ML20009B200
| ML20009B200 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Allens Creek File:Houston Lighting and Power Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/13/1981 |
| From: | Black R NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8107150049 | |
| Download: ML20009B200 (15) | |
Text
i 07/13/81 Nb I,h 'h UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LN
[g q\\r g BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD jN 7
In the Matter of U
tu HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER COMPANY Docket No. 50-466
( Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1)
NRC STAFF RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO INTERVENOR DOHERTY'S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO FILE CONTENTION 57 On June ??s 1981, Intervenor Doherty filed a motion seeking leave to file an additional Contention 57 on the vulnerability of control systems in nuclear power plants to electromagnetic pulses (EMP) generated b'y nuclear detonations. Mr. Doherty contends that a nuclear power plant should be shielded or 1.1 some other way be designed to protect against the EMP phenomena prior to construction. Motion, p. 1.
This contention is untimely, and pursuant to the Commission's Rules of Practice set forth in 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(a), his petition to intervene must be amended. A petition may be amended after the special prehearing conterance has been held only with the approval of the presiding officer, based on a balancing of the five factors specified in 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(a)(1).
See 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(a)(3). Those five factors are:
1.
Good cause, if any, for failure to file on time.
2.
The availability of other means whereby the petitioner's inter-est will be protected.
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3.
The extent to which the petitioner's participation may reason-ably be expected to assist in developing a sound record.
4.
The extent to which the petitioner's interest will be repre-sented by existing parties.
5.
The exter.t to which the petitioner's participation will broaden the issues or delay the proceeding.
The Intervenor has recognized these procedural burdens and has at-tempted to address these factors in his Motion. While we will briefly address the relevancy and merits of these arguments below, we believe that such arguments of good cause are immaterial because the contention, as Worded, is an impermissible challenge to the NRC regulations.
In accordance with 10 C.F.R. 5 2.758, NRC regulations are not subject to dttack by way of discover, proof, argument, or other means in any HRC adjudicatory proceeding unless "special circumstances" are shown.
It is a Cor.nission regulation that:
An applicant for a license to construct and operate a production or utilization facility, or for an amendment to such license, is not required to pro-vide for design features or other measures for the specific purpose of protection against the effects of (a) attacks and destructive acts, including sabotage, directed against the facility by an enenly of the United States, whether a foreign government or other person, or (b) use or deployment of weapons incident to U.S. defense activities." 10 C.F.R. 9 50.13.
Thus, the Connission's regulations do not require detailed analyses of 1
l the possible effects on nuclear power plants of EMP from nuclear deton-ations (the only potential source of sigaificant EMP). Accordingly, since MrbiJoh'erty has not alleged any "special circumstances" that would l
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justify a waiver of Commission policy, this contention must be rejected because ft alleges that design features must be provided that are explic-itly not required by 10 C.F.R. 9 50.13.
Although the Staff believes that the contention must be rejected on 10 C.F.R. 9 2.758 grounds, it is also our conclusion that the contention must be rejected because Mr. Doherty has failed in his burden of showing good cause for the untimely filing as required by 10 C.F.R 9 2.714(a).
The salient points of our argument on this score will be discussed brief-ly below.
1.
Good cause.
Mr. Doherty asserts that the EMP problem became known to him by reading an article in the May 16, 1981 issue of Science News (Vol. 219).
It appears that the article concerns the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) efforts to shield between 150 and 200 of the 600 radio stations that make up the voluntary emergency broadcast network to protect them against voltage pulses induced in the manner described above.I/ Mr. Doherty finally contends that this matter has been treated "somewhat secretly" because of its implications to military preparedness and 1. hat he could find no NRC research or evaluations on plant safety with regard to EMP. Moton, p. 2.
There can be no doubt that good cause to amend a petition to add &
contention exists when the basis for the contention is established after the filing date for the petition.
However, that is not the case here.
lj See attachment to " Applicant's Response to Intervenor Doherty's Request for Leave to File Contention 57," dated July 7,1981.
4 The effects of EMP from nuclear detonations (the only potential source of significant EMP) on nuclear power plants has been previously considered by the NRC Staff. This matter was raised as a possible outstanding safety issue in 1976 and was assessed by the Staff in NUREG-0153, " Staff Discussion of Twelve Additional Technical Issues Raised By Responses to November 3,1976 Memorandum From Director, NRR to NRR Staff" (December 1976). The Staff's discussion of this issue in NUREG-0153 is attached.
As is readily apparent, since this issue was publicly assessed in 1976, no good cause exists to resurrect it at this late date.
It has not been a well-kept military secret for many years nor has it been hidden by the NRC. Accordingly, the Science News article fails to establish the requisite " good cause" necessary to allow this untimely contention to be accepted into this proceeding.2_/
2.
Other means to protect interests.
Intervenor Doherty asserts that he knows of no rulemaking or any other NRC effort being developed on this issue. This is true.
In fact, NUREG-0153 concluded that " consideration of this issue does not warrant revisions of any existing licenses or changes in staff priorities."
NUREG-0153, p. 27-6.
Accordingly, although there may be no other means to protect Mr. Doherty's interest in this issue as it pertains to nuclear 2_/
In addition, NUREG-0153 notes that Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has prepared two reports on this subject:
" Transient Response of Nuclear Power Plants Cables to High-Altitude Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)," 0RNL-5156, May 1976, and "The Effects of Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) on Nuclear Power Plants,"
(draft) ORNL-8029. The authors of these reports conclude that a nuclear power plant would probably survive exposure to an EMP with-out any risk of a reactor accident because of the shielding provided by the containment building.
NUREG-0153, p. 27-4.
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power plants, this factor cannot weigh very heavily to his favor because the NRC nas concluded (NUREG-0153) that further review of this problem is not required and not warranted.
3.
Development of a sound record.
Mr. Doherty asserts that the significance of the EMP issue will improve the record. However, the assessment of this factor must consider the " extent to which the petitioner's participation may reasonably be expected to assist in the development of a sound record."
10 C.F.R. 9 2.714(a)(1)(iii). The Staff seriously questions whether Mr. Doherty's' participation on this highly technical problem would assist in developing a sound record. Thus, we submit that this factor must be weighed against i
the admission of this contention.
4.
Extent to which interest represented by existing parties.
The Staff believes it would be fair to conclude that existing parties would not adequately represent Mr. Doherty's interests and, ac-cordingly, the overall consideration of this factor weighs to his bene-fit.
5.
Participation will broaden the issues or delay the proceeding.
Mr. Doherty asserts that consideration of this significant issue is worth any attendant b.oudaning of the issues or delay in the proceeding.
However, we believe that not only is consideration of this issue pro-hibited by Commission regulation, but if it were admitted at this late juncture, it would seriously delay the proceeding and obviously broaden the issues to be considered. Accordingly, this factor must be weighed
. heavily against the admission of this untimely contention.
In conclusion, the Staff submits that this contention must be re-jected because it is explicitly prohibited by Comission regulation.
In dddition, good cause for its untimely admission has not been shown nor do the 10 C.F.R. Q 2.714(a) factors weigh in favor of its admission. Ac-cordingly, Intervenor Doherty's request for leave to file Contention 57 must be denied.
Respectfully submitted A
Richard L. Black Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 13th day of July,1981.
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l STAFF DISCUSSION OF TWELVE l
ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL ISSUES RAISED BY RESPONSES TO NOVEMBER 3,1976 MEMORANDUM FROM DIRECTOR, NRR TO NRR STAFF i
Date Published: December 1976 l
l Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Washington, D. C. 20555 I
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ISSUE 27 EFFECTS ON UTILITY TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS OF THE EXPLOSION OF A LARGE NUCLEAR WEAPON This issue was identified by Demetrios Basdekas in a memorandum dated November 19, 1976, to Ben C. Rusche in response to Mr. Rusche's memo-randum dated November 3,1976, requesting that staff members identify any significant safety issues they believe are presently being treated inadequately by the staff. The matter was discussed on December 6,1976, with Mr. Basdekas to determine whether or not further definition was necessary or desirable. As a result of this discussion, it was determined that some changes to the statement would be appropriate.
This issue, as originally defined in Attachment 4 to Mr. Basdekas' November 19, 1976 memorandum to Mr. Rusche, has been redefined to read as follows:
We "are working" on this problem but we are not doing anything in terms of regulatory requirements for applicants to start addressing this aspect of nuclear weapons effects. Considering that EMP may represent the largest common. mode failure event imaginable, NRC should assume a leading and aggressive role in addressing this issue.
Particular attention should be given to EMP effects on solid State Safety equipment and ESF electrical power and control systems.
Summary of Issue The electromagnetic pulse (EMP) produced by a high altitude nuclear detonation would induce adverse current and voltage transients in 1
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27-2 electrical conductors. Such fields that may be created would couple some EMP, energy to circuits in a nuclear power plant, and might cause common mode failures significant to safety.
i Summary Response NRC Regulations do not require consideration in the licensing and safety review of nuclear power plants of effects due to hostile actions of foreign powers.
It is presumed that these actions will be dealt with by the Defense Department with regard to protection of domestic facilities. Therefore,the staff does not make detailed analyses of-the possible effects on nuclear power plants of EMP from postulated nuclear explosions.
Some general studies have been conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory regarding the effects of EMP on a PWR.
They found that the most likely consequence of EMP for a PWR plant is an unschedlued shutdown, but some portions of the electrical and protection systems might be vulnerable to the effects of EMP.
Detailed Discussion Nuclear power plants are designed to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and to protect the health and safety of the public.
The staff, as part of its evaluation of postulated accidents, assumes that a sir.gle active failure occurs in systems required to mitigate
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27-3 the consequences of such events. The probability of multiple random failures involving two components or more coincident with an accident, is considered to be tro small to have any significance. Hgwever, in s
the case of an EMP, a great deal of equipment, in principle, could be affected and subject to a possible common mode failure.
10 CFR Part 50.13 states that:
"An applicant for a license to construct and operate a production or utilization facility, or for an amendment to such license, is not required to provide for design features or other measures for the specific purpose of protection against the effects of (a) attacks and destructive acts, including sabotage, directed against the facility by an enemy of the United States, whether a foreign government or other person, or (b) use or deployment of weapons incident to U. S. defense activities."
Accordingly it has been, and remains, the staff's policy not to require detailed analys6s of the possible effects on nuclear power plants of EMP from nuclear detonations (the only potential source of significant EMP).
Electromagnetic pulses from nuclear detonations are produced in the earth's atmosphere as a result of high energy gamma rays interacting with atmospheric gases providing a field of high energy Compton recoil electrons.
In the presence of the earth's magnetic field, these Compton electrons are influenced in such a way that a Compton current develops which becomes the primary source of the EMP field.
For high altitude l
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27-4 detonations, the EMP can affect very large areas of the country; e.g.,
one megaton detonations over central U.S.A. at altitudes of 100 and 400 km could affect the entire area of the U.S.A.
Low altitude detonations are much less effective for EMP; e.g., the blast may be the only effect over a few kilometers range.
ORNL has prepared two reports on this su,bject':
" Transient Response of Nuclear Power Plant Cables to High-Altitude Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)," 0RNL-5156, P. R. Barnes and J. H. Marable, May 1976, and "The Effects of Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) on Nuclear Power Plants," (draft) ORNL-8029, P. R. Barnes and R. W. Manweiler.
The authors of these reports, conclude that a nuclear power plant would probably survive exposure to an EMP without any risk of a reactor accident.
In all nuclear power plants, the reactor and some of the protection system circuitry are located within the containment building, which is either built of steel plate or is a concrete structure lined with steel plate.
In both cases, the shielding from EMP provided by the steel plate is excellent and there should be na adverse effects within the containment structure.
However, a substantial part of the protection system circuitry is outside the containment, in the control room, the cable spreading room, and in portions of the auxiliary building,where essential auxiliary systems are located.
The control room and auxiliary buildings are normally constructed of reinforced concrete, of heavy construction since they are
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built to withstand tornado missiles, differential pressures and seismic events. The multiple courses of reinforcing bars in the walls and ceilings of these structures should provide substantial attenuation of EMP.
It appears that up to 30 to 40 db of attenuation are available from this sort of heavily reinforced concrete construction.
Further shielding is provided by steel cabinets, cable raceways, and electrical conduits for wire and cable runs inside these structures.
The ORNL reports find that the most serious effects would be on digital logic circuits. They find that analog-type control circuits are more resistant to pulse damage. There is also a strong effect from large pulses on solid state circuitry, because the solid state elements (diodes, transistors, etc.) are typically unable to accept large temporaiy overloads as are vacuum tube elements.
Digital computers with solid state components are probably the most vulnerable kind of equipment to EMP exposures.
The ORNL reports note that a high altitude nuclear burst, with resulting EMP, could cause the transmission gr.id to fail over a large area. Nuclear plants are not dependent upon off-site power for safe shutdown, so this in itself should not be of any particular concern.
If the emergency power diesel generator control and starting circuitry is exposed, it could be vulnerable to the effects of EMP.
Also, the solid state control elements in the station battery circuits might be vulnerable to EMP if they are located in the open or are directly connected to lines leading out into the switchyard which would pick up substantial voltage pulses from EMP.
27-6 In conclusion, design provisions for protection against the effects of EMP ar,e not required by our regulations, and such effects are not reviewed as part of our safety evaluation of nuclear power plants.
The staff concludes that consideration of this issue does not warrant i
revisions of any existing licenses or changes in staff priorities.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THC ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER COMPANY Docket No. 50-466 (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating
)
Station, Unit 1)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO INTERVENOR DOHERTY'S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO FILE CONTENTION 57" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deoosit in the United States mail, first class, or, as indicated by an asterisk, through deoosit in the Nuclear Regulatory Connission'. internal mail system, this 13th day of July,1981:
Sheldon J. Wol fe, Esq., Chainnan*
Susan Plettman, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing David Preister, Esq.
Board Panel Texas Attorney General's Office U.S. Ncclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Washington, DC 20555 Austin, TX 78711 Dr. E. Leonard Cheatum Hon. Jerry Sliva, Mayor Route 3, Box 350A City of Wallis, TX 77485 Watkinsville, Georgia 30677 Hon. John R. liikeska Mr. Gustave A. Linenberger*
Austin County Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing P.O. Box 310 Board Panel Bell ville, TX 77418 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Mr. John F. Doherty 4327 Alconbury Street The Honorable Ron Waters Houston, TX 77021 State Representative, District 79 3620 Washington Avenue, No. ?62 Mr. William J. Schuessler Houston, TX 77007 5810 Darnell Houston, TX 77074 J. Gregory Copeland, Esq.
Baker & Botts One Shell Plaza Houston, TX 77002 1
Jack Newnan, Esq.
D. Marrack Lowenstein, Reis, Newman &
420 Mulberry Lane Axel rad Bellaire TX 77401 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037 Texas Public Interest Research Group, Inc.
Brenda A. McCorkle c/o James Scott, Jr., Esq.
6140 Darnell 13935 Ivymount Houston, TX 77074 Sugarland, TX 77478 Mr. Wayne Rentfro Rosemary N. Lemmer P.O. Box 1335 11423 Dak Spring Rosenberg, TX 77471 Houston, TX 77043 Leotis Johnston 1407 Scenic Ridge Houston, TX 77043 Margaret Bishop U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission J. Morgan Bishop Region IV, I&E 11418 Oak Spring 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Houston, TX 77043 Arlington, TX 76011 Stephen A. Doggett, Esq.
Bryan L. Baker Pollan, Nicholson & Doggett 1923 Hawthorne P.O. Box 592 Houston, TX 77098 Rosenberg, TX 77471 Robin Griffith Carolina Conn 1034 Sally Ann 1414 Scenic Ridge Rosenberg, TX 77471 Houston, TX 77043 Mr. William Perrened Atomic Safety and Licensing 4070 Merrick -
Board Panel
- Houston, TX 77025 i
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Docketing and Service Section*
l Office of the Secretary l
Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Appeal Board Panel
- Washington, DC 20555 l
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Carro Hinderstein l
Houston Bar Center 723 Main Suite 500 Houston, TX 77002 Richard L. 81 Counsel for N; Staff i
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