
9 reached all significant voids.
It is very unlikely that voids 0
would exist in the center of the shells because they are readily y
2 accessible for vibration, and the placing procedure involves 4
depositing concrete in the middle portion of the walls and 5
6 moving it outward to the form or liner surfaces.
Therefore,' I l
7 g
believe the investigation at STP has located and repaired all 9
0 except possibly a few small voids.
1 Q. 38 What are the consequences of any small. voids remain-2 3
ing in the STP containment?
4 5
A., 3 8 (JFA):
None.
Concrete structures inherently 5
7 contain some small voids.
The structural design of nuclear 3
9 power plants has safety margins well in excess of 100%.
The 3
L presence of small voids reduces this safety margin by at most a 2
3 few percent.
Such reduction has no safety significance.
Q. 39 Are you familiar with the procedures now in-effect 5
for placing complex concrete at STP, and if so, what is your 7
3 opinion as to their, adequacy?
9
)
A. 39 (JFA):
Yes, I have reviewed the new Concrete L
2 Construction Procedure CCP-25 and I am familiar with the reloca-3 g
tion now in effect of the construction joint relative to the 5
horizontal circumferential liner stiffeners and other design 5
I modifications made to increase access and vicibility, as well 3
3 3
L 1
,9
--.w--
l' 2
3 4
5 as the permitted use of grout in congested areas.
In my opinion, 6
7 utilization of these improvements and use of the new Procedure 8
9 will ensure dhat the placement of the concrete will be properly 0
performed and the resulting concrete structures will be properly y
2 consolidated.
3 4
Contentions 1(3) & 1(6) 5 6
Q. 40 Mr. Murphy, Mr. Artuso and Mr. Singleton, what is 7
g the purpose of your testimony regarding Contentions 1(3) and 9
0 1(6)?
1 A. 40 (GRM,JFA, CMS):
The purpose of our testimony is to 2
3 i
address contentions 1(3) and 1(6), and specifically to descr be 4
5 the preparation, inspection, testing, and documentation of 6
7 location of Cadwelds at STP.
The testimony will show that all 8
9 Cadwelds made at STP can be inspected, or were inspected before 0
1 they were integrated into the plant structures, and meet all 2
the STP design requirements; and that unique identification and 3
4 1
ation of a Cadweld is unnecessary once the batch of materials 5
6 from which the cadweld was made is found to be of acceptable 7
8 quality.
9 0
Q. 41 Mr. Murphy, what is a Cadweld and what is its 1
2 purpose?
3 4
A. 41 (GRM):
A Cadweld is a connector used to join two 5
pieces of reinforcing steel, or to connect a piece of rein-6 forcing steel to a structural member. Industry codes applicable 9
0 1
L' 2
3 4
5 to STP specify that all large-size reinforcing steel (#14 and 6
- 18 bars) be spliced using a mechanical (Cadwelding) system.
7 I
Smaller size bars of reinforcing steel may also be cadwelded.
O Q. 42 Where are cadwelds used at the South Texas Project 1
2 and what is their purpose?
3 i
.4 A. 42 (GRM):
Cadwelds are used primarily in the contain-
)
5l 6
ment structures at STP.
They are used to connect #18 and #14 7
g bars, and to make transition splices between different size bars.
In addition, Cadwelds are used to attach reinforcing S
1 steel to thickened portions of the liner plate in the contain-23l ments.
Finally, Cadwelds are used to make splices on other 4
5 sizes of reinforcing bars when specified lengths are not avail-6 7
able or where use of Cadwelds would alleviate rebar congestion.
8 9
Q. 43 Would you please describe the basic steps followed 0
in making a Cadweld splice?
y 2
A. 43 (GPM):
The basic steps are as follows:
The bar
'3 4
ends are prepared (cleaned, and squared if required).
- Next, 5
6 cadweld witness marks are applied on the bar ends for verifica-7 8
tion of centering.
The sleeve is then applied to the two bars, 9
j 0
and centered.
The sleeve ends are packed with wicking to seal 1
them.
End clamps are applied, and a pouring basin is attached.
2 3
A crucible is then attached to the pouring basin.
A torch 4
3 flame is applied to the entire apparatus for the purpose of 6
7 removing all moisture from the sleeve, the bars, and the cruci-8 9
ble.
A metallic powder is poured into the crucible and ignited 0
il
-za-
1 2
3 4j 5
so that it becomes molten and fills the space between the
'6 7
sleeve and the bars.
After a cooling period, the clamps, 8
,9 pouring basin, and crucible are removed.
The resulting mechani-0
'y &
cal splice is cleaned with a wire brush and pick to remove the
.2 packing and expose the ends of the Cadweld for inspection.
3
.4 Upon completion, the Cadwelder records a unique identifying
.5
.6 number on the Cadweld and in his log.
.7 j
,g Q. 44 What standards and requirements govern the use of
.9 Cadwelds at STP?
- 0 A. 44 (GRM)
ASME/ACI-359 Code, issued for trial use and j3 comments in 1973 and Addenda 1 through 6 thereto, controls the
.4
- 5 use of Cadwelds in the construction of nuclear containments at
- 6
- 7 STP.
This code contains the requirements for operator (Cadwelder) l8
- 9 qualifications, inspection and testing of Cadwelds, and accept-l0
- 1 ance criteria for test results.
In addition, the ESAR made NRC's Regulatory Guide 1.10 applicable to the Cadwelding activity 4
!5 at the STP except as provide! by ASME/ACI-359.
The limited I
l
'6 applicability of R.G. 1.10 was clarified in the FSAR, where the 1
r7 18 various sections of, R.G. 1.10 are specifically addressed.
69 iO Finally, Cadwelding at STP is performed in accordance with il
'2 Project specifications and Concrete Construction Procedure i3 CCP-25.
This procedure is based on the Project specifications
,4 provided by Engineering and the manufacturer's recommendations.
'I CCP-25 was issued in July 1980; the Cadwelding procedures it i8 i9 iO il...
ms.
L' 2
3l 4
5 contains are similar to those set forth in Procedure No. CCP-ll, 5
7 which it superseded.
The procedures in CCP-ll were applicable 3
l at all times prior to July 1980 during Cadwelding operations at 9
3 STP.
L 2
Q. 45 Mr. Singleton, how are cadwelders qualified?
3 4
A. 45 (CMS):
Project personnel authorized to make Cadwalds 5
5 are qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME/ACI-359.
7 g
Each Cadwelder prepares two qualification splices for each 9
position (horizontal, vertical or diagonal) for which he intends 3
1 to become qualified to shoot.
The qualification splices are to 2
3 be of the maximum size bar that he will use in that position.
4 5
A Cadweld QC Inspector witnesses the preparation and performance 5
7 of the qualification splices, and conducts a visual inspection 3
3 and " tensile test" (a physical test in which progressively 3
t increasing pulling force is cpplied to the connection until 2
either the splice or the bars it joins fail) of the completed
}
splices.
If the splices pass the visual inspection and the 3
5 tensile tests, and if the procedures followed in preparing and 7
3 shooting the C'adwelds are correct, the cadwelder is deemed
~
)
)
qualified to make production Cadwelds for the position in L
1 question.
3 g
Q. 46 What are the requirements for Cadweld inspections at STP?
3 7
3 7
3 L
-zi-
L' 2
3 4
5 A. 46 (CMS):
In-process inspection of Cadwelding is 6
7 performed on a surveillance basis by QC Inspectors.
The in-8 process inspection checks for cleanliness, pre-heat, witness 9
O marks, and fit-up.
Cadweld QC Inspectors inspect visually all 2
completed Cadwelds.
This final inspection covers cadwelder 3
4 qualification, location of cadweld in an authorized area, 5
6 sleeve and powder materials, bar size, sleeve on-center, slag 7
g and porosity, Cadweld number, sleeve type, and any void areas 9
that might exist.
The results of the inspections of completed 0
'l cadwelds are recorded in a Cadweld inspection book.
2 3
In addition, a Cadweld QC Inspector selects on a random 4
5 basis a minimum of 2% of the Cadwelder's shots for destructive 6
7 tensile testing in each' position, and records the test results 8
9 in the cadwelder's test record and on a separate cadweld test 0
y summary sheet.
2 Q. 47 Is there any physical evidence on the cadweld 3
4 itself that the Cadweld has been accepted by the QC Inspector?
5 6
A. 47 (CMS): Yes.
Acceptable completed Cadwelds are 7
8 marked by the Cadwe,ld QC Inspector with a white stripe of paint 9
1 0
to distinguish them from uninspected splices or rejected splices.
1 2
The principal purpose of this marking is to indicate that these 3
Cadwelds have all been inspected and accepted.
If, during the 4
5 concrete preplacement inspection, any cadweld is seen to lack a 7
white stripe marking, the cadweld must be reinspected or the 8
9 0
l 1
l l
~28-
~
l
---r-
L' 2
3 4
5 inspection documentation must be examined to confirm that the 6
7 Cadweld was inspected.
The concrete Pour Card completed before 8
placement indicates that the cadwelds were verified for compli-9 0
ance with the inspection requirements.
1 2
Q. 48 Have Cadweld inspection requirements been met at 3
4 STP and, if so, how has compliance been verified?
5 6
A. 48 (CMS):
Yes, Cadweld inspection requirements have 7
g been met at STP.
Except for a few Cadwelds for which inspection 9
records are unavailable, the Cadweld inspection books provide 0
1 documentary evidence of the in-process and final inspection of 2
3 Cadwelds by QC.
4 5
Q. 49 Have the Cadweld inspection books been reviewed to 6
7 verify the performance of inspections at STP?
S 9
A. 49 (CS):
Yes.
A Cadweld documentation task force 0
("CDTF") was organized by B&R and HL&P in October 1978.
The 1
2 CDTF was charged, among other things, with reviewing the final 3
4 inspection records for completeness.
The CDTF examined the 5
6 records of the approximately 36,300 cadwelds shot at STP between 7
8 April 1976 and Apri,1 1979, and was able to find visual inspec-9 j
0 tion records in the Cadweld inspection books for all but about i
1 2
190 of the assigned Cadweld numbers.
For the vast majority 3
(ab ut 150) of the Cadweld numbers for which no visual inspec-4 5
tion records were found, the applicable concrete Pour Card 7
verified that the Cadwelds in the placement area had been 8
9 0
1
-23
L L
\\
3 1
5 inspected prior to concrete placement.
For the few remaining 5
7 Cadweld numbers, there is not sufficient information available
-3 to identify the pertinent Pour Card.
It is believed that the 9
3 inspection records for those Cadwelds were misplaced or that 2
the Cadwelds never existed.
It is also possible that all or 3
4 some of those Cadwelds may have been cut out and scrapped after 5l 6
being shot but before final inspection to accommodate construc-7 g
tion of other plant structures.
9 0
Q. 50 Mr. Murphy, what would be the safety significance f
of failing to perform a final inspection on a few Cadwelds?
3 A. 50 (GEM):
There should be no safety significance 4
5 to the failure to inspect a few Cadwelds.
First_ of all, the 6
7 rejection rate of Cadwelds is very low..
For instance, the CDTF 8
9 found that only about 1% of the 36,300 Cadwelds were rejected 0
1 during the visual inspection.
Thus, it is very likely that if
-2 the cadwelds in question had been inspected, they would have 3
been found satisfactory.
Moreover, testing results indicate 6
that all but a minute portion of Cadwelds (even those rejected 7
8 upon visual inspect; ion) meet the tensile strength requirements.
9
~ 0 Therefore, the probability that a cadweld which was not subjected 1
i l
2 to inspection would fail to perform in accordance with the j
3 4
design requirements is remote.
5 Q. 51 Mr. singleton, have Cadweld testing requirements 6
7 been met at STP and, if so, has compliance been verified?
8 9
0 1.. _ _
-s, 1
A. 51 (CMS):
Yes, Cadweld testing requirements have been met at STP.
The performance and results of Cadweld tests are documented in two types of records: Cadwelter test records J
y l
(which document each test performed on cadwelds shot by a
\\
I Cadwelder) and Cadweld test summaries (which provide a summary I
L of all Cadweld tests performed, by date, Cadweld number and I
5 results).
I The CDTF examined testing records for the period 1976-1979 T
)
and confirmed that testing requirements had been fulfilled and
)
that the test records were in acceptable condition 3
Q. 52 What have been the results of the Cadweld testing 5
at STP?
3 7
A. 52 (CMS):
Since the beginning of the Project approx-3 3
imately 1203 specimens have been tensile tested.
There have 3
been only five instances in which test specimens have failed.
L 2
Three of those were due to failures of the steel reinforcing 3
bars (no failure of the splice itself was involved).
The 5
remaining two failures were splice failures.
Thus, of the 7
8 approximately 1,200,Cadwelds tested at STP to date, only two 9
0 splices have failed the tensile tests.
In each of the five 1
test failures, QC Inspectors utilized the inspection documen-2 3
tation to locate and examine adjacent splices.
4 f
Q. 53 Mr. Singleton and Mr. Murphy, how is the location 7
of Cadwelds at STP documented?
i 8
9 0
1 ---
L 2
3 4
5 A. 53 (CMS):
According to construction or QC procedures 5
7 applicable until 1979, QC Inspectors making final Cadweld 8
9 inspections were to identify splice locations by either identi-3 fying each Cadweld inspected on a location schedule or marking g
2 the splice location and Cadweld number on a " placing plan" (the 4
reinforcing steel cut sheet or the design drawing). In 1979, 5
6 Field Engineering took over from QA the task of identifying the 7
E location of Cadwelds, which since that date is entered by Field 9
0 Engineering in the field survey books.
1 (GRM):
Also, the Design Engineer may specify.on the 2
3 design drawings the location of mechanical splices at certain 5
areas of the plant, such as the containment shell walls.
3 7
Q. 54 Mr.. Singleton, what is an FSQ?
3 9
A. 54 (CMS):
The Field Sketch Quality drawings (FSQ's) 3 L
were field notes or drawings generated by the cadweld QC Inspector 3
2 in which the Inspector located Cadwelds.
The sole purpose of 3
preparing FSQ's was to permit identification of adjacent splices 5
and facilitate follow-up investigations in the event of test
,7 3
splice failures.
F,SQ's were prepared by the QC Inspectors a
3 following their final Cadweld inspectica.
Although the FSQ's L
2 were used by QC personnel, they were not required by any proce-3 g
dure.
Use of FSQ's was discontinued in 1979 when Field Engineer-5 ing took over from QA the task of documenting the location of 5
Cadwelds.
3 i
L
! I l
s i
I l
Q. 55 What means other than FSQ's or field survey book s'
entries are there by which mechanical splices can be located r
I for an investigation of a test splice failure?
I A. 55 (CMS):
There are a number of ways in which this can be done.
The primary method would be through the use of i
1 the QC Cadweld inspection book, which identifies individual 5
i Cadwelds by Cadwelder, position, cadweld sleeve number, powder 1
number date and general location.
Another method would be the y
)
use of Cadwelder material logs which contain very much the same
)
information.
3 Q. 56 Mr. Murphy and Mr. Singleton, is the documentation 4
5 of Cadweld locations needed after construction for any purpose 5
7 other than to investigate test splice failures?
3 A. 56 (GRM):
No.
Nor is it needed after testing splice g
O failures, if any, have been investigated.
Nevertheless, the t
CDTF has been able to establish the unique location (column 3
4 line or azimuth, elevation and radius) of about 34,000 of the 5
6 36,300 cadwelds shot between 1976 and 1979.
7 8
(CMS):
It sho,uld also be noted that some of the asserted 9
0 location problems are just minor documentation deficiencies.
1 For instance, for a number of the Cadwelds identified by the 2
3 CDTF as lacking a proper location, all that was missing was the 4
5 explicit marking of one coordinate in the location schedule, 7
and it was unequivocally clear from the rest of the listing 8
9 0
1
.1 2
3 4
5 what the missing coordinate was.
Another example of minor 6
7 location problems arose in connection with two placements, 8
g CS2-W5 and CS2-W6, when the QC Inspector performing final pre-placement inspection of the pour was given an inaccurate
- 2 number of Cadwelds to check for and could not veri fy that the
.4 placement contained the number of Cadwelds given ts him; hence,
.5
.6 he reported the matter as a location problem.
The matter was
.7.g easily resolved by physically counting and documenting the
.9 10 cadwelds in the placements and verifying that there were.no i
{j missing Cadwelds in the placements.
Q. 57 Mr. Singleton, contention 1(3) alleges that a
!5
" field document relating to cadweld inspections has been lost".
!6
!7 Could you please address this Contention?
18
!9 A. 57 (CMS):
The document in question is an FSQ, numbered 10 g1 FSQ-030.
An allegation regarding FSQ-030 being lost was investi-12 13 gated by an NRC I&E team in 1978.
As indicated in I&E Report 78-15, issued as a result of 16 the investigation, FSQ-030 could not be located at the time of 17 18 the inspection.
The apparent disappearance of FSQ-030 was not 19 iO regarded by I&E as an infraction, but as an unresolved item.
il
,2 Subsequent to this I&E investigation, it was determined that
.3
,4 FSQ-030 had not been lost, but had never been initiated.
A QC
.5 Civil Inspector had " logged out" (been issued by the QC document
,6
.7 control center) the "FSQ-030" number for the purpose of prepar-
.8
'9 ing the as-built location drawing of certain cadweld shots he iO il l'
2 3
l l
4 5
had just inspected.
However, the Inspector never made an 6
7 "as-built" drawing showing the location of these Cadwelds; 8
9 thus, to the best of my knowledge, FSQ-030 was never prepared.
f Further investigation revealed a cadweld inspection book 2
listing fourteen cadweld shots (28H31 through 28H44) which were 3
4 to have been identified on FSQ-030.
These Cadwelds, all of 5
6 which were inspected and found satisfactory, were shown on the 7
g inspection book as located in the secondary shield wall of Unit 9
0 1 Reactor Containment Duilding Internals.
This made it possible f
to identify a design drawing that shows the 3'6"x4.'x4' section 3
of the wall in which the fourteen Cadwelds are located.
4 5
In summary, it has been possible to reconstruct the general 5
7 location of the Cadwelds that would have been included in 3
3 FSQ-030, although their exact as-built location cannot be 3(
verified.
With this ad11tional information, I&E deemed the 2
3 matter of FSQ-030 resolved and, in I&E Report 78-18, this, item was closed.
5 Q. 58 What is the significance of these fourteen Cadwelds 7
3 not being specifically located?
)
)
A. 58 (CMS):
None.
As noted above, the only purpose of L
g an FSQ is to facilitate follow-up investigations that may be 3
g required in the unlikely event of a test splice failure.
FSQ's f
are not required for locating Cadwelds within the concrete 7
3
)
3 L
1 2
3 4
5 structure for verification of quality, since that function is 6
7 performed by the 100% QC inspection of Cadwelds upon completion j
8 9
of the splices.
In the specific case of FSQ-030, QC Cadweld inspection 2
records confirm that the cadwelds whose specific as-built
.3
.4 location would have been given by FSQ-030 were inspected and 3
.6 found satisfactory.
In addition, no Cadweld material failure
.7
.g occurred in cadwelds using the same sleeve and powder lots as
'9 O
they used.
Therefore, no subsequent investigation of these Cadwelds was ever necessary.
.3 Q. 59 Contention 1(6) alleges that "there are Cadwelds 4
5 which have been integrated into parts of the plant at2uctstre 6
7 which are not capable of being verified.."
Have all Cadwelds at 8
9 STP been " verified?"
0 1
A. 59 (CMS):
Yes.
As previously stated, the Cadwelds 2
n w integrated into parts of the plant structures were inspected 3
-4 by the Cadweld QC Inspector upon completion of the mechanical 5
6 splice.
These inspections are documented in the cadweld inspec-7 8
tion books.
The CDTF was able to verify the vast majority of 9
0 these inspections through review of the cadweld inspection 1
2 books.
In addition, the cadwelds are checked again (either by 3
4 examination of inspection records or by visual inspection) prior to concrete placement to assure that the cadweld has been 7
found satisfactory.
There are no regulatory, code or Project 8
9 0
1.
n.
L' 2
3 4
5 requirements that direct further " verification" of the accepta-5 7
bility of the Cadwelds shot at STP.
In any event, an additional inspecti6n of Cadwelds shot at STP was conducted in 1978 by 3
HL&P and B&R QA in response to the concerns raised in I&E L
2 Report 78-15.
Seven hundred thifty-three Cadwelds were inspected 3
4 by HL&P and 535 Cadwelds shot on the night shifts were inspected 5
5 by B&R.
The results of these inspections showed the Cadwelds 7
g at STP to be of acceptable quality.
During the process of the 9
B&R inspection, two Cadwelds shot on the night shift by each
)
1 Cadwelder were cut out and destructively tested, and all passed 2
3 the destructive test.
These inspections and tests again confirm 4
5 that the Cadwelds at STP meet the design requirements.
5 7
Q. 60 Mr. Artuso, are you familiar with Cadwelding prac-3 g
tices in large construction projects'such as nuclear power f
plants?
Inhifteenyearsofworkinconnec-2 A. 60 (JFA):
Yes.
4 tion with design, construction and testing of nuclear power 5
5 plants and other large construction projects, I have often 7
3 become involved in the surveillance of Cadwelding procedures 9
3 and testing of Cadwelds.
In fact, at most of the plants in L
2 which I have worked (the list appears in my testimony on concrete 3
verification activities), I have supervised the performance of 4
5 in-progress and final Cadwelding inspections and conducted the 2
7 destructive Cadweld testing program.
l S
9 3
l i
i
.jf.
i L'
2 1
3 4
l 5
Q. 61 Is cadwelding regarded as a well-established construc-r 6
7 tion procedure?
8 A. 61 (JFA):
Yes.
When Cadwelding was first introduced 9
to nuclear plant construction in the late 1960's all steps in 2
the procedure were usually required to be witnessed by QC 3
4 Inspectors for each Cadweld made.
Since then, a very high 5
6 degree of confidence in the technique and the product has 7
g developed, to the point that the current ASME/ACI-359 code 9
0 revision has substantially reduced Cadweld testing and inspec-f tion requirements.
3 Q. 62 What is the basis for such a high degree of confi-4 5
dence?
6 7
A. 62 (JEA):
The visual inspection that is performed at 8
9 the conclusion of each Cadweld is sufficient to determine the 0
1 Cadweld's adequacy.
In fact, virtually every Cadweld that is 2
3 tested, even those that fail the visual inspection (for instance, 4
because of the presence ~of voids), passes the tensile test; of 5
the few test failures that take place, most of these result 7
3 from failure of the, bars, not of the splices.
The impressive 3
3 testing record of Cadwelds gives a high degree of confidence L
2 that Cadwelds will meet the design strength requirements.
3 4
Q. 63 What is the significance of knowing the unique 5
identification and location of a Cadweld?
5 7
I 3
3 I
3 L
i j
L' 2
3 4
5 A. 63 (JFA):
While each batch of sleeve and powder is 5
7 being used, it is desirable to know the unique identification S
9 and location of the Cadwelds using that batch just in case f
testing reveals that the batch was defective (something that in all my experience has never occured).
Once testing has verified I
3 4
that the batch was of proper quality, the unique identification s
5 and location of the cadwelds prepared from that batch has 7
I absolutely no significance, just as the specific identification 3
l
)
of one given rebar within the concrete structure is of no f
interest or significance.
3 Contention 1(4) 1 5
Q. 64 Mr. Murphy, Mr. Singleton and Mr. Artuso, what is 3
7 the purpose of your testimony regarding Contention 1(4)?
3
)
A. 64 (GRM, CMS, JFA):
The purpose of our testimony ic 3
L to address Contention 1(4), and specifically to show that the sj waterproofing membrane placed on the reactor containment building h
structures at STP is not damaged and, even if it were, such 3
3 damage would have no consequences in keeping water out of the i
I
\\
3 containment buildings.
j
)
)
Q. 65 Mr. Murphy, how are the containment structures at
[
STP protected against groundwater seepage?
I A. 65 (GRM):
Protection against groundwater seepage is 3
achieved through several means, the principal ones being (1) g the continuous steel liner system, (2) the physical design of
)
.L 2
3 4
5 reinforcing steel which controls the potential crack widths in 6
7 the concrete, and (3) the concrete mix designs, which keep the j
I' l 8
water-to-cement ratio' low to ensure water tightness.
A redun-9
}0 dant, secondary means of protecting against groundwater seepage is the use of a waterproofing membrane on the exterior of i
4 structures below grade.
1 J5
.6 Q. 66 What is a waterproofing membrane and how is it
.7
,g used?
'9 O
A. 66 (GRM):
A waterproofing membrane is laminated sheet
'l material consisting of rubberized asphalt bonded to a polyethyl-2
- 3 ene sheet.
The membrane is placed so as to cover all exterior
.4
- 5 vertical and horizontal surfaces below grade (approximately EL
.6 J7
+28').
.8
,9 Q. 67 Were waterproofing membranes used at STP?
0
- 1 A. 67 (GRM):
Yes.
A waterproofing membrane was used at the reactor containment building of both units, as well as on 3
4 other structures such as the mechanical-electrical auxiliary 5
6 buildings.
7
'S Q. 68 Was the, waterproofing membrane required by any co'de
' 9 J
or standard applicable to STP?
1 2
A. 68 (GRM):
No.
3 4
Q. 69 If the membrane was not required by any applicable
-5 codes or standards, why was it decided that it would be uced at 6
7 the South Texas Project?
8 9
0 1
l 4 i r
I
L 2
3 4
5 A. 69 (GRM):
It was decided that, in view of its rela-j 6
i 7
tively low cost and simplicity of installation, it was desirable 1
8 9
to use it to add a redundant means of protection against passage 0
of groundwater into below-grade plant structures.
2 Q. 70 Is credit taken for the membrane in determining 3
4 whether the STP containments meet applicable leaktightness 5
6 criteria?
7 g
A. 70 (GRM):
No.
9 Is the membrane classified as a safety item at STP?
0 Q. 71 A. 71 (GRM):
Yes.
3 Q. 72 What is the reason for and significance of that 4
5 classification?
6 1
7 A. 72 (GRM):
The requirements for the materials and 8
9 installatfon of the membrane are set forth in the concrete 0
1 construction specification, which is a safety-related document.
2 Because of this, the membrane is classified as a safety-related 3
item, as are other items in the specification.
This classifi-6 cation, however, has no significance other than imposing more 7
8 stringent documenta, tion requirements.
9 0
Q. 73 Mr. Singleton, please describe the process by which 1
2 the waterproofing membrane was installed during construction of 3
the STP containment structures.
4 A. 73 (CMS):
The membrane was installed on horizontal 6
7 and vertical surfaces in accordance with manufacturer's recom-8 9
mendations, which became formalized in Concrete Construction 0
1 _ ____
LJ.
moe L
2 3
4 5
Procedure CCP-12 and later made part of concrete Construction
-6 "r
Procedure CCP-25, now in effect.
The following construction 8
9 procedure was followed:.
0 Once the soils excavation for the containment structure y
2 was completed and verified, a concrete mud slab was placed.
A 3
4 primer was applied to the mud slab surface; the membrane was 5
6 then applied.
Next, a three inch concrete seal slab was placed 7
g to protect the underlying membrane from damage during subsequent 9
0 placement of foundation reinforcing steel and concrete forms.
1 on vertical surfaces, the membrane was applied after concrete 2
3 placement had been made and cured, prior to placement sf backfill 4
5 against the structure.
The membrane was protected against 6
7 subsequent backfilling operations by a styrofoam board.
Before i
8 9
the installation of the concrete seal slab and styrofoam board, 0
1 the installation of the membrane seal was, checked by QC Inspec-I 2
tors.
3 Q. 74 Was this pr'ocedure followed in the installation of 6
the membrane at each of the two containment structures at STP?
7 8
A. 74 (CMS):,Yes.
9 0
Q. 75 Was the performance of QC inspections on membrane 1
2 placements at STP documented?
3 4
A. 75 (CMS):
Yes.
The applicable procedure required the 5
QC Inspector to complete a " quality assurance department exami-6 7
nation check" form reporting the details of the examination and 8
9 its results.
0 1..
...r
L L
3 L
i Q. 76 Has the membrane in the STP containment structures 3
7 ever been damaged during construction and, if so, how has such 3
damage been detected and repaired?
9 3
A. 76 (CMS):
There were instances of localized damage to I
the RCB membrane during the process of construction at STP.
3 i
The typical cause of damage was equipment being used in the 2
i vicinity of the plant structure.
In each instance, the damage T
y was identified by the QA/QC program prior to backfilling and
)
documented in NCR's.
I have reviewed those NCR's and verified
)
that in every case the damage was repaired and the,NCR item 3
closed.
l 5
Q. 77 Mr. Murphy, assuming the membrane were to sustain 3
7 damage for whatever reason and this dame.ge were not repaired, 3
3 vhat would be the result?
3 A. 77 (GRM):
If the damage consisted of a localized cut,
(
7 the pressure from the backfill dnd from the groundwater itself would prevent the cut from spreading and causing nonadherence 3
I of the membrane to the wall.
Eveu if the damage to the membrane i
3 were extensive, the,re would be no groundwater seepage into the
)
)
structure, because the principal protection mechanisms described above would prevent it.
I g
Q. 78 Mr. Artuso, are you familiar with the use of water-proofing membranes at nuclear power plants?
I I
)
3 L _...
L' 2
3 4
5 A. 78 (JFA):
Yes.
I supervised the in-progress and 6
7 final inspections on the membranes at Three Mile Island Unit 2 8
9 and at Beaver Valley Unit 2.
In addition, I am familiar with 0
the construction and placement of membranes at other nuclear g
2 power plants, such as Virgil c. Summer.
4 Q. 79 Were membranes at these other nuclear power plants 5
6 of the same type as those employed at STP?
7 g
A. 79 (JEA):
Some of the constituent materials were 9
0 slightly different, but the membranes were substantially similar 1
and were used for the same purposes as at STP.
2 3
l Q. 80 Are waterproofing membranes used at all nuclear 4
5 power plants?
5 7
A. 80 (JFA):
No.
The decision of whether to use a 3
9 membrane is a matter of judgment by the plant's architect-3 t
engineer.
2 3
Q. 81 What is the anticipated life of a waterproofing I
membrane?
3 5
A. 81 (JEA):
A membrane is expected to last at least as 7
3 long as the operating life of the plant, that is, forty years.
3 3
Q. 82 Based on your experience at nuclear power projects, I
L f
2 is it common for damage to occur to membranes in the course of l
3 g
construction?
5 A. 32 (JFA):
Membranes are occasionally damaged by being 5
I struck with sharp objects in the process of placing backfill 3
3 L
~ i
a...
L 1
3 4
5 against the structures.
If such damage takes place, the membrane 5
is easily repaired and sealed with no impairment of the membrane's 7
performance.
It is extremely unlikely that a membrane will 3
suffer damage after the backfilling operations are complete.
L 2
Q. 83 Nevertheless, assuming damage did occur and was not 3
4 repaired and sealed, what would be its consequences?
5 6
A.
83 (JEA):
None.
Due to the nature of the material 7
and construction, a cut in a membrane will not enlarge signif-g icantly with the passage of time and will not permit any signif-1 icant amount of water to interact with the concrete.
Even if 2
3 parts of the membrane surrounding the containment were to A
5 separate due to membrane damage, the containment liner would 6
7 continue to serve as the primary device for keeping water out 8
9 of the containment building.
Contention 1(5) -
2 Q. 84 Mr. Fisher, Mr. Murphy and Mr. Singleton, what is 3
4 the purpose of your testimony on contention 1(5)?
5 6
A. 84 (GLF, GRM, CMS):
The purpose of our testimony is 7
- 8 to address Contention 1(5) and to show that there is no unap-9 i
0 proved omission of reinforcing steel in the containment struc-l 1
tures at STP and, rpecifically, that no reinforcing steel bars 2
are missing from the concrete around the equipment doors in 5
those structures.
i 6
7 8
9 0
1
~
-so-
_s..
L l
1 3
8 5
Q. 85 Mr. Fisher, Mr. Singleton and Mr. Murphy, please 5
7 summarize your involvement in the design and erection of rein-3 forcing steel at the South Texas Project.
y 3
A. 85 (GLF):
As a Discipline Project Engineer and Staff
(
I Manager, I have been involved with the Project since its incep-3 4
tion, and have had supervisory responsibility for all civil and 5
5 structural engineering at STP, including the design of reinforc-7 g
ing steel ("rebar").
9 3
(GRM):
Since joining Brown & Root in 1975, I have spent full time on STP as the primary individual responsible for STP 3,
concrete specifications in the areas of construction, supply 4
5 and testing, and was directly involved in writing the require-5 7
ments for placing rebar as contained in the concrete construc-8 9
tion specifications.
0 1
(CMS):
In my capacity as a Civil QC Inspector and Super-2 visor, I have been responsible for the inspection of reinforcing 3
steel during in-process erection and prior to concrete placement.
6 Q. 86 Mr. Fisher, how is reinforcing steel used at STP?
7 8
A. 86 (GLF):, Rebar is used in all concrete structures at 9
0 STP to assure that the strength of the structure is adequate to 1
l 2
meet all design requirements. Rebar is used as a matter of i
3 i
4 standard practice in the design and construction of all types j
5 f concrete structures.
6 7
8 9
i 0
1
L' 2
3 4
5 Q. 87 What are the requirements for the design and erection 6
7 of rebar in STP containment shell structures?
8 9
A. 87 (GLF):
The basic design and construction require-0 ments for rebar in the containment shell structures are specified y
in the ASME/ACI-359 Code issued for trial use and commment in 4
1973 and Addenda 1 through 6 thereto, and Project specificationst 5
6 Q. 88 What are the requirements for rebar in the contain-7 E
ment internal structures?
9 0
A. 88 (GLF):
The basic design and construction require-1 ments for rebar in the containment internal structures are 2
3 specified in the ACI-318 Code and the Project specifications.
5 Primarily because of differing load combinations which must be 6
7 addressed in the design of the containment shell, the design 8
9 requirements for the containment, identified in the ASME/ACI-359 0
1 Code, are different and, in some cases, more striagent than the 2
3 design requirements for internal structures identified in the ACI-318 Code.
6 Q. 89 Mr. Murphy, how does the structural concrete design 8
process assure that the design rebar configuration can, in 9
3 fact, be erected?
L 2
A. 89 (GRM):
First, designers address the Code require-3 g
ments referred to by Mr. Fisher.
However, designers must also 5
take into consideration the constructability requirements set 7
by R. G.
1.55 insofar as constructability is affected, among g
3 i
3 L
. l
~
L' 1
3 4
5 other things, by the spacing, clear distance and cover of 5
7 reinforcing steel.
A supervisor within the Civil Structural 8
Engineering Department checks the design to make sure that it 9
meets all applicable requirements, including constructability.
2 Design drawings are then sent to appropriate Construction 3
4 personnel for the purpose of addressing constructability consi-5 6
derations.
The drawings are returned to the designer for 7
g resolution of their comments and are then issued for construc-9 tion.
O For very congested areas, special design drawings are 3
developed to show large scale details of all rebar and embedments 4
5 to assure placement of all items without interference.
For 6
7 particularly complex situations, scale plastic models are 8
9 constructed to represent the design reinforcing steel configura-O tion.
In ether cases, full scale reinforced concrete models 1
2 1
may be used.
3 4
It should be emphasized that although proper rebar design 5
6 and design review will in most cases encure that the rebar 7
8 design can be erected, there are certain creas of the contain-9 0
ment in which erected reinforcing steel is highly congested due 1
to the extensive reinforcement requirements for the containment 2
j structures.
This congestion mr.y result in potential concrete 4
consolidation problems, as addres' sed in my testimony on Conten-
'7 tion 1(2).
i8
- 9 iO il
L I
3 8
5 Q. 90 Mr. Fisher, how are design drawings translated into i
7 construction placing drawings for use by field personnel in 3
Construction and Quality Control?
9 3
A. 90 (GLF):
Structural concrete design drawings are L
2 transmitted to the reinforcing steel supplier who prepares cut 3
4 sheets and rebar detail drawings. The cut sheets and rebar 5
5 detail drawings are reviewed and approved by the responsible 7
g designer and issued for construction.
These drawings are used 9
by construction for actually placing the reinforcing steel.
A 3
1 final QC inspection is performed comparing design drawings 2
3 against ac'aual construction.
4 5
Q. 91 Mr. Murphy, if rebar shown on the placing drawings 5
7 cannot physically be erected due to configuration, congestion 3
g or interference, how are these conflicts handled by Construc-3 tion?
t A. 91 (GRM): Such occurrences are handled by a Field 4
Change Request ("FCR", formerly known as Field Request for 5
6 Engineering Action ("FREA")), in accordance with Project proce-7 9
dures.
These proce,dures require Engineering review and approval 9
l 3
of all changes to design draw 2ngs issued for construction.
L 2
Q. 92 Mr. Singleton, would you please describe the basic i
3 Quality control program applicable to rebar erection at STP?
4 5
A. 92 (CMS):
All rebar is examined by QC Inspectors in 6
7 the course of rebar erection, in accordance with acceptance 8
9 0
1 l
~
-ss-t l
l
l L'
l L
3
~
~~
1 I
criteria contained in Quality Concrete Construction Procedure i
T CCP-25 (and previously contained in Procedures CCP-3 and CCP-7).
3
}
Prior to rebar erection the QC Inspector reviews the applicable j
)
design drawings and familiarizes himself with the particulars
(
s of that pour such as rabar spacing, bar size, a'nd additional reinforcement. As the rebar is erected, the Inspector performs 3
i an in-process inspection and points out discrepancies that, if i
I allowed to go uncorrected, would be characterized as a noncon-
)
)
formance when presented for final inspection.
L If during the in-process inspection, a discrepancy between g
the existing configuration and the design drawing is noted and I
the discrep.ancy can not be resolved by reworking, the problem I
is brought to the attention of the applicable Construction I
)
Foreman and Area Engineer.
The Engineer may issue an FCR to
)
L Design Engineering for approval proposing a resolution of the discrepancy.
Discrepancies that are being resolved by rework are identified by the QC Inspector, who lists them on a Construc-I tion Pre-Pour In-Process Inspection Checklist.
Prior to the I.
Pour Card signoff,, tie Inspector ensures that all items identi-
)
I fled on the checklist have been corrected and approved by the
[
applicable craft or engineer.
If during the final acceptance I
g inspection, a discrepancy is noted and cannot be immediately I
reworked, a Nonconformance Report ("NCR") is written.
All i
NCR's are reviewed and resolved by the responsible Design y
I Engineer.
l
1-l 2
i 3
4 i
5 Q. 93 Are you aware of any instance in which a QC Inspector 6
7 at STP failed to perform or document properly a required inspec-8 9
tion of rebar due to pressure or intimidation from Construction l
or from anyone else?
2 A. 93 (CMS):
I know of no case in which a QC Inspector 3
4 has failed to perform or document properly a required QC inspec-5 6
tion, with respect to rebar or any other part of the plant, due i
7 g
to pressure, harassment, or for any other reason.
9 0
Q. 94 Mr. Murphy, Mr. Singleton and Mr. Fisher, pl'ase e
f address the allegation in Contention 1(5) that "there are steel 3
reinforcement bars which are missing from the concrete around 4
5 the equipment doors in-the containment and such bars are missing f;
6 I
7 from the containment structure as well."
S 9
A. 94 (GRM):
To the best of my knowledge, the allegation 0
1 is erroneous.
There is no " missing" rebar (that is, unapproved 2
mission of rebar) anywhere in the containment building.
3 4
Changes have been made in the rebar configuration identified in 5
i 6
the original design drawings, including deletion of individual
!l 7
8 reinforcing bars.
,Each of those changes, however, has been 9
0 fully reviewed and approved by the responsible Design Engineer 1
2-and properly documented in accordance with applicable procedures.
3 4
(GLF):
I know of no instance in which rebar has been 5
mitted without appropriate documentation in a FREA, FCR, DCN 5
7 or NCR.
Moreover, to my knowledge, in every instance in which 3
9 0
1
- l
h these documents have been submitted, they have been reviewed by the cognizant Designer and have resulted in a direction to I
Construction to either rework, repair, or use as is, as appro-I priate.
(CMS):
To the best of my knowledge, no rebar has been i
1 improperly omitted from the containment.
In the event that a i
rebar cannot be erected in accordance with the design drawings 1
y a QC Inspector will inspect against a properly executed and
)
approved FREA, FCR or DCN, as applicable.
QC has also identi-
.)
fied each instance where a discrepancy existed between the 3
design drawing and the as-built configuration and has documented I
i this discrepancy in an NCR, which has in turn been resolved to 3
7 the satisfaction of the Design Engineer.
QC has then ensured aj that the resolution provided by Engineering has been properly 3
implemented in the field.
g Z
3 4
5 5
7 I
3 TH:11:02:B 7
3 L
2 3
4 5
5 7
8 9
0 1
~~
L l
I TESTIMONY OF RALPH R. HERNANDEZ 8
ON CONCRETE PLACEMENT AND RELATED CONTENTIONS Q. 1 State your name and present employment.
I
)
A. 1 Ralph R. Hernandez, Supervising Engineer for l
Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P).
l l
Q. 2 Describe your educational background, profes-sional experience, and involvement with STP.
I A. 2 These matters are set forth in my testimony on I
the Concrete Verification Program.
)
I Q. 3 What is the purpose of your testimony?
{
A. 3 The purpose of my testimony is to describe the I
role of HL&P Engineering in the development and implementa-tion of the concrete placing activities at the STP and to i
I address the related contentions of the incervenors.
i.e.,
1 I
contentions 1(2), 1(3), 1(4), 1(5) and 1(6)
)
Q. 4 Please describe how HL&P Engineering has been i
f involved in the concrete placing activities at the SZ?.
3 1
A. 4 HL&P Engineering has taken an active role in the f
planning and implementation of the concrete placing activi-l I
ties for STP.
This role has included the review and approval
)
I of fundamental design criteria, engineering specifications
[
and changes to criteria or specifications.
It also includes I
continual consultation with B&R Engineering during the 1
development of the design and participation in various i
engineering decisions on the Project, such as the resolution g
of problems that arise during construction.
L
Q. 5 How does EL&P Engineering perform its design reviews?
A. 5 In developing the concrete program B&R first prepares design criteria and submits these criteria to HL&P Engineering for review and approval.
Based on the criteria approved by HL&P, B&R drafts engineering specifications and submits them to HL&P for review and approval.
Approved engineering specifications are ultimately transmitted to B&R Construction at t'.te site, which incorporatas them into draft I
Construction Procedures.
These are reviewed and approved by HL&P Construction and by both HL&P and B&R QA.
When changes l
are needed in criteria, specifications or procedures, the changes are prepared and reviewed using the same procedures I
applied to the original documents.
I I
Whether reviewing criteria, specifications, or changes i
to either, we base our review on NRC regulatoiy references, I
L industry codes and standards, and other available information i
appropriate for our consideration, such as data on materials i
or equipment.
We review to determine whether the draft design document reflects adequate consideration of the I
)
k appropriate requirements and information, and whether there I
are design alternatives that HL&P would prefer.
We also I
5 review selected calculations in order to determine whether i
7 they are reasonable.
3
)
3 L ~
i i
\\
Q. 6 Explain what you mean by " regulatory references",
" industry codes and standards" and "other available informa-tion".
A. 6 Regulatory references would include the regulations the NRC St'ndard Review Plan in 10 CFR, Regulatory Guides, a
l and other NRC publications.
For example, in our review, we compared the specifications proposed for cadwelding with the NRC Staff positions on inspection and testing requirements for cadwelds presented in Reg. Guide 1.10 " Mechanical (Cadweld)
Splices in Reinforcing Bars of Category I Concrete Structures" and developed alternative for complying with the Staff positions.
The NRC staff reviewed and accepted our proposal.
Industry codes and standards are those adopted by generally recognized industry standards making orgar.izations like the American Concrete Institute (ACI) or the'American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME).
The ASME specifies requirements for materials, design, fabrication, construction, inspection and testing in the Proposed ASME Boil'er & Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 2, Code for Concrete Reactor Vessels and containments, Addenda 1 through 6 issued in 1973.
Similarly there are requirements applicable to the testing and consolidation of concrete in the ACI Codes and Reference Reports and to the placement of concrete under extreme weather conditions in ACI 305 and ACI 306.
Other appropriate information includes technical refer-ences, such as data on the properties of various materials, manufacturers' recommendations, or any other source of information that may be of use in reviewing the adequacy of a particular specification.
For example, in reviewing the specifications for waterproofing membrane, we verified that they gave appropriate consideration to the manufacturer's recommendations concerning the applicability of the membrane for the design function, the methods of application and the type of adhesive to use.
Q. 7 Explain what you mean by HL&P preferences among' design alternatives.
A. 7 In the course of designing a nuclear plant there are many decisions that must be made regarding alternative design approaches.
When we perform our reviews we sometimes identify design alternatives we believe w.ill be easier to construct, will be easier to use or maintain during plant operation or will increase the margin of safety.
Examples of these decisions include:
1.
In our comments on the concrete criteria for the i
Project, EL&P requested B&R to use only concrete suitable for safety related structures, and not to utilize a separate specification for concrete to be used in non-safety related structures.
This precluded the possibility of inadvertent use of improper concrete in safety related structures.
l l _
-w
2, 1
2 3
~ imilarly, in our comments on the specification 4
2.
S 5
6 for reinforcing steel HL&P requested that B&R use only 7
3 reinforcing steel suitable for safety related structures.
9 U on reviewing the Structural Integrity Testing 3.
p LO
~
Specification for the Reactor Containment Building, HL&P L3 requested the incorporation of additional strain gauges in L4 L5 order to allow for containment prototype testing should the L6 L7 need ever cccur, LE (g
4.
In selecting a waterproofing membrane HL&P requested 20 that a membrane be selected such that small tears or abrasions 21 22 would not jeopardize the waterproofing capability of the j
24 membrane.
i 25 R26 Q. 8 Intervenors' contention 1(2) alleges that "There 27 28 has been a field construction error and as a result extensive 29 30 voids exist in the concrete wall enclosing the containment 31 l
32 building, in vi lation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Sec-tions IX and X."
Describe HL&P's involvement in the program 35 to detect and repair voids in the Reactor Containment Build-36 37 ing Unit 1 & 2 shell walls.
38 39 A. 8 HL&P has been involved throughout the entire void 40 41 detection and subsequent repair program for the Units 1 & 2 42 43 Reactor Containment Buildings.
Our involvement included the 44 45 review and approval of each of the successive phases of the 40 program to investigate, detect and repair the voids in the 7
48 containment shell walls.
49 50 51
-s7-
Upon the identification of potential voids within the containment shell. wall by B&R in October, 1978, HL&P convened the Incident Review Committee to establish whether this item was reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e).
Upon establishing reportability, HL&P worked with B&R's en'ineers in developing g
a Technical Reference Document (TRD) which would establish the means by which the containment polar crane brackets and liner would be investigated in order to determine the loca-tion of "possible", voids for further investigation.
As the investigation progressed the T2D was amended to establish the means for conducting an expanded scope of investigation and a method of repair and testing.
HL&P Engineering partici-pated in formal and informal meetings and reviewed and com-mented on drafts of amendments to the TRD as it progressed through the investigation and repair.
This included estab'-
lishing the method of sounding the containment liner, deter-mining the extent of the voids, repairing the voids by injection of a non-shrink grout through the liner, inspecting the holes drilled to verify the adequacy of the repair and the subsequent repair of the liner.
I participated in all phases of the investigation and i
repair of the Reactor Containment Building Units 1 and 2 shell walls.
For example, in conjunction with B&R, I inter-viewed STP Construction and QA personnel in order to assist in identifying the location of suspected voids in the contain-ment shells.
I witnessed the repairs and my review of the i j
1"
~
adequacy of the completed repairs included personal inspection of the completed repairs.
I evaluated the candidates for selection as a testing agency to test the adequacy of a repaired polar crane bracket, and I helped develop the plan for the full scale testing of the brackit.
I provided technical guidance on how the test should be conducted, witnessed the test and evaluated the test report.
I was also involved in the review and revision of the i
construction procedure for concrete work and other related j
l design documents as well as in defining the actions to be taken to provide recurrence control.
During this period I also reviewed and approved all reports submitted to the NRC regarding the investigation and repair of the containment voids.
Q. 9 In your opinion, was the void detection and repair program adequate to id'ntify and correct all signifi-e cant voids in the Reactor Containment Building shell walls?
A. 9 Yes.
In my opinion the program to investigate and repair the containment shell voids was comprehensive and all significant voids.have been detected.
Because concrete was placed in the center of the space between the liner and the exterior form and then vibrated outward through the reinforcing steel to the wall surfaces, voids in the wall would be along the wall faces.
The entire exterior face of the shell wall has been inspected.
The interior face, which l
l '- l l
is covered by the steel liner, has been sounded in a five-phase program that first confirmed that areas of high rein-forcement steel congestion around the stiffeners and brackets were the only areas subject to void occurrence, and then investigated all of the liner surface in'those areas.
In all, 80% of the liner surface was sounded and more than 1500 holes were drilled through the liner into the concrete to check for voids.
The voids that were found were repaired by injection of non-shrink grout that was shown through testing to be as strong or stronger than the original concrete.
s Therefore having participated in or witnessed all phases of the program to investigate and repair the contain-ment shell voids I conclude that the program as performed to date identified and corrected all significant voids.
l i
I Q. 10 Intervenors contentions 1(3 ) and 1(6) -are that:
[
"In violation of Quality Assurance and Quality control I
requirements applicable to the South Texas Nuclear Project i
~
with regard to document control'(10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Sections VI and XVII), a field document relating to cadweld inspections has been lost."; and I
"There are cadwelds which have been integrated into l
I parts of the plant structure which are not capable of being I
i verified with regard to compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, I
Appendix B, in violation of Sections IX and X of Appendix I
B."
y
)
L _... _ _..
v
How has HL&P Engineering been involved in the design and installation of Cadwelds into the concrete structures at STP?
A. 10 Cur involvement in Cadweld design began with-the definition of the criteria for Cadweld inspection and testing on the Project.
EL&P Engineering took the lead in defining the inspection and testing requirements in response to NRC Reg. Guide 1.10 " Mechanical (Cadweld) Splices in Reinforcing Bars of Categor I Concrete Structures" and the overlapping requirements of ASME/ACI-359.
Our proposed alternative inspection and testing requirements were presented in the PSAR and approved by the NRC Staff.
As the Project has progressed we have participated in the resolution of various minor problems and questions of interpretation that occurred and reviewed the dispositim a of a number of FREAS and NCRs regarding Cadwelds.
Q. 11 In your opinion, are the Cadwelds installed in the STP adequate to perform their design function?
A. 11 Yes.
The record of Cadweld fabrication, inspec-tion and testing on STP demonstrates that Cadweldiuq on STP, as on other nuclear projects, is a reliable technique.
The history of Cadwelding in nuclear plant construction has shown that there is ar. extremely low reject rate and an even lower rate of failure under tensile testing.
.A As discussed in the testimony of Mr. Murphy and Mr. Singleton, and in the testimony of Mr. Long, over 99 percent of the Cadwelds fabricated at STP passed visual inspection and over 99 percent of the Cadwelds destructively tested were shown to have adequate tensile strength.
Some cadwelds that were rejected by visual inspection were destruc-tively tested and nevertheless were shown to have had adequate strength.
Based on these inspection and testing results alone, I have a high degree of confidence the Cadwelds installed at STP are adequate.
The results of the investigation of Cadweld documenta-tion performed by the B&R Cadweld documentation task force (CDTF) add'still another measure of assurance that the Cadwelds are adequate.
The CDTF reviewed the records on Cadwelas made between April 1976 and April 1980 and found records of visual inspection and acceptance for more than 99 percent of the Cadwelds made.
In addition to these assurances that the cadwelds do satisfy design requirements, one should keep in mind that the safety margins designed into the STP structures provide substantial assurance that the structures will have the capacity to perform under design conditions even if there were instances of Cadwelds that were below design strength or completely omitted from the structure.
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2 3
i 4
Based on the results of inspection and testing of the i
6 Cadwelds, the results of the CDTF effort and the design 7
3 margins in the structures, I am confident that the cadwelds 9
LO installed in STP are adequate to perform their design func-
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tion.
y Q. 12 Intervenors' Contention 1(4) is that "There are i
L5 membranes seals in the containment structure which are L6
'7 damaged, indicating a violation of 10CFR Part 50, Appendix
'E I
(9 B,
Section X, XV and XVI."
Describe the involvement of HL&P
}
- O g1 Engineering in the design and installation of the waterprool-Z2 ing membrane n the containment structures at STP.
13 A. 12 HL&P Engineering reviewed and approved the 16 design criteria related to the design of the concrete basemat 17 18 and walls and the requirements for water tightness and 19 30 permeability.
We reviewed the criteria for compliance with j
31 l
32 the requirements of applicable codes and standards, such as 33 the ACI 359 Coce.
We have chosen to provide a three inch 34 cover for all reinforcing below grade and therefore the Code 37 does not require the installation of a waterproofing membrane.
38 39 Nevertheless, HIAP E$1gineering approved the installation of 40 41 waterproofing membrane as a redundant waterproofing measure 42 43 because it was inexpensive and routinely used on concrete 44 45 structures below grade.
46 As I mentioned above in our review of the specification 47 40 for the procurement of the membrane, we selected a material 49 50 such that small tears and abrasions would not jeopardize 51
the waterproofing capability of the membrane.
We also reviewed the design specifications for t:1e membrane and verified that the design adequately considered the data provided by the manufacturer regarding installation, selec-tion of adhesives and repair of damaged membrane.
Q. 13 Describe HL&P's evaluation of the allegationa rolated to Intervenors Contention 1(4).
A.
13 Although we are not aware of any information substantiating that the containment building has damaged membranes which have not been repaired, as a result of this contention HL&P reanalyzed the potential consequences if there were damaged membranes.
We reviewed the applicable codes and standards, the criteria for concrete mix designs which provide for low permeability, the criteria for spacing reinforcement to control cracking, ' the use of waterstops on containment construction joints up do elevation 43 '-0",
the criterion for concrete cover around reinforcing steel below grade and the criteria regarding leak tightness of the steel containment liner.
Based on this review we concluded that the waterproofing membrane does not add significantly to the waterproofing of the containment building, and that even total absence of the membrane would be of no safety signifi-cance.
Q. 14 Intervenor's Contention 1(5) states "There are steel reinforcement bars which are missing from the concrete i
I
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around the equipment doors in the. containment and such bars are missing from the containment structure as well, indicat-ing violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Sections X, XV, and XVI.."
Describe the involvement of HL&P Engineering ir. the design and installation of steel reinforcement for the concrete placements in safety related structures at STP.
A. 14 HL&P Engineering reviewed the design criteria and specifications, and selected design drawings detailing the design of steel reinforcement for the various plant structures.
We verified that the design complied with applicable requirements such as ASME/ACI-359 and ACI-318, made appropriate allowance for crack control and took into account the necessary loads and loading combinations.
We performed the same type of review for many of the changes in design, including these resulting from dispositions of NCRs i
and FREAs.
In the course of our review we requested that B&R develop reinforcing steel models in order to alleviate reinforcing steel interferences and insure constructability.
Our participation in the resolution of problems that were identified during construction, included activities such as meetings with the reinforcing steel detailer and with B&R Engineering to resolve interferences.
Q. 15 Please describe the construction process for installing rebar.
A. 15 Construction procedures provided the general guidance for installing rebar while the specific physical location of rebar was dictated by the designated engineering drawings.
In some situations, however, it was sometimes impossible for Construction personnel to' place the rebar in exactly the positions described in the engineering drawings.
This might occur because of an unforeseen interference between the rebar and imbedments, blockouts or other rebar placements.
In other situations, Construction personnel might want to change a rebar placement in order to provide greater accersibility in order to ensure proper concrete vibration and consolidation.
In order to obtain authoriza-tion to change the placement of rebar or omit rebar altogether, Construction generated FREAs using the procedure described in Mr. Briskin's testimony.
A FREA describes the'particular problem and seeks Engineering approval for a proposed change.
The review and approval of such FREAs by B&R Engineering modified the design in such a fashion as to allow reinforcing steel to be eliminated or re-located.
Q. 16 Please describe the QC inspection process for reinforcing steel placement.
A.
16 QA/QC procedures generally describe the process by which QC personnel inspected and documented their inspec-tions of rebar placement.
The essence of these inspections was to verify compliance with design drawings and specifica-tions.
The QC inspections were performed in two phases:...
in-process and final.
During the on-going construction placement of reinforcing steel, QC personnel performed an in-process inspection and noted all potential deviations (i.e., those which if left uncorrected until final inspection would be nonconforming conditions) from design drawings and specifications on a " punch list" such that the Construction personnel would be able to resolve them prior to the final inspection by either reworking or initiating a FREA.
In any event, no nonconformance report was to be issued at this point.
Additionally, the " punch list" provided the QC Inspcetor with a reminder of certain deviations to be verified during the final inspection.
-A deviation noted during the final inspection was identified on a nonconformance report.
The nonconformance report was dispositioned by the Engineers in one of four ways:
rework, repair, "use as is"'or scrap.
Q. 17 Did HI&P Engineering review and concur in NCRs or FREAs that had the effect of changing the design to permit the relocation or elimination of reinforcing steel that had been required in the original design?
A. 17 Yes.
We reviewed and concurred with a number of NCRs and FREAs which permitted alternate design configuration of reinforcement because the original design was difficult to achieve or because of an error during construction.
In each case B&R Engineering had reviewed the change and verified that the design criteria were still satisfied.
While HL&P I
.~ _ _ _.
did not attempt to duplicate the designer's calculations, we did review a large number of FREAs and NCRs of this type and satisfied ourselves that the individual dispositions had been properly evaluated and were correct.
Q. 18 Did you perform an analysis'of Project documenta-tion related to the reinforcing steel placement in the reactor containment buildings and the associated QC inspec-tions at the STP?
A. 18 Yes.
An analysis was performed by HL&P employees under my direction.
Q. 19 What criteria were used in selecting which reinforcing steel (rebar) placements and QC inspections would be analyzed?
A. 19 We reviewed the construction documentation and QC inspection reports for the RCB-1 equipment hatch and the following concrete pours:
CIl-S5S, CIl-S8, CI2-W14, CIl-W44A, CIl-S40, CI2-S8, CI2-W17, CIl-W44, CIl-W24F, CIl-W29, CIl-W45D, CIl-S44, CIl-W34, CIl-W99A, CSI-W37, CIl-W20I and CIl-W76.
Additionally we reviewed the Non-Conformance Reports (NCR),
Deficiency Disposition Reports (DDR) and Field Requests for Engineering Acticn (FREA) concerning mislocated or omitted rebar in both reactor containment buildings (RCBs).
Q. 20 How were these pours selected?
A. 20 These pours were identified by Citizens Concerned About Nuclear Power (CCANP), as having " missing" rebar in.
- m... - --
,-.w--.-
answer 24 of the " Answers of Citizens Concerned About Nuclear Power, Inc. to Second Set of Interrogatories and Request's for Production of Documents From Houston Lighting & Power, Et Al., Applicants."
CCANP listed several non-existent pours, apparently by reading "S" as "5"'or "3" and we made the following assumptions regarding the pours CCANP intended to identify:
As Identified by CCANP Pours Investigated by HL&P CIl-555 CIl-S55 CIl-S8 CI2-S8 CIl-340 CIl-S40 CI2-58 CI2-S8 CIl-W450 CIl-W45D CIl-344 CIl-S44 CIl-355 CIl-S55 CIl-W205 CIl-W20I Q. 21 Have there been any FREAs or NCRs approving omission or changed location for reinforcing steel for the placement surrounding the RCBl equipment hatch or any of the previously enumerated pours?
A. 21 Yes, there were a number of FREAs and NCRs approving changes in the design of reinforcing steel.
In about half of the NCRs written on omitted reinforcing steel the disposition was to repair (e.g., the omitted reinforcing steel was replaced), and the balance were approved-"use as is" i.e.,
elimination of reinforcement steel was approved by Engineering.
Q. 22 Based on your review of the NRC's and FREA's for the placements surrounding the RCB1 equipment hatch and the :
I o
l enumerated pours; is reinforcing steel " missing" or improp-erly located?
A. 22 No, in each pour cited by CCANP, the omissions or relocations were approved or repaired to the satisfaction of the B&R Engineering personnel.
Engineering approval had the effect of changing the design of the reinforcement, and was not improper.
It appears that CCANP may have identified the enumerated pours from a review of the NCR Log, because the order in which CCANP listed the pours is the same order in which these pours appear in the NCR Log.
Q. 23 Based on your understanding of the construction and QC inspection process, would it be possible for a QC inspector to notice mislocated or omitted rebar and not be required to note it on a NCR?
A. 23 Yes.
As I described earlier, NCRs were normally not initiated during the construction phase bf a placement but rather deviations were either noted on the " punch list" or a FREA would be initiated to modify the design drawing or specification to permit such a deviation.
Thus, it is both possible and proper that an Inspector would note a problem with rebar placement and not write an NCR about the problem.
t Q. 27 More specifically, CCANP has alleged that Mr. Swayze remembers that reinforcing steel was missing around the RCB1 equipment hatch.
Is your previous response applicable to this situation?
A. 27 The scenario I suggested in the previous answer is most appropriate to this situation because as of August 22, 1978, the day Mr. Gwayze was terminated, only 3 of the 12 placements and final inspections for the RCB1 equipment hatch had been performed.
Thus, three-fourths of the place-ments for the RCB1 equipment hatch had not yet had a final inspection.
Therefore, it is entirely possible that Mr. Swayze might have noticed mislocated or omitted reinforcing steel for which no NCR had been written.
Mr. Swayze, however, could not have any personal knowledge as to whether such deviations were later corrected or whether a FREA or NCR had been written.
Q. 25 Are you aware of any evidence which indicates that Construction pressured QC Inspectors to overlook rebar placement problems?
A. 25 No.
I think the evidence demonstrates that rebar location problems are relatively common occurrences that are dealt with in a routine fashion by construction personnel.
The number of closed FREA's for the entire plant involving the addition, deletion or mislocation of rebar was 495 as of February 13, 1981.
The vast majority of these l
FREAs were wri %en by Construction personnel.
In light of the availability and use of the FREA system to resolve these problems, it is unreasonable to assume that Construction 1
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Personnel would attempt to intimidate QC personnel about the reporting of mislocated or omitted rebar.
T. Hudson:10:B l
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TESTIMONY OF DAVID G. LONG ON HL&P's CIVIL QA PROGRAM PRE-SHOW CAUSE Q. 1 Please state your name and present employment.
A. 1 David G. Long.
I am employed by Houston Lighting
& Power Company (HL&P) as a Senior Engineer on the South Texas Project (STP).
Q. 2 Please describe your educational background and work history.
A. 2 I graduated from Texas A&M University with a l
Bachelor of Science Degree in Civil Engineering in 1973.
My initial employment was with Mitchell and Associates as the Physical Testing Manager for the construction materials testing laboratory.
This laboratory tested concrete compo-nents, soils and asphalt for various types of coastruction.
For the nine months immediately preceding my employment with HL&P, I worked for Shilstone Engineering, a testing firm, as the Assistant Resident Engineer at the Parish power plant construction site.
Shilstone Engineering had the civil materials testing contract for this job.
In June 1975, I began working at STP as a member of HL&P's Quality Assurance (QA) Department with responsibilities in the civil' discipline.
I became Lead Civil Engineer for QA in June 1978 and took my present position with Site Engineering in September 1980.
This position involves the review of any design changes reflecting the safety related concrete structures, such as changes in concrete specifications, rebar placement, embed placement and blockout locations.
Q. 3 What is the purpose of your testimony?
A. 3 The purpose of my testimony is to describe the role of HL&P Site QA in assuring that quality concrete was being produced and placed at STP prior to January 1980, and to show that Intervenors' Contentions 1(2), 1(3) and (6),
1(4) and 1(5) raise neither significant questions about the overall adequacy of the STP QA/QC program, nor significant safety issues.
Q. 4 Please describe the HL&P QA surveillance system.
A. 4 Since the commencement of construction at STP, the HL&P surveillance of concrete has included monthly documented surveys (commonly called " formal surveillance")
of concrete material receiving and storage, reinforcing steel, preplacement activities, concrete placements, formwork, curing, concrete testing at the placement, laboratory tests and the in-process, tests required by ASME Section III Div. 2 (Proposed 1973 issue with Addenda 1 thru 6).
The surveillance of each activity however, was not limited to a monthly basis.
If problem areas arose, we increased the number of l
4 surveys as needed so we could be assured the problems were l
resolved.
For example, after problems were noted in the
~~~.,
In addition to this " formal surveillance", the Engineers and Specialists working for me performed what we term " informal surveillance" or monitoring on a daily basis.
This surveil-lance activity differs from formal surveillance in that we did not complete checklists, but rather, inspected areas where we thought problems might arise.
The majority of all our Speed Letters, Discrepancy Memorandums and Concern Memorandums were generated as a result of these informal surveillance activities.
As with formal surveillances, informal surveillance activities were at times increased and focused on specific activities.which we felt deserved closer examination.
In early 1979, for example, we began to observe most major concrete placements.
In January 1980, we formal-ized this activity so that an Engineer or Specialist from HL&P QA was to attend the pre-placement, placement and post-placement activities for each Category I placement.
These Engineers or Specialists monitored each Category I placement for compliance to site construction procedures.
Q. 5 Please describe the items covered by the concrete surveillance checklists.
)
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A. 5 Sample checklists are described below.
Checklist C2.1 covers the testing and certification of all the concrete constituents received by the on-site concrete 5
batch plant. _. _. _
Checklist C2.2 is a check of the batch plant operation.
Pursuant to this check d.st, the water-cement ratio is calcu-lated from a random load to make sure the maximum water-cement ratio has not been exceeded.
Checklist C2.3 pertains to concrete preplacement activi-ties.
Here we check construction joint preparation, quantity, location and cleanliness of the reinforcing steel and avail-ability of adequate lighting for both craft and QC inspection personnel.
Checklist C2.4 addresses tF a surveillance of concrete s
placement activities.
In this checklist we confirm the proper completion of the pour card and other related documen-tation and also that the maximum spacing for concrete vibrator insertion has not been exceeded.
We also check the lateral movement, freefall, lift thickness, truck mixer counter i
reading and elapsed time since batching.
Checklist C2.5 is a check of the utilization of the proper curing procedures.
Checklist C2.6 covers the in-process testing of all the concrete components in accordance with the frequencies set forth in ASME Section III Div. 2 (Proposed 1973 issue with Addenda 1 thru 6).
Checklist C2.7 is a surveillance of the concrete sampl-ing process (slump, air content, temperature, unit weight).
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l Checklist C2.8 assures that the testing concrete spsci-mens done by the on-site laboratory is done in accordance with specification requirements.
Checklist C2.9 covers the quality control for non-nuclear concrete.
Checklist C2.10 is a check of B&R preplacement and placement inspection personnel to ensure they meet the minimum requirements of American Concrete Institute Code 359 Appendix VII.
Checklist C2.11 surveys the methods employed for con-struction joint preparation, concrete finishing and repair.
Checklist C2.12 is a surveillance of specialty grouts to ensure they are being placed in accordance with STP procedures.
Q. 6 Intervenors' Contention 1(2) statps that "There has been field construction error, and as a result, extensive voids exist in the concrete wall enclosing the containment building."
Have voids occurred in the concrete at STP?
A. 6 Yes.
We have found voids in certain areas where high rebar concentration prevented the concrete from flowing uniformly.
The first such occurrence was in the lower side of the Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool slab.
The quantity and forma-tion of rebar, together with the number of embedded plates, made this placement a "one-of-a-kind" in Unit 1.
The voids i
i L.....
were repaired and changes in placement techniques prevented a recurrence when the same slab in Unit 2 was poured.
Q. 7 Describe the voids detected in Unit 1, Lift 15 of
'the Reactor Containment Building (RCB) shell wall.
A. 7 Some small concrete voids in Lift 15 of Unit 1 containment shell were visible next to the steel liner and immediately behind the polar crane bracket embeds.
These voids were detected by B&R personnel cleaning up after the pour.
EL&P was informed by B&R QC personnel.
The cause was attributed to the combination of long slick lines, concrete pump failure, length of time required to complete the pour, and rebar and embed congestion caused by the polar crane bracket embeds at this location.
This portion of Lift 15 is unique to the containment shell wall.
Under maximum loading conditions each of the polar crane brackets must support such heavy loads that massive steel sections are welded to the bracket and embedded in the concrete of the shell wall for support.
Since this is a high stress area, additional rebar is required around these massive embeds, thus making the concrete placement more difficult.
These voids were reported to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.55(e) on October 20, 1978.
The final 50.55(e) report following repair of the voids was filed on June 5, 1979.
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Q. 8 Did the discovery of voids in Lift 15 of' RCB Unit 1 indicate that there might be voids in other lifts?
A. 8 No, the voids were concentrated around the polar crane bracket embeds.
The rebar congestion in this area, together with the mechanical problems occurring during the pour, indicated that those voids were a unique situation.
There was no reason to expect the presence of other voids.
Q. 9 Were any recurrence control measures taken by B&R?
Q. 9 The construction Supervisors and Field Engineers I
along with Quality control personnel were directed to attend a training session which included a discussion of the causes of the voids and the measures required to prevent their recurrence.
Such things as pump failure, excess time consumed in the lift and proper procedures were enumerated.
~
Q. 10 Describe the voids detected in Unit 1, Lift 8 of the RCB Unit 1 shell wall.
A. 10 The voids in Lift 8 were located next to the containment liner and beneath (i) the 8 inch horizontal stiffener that is welded to the liner and (ii) the major penetrations in the shell wall.
Q. 11 How were these voids discovered?
A. 11 During the investigation of the Lift 15 voids, we received information from site personnel that similar
O problems'might exist in other lifts, including Lift 8.
Although our review of the construction records did not 1
reveal any unusual circumstances arising during the placement that could have produced voids, we decided to sound Lift 8.
The voids discovered by sounding and drilling were reported to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.55(e) on June 18, 1979.
A stop-work notice on concrete placements was imposed on June 22 as a result of the Lift 8 voids discovery.
Since this was the second such occurrence of voids in the shell wall, HL&P and B&R developed a. multi-phase program for the detection and repair of concrete voids in the shell walls of both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
Phases I and II consisted of developing the repair procedure and the sounding and 1
repair of Lifts 15 and 8.
During Phases III and IV all of the areas in Unit I containing high stress penetrations (such as the equipment hatch, personnel air lock or main steam and feed water lines), horizontal 8" stiffeners or high rebar congestion were sounded and repaired.
Phase V consisted of investigating and repairing Unit 2 voids (6 lifts poured at that time).
1 The results of Phases III-V confirmed that most of the voids behind the containment liner occurred under the 8" horizontal stiffener or penetrations. -
1 l
Q. 12 Have all the voids been repaired?
A. 12 All the containment voids have been repaired, except for those behind the bulge area in the Unit 2 RCB liner.
These will be repaired after the new liner piece is welded in place.
B&R Design Engineering directed the repair and HL&P QA conducted surveillance of the repair operation.
Q. 13 Has HL&P' investigated the possibility that voids may exist in other areas of the plant?
A. 13 Yes, we have.
We requested that B&R select and scund an area outside the RCB shell wall which (a),used a steel liner as a concrete form and (b) con *-ined the greatest rebar congestion.
B&R sounded the cask loading pool and two small hollow sounding areas were detected on the pool walls.
B&R Design Engineering determined that potential voids of this size were insignificant from a structural support or i
shielding persepctive and no further action was necessary.
Q. 14 What corrective measures were taken before the resumption of complex concrete placements to prevent the reccurrence of voids?
A. 14 Several basic changes were implemented for i
future shell wall placements:
l.
The concrete design mix was monitored more closely to ensure that the concrete delivered to the site met the i
4
)
specifications requirements for slump, aggregate size and moisture.
2.
The need to consider at preplacement meetings all relevant factors such as vibration, point of concrete dis-charge, lighting, crew size and qualifications, equipment backup and rate and duration of pour was emphasized.
l 3.
The requirements for access and visibility were examined.
The requirement for adequate lighting was reviewed and certain changes were made in the size of pours and in rebar placement to relieve congestion.
For example, larger holes were drilled in the 8" horizontal stiffener to permit concrete to flow freely under the channels.
4.
Human factors were also considered.
Concrete vibrator-placement foremen and their crews attended vibrator training field classes which demonstrated and explained placement techniques.
At prepour placement meetings, QC Inspectors and Construction workers were encouraged to explain how identified problems were to be solved during the placement.
Concrete was ordered by 9:00 a.m. or the pour was scrapped to avoid worker fatigue.
5.
The type of vibrators used and the method of vibra-tion were examined.
Pencil vibrators were used at inside and outside face work sections as well as at penetrations.
6.
Back-up equipment was located at complex pours.
i The workers were reinstructed to follow the equipment mainte-nance program to increase equipment reliability.
7.
The next pour in the Unit 2 shell wall was decreased in height so that the 8" horizontal stiffener would be very close to the top of the placement.
8.
Post-placement meetings were held to review documen-tation and to exchange information learned during the place-ment.
Q. 15 Were there any changes in HL&P QA coverage of concrete surveillance activities as a result of the problems described above?
A. 15 Yes, beginning in early 1979, we began conducting informal surveillance on almost all major concrete placements.
Q. 16 Did the procedure changes described in A. 14 reduce the potential for occurrence of voids?
A. 16 Yes, I believe that the changes made to the B&R construction procedures were definitely a step in a positive direction.
These procedures were utilized in the pouring of Lift 7, Unit 2.
We requested that B&R Construction Engineers sound the concrete in this pour in order to test for potential voids.
No voids were detected.
Q. 17 Why was a Stop Work Order imposed by HL&P after Lift 7 was poured?
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A. 17 The Stop Work Order initiated in December 1979 was not related to any difficulties encountered with the placement of Unit 2, Lift 7.
It was self-imposed by HL&P as a result of the findings made by the NRC. Inspectors perform-ing inspection 79-19.
Since the NRC had identified several noncompliances with concrete procedures, HL&P decided to halt safety-related complex pours and take a hard look at the concrete program at STP.
Q. 18 Have the more recent concrete construction procedures included the provisions that were in effect for Unit 2, Lift 7 of the RCB?
A. 18 Yes, the changes made prior to pouring Lift 7 of Unit 2 have been incorporated in the new concrete procedures.
Q. 19 Does the discovery of voids at STP evidence a
- breakdown" in the QA/QC program for concrete?
A. 19 No, it d*'s not.
The voids behind the polar crane bracket e'mbeds in Lift 15 of the Unit I were caused by the unique rebar congestion in these areas and, in the case of Lift 15, the mechanical difficulties o'ccurring before and during the placement.
These problems can be dealt with, by improving placement techniques and procedures to enhance constructability.
Concrete placement practices also have been altered to prevent the difficulties which plagued Lift 15.
'I l
The voids beneath the 8" horizontal stiffeners in the RCB shell resulted from the configuration of the steel design, which made it difficult to get the concrete to flow under the stiffeners.
There are approximately 9,900 feet of 8" horizontal stiffener welded to the liners in Unit 1 and the first 6 lifts of Unit 2.
Voids were present beneath approximately 175 feet of this stiffener.
Obviously the Construction crews were successful in vibrating the concrete beneath the great majority of the stiffener.
As the correc-tive measures and the Unit 2, Lift 7 experience indicate, the factors causing voids have been successfully addressed through changes in concrete placement procedures and practices, and not by any significant changes in the QA/QC program.
Thus, I believe the voids discovered at STP do not evidence a breakdown in the QA/QC program.
Q. 20 Intervenors' Contentions 1(3) and 1(6) state that "a field document relating to cadweld inspections has been lost" and that there are "cadwelds which have been integrated into parts of the plant structure which are not capable of being verified."
When did HL&I~s involvement with Cadwelding* activities begin?
"Cadweld" is a Registered Trademark of Erico Products, Inc.
-ee-
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i capable of being verified."
When did EL&P's involvement with Cadwelding* activities begin?
A. 20 HL&P's QA department has been involved in a sur-veillance capacity from the very beginning.
We would observe the total Cadwelding process and document our observations on checklists once a month.
In addition, we conducted random, informal surveillance of Cadwelding whenever we were in the field.
Although we had been involved in minor Cadwelding l
procedural problems through consultation with B&R, our first involvement of a more significant nature began when one of l
my Engineers was conducting a monthly formal surveillance.
As a part of that surveillance, he examined the supporting documentation for Cadwelds on September 7, 1978.
His random sampling of a few Cadweld folders' uncovered a number of i
documentation problems.
Thus, we requested that a thorough review of Cadweld records be undertaken by B&R.
Q. 21 What was B&R's response to that request?
1 A. 21 B&R researched the specific problems we had i
identified and responded with proposed solutions.
During the review of the proposed solutions, we discovered additional documentation problems.
As a result of our re-examination of the records, we met with B&R to discuss these new problems "Cadweld" is a Registered Trademark of Erico Products, l
Inc.
and B&R agreed to undertake a review of all Cadweld records.
A Cadweld Documentation Task Force (CDTF) was formed and a thorough records review was conducted.
Q. 22 What were the results of this review?
A. 22 The most significant finding is that out of 36,000 Cadwelds reviewed there are approximately 190 Cadwelds, about 0.5% of the Cadwelds reviewed, for which we are lacking inspection records.
As explained in the testimony of Mr. Murphy and Mr. Singleton, however, approximately 150 of these Cadwelds can be located in specific pours and the pour cards attest to the fact that all cadwelds in those pours had been inspected by the time the preplacement inspec-tion was completed.
Q. 23 Do these Cadweld documentation problems evidence i
a breakdown in the QC program?
A. 23 No.
Records for~ a very small portion of the Cadwelds have apparently been lost or never existed, but there is extensive confirmation that the actual shooting and inspecting of Cadwelds has been done properly and routinely.
The record retention deficiencies have been documented by the CDTF, analyzed by Design Engineering and found not to affect the structural integrity of the plant.
Q. 24 is HL&P aware of any other significant issues regarding Cadwelds?
I
A. 24 Yes.
In September 1978, the NRC I&E Staff investigated Cadwelding practices at STP.
They noted proce-dural violations and found that in one instance a cadwelder had concealed a void in a cadweld with a piece of tie wire.
While B&R QC had not yet inspected this Cadweld, we decided to investigate this matter further to determine if the void discovered by the NRC was a common occurrence.
Q. 25 What did HL&P do?
A. 25 I organized a team of four HL&P QA Inspectors and wa inspected every accessible cadweld in the plant.
We examined 733 cadwelds for voids and witness marks and found only one Cadweld with a void.
Even this Cadweld was accept-able because the void was within allowable limits.
- Thus, the NRC finding was an isolated occurrence in my opinion.
Q. 26 Did HL&P QA take any other action with respect to the Cadwelding process at that time?
A. 26 Yes.
Construction forces were working seven days a week, two shifts per day at this time and a lot of Cadwelding was being done.
We decided that increasing our surveillance of Cadweld operations would give added assur.ince of Cadwelders' compliance with procedures.
Thus, from September 14, 1978, through October 31, 1978, we had an HL&P Inspector present on each night and weekend shift seven days a week.
In November and December we scaled down the surveil-lance to two or three days per week.
The days we were 4
present included sii Saturdays and one Sunday in the November-December period.
Q. 27 What were the results of your surveillance?
A. 27 We found that the Cadwelders were doing a good job of following procedures.
We noted a couple of problems which were immediately corrected by B&R.
Q. 28 Were any other actions taken in response to the NRC inspection in September 1978?
A. 28 Yes.
Independent of our program, B&R's QA/QC l
department proposed a program which we reviewed and approved.
B&R reinspected some 535 Cadwelds that had been shot on the night shift.
In addition, two Cadwelds shot on the night l
I shift by each Cadwelder were cut out and destructively I
tested.
The Cadwelds tested included the Cadweld with the void discovered by the NRC.
All Cadwelds passed the destruc-tive test.
B&R also conducted retraining programs for Cadwelders and inspectors in proper Cadwelding procedures.
The Cadweld procedures were revised after discussions with the manufacturer to delete requirements not essential to the production of an acceptable Cadweld.
B&R QC also increased its surveillance of Cadwelding operations.
Q. 29 Are you aware of any situations which could have resulted in Cadwelds not being inspected prior to coverage with concrete? -
_. t 4
A. 29 No, I believe all Cadwelds have been inspected.
j Even if some have not been, B&R's experience to date with over 49,000 Cadwelds demonstrate that the chances of such a cadweld being acceptable are in excess of 99%.
Q. 30 Intervenors' Contention 1(4) states that "There are membrane seals in the containment structure which are damaged."
Describe the HL&P program for monitoring the installation of waterproofing membrane.
A. 30 The HL&P QA conducted surveillance on the instal-lation and inspection of waterproofing membrane.
Since the horizontal waterproofed surfaces are subject to foot traffic, I personally monitored the membrane just prior to the pouring of the protective slab for the Unit 2 Mechanical Electrical Auxiliary Building (MEAB) and others.
Although vertical surfaces were less susceptible to' damage, we monitored them for any damage that might be inflicted by backfill-related equipment and other machinery that worked near waterproofed walls.
On these vertical surfaces, however, the membrane is protected by a styrofoam board placed over it, so there is little likelihood of damage once the cover is in place.
Q. 31 Were any instances of non-inspection noticed by F,AP QA?
A. 31 No, we were not aware of any instances where the waterproofing membrane was covered with backfill before it could be inspected.
3.'O' Q. 32 Are you aware of the allegations that some waterproofed surfaces were covered without being inspected?
A. 32 Yes.
We became aware of this allegation when investigated by the NRC.
Since we had no information concern-ing this allegation, we waited for the NRC to issue its findings.
Since I&E Report 79-14 indicated that there was no substance to the allegation, no further action was warranted.
In preparation for this hearing we have reviewed NCR's and QC inspection records relating to waterproofing membranes.
NCR SC-878 indicates that backfill was placed over a membrane prior to inspection.
The disposition of this NCR required that the membranes be inspected.
Thus, Construction w'as required to remove the backfill.
All of the NCR's reviewed, which documented any damage to. a waterproofing membrane, were dispositioned " rework" or " repair".
In addition, the QC inspection records reveal numerous instances of damage to membrane being repaired during the inspection at the request of a QC Inspector.
The repair of waterproofing membran* is one of the easiest procedures on the Project and the inspec-tion records indicate that it is readily performed by Con-struction whenever damage is noted.
Thus there is no reason to believe that membranes would not be inspected or that damage would be overlooked.
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